MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND

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The declaration of martial law in Poland on Dec. 12, 1981, was the most dramatic development since the beginning of the Polish crisis in mid-1980. The authorities' massive show of force succeeded in quelling most open resistance within several weeks. Over 6,000 Solidarity officials, activists and anti-government intellectuals were interned, as were a number of former high-ranking government officials.

The regime's future political course is uncertain, as is its ability to revive its failing economy and carry its $26 billion foreign debt. Opinions differ as to the most appropriate Western economic policy toward Poland: to help the Polish people or to penalize the Polish government. U.S. and West European decisions regarding the Polish debt, default, and economic assistance will be strongly influenced by Warsaw's political and economic performance and by the general context of East-West relations.

[For detailed discussion of the Polish economy, the Polish debt, and events leading up to martial law, see CRS Issue Brief 80089: The Polish Renewal.]

BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS

THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW

At midnight on Saturday, Dec. 12, the Polish Council of State issued a proclamation declaring a state of emergency and introducing martial law. At the same time, a "Military Council of National Salvation" was formed. Its members are high-ranking Polish army officers under the chairmanship of Party Chief, Premier, and Defense Minister General Wojciech Jaruzelski. According to the proclamation, "For the Polish people, a historic moment and the last chance to introduce order in their own home and by their own forces has arrived." Armed police occupied Solidarity's Warsaw headquarters just after 3 a.m. on Dec. 13, confiscated union property, and cut communication lines. Jaruzelski delivered a speech on radio at 6 a.m., asking Polish workers to "give up, for the Fatherland, your inalienable right to strike, for such a period as may be necessary."

Under the martial law edict, the right to strike and to hold protest actions was suspended; trade unions were barred from holding or conducting any activities, although they were not declared illegal. Solidarity was "suspended" by the martial law authorities. Almost all gatherings were banned and a curfew from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. was imposed. Schools were closed early for the winter break and the independent students' union was "dissolved." Domestic and international travel was severely restricted and Polish air space closed to international traffic. All normal channels of communication within Poland, as well as between Poland and other countries, were cut off. Some analysts have suggested that the imposition of martial law was, in effect, a military coup d'etat by General Jaruzelski and his military officer colleagues on the "Military Council of National Salvation."
Others believe that the Party is still firmly in control but is hiding behind the military because the Party is discredited in Poland while the army enjoys relatively high prestige. Another view is that top party leaders felt that the Party itself had become so influenced by Solidarity and the forces of "renewal" that a declaration of martial law was necessary, not only to reimpose order and obedience in society at large, but to reimpose Leninist-style discipline within the Party.

Immediately prior to the imposition of martial law, General Jaruzelski simultaneously held the positions of Communist Party Leader, Prime Minister and Defense Minister. As head of the martial law regime, he can be perceived as representing the army, the Party, the government or any combination of them.

The relatively democratic party statutes and regulations which had been instituted during the period of renewal were suspended under martial law. Resignations reduced Party membership from 3.2 million to less than 2.5 million. In addition, party hard-liners instituted a sweeping purge of the Party, government, news media, schools, and other key institutions, in the name of "ideological verification," expelling those who supported Solidarity's activities.

AFTERMATH

In the months since martial law was imposed, the regime has moved toward relaxing some of its most stringent features, such as curfews, bans on personal travel and restrictions on long-distance communication, in an attempt to restore some semblence of "normalcy." However, recurrent episodes of populace resistance to the regime have caused authorities frequently to reimpose harsh controls. There also continue to be widespread reports of passive resistance and clandestine opposition to the martial law regime: work slow-downs, distribution by Solidarity activists of pamphlets and leaflets urging various forms of resistance to martial law, clandestine radio broadcasts, symbolic gestures of opposition to the martial law regime, street rallies and demonstrations, and greatly increased emigration. Officials have acknowledged 22 deaths and many hundreds of injuries in clashes between Polish workers and the police and armed forces since Dec. 13, 1981. Of the 6,000 Solidarity members and leaders interned in December 1981, approximately 2,000 are still being held, many having been released and subsequently reinterned. In addition, according to official reports, tens of thousands of Poles have been summoned to appear before special courts for violations of martial law.

Lech Walesa, the former Solidarity leader, was held for months near Warsaw while authorities tried to persuade him to use his influence to get Solidarity members to go back to work "for the good of the nation." Walesa refused to negotiate with martial law authorities without the participation of the entire Solidarity national leadership group. Most of Solidarity's national leaders have been detained by authorities. Some are in hiding. The four top Solidarity leaders who escaped the authorities' dragnet in December formed an underground Solidarity Provisional Coordinating Commission in April 1982. A few who were out of the country on Dec. 12 have formed what could be called a Solidarity leadership council-in-exile in Western Europe.

