

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT

OF THE

JOINT COMMITTEE



ON

THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR,

IN TWO VOLUMES.

SUPPLEMENTAL TO SENATE REPORT NO. 142, 38TH CONGRESS, 2D SESSION.

VOLUME II

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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, *June 18, 1866.*

*Resolved*, By the Senate, (the House of Representatives concurring,) that there be printed for the use of the members of the Thirty-ninth Congress, the reports of Major Generals W. T. Sherman, George H. Thomas, John Pope, J. G. Foster, A. Pleasanton, and E. A. Hitchcock, made to the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, together with such other reports as may be received by the commencement of the next session of Congress, the same number, and in the same style, as were printed of the reports heretofore made by said committee.

Attest:

J. W. FORNEY, *Secretary.*

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES,

*June 20, 1866.*

*Resolved*, That the House concur in the foregoing resolution of the Senate in relation to the printing of the reports of Major Generals Sherman, Thomas, Pope, Foster, Pleasanton, and Hitchcock, made to the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, &c.

Attest:

E. McPHERSON, *Clerk.*

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**REPORTS**

MADE TO THE

**JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR,**

BY

MAJOR GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,  
MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
MAJOR GENERAL JOHN POPE,  
MAJOR GENERAL J. S. FOSTER,  
MAJOR GENERAL A. PLEASANTON,  
MAJOR GENERAL E. A. HITCHCOCK,  
MAJOR GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN,  
BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES B. RICKETTS,  
COMMUNICATION OF NORMAN WIARD,  
MEMORIAL OF NORMAN WIARD.

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REPORT

OF

MAJOR GENERAL JOHN POPE,

TO THE

HON. COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

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REPORT  
OF  
MAJOR GENERAL JOHN POPE,

TO THE  
HON. COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

PART I. — MISSOURI.

ASSIGNMENT TO COMMAND OF THE DISTRICT OF NORTH MISSOURI; CONDITION OF THE STATE; ORDERS ISSUED AND MEASURES ADOPTED TO INDUCE THE CITIZENS TO KEEP THE PEACE; DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW BY GENERAL FRÉMONT; BATTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK; SURRENDER OF LEXINGTON; REMOVAL OF GENERAL FRÉMONT; ASSIGNMENT OF GENERAL HALLECK; CAPTURE OF PRISONERS AT BLACK-WATER; OPERATIONS RESULTING IN CAPTURE OF NEW MADRID AND ISLAND NO. 10; CORRESPONDENCE AND REPORTS OF DIVISION AND BRIGADE COMMANDERS.

Hon. B. F. WADE,

*Chairman of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War:*

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22d of May, 1865, requiring from me, on the part of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, answers to the following questions:

Question 1. Please state what positions you have held and what commands you have exercised since the commencement of the rebellion, giving the periods during which those respective commands have been exercised by you.

Question 2. Please state such particulars as you may deem necessary to a proper understanding of the several campaigns in which you have been engaged; setting forth the orders and instructions under which those campaigns were conducted, and the principal orders and instructions given by you, with such incidents and circumstances as you consider will be of interest to the public, appending to your statement copies of your reports and those of your principal subordinates, keeping the account of each campaign by itself as far as convenient.

In reply to the first question I have to say, that, having been appointed brigadier general of volunteers, to date from May 17, 1861, I proceeded to Missouri and assumed the command of the district of North Missouri on the 17th of July, 1861. I retained this command until the movement of General Frémont, in pursuit of Price, in October of the same year, when I was assigned to command the second division and right wing of that army.

After the army withdrew from Springfield, Missouri, to the line of the Pacific railroad, I was directed to assume command of all the troops west of and including Jefferson City, in what was then designated the district of Central

Missouri. When the necessity of retaining so large a force in that part of the State had ceased with the retreat of Price into Arkansas, I was recalled to St. Louis, after sending the greater part of the forces under my command in advance. I was then ordered to proceed to Commerce, Missouri, and organize a force for operations against New Madrid and Island No. 10. I commanded the force thus organized, known as the army of the Mississippi, during the reduction of those places and the subsequent operations around Corinth.

On the 21st of March, 1862, I was promoted major general of volunteers. In June, 1862, I was ordered to Washington and placed in command of the army of Virginia, which consisted of three army corps, commanded respectively by Generals Frémont, Banks, and McDowell.

On the 14th of July I was appointed brigadier general in the regular army. At the conclusion of the campaign of the army of Virginia, I was assigned to the command of the department of the northwest, and in January, 1864, to command the military division of the Missouri, which embraced the department of the northwest, the department of the Missouri, and the department of Arkansas, and included the whole region west of the Mississippi river as far west as California and Oregon, and as far south as Texas.

In reply to your second question, I submit the following narrative, into which I have incorporated such official reports, letters, and telegrams sent and received by me, as are necessary to sustain and explain the statements therein made.

#### NARRATIVE.

In accordance with telegraphic orders from Major General Frémont, who had been assigned to the command of the western department, but who was still in New York, I proceeded from Alton, Illinois, with three infantry regiments, and part of a cavalry regiment, all Illinois troops, to St. Charles, Missouri, and assumed command of the district of north Missouri on the 17th of July, 1861. Several other regiments had entered Missouri by way of Quincy and Hannibal, and were distributed along the line of the Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad. That the orders issued and the course pursued by me during the months of July, August, and September of that year, for the pacification of northern Missouri, may be fully understood, it will be proper for me to sketch briefly the condition of affairs in the State when first I assumed command. As I still believe that the measures inaugurated in the orders then issued would, if thoroughly carried out, have saved the State of Missouri from much of the suffering, outrage and lawlessness which have characterized its history during the war, and as these measures were overruled and set aside by higher authority than mine, to the detriment, in my opinion, of the Union cause in Missouri, I beg to invite the special attention of the committee to the facts herein stated.

The events which swiftly followed the inauguration of President Lincoln, and the capture of Camp Jackson, together with the flight of Governor Jackson and Sterling Price from Jefferson City, and the battle of Booneville, had profoundly affected the public mind in Missouri. While the secessionists in all parts of the State, long prepared for such an issue, were active and confident, the Union citizens, wholly taken by surprise, uncertain what to do or upon whom to rely, fearful for the first time of danger to the government and peril to themselves, were, as a mass, paralyzed and seemingly incapable of thought or action. There is not a doubt that, but for the presence of mind, resolution and boldness of Captain Lyon, in command of St. Louis arsenal, and of F. P. Blair and a few others, Missouri would have been lost temporarily to the government. These few men, bold, energetic, and determined, assembled at night in secret places, with such arms as they could procure, organized themselves, collected around them all the Union men not too timid to take an open stand for the Union cause, and when the time came, struck the blow, from which secession never recovered in



Missouri. General Lyon followed it up by the battle of Booneville and the pursuit of the enemy nearly to the Arkansas line. It is safe to say, with knowledge of the facts since developed, that if two or three of the regiments which could well have been spared from other points had been sent to Lyon, as could easily have been done, he would have beaten the enemy at Wilson's creek, and either have captured their leaders or driven them in despair from the State. The result of that battle, however, so encouraged the secession, and depressed the Union element in the State, that years of war, devastation and ruin have been the fate of the people of Missouri.

On the 17th of July, 1861, however, when I assumed the command in north Missouri, everything in the State was still in confusion and uncertainty. Armies were being rapidly organized north and south. The fate of Missouri, divided in sentiment as was its population, trembled in the balance. In the interior, especially in northern Missouri, (by which is meant that portion of the State north of the Missouri river,) the people were nearly equally divided in political opinion. In some counties the southern sympathizers predominated; in others the Union men were largely in the majority. The difference between them was, that the secessionists, being the revolutionary party and prepared by speeches, harangues, and personal influences for the result of secession, were infinitely the most active and confident. That portion of the people faithful to the Union had never fully realized that it was the purpose of any citizen of the United States to break up the government, and it was with difficulty that they were brought to believe, by force of actual events, that the State was about to be precipitated into civil war. The secessionists in north Missouri had struck the first blow, seemingly as an experiment and to commit their friends to hostilities.