Attacks against Solidarity in the Polish and Soviet media have become
increasingly harsh. However, a distinction is made between the leaders and "good" patriotic members of Solidarity who were misled by anti-socialist elements who allegedly were plotting to overthrow the Communist regime. Since the imposition of martial law, General Jaruzelski repeatedly has assured the Polish people that genuine reforms would continue and that there would be no return to the pre-August 1980 conditions. On the other hand, many aspects of the crackdown under martial law and Solidarity's responses have made a genuine compromise between the authorities and Solidarity grow less likely.

THE CHURCH

Polish Roman Catholic Primate Archbishop Josef Glemp repeatedly warned that open opposition to authority under martial law could result in bloodshed. He said that the Catholic Church would continue to demand the release of Poles arrested "without justification." Glemp urged moderation, but as the extent of the crackdown on Solidarity became more evident, especially with reports of widespread government violence against the populace and arrest, detention, and harassment of priests, the tone of statements by church leaders became increasingly hostile. Archbishop Glemp has denounced what he called "military terrorization" of the people and called for an end to martial law and a speedy restoration of Solidarity activity. In Rome to consult with Pope John Paul II, Glemp said "Poles are overcome by anger.... A place will be found for Solidarity, as there is a place for the church."

With the "suspension" of Solidarity by martial law authorities, many Poles may look to the Church as the most legitimate functioning representative of their interests vis-à-vis the regime. There are reports of talks between martial law authorities and church leaders over normalization of conditions in Poland. There does not appear to have been any agreement. In August, the Pope's scheduled visit to Poland to commemorate the 1300th anniversary of the "Black Madonna," Poland's holiest religious Shrine, was postponed to a later, undetermined date.

EFFECT ON THE ECONOMY

Polish authorities claim that industrial production began to rise soon after the imposition of martial law, in contrast to the decline in productivity during the months of Solidarity activity. Many outside observers claim that production declined sharply after mid-December due to slowdowns and other forms of passive resistance.

While strikes are banned and severely dealt with under martial law in Poland, workers' passive resistance, plus numerous shortages and bottlenecks due in part to U.S. economic sanctions, in part to the virtual bankruptcy of the Polish economy, and exacerbated by the disruption of communications during martial law are apparently keeping industrial output at levels approximating those prevailing before martial law was imposed.

The agricultural problem continues to be mainly one of distribution rather than supply. The 1981 and 1982 harvests were reported to be good, in
contrast to the three dismal harvests of 1978-1980. But farmers are reported to be selling only a fraction of their produce to the state at official prices because the zloty has lost much of its purchasing power and there are relatively few manufactured goods available for farmers to buy. How effectively direct sales from peasants to city dwellers, barter, or "black" markets are working is conjectural. Use of forced deliveries under martial law has been threatened but not yet instituted. Although the availability of foodstuffs, including many basic commodities, on the open market is much reduced, famine is not believed to be an immediate danger.

Since the imposition of martial law, convoys of trucks with emergency supplies and food have been arriving in Poland from both Eastern and Western Europe. The United States and most West European states have cut off official aid to Poland, but private aid efforts, some of it government-financed, are still being permitted by the Reagan Administration.

The Soviet Union has sent several large shipments of food, including beef and pork, to Poland. On Jan. 6, 1982, Moscow announced a grant to Poland of $3.4 billion in trade credits on easy terms. The Soviet-Polish trade protocol included a Soviet promise to supply food, raw materials, and energy to Poland. During 1981, the Soviet Union delivered 16 million tons of oil to Poland, as compared to 14 million in 1980. Soviet oil deliveries to other East European countries were cut by 10%. Some Western analysts believe that recent large Soviet sales of gold indicate that Moscow is raising hard currency to help Poland avoid default on its debts to Western governments and banks. These moves indicate that the Soviet Union is prepared to pay a considerable price for the stabilization of the Polish economy. [For detailed discussion of the Polish economy, see CRS Issue Brief 80089: The Polish Renewal.]

POSSIBLE CAUSE AND TIMING

There is considerable question as to the cause and timing of the imposition of martial law. Domestic factors may have been primarily responsible for provoking the government action. Party leadership may have felt threatened by the erosion of its own political power. At a Solidarity meeting in Radom on Dec. 3, 1981, seven militant demands were presented. These were then adopted as the basis for the union's program at the Gdansk meeting of Solidarity's 107-member policymaking national commission on Dec. 11 and 12. The seven points included a general strike warning if the government were to enact a labor law empowering authorities to curb union activities and to impose a 3-month ban on strikes. The other demands were: an end to the Communist monopoly in broadcasting; union control over the economy and distribution system; introduction of economic reform based on enterprise self-government; creation of a special social council -- with control of the government's socioeconomic policies -- to oversee the economy; presentation to the Parliament of the statute on trade unions in the version agreed upon with Solidarity representatives; and finally, free and democratic elections to people's councils.

On Saturday, Dec. 12, the Solidarity plenum directly challenged Communist rule by proposing a national referendum on setting up a non-Communist government and defining Poland's military relationship with the Soviet Union. The referendum was to ask the following questions: Are you in favor of a no-confidence vote against the Jaruzelski government? Are you for establishing a provisional government and free elections? Are you in favor of
providing guarantees of Soviet military interests in Poland? Can the Party be the instrument of such guarantees in the name of the whole society?

Riot police raided Solidarity's Warsaw headquarters early on Dec. 13, a few hours after the Gdansk meeting issued its challenges to Poland's Communist authorities.

According to Jaruzelski's speech of Dec. 13, Solidarity statements had "completely unmasked the true intentions of its leading bodies." A taped meeting of Solidarity leaders, with stress on confrontational statements by Walesa, was given wide play in the Polish media as proof that the trade union was seeking to unseat the Polish government. The latest Solidarity threats of further strike action may have been seen by the Polish leadership as the final straw, although many observers reject this assessment, arguing that the imposition of martial law was planned well in advance.

The proclamation of martial law may have been in response to increased Soviet pressure on the Polish leadership. A Dec. 10 TASS report charged that Solidarity had set up "commando units," that weapons and explosives had been stolen from state warehouses, and that Solidarity planned to take over Polish television and radio on Dec. 17. The most serious accusation from Moscow was that there had been demands from some Solidarity members for Poland to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and to "use the lines of communication passing through Polish territory to pressure Poland's allies." The reference to the Poles' "last chance to introduce order in their own home" in the State Council's proclamation supports this view.

The martial law decree may also have been a response to a fear of a general breakdown of law and order. Public dissatisfaction over deteriorating economic conditions may have been heightened by the onset of colder weather. With the approach of Christmas, the scarcity of food and consumer goods may have been seen by the government as creating an explosive atmosphere.

The imposition of martial law on Dec. 12 may have been the implementation of a long and carefully planned government counterattack against Solidarity for which the provocative Solidarity statements at Radom were merely a convenient pretext. Proponents of this view point to the government's dispatch of small army units throughout the countryside earlier in the autumn as a preparation for martial law. The food shortage, rising to near crisis proportions, had been blamed on Solidarity by the government, undermining popular support for Solidarity. But some argue that the food shortage may have been artificially intensified by the government for political purposes, and then abruptly relieved simultaneously with the imposition of martial law.

POSSIBLE OUTCOMES

The Polish leadership, with its declaration of martial law, took the most drastic step to reestablish its control since the outbreak of the crisis in mid-1980. The final outcome of this social, economic, and political struggle is still unclear, but it appears that the martial law regime has been far more successful than most Western analysts (and millions of Poles) thought possible in repressing Solidarity and reasserting Communist authority without provoking widespread violent popular resistance.
General Jaruzelski repeatedly pledged his commitment to basic reform of the pre-1980 conditions in Poland. He has argued that the imposition of martial law was necessary to save rather than destroy the framework of accords with the workers in the face of imminent social, economic, and political disaster. It may be too early to judge whether these pledges are sincere.

There are growing indications, however, that hardline elements within the Polish Communist Party and armed forces consider Solidarity, as previously constituted, wholly unacceptable politically. These elements are believed to be pressing either for the permanent dissolution of Solidarity or for its subjugation. In the latter case, it might be transformed into a Communist-dominated trade union called Solidarity but bearing little resemblance to the free trade union.

If the Party or the military have abandoned the course of conciliation with Solidarity, then confrontation is more likely, though still not inevitable. The present Polish leadership may be able to achieve its political objectives without massive violence. The arrest of Solidarity leaders, the threat of severe punishment for any workers who defy authorities, backed by a massive show of force, may prove enough to subdue the populace. Such an outcome might give the leadership a free hand to eliminate both Solidarity and the accords of 1980. The government would in this case be taking a great risk, given the momentum and overwhelming public support developed by the reform movement over the preceding 18 months. Even if the government were to succeed in suppressing the independent labor union movement, the underlying social and economic problems which gave birth to Solidarity would remain, perhaps in even more acute form. The likely curtailment of Western economic cooperation with Poland might further hamper efforts to restore Poland's economic health.