The North Missouri railroad, leading from St. Louis through the centre of north Missouri, had been broken up and several bridges destroyed north of the Missouri river. Both parties stood face to face, but, though in nearly every county there had been some acts of violence committed by small bands, no actual hostilities on any considerable scale had yet been inaugurated. All the civil machinery, however, of that portion of the State was arrested; courts and sheriffs had ceased to exercise their functions; every man was suspicious of his neighbor, and the agony of fear and apprehension of total anarchy brooded over the people. A single spark would have been sufficient to put the whole of north Missouri in a flame, which would have swept away all restraints of law and all security of life and property. Every man was armed and watched his neighbor with sleepless vigilance, expecting to be attacked and ready to kill on the slightest pretext. Meantime the younger and more violent left nothing undone to precipitate a collision and to involve the entire population in war against each other.

The position and condition of the border States were entirely different from those of the States north and south of them. While the latter were so far unanimous in sentiment that no open opposition was made, and the civil machinery of the State governments acted freely and without interruption, the former were so divided in sentiment and there were so many of the civil officers enlisted on each side of the question that civil law was either not executed at all, or was made the cloak of outrage and injustice upon political opponents. This was the case particularly in Missouri. The governor and other high civil officers of the State had fled from the capital and had joined the armed insurgents and destroyed or carried off the State records and the public funds, leaving behind them confusion, disorder, and dismay. The head of the State government and many of its civil officers having abandoned their duties, no laws were executed, and the people left thus to themselves, inflamed with enmity and crazy with apprehension, confronted each other with all the surroundings that seemed to render a bloody anarchy inevitable. Everything was ripe to plunge Missouri into a conflict in which neighbor would have warred upon neighbor; in which no organization, civil or military, willing or able to enforce the laws of humanity, would

have existed; in which there would have been let loose among helpless women and children all the brutal and lawless passions of infuriated and unrestrained men. The whole framework of society seemed ready to tumble to pieces. At this time, and under these circumstances, I assumed the command in northern Missouri, with the small force heretofore designated, which was immediately distributed along the North Missouri and Hannibal and St. Joseph railroads. It was necessary in the first place to secure these roads, as the only available means of communication with the interior of that portion of the State, so that in case other measures of pacification failed, military operations could be conducted with convenience and rapidity. I had not sufficient force, nor would it have been judicious, to protect by actual presence of troops the whole of these long railroads. I therefore posted my command at the most important points, so as to be at hand when needed, and devolved the protection of the railroads upon the people living along and in the vicinity of them. The manner of thus securing the roads is fully set forth in the order hereto appended:

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF NORTH MISSOURI,

*St. Charles, July 21, 1861.*

An investigation of the circumstances attending the difficulties along the line of the North Missouri railroad, and the wanton destruction of bridges, culverts, &c., makes it manifest that the inhabitants of the villages and stations along the road, if not privy to these outrages, at least offered no resistance to them, and gave no information by which they could have been prevented, or merited punishment inflicted upon the criminals.

I desire the people of this section of the State to understand distinctly that their safety and the security of their property will depend upon themselves, and are directly and inseparably connected with the security of the lines of public communication.

It is very certain that the people living along the line of the North Missouri railroad can very easily protect it from destruction, and it is my purpose to give them strong inducements to do so. I therefore notify the inhabitants of the towns, villages, and stations along the line of this road that they will be held accountable for the destruction of any bridges, culverts, or portions of the railroad track within five miles on each side of them. If any outrages of this kind are committed within the distance specified, without conclusive proof of active resistance on the part of the population, and without immediate information to the nearest commanding officer, giving names and details, the settlement will be held responsible, and a levy of money or property sufficient to cover the whole damage done will be at once made and collected.

There seems to be no method of enlisting the active agency of the citizens along the line of this road for the protection of a public work in all respects so beneficial to them, except by making it their very evident personal interest to do so, and I desire them to understand that they will be compelled to pay in full of property or money for any damage done in their vicinity. It has been impossible heretofore even to ascertain the names of the criminals engaged in this kind of work, although they were well known to every body in the neighborhood. If people who claim to be good citizens choose to indulge their neighbors and acquaintances in committing these wanton acts, and to shield them from punishment, they will hereafter be compelled to pay for it; or if they disapprove, their objections must take more tangible form than mere words. It is not to be expected that the general government will occupy a large force merely to protect from the people of this part of the State a work built for their own benefit, or to defend from outrages and hostility communities which encourage violations of all law by giving no information and by offering no sort of resistance. I therefore expect all law-abiding citizens at once to take measures to secure the safety of the North Missouri railroad in their vicinity,

and I notify all others that upon the safety of the road depends the security of their own property and person. To carry out the intentions set forth above, divisions and sub-divisions of the road will be made as soon as practicable from these headquarters, and superintendents and assistant superintendents appointed by name, without regard to political opinions, who will be held responsible for the safety of the railroad track within their specified limits. They will have authority to call on all persons living within these limits to appear in such numbers and at such times and places as they may deem necessary to secure the object in view. I expect all good citizens who value peace and the safety of their families and property to respond cheerfully to this arrangement, and to assume to themselves the care and protection of their own section.

JOHN POPE,

*Brigadier General U. S. A., Commanding North Missouri.*

This order at once arrested attempts to destroy the railroads in northern Missouri. It compelled the secessionists to restrain their friends from acts which would at once destroy their own property and endanger their personal safety. The security of the railroads against any considerable injury being thus assured, I addressed myself to the task of allaying the excitement among the people, and as far as practicable of restoring quiet and sense of safety. It would have been easy to declare martial law and thus to enforce submission—but martial law, bad enough at the best, when administered by well disciplined and experienced troops, having neither personal nor political feelings toward the people concerned—becomes an oppression whose horrors it would surpass the power of language to portray when the military force is scarcely organized, and officers and men are alike new and undisciplined, and inflamed by prejudice and passion. From martial law, whose administration must of necessity have been confided to such hands, I earnestly wished to spare the people of north Missouri.

I knew too that troops were greatly needed further south, where the rebellion was thoroughly organized and confronted with armed forces the authority of the United States. I was loth therefore to keep a single soldier in north Missouri, whose services were not absolutely necessary. In considering the condition of affairs which confronted me and which I have endeavored to describe, I found two modes of procedure open to me:

- 1st. To declare martial law and endeavor to keep the peace by armed force.
- 2d. To adopt measures which would compel the people of property, discretion, and influence to act together, irrespective of their political sympathies, to enforce the civil law and preserve peace among themselves.

To a declaration of martial law and the subjection of any portion of the people to military rule I was greatly opposed. Aside from the natural repugnance of every American born and bred under our institutions to see any government except civil government imposed upon any part of our people, and aside from the fact that had I declared martial law, its execution must have been intrusted to undisciplined troops, inflamed with political feeling and personal hostility toward the people concerned, I was well satisfied that less arbitrary measures would best secure peace in north Missouri, and leave nearly the whole force under my command at the disposal of the government for service at other points and against the organized forces of the enemy. In the condition of affairs which existed, had martial law been declared, it would have been necessary to divide my command into small detachments, which would still further have loosed the bonds of discipline, and distributed them to every important town and neighborhood.

Small bands of secessionists, mostly consisting of young men, were scattered through every county of north Missouri. Their depredations were committed without fear of exposure, even by the people upon whom they were inflicted. The secessionists would not betray them. The Union men dared not, lest the next night their houses should be burned and themselves and their families killed.

Hence, although every individual of these bands was known among the inhabitants, no information could be obtained by the military. Pursuit of them by troops only resulted in finding men working quietly in the fields or sitting in their stores or offices. As soon as United States troops appeared in the vicinity these bands quietly separated, each man going to his home and resuming his occupation, where he was sure, for sufficient reasons, that he would not be betrayed. Young men attached to the Union cause also, in imitation of this lawlessness, or in a spirit of revenge, committed acts of hostility upon people of southern sympathies in precisely the same irregular and lawless manner, and in conjunction with the bands of secessionists were thus keeping the whole country in an uproar alike injurious to the government and ruinous to the people. An attempt to control matters through the sole agency of troops would have been a total failure under such circumstances, and the pursuit of those small bands by detachments of soldiers would have carried dismay and outrage into every corner of the State, alike to Union men and secessionists. Such a course would have also necessitated the employment of large bodies of troops which could ill be spared by the government from other and more important fields. In view of all these considerations, I at once abandoned any idea of declaring martial law. It became necessary then to devise some means by which secession sympathizers and Union citizens might be brought to act together for the security of life and property and the preservation of peace and order among themselves. It was not easy to bring about this joint action while the young men in question, desiring to take active part for or against the rebellion, remained in their midst. It was therefore desirable to rid the State of these turbulent characters, by making it impossible for them to commit acts of hostility upon the people without inflicting at the same time immediate and ruinous injury upon their personal and political relatives and friends. As a part of any organized army, these young men would have been compelled to observe to some extent the laws of war. Concentrated in an army they would have had infinitely less power to do injury than when scattered about over a large district of country, keeping the whole population in alarm and excitement by committing depredations with little fear of detection or punishment. If with an organized army, an equal number of troops would have been sufficient to hold them in check, whereas scattered over the country at wide intervals, wearing the usual garb of citizens, and appearing suddenly at places remote from each other, a very few of them were sufficient to keep twenty times their number of United States soldiers employed in the protection of the peacefully disposed citizens of both parties. The outrages which either party committed would have been abundantly retaliated, and both parties would soon have acquired that disregard of moral obligations and the restraints of law, which would have made them alike dangerous to friend and enemy. The large number of United States troops that would have been necessary to preserve peace, scattered about in small detachments, would soon have acquired the same loose ideas and lawless habits, and the peacefully disposed people of respectability and wealth would have been equally the prey of all parties. All these considerations pressed painfully upon my mind, and led me to adopt the measures which are set forth in the appended order:

GENERAL ORDER }  
No. 3. }

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF NORTH MISSOURI,  
*Mexico, July 31, 1861.*

The commanding general in north Missouri being about to assemble in one camp, away from the railroad lines, all of the forces under his command, has determined to commit to the people of north Missouri the peace and quietude of their own section, and with these the safety of their property. Certainly the people of the various counties have to-day the same machinery of government and the same power of self-protection against lawless marauders as they had a year ago, and it only needs the same active agency and the same common

interest to bring together for such a purpose all those who have anything at stake. It is demonstrated by sufficient testimony, and by the experience of the past two weeks, that the disturbances in northern Missouri have been made by small parties of lawless marauders, which at any other time could have been easily suppressed with no more than the usual exertions of the people against breaches of the peace in times past. Certainly quiet and good order are of all things desirable in civilized communities, and should form a common bond of Union between citizens of every shade of political opinion. When these desirable results are secured, there will no longer be a necessity for the presence of armed forces in north Missouri. It is therefore the purpose of the general commanding in this region of country, before removing the military forces under his command from their present stations, to visit with a considerable force every county seat and considerable town in north Missouri, and in each to appoint a committee of public safety of persons selected from those of all parties who have social, domestic and pecuniary interests at stake. Each committee shall consist of not more than five persons, and wherever it can consistently be done, the proper county officers shall be selected as members. No one thus appointed shall be permitted to decline, or shall fail to perform his duties, under such penalties as the commanding general shall affix. These committees shall be charged with the duty of maintaining peace and order in their respective counties, and shall have power to call out all citizens of the county, to assemble at such times and places, and in such numbers, as may be necessary to secure these objects. Any one who shall refuse to obey such call will be turned over to the military authorities. If the people of the counties respectively are not willing or able to enforce the peace among themselves, and to prevent the organizing of companies to make war upon the United States, the military force will perform the service, but the expenses must be paid by the county in which such service is necessary. To secure their prompt payment, a levy of a sufficient amount of money will be at once made and collected by the officer in command. Upon the call of a majority of the committee of public safety in each county, troops will be sent to keep the peace, but as such expeditions are for the benefit of the people concerned, who have in nearly every case the power to discharge the service themselves, the troops thus sent will be quartered upon them, and subsisted and transported by the county in the manner above specified for the whole period it may be necessary for them to remain. If, in consequence of disturbance not reported by the committee, the general commanding finds it necessary to send a force into any county to restore order, they will be in like manner billeted upon the county, unless the combination against the peace were too powerful to be resisted, or the parties engaged were organized in other counties, and brought on the disturbances by actual invasion. It is not believed that the first case can arise in any county of north Missouri; and in the second, the forces will be marched into the county or counties where the marauding parties were organized; or whence they made the invasion, and will in like manner be quartered upon them. Where peace and good order are preserved the troops will not be required; where they are disturbed they will be restored at the expense of the county. To preserve the peace is the duty of all good citizens, and as all will suffer alike from the breach of it, men of every shade of political opinion can act cordially together in the discharge of a duty as full of interest to one as to another. By performing this simple service as in times past, and which it is certainly as much their interest and their duty to discharge to-day, the people of this section of the country will be spared the anxiety, uneasiness and apprehension which necessarily attend the presence of armed forces in their midst, and will again enjoy that security of person and property which has hitherto been their privilege. All persons who have heretofore been led away to take up arms against the United States are notified that by returning and laying down their arms at the nearest military post, and by performing their duty hereafter as peaceful and

law abiding citizens, they will not be molested by the military forces, nor, so far as the general commanding can influence the matter, will they be subjected to punishment unless they have committed murder or some other aggravated offence.

By order of Brigadier General Pope :

SPEED BUTLER,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

The purpose of this order seems to me plainly enough indicated. It was necessary to furnish alike to Union men and secessionists a common object, upon which they could cordially agree, and to the accomplishment of which their joint efforts could be directed. That object was the preservation of their personal liberty and the security of their property. Whatever may have been their sympathies in relation to the rebellion, it is very certain that nine-tenths of the respectable property-holders in Missouri never had any purpose to take an active part on one side or the other. This great majority of the people I wished in some way to induce to remain quietly at home, to observe and help execute the civil laws, and to enforce, by some means, the departure from among them of all the restless and dissatisfied persons who wished to be personal actors in the war. Such a result would have left north Missouri in peace—a peace to the preservation of which every man was bound by the strongest motives of personal and pecuniary interest, and which would at once have freed a considerable military force for service where it was greatly needed. The arrangements indicated in this order were at once carried out, and for a time the results were all that could be desired. At this early period of the rebellion, however, it is not strange that people the most loyal and best disposed should contemplate with disapproval and indignation any curtailment of the entire liberty they had always enjoyed, and should have looked upon this order as tyrannical and unwise. It was not long before such opinions began to circulate, and violent partisans speedily availed themselves of the opportunity to have the order set aside. Union men of high position began to complain of the order, asserting that it was unjust and tyrannical; that it placed Union men on the same footing with secessionists; that secessionists alone should come under its provisions, &c., &c. Complaints of substantially the same character were made by men who, although sympathizing with the rebellion, had no purpose to break the peace in any manner, and thought it hard that they should be held responsible for the acts of a few violent and lawless men in their midst. It is needless to say that the whole purpose of the order was to secure a joint action of Unionists and secessionists for the preservation of peace, through a common interest and under a common penalty. If either party were excepted the whole plan must of necessity fall to the ground. The opinions and active personal influence of these men began speedily to be felt among the people. The hot-headed on both sides were not slow to take advantage of it to produce the state of things which they were seeking. At length a blow was struck to test the value of this order and my purpose to execute it literally. The experiment was made by firing into a train on the Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad, in the county of Marion. I immediately called upon the committee of safety to act in the matter; but as they did not respond promptly, I sent a military force into the county with orders to quarter upon the people and to levy upon the county for supplies in accordance with the order. This act brought the matter to an issue, but by this time mistaken counsels and unfounded representations had so influenced the department commander that the execution of my order was suspended indefinitely. It was enough—the whole scheme, which I had hoped would protect the peaceful, law-abiding citizens of north Missouri from the horrors of irresponsible military domination, fell to the ground. I need only point to the history of Missouri for the last four years for a fulfilment of my worst anticipations. It affords, in its

ruined towns, its devastated fields, and its impoverished and heart-broken people, the most graphic and melancholy illustration of every foreboding of evil which I then entertained. I append hereto a copy of a letter dated August 1, 1861, addressed to the Hon. I. H. Sturgeon, a prominent citizen of Missouri, and then, as now, president of the North Missouri railroad. The letter, although short and hurriedly written, indicates, as far as was then judicious, the views and purposes entertained by me at the time, and fully set forth in this paper:

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF NORTH MISSOURI,  
*Mexico, August 3, 1861.*

DEAR SIR: Your letter of the 1st instant is before me. I will, with great satisfaction, reply to your inquiries, as well from personal regard for yourself as that it gives me the opportunity to explain clearly what few persons in your city seem to comprehend.