Finally, there is still a danger of violent confrontation in Poland. If the authorities move to eliminate Solidarity and punish former leaders and activists, serious active resistance might result. Also, continued deterioration of the economic situation, with government-imposed price increases and austerity measures, might trigger widespread resistance (demonstrations, strikes, violence) as occurred in 1970, 1976, and 1980 in Poland. The regime has already shown its awareness of the threat of anti-government terrorism by small groups, as well as the more visible threat of mass demonstrations. Government efforts to put down demonstrations or strikes by force might be resisted, leading to street violence or widespread passive resistance. The Polish army has the manpower to quell any disturbances, but its loyalty to the government under such circumstances is in doubt. Many Western analysts believe that Polish troops could not be relied on to put down a national uprising. Large numbers of soldiers might refuse to leave the barracks or ultimately might even join the workers. On the other hand, the Polish army's discipline and cohesion appear to have held up well since the imposition of martial law, and the population has responded to martial law with greater restraint and moderation than many had predicted. Perhaps the potential for violent confrontation in Poland is exaggerated. But most analysts would agree that the possibility cannot be ruled out altogether. In the event of widespread violence, the possibilities of an internal settlement would be reduced, raising the likelihood of Soviet intervention.
The relative forebearance shown by the Soviet government in the year and a half since the onset of the Polish "renewal" suggests that Kremlin leaders view the prospect of direct military intervention in Poland as highly undesirable -- a last recourse to prevent Poland from slipping out of the Soviet orbit. Nonetheless, Soviet military intervention might be triggered by a general strike in Poland or by the outbreak of widespread disorder and violence with which Polish authorities could not effectively cope.

The introduction of Soviet military forces into Poland would be likely to inflame Polish national passions, with unpredictable -- and potentially catastrophic -- consequences. Any such Soviet move would have to be on a massive scale to be effective in restoring the status quo ante (pre-1980).

Soviet military intervention might strengthen Polish authorities (either the present government in Warsaw or a new one) in instituting a repression of the "renewal" process, abrogating the reforms of the past year and a half, outlawing Solidarity, and instituting tight repression, as was done in Czechoslovakia in late 1968. Such intervention would not relieve the underlying economic crisis which sparked the Polish turmoil in 1980, and might further aggravate the economic situation.

Soviet military intervention might provoke widespread non-violent Polish resistance in the form of strikes and general refusal to cooperate with authorities. This had, in fact, repeatedly been threatened by Solidarity spokesmen before martial law.

Soviet military intervention also might trigger armed resistance by Polish "partisans" and/or by units of the Polish armed forces. There is little doubt that the Soviet army could (re)conquer Poland if it had to. There is no suggestion of direct U.S. or NATO military intervention on Poland's behalf. But the economic, political, and military consequences of a Soviet invasion would be staggering for the U.S.S.R. In the event of a Soviet invasion, Moscow would have to shoulder the economic dead weight of Poland. If there was active Polish resistance and bloodshed, the Soviet Union might be completely cut off from Western technology and credit, on which its economy is dependent. Politically, a Soviet invasion of Poland would undo years of Soviet effort to weaken the Western alliance and portray itself as peaceful. NATO would probably be revitalized and determined to strengthen itself militarily against the Soviet threat. Militarily, a reconquered Poland would seriously weaken the Warsaw Pact. It would be occupied territory, smoldering with resentment, threatening Soviet lines of communication in any future military confrontation with the West. In the final analysis, however, these negative consequences of direct military intervention in Poland -- which Moscow earnestly wishes to avoid -- would be eclipsed by the still more dreadful consequences of "losing" Poland altogether.

It should be stressed that from the Soviet perspective, the Polish upheaval has already caused much political and economic damage. In their best case, even if the martial law regime succeeds in quelling active Polish opposition so that direct Soviet military intervention is unnecessary, the Soviet outlook is far from rosy. In the short-term run, at least, the underlying Polish economic deterioration will probably be aggravated rather than improved by martial law. It seems unlikely that the 10 million Solidarity members, the bulk of Poland's labor force, will increase their work productivity under duress. Poland's economic burden on the Soviet Union
will probably increase, for if Poland is allowed to default on its debt to the West, Western credits for such projects as the Soviet export gas pipeline would be jeopardized. Thus, under almost any circumstances, Moscow seems to be facing the prospect of a high bill for Poland.

CONSEQUENCES FOR THE UNITED STATES

The United States Government continues to advocate -- as it has done since the unrest in Poland began in 1980 -- nonviolent resolution of the situation based on constructive, cooperative agreements among the Polish people themselves.

The threat of unilateral abrogation by Polish authorities of the historic economic, social, and political agreements concluded with Solidarity since mid-1980 is a source of great concern in the United States. This has been underlined by many authoritative statements from the Reagan Administration and from the Congress. Two days after the imposition of martial law, U.S. State Department spokesmen indicated that further U.S. economic assistance to Poland would be suspended, pending clarification of the situation in Poland.

In a nationally televised speech on Dec. 23, President Reagan announced a series of economic sanctions against the Government of Poland in response to its imposition of martial law. The sanctions included: (a) suspending U.S. Government-sponsored food shipments to Poland until "absolute assurances" are received that distribution of these products is monitored by independent agencies (food shipments to Poland by private agencies are not affected); (b) stopping the renewal of Poland's export credit insurance by the U.S. Government-backed Export-Import Bank; (c) withdrawing U.S. civil aviation privileges from Poland's national airline, Lot; and (d) denying to Poland's long-distance fishing fleet the right to operate in U.S. waters. In addition, President Reagan said that the United States was proposing to its allies further restrictions on the export of high-technology items to Poland.

The President stressed that, "these measures are not directed against the Polish people. They are a warning to the Polish government that free men cannot and will not stand idly by in the face of brutal repression."

The Polish and Soviet governments strongly criticized these U.S. measures, denouncing them as harsh blows against the Polish people and as unacceptable interference in the internal affairs of Poland. General Jaruzelski immediately summoned the West European diplomats in Warsaw to a closed meeting in which he sought to drive a wedge between the United States and its European allies on the issue of sanctions. In the following weeks, however, most West European nations and Japan imposed limited economic and political sanctions against Poland: halting government credit, halting negotiations on rescheduling Poland's foreign debt payments, and restricting the travel of Polish diplomats.

The question of economic sanctions against Poland has stirred debate within the United States and Western Europe. Some critics of U.S. policy argue that the imposition of martial law is a domestic Polish matter in which the West should not seek to interfere. Others make the point that the economic sanctions ultimately penalize the hard-pressed Polish people, on whose behalf the U.S. Government claims to be acting.
At the other end of the spectrum are critics who charge that the U.S. sanctions are weak and ineffective. More should be done, they argue, either in concert with our allies or unilaterally, to force the martial law authorities to change their course or punish them for it. Advocates of this view point to Poland's $26 billion foreign debt as a ready means of exerting pressure on Warsaw. They were highly critical of the Reagan Administration's decision in late January to have the CCC make a $71 million payment to U.S. banks on an earlier U.S. Government-backed loan to Poland.

Supporters of the Reagan Administration's policy maintain that some significant U.S. response to the imposition of martial law was necessary in order to show strong U.S. displeasure and exert pressure on the martial law authorities. The limited U.S. sanctions are appropriate, they say, providing a "stick" but still leaving a "carrot" with which to influence events in Poland. Precipitating Polish default, they argue, would surrender what economic leverage we now have, and would "let Poland off the hook" on their foreign debt.

President Reagan has also taken the lead in public statements linking the imposition of martial law in Poland to the Soviet Union. On Dec. 29, the President announced the imposition of certain economic sanctions against the U.S.S.R., which included: (a) stopping the export of U.S. electronic, computer, and energy-related technology to the U.S.S.R.; (b) denying civil aviation privileges to the Soviet national airline, Aeroflot; (c) restricting access by Soviet ships to U.S. ports; (d) closing the Soviet Purchasing Commission (a Soviet foreign trade agency) in New York; and (e) postponing negotiations on a new long-term U.S.-Soviet grain purchase agreement to replace the one-year agreement due to expire Sept. 30, 1982 (under whose terms Moscow has already ordered 11 million tons of grain, and may purchase as much as 23 million tons).

As with the earlier economic sanctions against Poland, these sanctions against the U.S.S.R. are criticized by some as a misdirected overreaction to internal Polish developments beyond our control. Others argue that the sanctions are weak and ineffective because they don't go far enough and because they were imposed unilaterally by the United States.

Those who seek tougher sanctions against the Soviet Union criticize a situation in which the United States denies additional food aid to Poland while permitting the Soviets to buy millions of tons of U.S. grain. They also call for Washington to precipitate Polish default on its debts to the West, thereby presumably placing the economic burden of martial law in Poland on Communist -- East European and Soviet -- shoulders.

Opponents of harsher sanctions argue that the U.S.-Soviet grain trade benefits the United States, and that throwing Poland into default would be a surrender of the most useful leverage the West has over future developments in Poland.

[For a discussion of linkage between Polish foreign debts and the Soviet-West European gas pipeline, see CRS Issue Brief 82020, Soviet Gas Pipeline: U.S. Options.]

The West European response to the U.S. economic sanctions against Moscow was mixed. Few European governments chose to impose comparable sanctions, citing the unilateral character of the United States action and the differing economic circumstances. The Reagan Administration's decision not to
interfere with grain sales -- by far the biggest slice of U.S.-Soviet trade this year -- was cited by some Europeans in explaining their reluctance to cut their own trade with Moscow.

On the other hand, after some initial hesitation the West European governments joined the United States in indicting the Soviet Union as a principal factor responsible for the imposition of martial law in Poland. Some European governments have imposed limited sanctions on the Soviet Union. Also, it is understood that the NATO and EEC states have pledged not to undermine the U.S.-imposed sanctions by stepping in to fill export contracts vacated by U.S. firms.

The Soviet government responded sharply to the U.S. economic sanctions, but its response has been verbal. Neither Moscow nor Washington seem eager to scuttle the current grain sale agreement or the arms control talks in Geneva.