When I arrived in north Missouri to assume the command, I found the whole country in commotion, bridges and railroad tracks destroyed, or in great danger of being so, and the entire population in a state of excitement and apprehension unwarranted by the facts. My first object has been to restore quiet and secure the safety of public and private property. The only persons in arms, so far as I could learn, were a few reckless and violent men, in parties of twenty or thirty, who were wandering about, committing depredations upon all whose sentiments were displeasing, and keeping this whole region in apprehension and uneasiness. I found that those who had been quiet had been no more; had taken no part to prevent the outrages committed by these lawless bands, and had not even been willing to give information by which they could be apprehended or prevented from engaging in hostile and lawless acts against the peace of the country. So soon as these marauders found that troops were approaching, which they easily did, from the very persons who ask for protection, they dispersed, each man going to his home, and, in many cases, that home in the very town occupied by the troops. Parties of these men would leave their houses and families in the immediate vicinity and engage in forays upon Union men and their property in the immediate neighborhood, being sure that those even most opposed to their lawless conduct would carefully shield them from exposure. The mass of the people stood quietly looking on at a few men in their midst committing all sorts of atrocious acts, and neither attempted to prevent them, nor to give any information by which they could have been prevented and punished. This was the actual state of things in a large part of the eastern counties of northern Missouri. When troops were sent out against these marauders they found only men quietly working in the field or sitting in their offices, who, as soon as the backs of the federal soldiers were turned, were again in arms and menacing the peace. To such an extent had this gone that there was no safety of persons or property in north Missouri except to the secessionists, and the Union men were too timid or too much in the minority to offer the least resistance. My first object was to restore peace and safety, so that the forces under my command could be removed from the vicinity of the settlements, and to do this with the least bloodshed, the least distress to quiet persons, and the least exasperation of feeling among the people. Two courses were open to me to effect this desirable result: The first was to put in motion in all parts of this region small bodies of troops, to hunt out the parties in arms against the peace, and follow them to their homes, or places of retreat, wherever they might be. This course would have led to frequent and bloody encounters, to searching of houses, and arrests in many cases of innocent persons, and would only have resulted in spreading the apprehension of distress over districts hitherto quiet. I was and am satisfied that the people of the counties in north Missouri are abundantly able to keep peace among themselves, and this is all I ask or exact from them. It is certainly their interest that they should do so. To spare effusion of blood, destruction of life or property,

and harassing and oftentimes indiscriminating outrage upon the people, I have determined to present to the people, if possible, some common inducement to preserve the peace in their own midst. The common bond is their property, always in my power, though the owner might be beyond my reach. I believed, as I do now, that as soon as it was felt that only by preserving peace and quiet among themselves, and not molesting public or private property, there would result security of person and property, and the power to pursue unmolested their several avocations, Union men and secessionists would alike engage in putting a stop to lawless and predatory bands, and that the persons themselves, who had joined these armed marauders, would soon cease their forays and abandon their organizations when they discovered that they had no sympathizers at home, and that every act they committed hostile to the peace of the country was a blow not only at their own property and safety, but also at that of their own friends and relatives. Certainly, loss of property is not to be weighed for a moment with loss of life or personal liberty, and as I believe firmly that the policy I have adopted will bring peace and quiet to north Missouri, with the least destruction of human life, I intend to enforce it promptly and vigorously in all cases. Security of property and the absence of the military depend simply upon the people of north Missouri keeping the peace among themselves, as in times past, and if they fail to do so they will be less wise than most of their race. I have not the slightest disposition to play the tyrant to any man on earth. I only ask the people of north Missouri to keep the peace and respect the rights of others in their own midst, and this I mean to exact from them if I have the power. If they will only do this, as they have done in times past, and can easily do now, they will neither see me nor my command. I sincerely hope that these views may be satisfactory to you, and remain, very truly, yours, &c.,

JOHN POPE.

J. H. STURGEON, Esq., *St. Louis, Missouri.*

The moment it was known that my order would not be executed, all the violent and reckless elements in north Missouri at once resumed full sway. Bands of secessionists and of Union men were organized all over that section of the State, and commenced an indiscriminate warfare upon each other and upon the people. It was not long before all distinction between friends and foes was forgotten and the necessities or the inclinations of the depredators were gratified at the expense of the community. No man, whatever his age, pursuit, or respectability, was safe on the public highway or in his own house. His family was likely at any moment to be outraged, and his property destroyed or taken possession of by these wandering bands of midnight robbers. Distress and dismay invaded every fireside in the country. Large numbers of United States troops were thrown into the State, but divided into small detachments, often without discipline or experience, and in many instances they added to the consternation and suffering. A large force of militia was organized by the provisional governor, and sworn into the United States service, but they only added fuel to the flame. For four long years Missouri was delivered over to the supreme control of irresponsible and violent military officers, whose labors at outrage and injustice were powerfully assisted by the numerous gangs of outlaws which infested every part of the State. Every commander of the smallest detachment was supreme within his limited jurisdiction, and the lives and the property of the people were at his absolute disposal. No civil courts were held, no process of law executed or even issued. No protection whatever was given to any of the rights or privileges of American citizens, except what was granted at his whim or his judgment by some small military satrap. So great and so humiliating were these abuses, and so much were the people of Missouri broken down and dispirited, that, at this date, August 1, 1865, when there is no longer a handful of troops in the State, and not a vestige of military rule left, any drunken worthless vagabond can go into the



interior, and by simply proclaiming that he has the authority of the general commanding the department "to look into matters," without even a paper or evidence of any description that he speaks the truth, he can rob and steal, or commit any outrage whatever, and not a citizen or civil officer will dare to lift his hand against him. This has actually occurred within the last month. The result of such a system upon the people of Missouri is sadly illustrated by the degradation and despair which could bring American citizens to submit to such humiliation. Not less than fifteen thousand United States soldiers have at any time been retained in Missouri to accomplish these deplorable results; a force which, if properly applied, would have been sufficient to decide the result of any great battle of the war.

It is not my purpose to censure any one for the unfortunate results of the policy or want of policy which has so cursed the people of that State. Everything was so new and so strange in the beginning of the rebellion that the wisest men might well be at a loss to decide upon judicious measures. It seems to me, however, that a grave mistake was committed at the outset in Missouri, which led inevitably to the disasters and misfortunes which have afflicted that people. Everything which has occurred can be readily traced back to this first mistake which, once made, admitted not of repair. A wise system at the beginning might and probably would have averted all or nearly all of these calamities, but at no subsequent time was it possible to bring back a people to a condition of things which would have made the same measures applicable which at the beginning might have been applied with success. I do by no means mean to claim that the measures inaugurated in my order would have spared the people of Missouri the terrible evils which succeeded its abrogation by superior authority. No man could say so much with confidence. But the more I have considered the matter in the light of events which from day to day have marked the history of the State, the more satisfied I am that, at the time and under the circumstances, the measures I proposed were wise and judicious, and might have led the people of north Missouri through the "valley of the shadow of death" with less suffering and less humiliation. Certainly anything worse than has befallen the State is not conceivable.

On the 30th of August General Frémont declared martial law in Missouri, and the whole State, in all the relations between its citizens, passed completely under the control of the military authorities. In St. Louis, where the headquarters of the military department were established, and where many if not all the civil officers were loyal men, a sort of administration of civil law was kept up; but as judges, jurors, and lawyers were at any moment subject to arrest by provost marshals, and their decisions at any time likely to be overruled, or the cases withdrawn from their courts by the same military functionary, civil law was so loosely and irregularly administered as to afford little satisfactory protection of person or property. In the interior of the State there was little attempt made anywhere to carry on civil government. The numerous military provost marshals with their armies of assistants and followers ruled supreme, and being in authority, above and beyond the reach of any civil process, exercised their full pleasure. No man who was outraged or wronged dared to complain to any authority high enough to redress the injury done him, lest, if he should fail in having the provost marshal entirely removed, worse things should befall him. The troops under my command in north Missouri were scattered over the State in detachments of various strength, and occupied themselves vigorously but fruitlessly in trying to break up or capture the bands of rebel guerrillas. Whenever it was possible they used the services of Union organizations to assist them, but even the very limited discipline of volunteer troops in Missouri was so distasteful to these independent organizations that they did not serve in conjunction with any degree of zeal or satisfaction. To be restrained from committing any outrage whatever, for the gratification of personal revenge