If the U.S.S.R. were to intervene militarily in Poland, especially with large-scale loss of life, such action would undermine the already fragile basis for U.S.-Soviet cooperation across-the-board on cultural, economic, political and arms control issues. The Administration has explicitly warned on a number of occasions that direct Soviet intervention would result in severe sanctions by the United States and its NATO allies.

LEGISLATION

H.Con.Res. 240 (Zablocki et al.)
Reaffirms the support of the Congress of the United States for the people of Poland. Introduced Dec. 15, 1981; called up by unanimous consent, considered, and passed the House Dec. 15, 1981. Referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the same day.

S.Res. 268 (Percy et al.)
A resolution on the imposition of martial law in Poland. Introduced Dec. 15, 1981; called up by unanimous consent, considered, and passed the Senate Dec. 15, 1981 (roll call #491, 95-0).

H.Res. 304 (Nelligan et al.)
Expresses the sense of the House of Representatives that the President should seek a halt in any deportation proceedings involving Polish citizens until he determines that the political situation in Poland is stable. Introduced Dec. 14, 1981; referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. Called up by committee discharge, considered, and passed the House Dec. 15, 1981.

[See also CRS Issue Brief 80089, The Polish Renewal.]

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

03/04/82 -- Col. Hipolit Starszak, an official of the Interior Ministry, said that about a dozen internees had applied to emigrate. He also said that 42,000 Poles had returned from abroad since martial law was declared and estimated that about 96,000 were still abroad.

03/03/82 -- U.S. State Department spokesman Dean Fischer said that President Reagan had decided to postpone any new
economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, pending consultation with the European allies.

-- Polish Interior Minister Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak issued a communique formally announcing that the approximately 4,000 Poles still interned and their families would be permitted to apply for passports to leave Poland as of Mar. 15. The communique also said that restrictions on foreign travel and on visits by foreigners would be relaxed.

03/02/82 -- Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski returned to Warsaw after two days of talks in Moscow. A joint communique said: "It was stressed by the Polish side that any attempts to resume actions aimed at causing economic disarray, at resumption of anarchy, disturbances, at changing the social and political system will be cut short most resolutely in the future, too."

-- Polish education authorities announced a new political indoctrination program to begin in October. First and second year university students will devote 300 hours per year to ideological study of economics, philosophy, politics, and sociology. For third and fourth year students, the number of hours will drop to 90 per year.

03/01/82 -- Jaruzelski received an enthusiastic welcome in Moscow. His 2-day trip to Moscow was his first foreign visit since he became the Polish Party Chief in October 1981.

-- At a Kremlin dinner honoring Jaruzelski, Soviet Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev praised the "timely measures" taken by the Polish leadership. Both Brezhnev and Jaruzelski emphasized that Poland alone had made the decision to impose martial law.

-- Interior Minister Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak announced that 6,647 people were interned under martial law and that as of Feb. 26, 2,552 had been released. 300 more had been released since Feb. 26.

02/28/82 -- Interior Minister Kiszczak announced that restrictions on travel within Poland would be relaxed except in border areas.

02/27/82 -- After a two-day meeting in Warsaw, the Polish Catholic episcopate called for a resumption of talks between Communist authorities and Solidarity and appealed for amnesty for the hundreds of Poles jailed for martial law violations.

02/25/82 -- The two-day meeting of the Polish Central Committee ended with a resolution of "full support" for the martial law regime. Jaruzelski's choices for alternate members of the Politburo, Interior Minister Lieut. Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak and government economist Marian Wozniak, were elected by near-unanimous votes. Kiszczak's election brought the number of generals in the Politburo to four.

02/24/82 -- The Polish Central Committee met for a 2-day session, its first meeting under martial law.
-- In his address to the Central Committee, Jaruzelski said that it was "impossible" to lift martial law restrictions "to the degree we intended. We are prevented by tensions, rash acts, poster campaigns. They are prolonging martial law."

02/23/82 -- At a meeting in Brussels, the Foreign Ministers of the European Community agreed to restrict imports from the Soviet Union as a sign of disapproval of the repression in Poland. They also approved $9 million in food aid to Polish civilians.

-- The official Polish news agency, PAP, said that Lech Walesa had been "the front for an anticommunist crusade." This was the first PAP attack on Walesa since martial law was declared.

02/21/82 -- The Polish martial law government published a statement on trade union policy.

02/19/82 -- Polish government spokesman Jerzy Urban said that a priest had been arrested and was being tried for giving a sermon slandering Gen. Jaruzelski.

02/18/82 -- Radio Warsaw charged that some "lower Catholic clergy" were "rekindling old sources of conflict," according to the Washington Post.

02/17/82 -- The official Polish news agency, PAP, reported that about 4,000 Poles were arrested over a two-day period. No dates were given for the action, officially known as "Operation Calm." Police dealt with 145,000 violations of martial law during the "operation." Most of the violations were of curfew regulations.