or malevolence, seemed to them tyrannical, and they did not long continue to act with the United States troops, except in cases where apprehension of a superior force of rebel guerillas forced them to unite their irregular bands with bodies of troops for temporary safety. Missouri became a pandemonium the like of which has not been seen in this country, and I trust may never be seen again. Meantime the battle of Wilson's creek had been fought and lost by the Union troops, and the heroic General Lyon had laid down his life in the cause of his country. His gallant little army, forced to give back by overwhelming numbers, had retreated from Wilson's creek to Rolla with all its trains and munitions of war, too firm, even in retreat, to be molested by the enemy. Sterling Price, with an irregular and almost entirely unorganized force, which was every day augmented by recruits flocking to it from all parts of the State, encouraged by the defeat and death of Lyon, began leisurely and at his ease, but with great blowing of trumpets and public announcements of his purpose, to move north towards the Missouri river with a view to invest Lexington, then garrisoned by about three thousand Union troops. It is safe to say that nine-tenths of the people south of the Missouri river knew perfectly his object and his movements and positions, from day to day, during the long weeks occupied in marching from Wilson's creek to the Missouri river. It would be out of place for me to attempt any account of the investment and fall of Lexington further than to correct a serious error, rather implied than stated, in a history of the rebellion, by Hon. Horace Greeley, lately published. It is intimated in that work that I was in some manner at fault for not re-enforcing Lexington in time, and that I had orders from General Frémont to that end. Such an impression is wholly unfounded. At the time, that portion of Missouri was not under my command. More than three weeks before Price reached Lexington I had been requested by General Frémont to proceed to northeast Missouri, and personally to look into matters in that region. From there I had returned to the line of the Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad, had partially dispersed the strong guerilla band under Martin Green, and was occupied in clearing the Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad from strong bands of outlaws which had broken it up. I reached Platte bridge, in the vicinity of St. Joseph, on the 14th of September, a large rebel force in that town retiring before my advance in the direction of the Missouri river, above Lexington. Having reopened the railroad, I despatched the entire force under my command in pursuit of the retreating rebels—one column from St. Joseph, the other from Utica, seventy-one miles farther east, to unite near the Missouri river at Blue mills. After beating or driving the rebel force across the Missouri river, these united columns were ordered to proceed to a point opposite Lexington, and if it were necessary and practicable to cross the river and report to the commanding officer at Lexington. As Price was known to be moving towards the Missouri river before I left St. Louis, and as various rumors and reports of his progress reached me from time to time through citizens of the country, I presumed that the force I sent might not be unacceptable. I had nothing, however, to do with providing re-enforcements for Lexington, had no control over it or its garrison, and had not received from General Frémont a word of information or any order whatever concerning it. It was not until I got back to Macon, the junction of the Hannibal and St. Joseph and North Missouri railroad, one hundred and thirty-five miles east of St. Joseph, on the 16th of September, that I heard anything definite or official concerning matters in the vicinity of Lexington. It was through a telegraphic despatch to General Sturgis from General Frémont, which the former showed me at Macon, that I first knew of any imminent peril to Lexington. Sturgis had orders to go to its relief, and was pushing in that direction with about a thousand men. I at once sent back orders to overtake the columns I had despatched the day before in the direction of Lexington, directing them to push forward with all speed to that place, as it was in serious peril; but Lexington had fallen before my messenger could

reach them. It would not have been possible for them to cross the Missouri river, even had they reached the crossing opposite Lexington in time, as the enemy had captured the ferry-boats some days before, and closely invested the garrison. Whatever may have been the failures or mistakes which caused the surrender of Lexington, I had no part whatever in them. I append the telegrams sent and received at the time, to show that I neither received orders nor information about Lexington from General Frémont or any of his staff; that I was nowhere in the vicinity of the place, and had no communication with it:

PLATTE RIVER BRIDGE,  
September 15, 1861.

Major General J. C. FRÉMONT, *St. Louis*:

Road to Hannibal open except to Platte river. Two thousand five hundred secessionists retreating southward. I have sent a column of one thousand men and three pieces of artillery, under Colonel Smith, and the Iowa regiment and one hundred and fifty irregular horse, to march rapidly from Liberty, and form junction with Smith. There is no doubt, in my judgment, that the large train of plunder will be captured, but the rebel forces will probably disperse, and, unless General Smith can surprise them, will escape.

JOHN POPE, *Brigadier General*.

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HUDSON, MISSOURI, September 16, 1861.

Major General FRÉMONT, *St. Louis*:

Presuming, from General Sturgis's despatches, that there is imminent want of troops at Lexington, I have despatched Colonel Smith to move forward to that place with sixteenth Illinois and third Iowa and three pieces of artillery from Liberty as soon as he completed the object of his expedition. He reaches Liberty to-morrow morning, and will accomplish his purpose very soon after. His pursuit will lead him in direction of Lexington. I have used the three thousand irregular troops under Colonels Trainor and Edwards, mentioned in yesterday's despatch, to replace Smith and Iowa regiments on line. Tindall is back at Chillicothe. There will be no danger in north Missouri. My presence at Canton and Keokuk is imperative, and must be there as soon as possible.

JNO. POPE, *Brigadier General*.

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PALMYRA, September 16, 1861.

Major General FRÉMONT, *St. Louis*:

From papers just handed me I learn for the first time that important matters are occurring at Lexington. The troops I sent to Lexington will be there day after to-morrow, and consist of two full regiments of infantry, four pieces of artillery, one hundred and fifty irregular horse. These, with the Ohio regiment, which will reach there Thursday, will make a re-enforcement of four thousand (4,000) men and four pieces of artillery. Do you wish me to come down to St. Louis or go to Canton and Keokuk to finish matters in this section?

The following force along this road:

At Hannibal, —; at Kansas, 480; 320 of the twentieth Illinois at Hudson; 450 of Foster's men at Boonville; 650 of Morgan's regiment at St. Joseph; coming east, 3,000 Iowa and Missouri irregular troops. Please answer this at Quincy.

JOHN POPE, *Brigadier General*.

Immediately after the surrender of Lexington, which was made on the 19th of September, 1861, General Frémont began to throw forward to Jefferson City, for an active campaign against Price, all the regiments which had been encamped around St. Louis for several weeks previously. The whole force, however, was unorganized. Only the regimental organizations made before the regiments reached St. Louis were in existence. At Jefferson City these regiments were assigned in orders to constitute brigades and divisions, but many of them were scattered at remote points, and some of them did not join the brigades to which they were assigned until sometime after General Frémont was relieved from command of the western department. The second division, so designated in orders, was given to me. There were only fragments of it together, and other regiments belonging to it were stationed at remote points, far beyond my reach and beyond communication, except by telegraph through St. Louis and by way of Springfield and Quincy, Illinois, and Palmyra, Missouri. I append the order issued by General Frémont for the organization and distribution of his force:

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,

*St. Louis, September 24, 1861.*

SIR: For a basis of operations the army will take the following position: Right wing, second division, Acting Major General Pope, headquarters at Boonville, covering the line between Boonville and Palestine, and keeping communication with centre, fifth division, Acting Major General McKinstry, headquarters at Syracuse. Left wing, first division, Major General Hunter, headquarters Versailles. Advance guard, third division, Acting Major General Sigel, headquarters Georgetown, keeping communication with troops stationed at Marshall. Reserve, fourth division, Acting Major General Ashboth, headquarters Tipton. The bridge over the Osage river at Osage City and the crossings at Tusculum and Linn creek are to be occupied by the division of General Hunter. The first Kansas regiment, of General Pope's division, is directed to proceed from Hannibal at once to Chillicothe, re-enforcing our troops at that place, and preventing, in this manner, the enemy from crossing Grand river. General Pope, after arriving at Boonville, will open communication by way of Glasgow and Brunswick, and add re-enforcements in his discretion to the post at Chillicothe. The commander of the troops which have already advanced to Marshall will also open communication with the troops at Chillicothe by way of Brunswick. The commanders of the different divisions will so order their troops as to occupy their designated stations in the quickest time and by the shortest possible route. It is also recommended to obtain by every mode, especially by strong scouting parties, all possible information in regard to the strength and movements of the enemy. And it is especially enjoined upon them to send daily reports to the commanding general whether any movements have been made by the enemy, or their own forces, or not, and also to communicate, daily, with the commanders of adjoining divisions.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHAUNCEY McKEEVER,

*Assistant Adjutant General.*

Brigadier General J——,

*Acting Major General, Commanding Fifth Division.*

My headquarters were fixed at Boonville, on the Missouri river. Price was still in the immediate vicinity of Lexington, — miles above Boonville, when I landed from a steamboat with one regiment on the 30th of September.

It is unnecessary to pursue the history of the campaign which terminated at Springfield, Missouri, where General Frémont was relieved from command by orders received on the 4th of November. His letters and despatches to me at the time are appended:

SPRINGFIELD, Mo., *November 1, 1861.*

GENERAL: I am directed by the general commanding to inform you that he has sent duplicate despatches to you, urging your moving forward with the greatest alacrity to join the advanced corps at this place. This communication has been sent to you in the uncertainty of the others having reached you, and to report that it is imperatively necessary that you should come here by forced marches. Mr. Jullan, who bears this to you, a well informed and reliable guide, is directed to move with and guide you.

Very respectfully,

J. H. EATON,  
*Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

Major General J. POPE,  
*Commanding Second Division, en route.*

SPRINGFIELD, Mo., *November 2, 1861.*

GENERAL: Your despatch of this day *en route* is received. General Frémont directs me to say, that having been relieved from the command of the western department, and having relinquished command in orders in the hands of Major General Hunter, when you reach here the control of the public service at this point will fall upon you; you should, therefore, he says, push on to reach here with all despatch.

Respectfully,

J. H. EATON,  
*Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

Acting Major General JOHN POPE, U. S. A.,  
*Commanding Second Division U. S. forces, en route.*

In relation to the withdrawal of General Hunter to Rolla, and the line of the Pacific railroad west of Jefferson City, I suppose that I can give little information that is not already in possession of the public. The withdrawal was made at the suggestion of the President of the United States, from whom a letter to that effect had been received by General Hunter, which was read to a council of war which he assembled at Springfield, a day or two after he assumed the command. While the letter from the President did not convey a positive order to General Hunter, as to his movements, yet the suggestions made were so strong and the wishes of the President so manifest, that I do not well see how General Hunter could have acted otherwise than in conformity to them. It was manifest that Price would retreat as soon as we advanced on him from Springfield. No provision whatever had been made for such a campaign, even as far as Springfield, a fact sufficiently indicated by the necessity I was under, as soon as I reached that place, to empty my wagons nearly entirely of provisions for the sick men in the hospital at Springfield, who had been thirty-six hours without food, according to the terms of the application made to me for supplies. Although I marched back to the Pacific railroad with all speed, I only succeeded in getting there without great suffering by meeting half way a small train which I had sent back from Humansville for rations ten days before, with orders to load and follow to Springfield by forced marches. One-half of this train I was obliged to leave behind me, when I met it, to furnish provisions to the division coming after me, only keeping enough to reach Otterville, on the railroad, by rapid marching. Had we gone far south of Springfield after Price, I do not believe we would have been able to get back without great suffering and loss of life from starvation. By the time General Hunter reached the railroad, he was superseded in the command by General Halleck.

About one-half the army that had retired from Springfield was assembled along the Pacific railroad from its western terminus (Sedalia) to Jefferson City. Of this force I was placed in command, and occupied with it a section of Missouri officially known as the district of central Missouri. Shortly after the withdrawal of our forces from Springfield, Price began to move north slowly and cautiously, and finally, by the first of December he was encamped on the Osage river, at and around Osceola. His army and the force under my command were separated by about seventy miles of beautiful prairie country, everywhere practicable for artillery and wagons. Price issued a proclamation, inviting the young men of Missouri to join his standard. His great personal popularity and commanding influence in the State produced powerful effects for mischief, and thousands of young men organized in squads, large and small, in various counties of the State, north as well as south of the Missouri river, and began to make their way to his camp, carrying with them all the supplies they could procure by robbery, and transported in the wagons which they seized all over the country. As long as Price remained so near at hand as his camp on the Osage the excitement continued, and his irregular force was for a time daily augmented by the arrival of small parties from every county in the State. I append hereto several letters on the subject.

SYRACUSE, December 8, 1861.

Major General HALLECK: Steen's division of Price's force crossed Osage three days since, and scattered along the river above and below Osceola. Price on south side still. Returns of his force show eight thousand men. It is undoubtedly his purpose to scatter most of force in the counties adjoining the Osage on north side for subsistence. One battalion of Steen's division descended the river towards Warsaw. If it be desired to keep Price's force on south side of Osage an advance in force towards Clinton will be necessary.

JNO. POPE,

*Brigadier General Commanding.*

SYRACUSE, December 9, 1861.

Major General HALLECK: Detachment returned from Warsaw this morning. Drove in enemy's pickets from points ten miles this side. Found no force in Warsaw. Confirms information that Steen is on north side of Osage. Strong pickets of enemy from Bolivar to Osceola to cover his rear. Whole region south of Osage devastated by Price. It was understood by people at Warsaw and along the road that this detachment was our advanced guard moving on Springfield. The people understood that it is the determination of Price to force his way to Missouri river. (Doubtful.) No news of importance from the front. I shall not move from Tipton until I hear from you.

JNO. POPE,

*Brigadier General Commanding.*

SYRACUSE, December 11, 1861.

Major General HALLECK: I transmit a number of letters captured with the mail carrier. There is a large number of them, but in substance they convey the same information, viz., that Price's force is disintegrating; that he has short of ten thousand men now with him; that recruiting is very slow; that unless he can raise five regiments to enter the confederate service, he cannot get a commission in their army, &c.

I am satisfied that a rapid movement would utterly destroy his army, either as the result of an action or of a retreat. His army cannot possibly survive another retreat south. His men are only kept together now by the speedy termination of their terms of service, and the prospect of getting home by New Year's day. They will not be led south again in any large number. With the delightful weather we have had, and which promises to continue for some time, and the good roads, such a movement would consume but a few days, and would destroy in a moment all hope of recruiting for Price in this whole region.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT CENTRAL MISSOURI,  
*Syracuse, December 11, 1861.*

Major General HALLECK: The constantly increasing disturbances in all this region, occasioned by the efforts of Price's recruiting officers and straggling parties of guerillas, exhibited in the general alarm, the robbing of peaceful inhabitants, and the outrages of every description perpetrated in every village, hamlet, and farm-house, are caused directly by the encouragement and countenance given to such acts by the presence of the enemy in such force on the Osage. Once driven from that position, and forced back into the region of country which he has so recently laid waste, all encouragement would be withdrawn from his adherents and sympathizers now disposed to enlist in his army.

We can march from the railroad in this vicinity with a full and well appointed army of fifteen thousand men and forty pieces of artillery, and still leave force enough along the railroad to guard all the public stores and protect the road itself from any damage.

I would respectfully suggest, therefore, that to quiet all the disturbances and uneasiness engendered by the presence of so large a hostile force in this region, an advance in force against Price be made as soon as possible. For this army of fifteen thousand men there is abundance of transportation and of supplies, and they constitute a force large enough, considering the difference of organization, discipline, and arms, to deal with Price easily, even had he the fifty thousand men he calls for in his proclamation. Most of his men are only armed with shot-guns, and have scarcely the pretence of an organization. He has, perhaps, four or five thousand tolerable troops, armed with muskets, and about thirty pieces of artillery, few of which can be properly served, and some of which are rough iron pieces, made in Missouri.

Our forces here are in such condition that they can march with two hours' notice. Each regiment has its own transportation, and there is nothing necessary except to throw into the wagons camp equipage and rations. Should such a movement be intrusted to me, I would respectfully suggest the following plan:

The first object to be kept in view is, that the enemy, to some extent, must be surprised, in order that he may be brought to an engagement. For this purpose I would propose that, for several days before the real movement was made, strong bodies of cavalry with some artillery be sent forward on the Warsaw and Clinton roads to force in their pickets, reconnoitre in force, and then return; that this operation be repeated several times, and that finally, under cover of such a movement, the whole force be rapidly thrown forward to the Osage at Warsaw. I believe by proper management and vigor, the advanced division of this army could cross the Osage before the news of the movement could reach the enemy. If he then attempted to retreat to the southwest, he must at least lose his baggage train and supplies. While his line of retreat would be threatened, if not

intercepted, by such a movement, ours would be open to the railroad at almost any point east of Otterville.

I, however, do not suppose for a moment that he will stand, unless retreat is cut off, and in either event the disturbances in this section will be ended. Such a campaign need not last more than twenty days, if so long, and the forces here would enter upon it with a feeling very different from that of going into winter quarters on the Lamine.