02/16/82 -- Father Henryk Jankowski, Lech Walesa's parish priest, spoke to reporters about his visit with Walesa. Walesa said that he had issued no statements since being confined by martial law authorities.

02/15/82 -- The Polish Communist Party newspaper, Trybuna Ludu, published its most extensive attack so far on resistance to martial law.

02/13/82 -- The New York Times reported that Poland had signed a trade agreement with China. The agreement for 1982 provides for a 25% increase in trade.

02/11/82 -- The first anniversary of Gen. Jaruzelski's appointment to Premier of Poland was marked by tributes in the Polish press.

02/09/82 -- At the Madrid meeting to review the Helsinki accords, U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig charged that Polish authorities had violated the Helsinki accords and that "through intimidation and interference, the Soviet Union has conspired with the Polish military authorities...."
Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Jozef Wiejacz, the chairman for that session, announced that he was adjourning the session.

-- At a special audience for an international group of labor leaders, Pope John Paul II said that a restoration of Solidarity was the only way out of the Polish crisis. The Pope's statement followed a sermon in Rome by Polish Primate Archbishop Jozef Glemp.

02/08/82 -- Polish universities reopened after a forced 2-month recess.

02/07/82 -- In Rome to consult with Pope John Paul II, Polish Primate Archbishop Jozef Glemp said that "Poles are overcome by anger.... A place will be found for Solidarity, as there is a place for the church."

01/30/82 -- Street clashes in Gdansk resulted in 14 injuries and 205 arrests. 101 youths were sentenced to jail terms of one to three months. "Solidarity Day" with Poland was observed in the U.S.

01/26/82 -- In a speech to the Sejm, Gen. Jaruzelski said that there were 4,549 internees and that 1,760 people had been released.

-- Before meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Geneva, U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig said that Gen. Jaruzelski's Jan. 25 speech was "a disappointment" and "essentially an effort to justify the continuing repression of the Polish people."

-- One hand was raised when the Sejm was asked whether anyone opposed the martial law decrees imposed in December. There were six abstentions.

01/25/82 -- After hearing a policy statement by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the Polish Sejm (parliament) endorsed martial law as preferable to confrontation.

-- In his address to the Sejm, Poland's military ruler General Jaruzelski promised some relaxation of martial law regulations by the end of February, but said that control over the Solidarity movement would remain strict.

01/24/82 -- Polish Primate Archbishop Jozef Glemp said that Poles had the right to honest information and the right to know why they were being deprived of civil liberties. Glemp's sermon was broadcast over national radio. He warned that curbs on freedom could lead to protest and war.

-- A pastoral letter from Poland's Roman Catholic bishops was read in most Polish churches. The letter called for the restoration of freedoms revoked under martial law. Pope John Paul II endorsed the pastoral letter and urged all Catholics to pray "for my fatherland."
01/22/82 -- Warsaw radio reported that Poland sent a note to 34 nations warning them against attempting to denounce Poland's martial law regime at the Feb. Madrid meeting to review the Helsinki accords.

01/21/82 -- A petition signed by more than 100 intellectuals and artists was sent to the Sejm and to Primate Archbishop Glemp. The petition demanded the lifting of martial law, the release of detainees, and resumption of a dialogue with Church and Solidarity representatives.

-- The European Common Market withdrew a proposal to supply over $236 million in food aid to the Polish government. This was the first sanction imposed against Poland's martial law government by Western Europe. Aid through non-governmental organizations should increase, according to Gaston Thorn, President of the Common Market Commission.

01/18/82 -- Representatives of the Polish military government and of the Catholic episcopate met in Warsaw.

-- Warsaw radio reported that Deputy Premier Mieczyslaw Rakowski met with foreign journalists in Warsaw. He told them that martial law was "essential because all possible available political means by which the government had wanted to halt the process of dismantling the economy and state structures" had failed. He said that no date had been set for lifting martial law and that the authorities planned to use the period to introduce economic reforms, including price increases.

-- PAP, the official Polish news agency said that the government must raise prices of food, clothing, and other necessities to prevent total economic collapse.

01/17/82 -- Sunday mass was broadcast on Polish radio for the first time since martial law was declared.

-- Polish Primate Archbishop Glemp criticized the military government for extracting "loyalty oaths" from Poles.

01/16/82 -- The Soviet news agency, TASS, announced that the Soviet Union would send medical supplies, blankets, dried milk, and sugar to central Poland which was hit by floods.

-- The Polish Communist Party newspaper, Trybuna Ludu, said that if farmers did not increase deliveries, "obligatory deliveries" of grain might be imposed.

01/10/82 -- Polish Foreign Minister Jozef Czyrek was in Moscow for two days of talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and other senior officials.

-- Telephone service was restored in Warsaw 29 days after martial law was declared.
01/09/82 -- Censorship of foreign news reports was lifted.

01/08/82 -- The Polish military government announced that 17 people had died since the imposition of martial law. This was more than double the total previously announced.

01/06/82 -- The Soviet Union announced a grant to Poland of $3.4 billion in trade credits on easy terms.

12/30/81 -- Deputy Premier Rakowski visited Bonn for two days. He said that Western attempts to use economic restrictions against Poland amounted to interference in Polish internal affairs.

12/29/81 -- President Reagan announced the imposition of a series of economic sanctions against the Soviet Union for its part in the imposition of martial law in Poland.

12/25/81 -- Warsaw radio reported that more than 1,200 coal miners were still conducting a sit-in in the Piast coal mine in Katowice. The protest began on Dec. 14.

12/24/81 -- Zdzislaw Rurarz, the Polish ambassador to Japan, defected to the United States.

12/23/81 -- In a nationally televised speech, President Reagan announced a series of economic sanctions against the Polish government in response to its imposition of martial law.

12/22/81 -- Warsaw radio reported that curfew would be lifted on Christmas Eve so that people could attend midnight mass.

-- Warsaw radio's international service resumed broadcasting for the first time since Dec. 12.

12/21/81 -- Polish government spokesman Jerzy Urban confirmed that Walesa was being held in Warsaw and would be released "as soon as the situation in the country allows."

-- In an interview broadcast on Warsaw radio, Polish government spokesman Jerzy Urban said that 5,000 people had been detained and that some had already been released.

-- Polish government spokesman Jerzy Urban confirmed that Walesa was being held in Warsaw and would be released "as soon as the situation in the country allows."

-- Moscow TASS reported that thousands of workers had barricaded themselves inside the Katowice steel mill.

12/20/81 -- Radio Warsaw announced that Poland's Baltic shipyards would be shut down until after Christmas and warned farmers that they might be compelled to speed up food deliveries.
-- The Polish ambassador to the U.S. Romuald Spasowski, asked for and was granted political asylum in the U.S.

12/19/81 -- The official news agency, PAP, reported that authorities had confiscated 500 rounds of ammunition, grenades, firearms, and iron bars in the Szczecin repair shipyard.

-- Warsaw radio reported continuing strikes in Gdansk, Sopot, and Gdynia. Massive food shipments from East Germany arrived in Warsaw.

12/18/81 -- Foreign journalists were given permission to file censored dispatches over a single telex line from the Foreign Ministry's press center.

12/17/81 -- Riot police in Warsaw used nightsticks and tear gas to disperse thousands of Poles defying the martial law curfew to mark the 11th anniversary of the 1970 Baltic coast food riots which resulted in dozens of deaths.

-- Warsaw radio reported that seven Poles were killed and hundreds wounded in clashes with troops enforcing martial law. The deaths occurred at a coal mine near Katowice in Silesia.

12/16/81 -- In the first communication from Polish banking authorities since martial law was declared, Poland asked its major creditors to lend it an additional $350 million to help pay the interest Poland owed on $2.4 billion in loans due to Western banks.

-- Warsaw radio reported demonstrations in Gdansk. 160 militiamen and 164 civilians were reported injured.

-- Heavily armed Polish troops led by tanks stormed the Lenin steel works. Some strikers were beaten and the others threatened with being shot if they did not return to work. The steel works were partially operating later in the day.

12/15/81 -- The Polish government froze all private bank accounts containing hard currency and suspended all foreign remittances and other orders requiring foreign exchange.

-- A U.S. State Department spokesman announced that U.S. economic aid already "in the pipeline" to Poland would be allowed to proceed, but that decisions on future economic assistance would be postponed pending clarification of the Polish situation.

12/14/81 -- Coal miners at the Piast coal mine in Katowice province in southern Poland began a sit-in strike in the mine. On Dec. 25, more than 1,000 miners were reported still underground.

-- All normal cable, telex, and telephone communications with Poland were shut off.
The Polish government announced that 150 factories had been "militarized." Disobedience could result in penalties ranging from two years in prison to death.

12/13/81 — Shortly after 3 a.m., police occupied Solidarity's Warsaw headquarters, confiscated union property, and cut communication lines.

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At 6 a.m., General Jaruzelski delivered a speech on radio announcing the imposition of martial law at midnight on Dec. 12 and asking Polish workers to "give up, for the Fatherland, your inalienable right to strike, for such a period as may be necessary."

12/12/81 — At midnight, the Polish Council of State issued a proclamation declaring a state of emergency and introducing martial law. At the same time, a "Military Council of National Salvation" was formed.

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A Gdansk meeting of Solidarity's 107-member policy-making national commission adopted the demands made at Radom on Dec. 3 as the basis for the union's program.

12/10/81 — A TASS report charged that Solidarity had set up "commando units" and had stolen weapons and explosives from state warehouses. The report stated that Solidarity planned to take over Polish radio and television on Dec. 17.