I submit these views to you with much diffidence, and should probably not do so at all, but that I am impressed with the belief that neither secession in Missouri nor Price's army can survive another retreat of that army towards Arkansas.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT CENTRAL MISSOURI,

*December 16, 1861.*

COLONEL: To-morrow morning at 10 o'clock I wish you to march in the direction of Knob Noster, keeping a sharp lookout on your left as far as you can towards the road leading from Warrensburg to Clinton; when you get within three miles or so of Knob Noster you will halt and await further orders. I will be in the neighborhood of Warrensburg, most likely, to-morrow night. The enemy, about four thousand strong, is in the neighborhood of Warrensburg. Your movement is designed to cut them off from getting into the Clinton or Warsaw road east of Warrensburg. Be very cautious in your movements, and keep your flanks and front well protected by scouts; keep your train and command well closed up, and your force ready for action at any moment. If you need re-enforcement despatch to Colonel Turner at Sedalia.

JNO. POPE,  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

On the 14th of December he (General Halleck) directed me to move a part of my force from Sedalia in the direction of Lexington (the opposite direction from Price) for the purpose of trying to intercept a large body of recruits for Price's army, said to be moving towards Osceola from the Missouri river. By telegraph, I was afterward permitted to direct my march from Sedalia to the southwest, so as to occupy a position half-way between Sedalia and Osceola, on the great road usually travelled from Lexington south. For the details of the movement and its results, I refer to the appended copy of my report:

REPORT OF MOVEMENT OF TROOPS.—CAPTURE OF PRISONERS AT BLACK-WATER.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CENTRAL MISSOURI,

*Otterville, December 23, 1861.*

Captain JOHN C. KELTON: I have the honor to report that having replaced by troops from Lamine the garrison of Sedalia, I marched from that place at 3 o'clock on Sunday, the 15th instant, with a column of infantry, cavalry, and artillery numbering about four thousand men. The first brigade was commanded by Colonel Jeff. C. Davis, Indiana volunteers; the second, by Colonel F. Steele, eighth Iowa regiment. The object of the movement was to interpose between Price's army on the Osage, and the recruits, escort, and supplies on their way south from the Missouri river. This body of the enemy was represented to be between five and six thousand strong, with a large train of supplies



I encamped on the 15th eleven miles southwest of Sedalia. That the enemy might be thoroughly misled as to the destination of the expedition, it was given out that the movement was upon Warsaw, and the troops pursued the road to that place several miles beyond Sedalia. I threw forward on Clinton four companies of the first Missouri cavalry, under Major Hubbard, with orders to watch any movements from Osceola, to prevent any reconnoissance of our main column, and to intercept any messengers to the enemy at Osceola.

On the 16th I pushed forward by forced march twenty-three miles, with my whole force, and occupied, at sunset, a position between the direct road from Warrensburg to Clinton and the road by Chilhowee, which latter is the road heretofore pursued by returning soldiers and by recruits. Shortly after sunset the advance, consisting of four companies of the first Iowa cavalry, under Major Florence, captured the enemy's pickets at Chilhowee, and learned that he was encamped in force, about thirty-two hundred strong, six miles north of that town. After resting the horses and men for a couple of hours, I threw forward ten companies of cavalry and a section of artillery, under Lieutenant Colonel Brown, seventh Missouri regiment, in pursuit, and followed with my whole force, posting the main body between Warrensburg and Rose Hill, to support the pursuing column. I, at the same time, re-enforced Major Hubbard with two companies of Merrill's horse, and directed him, in order to secure our flank in the pursuit, to push forward as far as possible towards Osceola. This officer executed his duty with distinguished ability and vigor, driving back and capturing the pickets and one entire company of the enemy's cavalry, with tents, baggage, and wagons. One of the pickets and two wagons were captured within the lines of Rains's division, encamped north of the Osage river.

The column under Lieutenant Colonel Brown continued the pursuit vigorously all night of the 16th, all day of the 17th, and part of the night of the same day, his advance guard, consisting of Foster's company of Ohio cavalry, and a detachment of thirty of the fourth regular cavalry, occupying Johnstown in the course of the night. The enemy began to scatter as soon as the pursuit became vigorous, disappearing in every direction in the bushes, and by every bye-path driving their wagons into farm yards remote from the road and throwing out the loads. As their wagons were all two-horse wagons of the country, and had been in fact taken by force from the farm-houses, it was impossible to identify them. When our pursuit reached Johnstown, about midnight on the 17th, the enemy, reduced to about five hundred, scattered completely, one portion fleeing precipitately towards Butler, and the other towards Papinsville. The main body of my command moved slowly towards Warrensburg, awaiting the return of the force under Lieutenant Colonel Brown, which proceeded from Johnstown to scour the country south of Grand river to the neighborhood of Clinton. In these operations sixteen wagons, loaded with tents and supplies, and one hundred and fifty prisoners were captured. The enemy's force was thoroughly dispersed.

On the morning of the 18th Lieutenant Colonel Brown's force rejoined the command. Knowing that there must still be a large force of the enemy north of us, I moved forward slowly on the 18th towards Warrensburg, and when near that town the spies and scouts I had sent, before marching from Sedalia in the direction of Lexington, Waverly, and Arrow Rock, reported to me that a large force was marching from the two latter places, and would encamp that night at mouth of Clear creek, just south of Milford. I posted the main body of my command near Warrensburg and Knob Noster, to close all outlet to the south between those two points, and despatched seven companies of cavalry, five of the Iowa first and two of the fourth regular cavalry, afterwards re-enforced by another company of regular cavalry, and a section of artillery, all under command of Colonel J. C. Davis, Indiana volunteers, to march on the town of Milford, so as to turn the enemy's left and rear, and intercept his re-

treat to the southeast, at the same time directing Major Marshall, with Merrill's regiment of horse, to march from Warrensburg on the same point, turning the enemy's right and rear, and forming a junction with Colonel Davis. The main body of my command occupied a point four miles south, and ready to advance at a moment's notice, or to intercept the enemy's retreat south. Colonel Davis marched promptly and vigorously with the forces under his command, and at a late hour in the afternoon came upon the enemy encamped in the wooded bottom land on the west side of Blackwater, opposite the mouth of Clear creek. His pickets were immediately driven in across the stream, which was deep, miry, and impassable, except by a long, narrow bridge which the enemy occupied in force, as is believed, under Colonel Magoffin. Colonel Davis brought forward his force, and directed that the bridge be carried by assault. The two companies of the fourth regular cavalry being in the advance, under the command, respectively, of Lieutenant Gordon and Lieutenant Amory, were designated for that service, and were supported by the five companies of the Iowa first. Lieutenant Gordon of the fourth cavalry led the charge in person with the utmost gallantry and vigor, carried the bridge in fine style, and immediately formed his company on the opposite side. He was promptly followed by the other companies. The force of the enemy posted at the bridge retreated precipitately over a narrow open space into the woods, where his whole force was posted. The two companies of the fourth cavalry formed in line at once, advanced upon the enemy, and were received with a heavy volley of small-arms, muskets, rifles, and shot-guns. One man was killed and eight wounded by this discharge, with one exception all belonging to company D, fourth regular cavalry, Lieutenant Gordon. Lieutenant Gordon himself received several balls through his cap. Our forces still continuing to press forward, and the enemy finding his retreat south and west cut off, and that he was in presence of a large force, and at best could only prolong the contest a short time, surrendered at discretion. His force, reported by the colonel commanding, consisted of parts of two regiments of infantry and three companies of cavalry, numbering in all thirteen hundred men, amongst whom there were three colonels, (Robinson, Alexander, and Magoffin,) one lieutenant colonel, (Robinson,) one major, (Harris,) and fifty-one commissioned company officers. About five hundred horses and mules, seventy-three wagons, heavily loaded with powder, lead, tents, subsistence stores, and supplies of various kinds, fell into our hands, as also a thousand stand of arms.

The whole force captured, with their train, was marched into the camp of the main body, reaching there about midnight. Many arms were thrown away by the enemy in the bushes, or creek, when he surrendered, and have not yet been found. It was impossible to furnish any accurate account of the number of prisoners, arms, or horses, when I telegraphed, *vs* they surrendered just at dark, and were brought into camp at a late hour of the night. The weather was bitterly cold, and the troops marched as early as possible the next morning for Sedalia and Otterville. As the prisoners and arms were at once sent down to St. Louis, I have not yet had the opportunity of making any accurate count of them. The numbers as stated were reported to me by Colonel Robinson, their commander, by Colonel J. C. Davis, and by Major Torrence, first Iowa cavalry. The forces under Colonel Davis behaved with great gallantry, and the conduct of Colonel Davis himself was distinguished. I desire to present to your special notice Colonel J. C. Davis, Indiana volunteers, Major Hubbard, first Missouri cavalry, and Lieutenant Gordon, fourth regular cavalry. Both officers and men behaved well throughout. Within five days the infantry forces comprising this expedition have marched one hundred miles; the cavalry more than double that distance—have swept the whole country of the enemy west of Sedalia as far as Rose Hill, to a line within fifteen miles of the Osage, and have captured nearly fifteen hundred prisoners, twelve hundred stand of arms, nearly

one hundred wagons, and a large quantity of supplies. The march alone would do credit to old veterans, and it gives me pleasure to state that it has been performed with cheerfulness and alacrity. The troops reoccupied their camps at Sedalia and Otterville just one week after they marched out of them. A list of our killed and wounded will be transmitted as soon as possible. The enemy's loss is not known, and cannot yet be ascertained. Some of his dead were found on the field.

I am, captain, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT CENTRAL MISSOURI,  
*Otterville, December 22, 1861.*

Major General HALLECK: I beg to state, in reference to prisoners sent down in charge of Colonel Davis, that much care should be observed in the examination and disposal of them, which perhaps the provost marshal general in St. Louis may not give. Many of the prisoners are the most dangerous men in this whole State, and have been the most active and influential in fermenting disturbances. One in particular, a Dr. Smith, is a man of large wealth, owning nearly two hundred negroes. Some of them are not legitimately connected with the rebel forces, and not entitled to the right of prisoners of war. I suggest this to you lest some mistake be made in the office of the provost marshal, and men dangerous to the peace in a much greater degree, and with less excuse than officers or enlisted men, be turned loose on the country.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN POPE,  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

As this operation, though on a small scale, was the first success which had been met with anywhere by Union troops since the battle of Bull Run, it was widely circulated, and in Missouri had a most encouraging effect. The moment this movement was made by our forces in the direction of Osceola, Price broke up his camp in confusion and made a hasty retreat south as far as Springfield, leaving all of Missouri north of the Osage comparatively quiet. As soon as it was known that Price was retiring towards Springfield, General Curtis was sent from Rolla with a considerable force to pursue him. Curtis was re-enforced by a division from my command under Brigadier General Jefferson C. Davis. The battle of Pea Ridge, in April, finally freed Missouri for a long time from Price and the other rebel forces which had co-operated with him. The considerable force under my command in central Missouri was gradually withdrawn as Price retreated south; the larger portion was sent to re-enforce General Grant, then beginning his campaign against Forts Henry and Donelson. At this time the rebel armies in the west occupied a line of fortified positions from Bowling Green to Columbus, Kentucky. This line was broken by General Grant at Forts Henry and Donelson by the 16th of February, 1862. His operations compelled the evacuation of Columbus, on the east bank of the Mississippi river, which place, though strongly fortified, was turned, by the advance of Grant up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. This result had been for some time foreseen by the rebel generals, and General Beauregard, who had been assigned to command, selected Island No. 10, sixty miles below Columbus, as the strong place where the possession of the Mississippi river was first to be contested. The place was strongly fortified, mounted with one hundred and fifty pieces of heavy artillery and garrisoned by about nine thousand men. I do not mean that the island itself contained this garrison and these guns, but that they were disposed in the system of defences for the island, on and around it, on both banks of the Mississippi river. In order that the situation may be

fully understood, I append a map of the region in question, with a brief description of its topography, taken from my official report :

“Island No. 10 lies at the bottom of a great bend of the Mississippi, immediately north of it, being a long narrow promontory on the Missouri shore. The river from Island No. 10 flows northwest to New Madrid, where it again makes a great bend to the south as far as Tiptonville, (otherwise called Merriweather's landing,) so that opposite New Madrid also is a long narrow promontory. From Island No. 8, about four miles above Island No. 10, the distance across the land to New Madrid is six miles, while by the river it is fifteen. So likewise the distance overland from Island No. 10 to Tiptonville is five miles, while by water it is twenty-seven. Commencing at Hickman, a great swamp, which afterward, becomes Reelfoot lake, extends along the left bank of the Mississippi and discharges its waters into the river forty miles below Tiptonville, leaving the whole peninsula opposite New Madrid between it and the river. This peninsula, therefore, is itself an island, having the Mississippi river on three sides, and Reelfoot lake and the great swamps which border it on the other. A good road leads from Island No. 10 along the west bank of Reelfoot lake to Tiptonville. The only means of supply, therefore, for the forces at and around Island No. 10, on this peninsula, were by the river. When the river was blockaded at New Madrid, supplies and re-enforcements were landed at Tiptonville and conveyed across the neck of the peninsula by land. There was no communication with the interior except by a small flat-boat, which plied across Reelfoot lake, a distance of two miles, and that through an opening cut through cypress swamps for the purpose. Supplies and re-enforcements, or escape to any considerable extent, were therefore impracticable on the land side. One mile below Tiptonville begin the great swamps along the Mississippi on both sides, and no dry ground is to be found, except in occasional spots for at least sixty miles below. By intercepting the navigation of the river below Tiptonville, and commanding by heavy artillery the lowest point of dry ground near that place, the enemy would be at once cut off from his resources and prevented from escaping.”

New Madrid was manifestly the weak point of this system, and against that place our first operations were to be directed. I was recalled to St. Louis from central Missouri on the 14th of February, 1862, and on the 18th General Halleck pointed out to me the situation at New Madrid and Island No. 10, and directed me to organize and command a force for their reduction.

On the 19th I left St. Louis for Cairo, Illinois, which was then believed to be threatened from Columbus, with orders to assume command at that place in case any movement against it was made by the enemy, but as soon as apprehension of such a movement was at an end, to proceed with my operations against New Madrid.

On the 21st of February, finding that the fear of an advance upon Cairo was groundless, I left that place on a steamboat with a guard of one hundred and forty men, and landed on the Missouri shore at Commerce, thirty miles above. Commerce is the lowest point where the bluffs impinge upon the river between St. Louis and Helena, in Arkansas, and was on that account selected as a base of operations against New Madrid, from which place it is distant by land,—— miles. The bluffs, however, retreat directly to the west from Commerce, leaving an alluvial, swampy bottom land, at least thirty miles wide, along the river below that place. A dismal and almost impassable swamp, known as the Great Mingo swamp, extends all the way from Commerce to New Madrid. At that season of the year the banks of the Mississippi were overflowed, and the river spread out for miles on both sides, beyond its bed; the whole country for thirty miles west of the river was under water. At many places the water was eight or ten feet deep, and everywhere from one to five feet deep. An old embankment, upon which a corduroy road had been built, extended part of the way

to New Madrid, but the road had not been repaired for years, was in very bad condition, and in many places entirely impassable. The weather was cold and wet, a drizzling snow and rain was falling upon us, and adding to our almost insuperable difficulties from the time we marched from Commerce until we reached New Madrid. I can only account for the fact that the enemy attempted no opposition to our march by their belief that the country at that season of overflow was entirely impracticable.

I landed at Commerce on the night of the 21st of February, 1862, with the small escort I have mentioned. Regiments were sent me rapidly from St Louis, from Cincinnati, and from Cairo, most of them entirely raw, having had their arms first placed in their hands when they embarked on the steamer to join me. Few of them had ever served at all, and as they had never served together or been even brigaded, I was forced to make a complete organization of them at Commerce. In this difficult task I was so ably assisted by Generals Schuyler, Hamilton, Stanley, Palmer, and Granger, that within one week of the day I landed, almost alone, at Commerce, we began our march to New Madrid. This organization was the nucleus of the corps afterwards designated the army of the Mississippi, widely known and greatly distinguished in the west for its discipline, its gallantry, and its effectiveness, and for the soldierly and cordial good feeling which characterized both officers and men. It is not only proper, but it is my duty to say here, that during my whole experience in this war, I have never seen troops which would compare with this little army. Of the mobility and *esprit-de-corps*, of the courage in battle, and patience and fortitude under exposure, labor, and privation, and of the cordial harmony which existed among the officers and men, from the highest to the lowest, the services and the reputation of this little army from the beginning to the end of the war, whether acting together or separated and serving in other organizations are sufficient evidence. I cannot at this day think of them, and recall my association with them, as their commander, without emotions which could not be expressed in such a paper as this. As long as I live I shall never cease to remember them, nor fail to acknowledge the deep and lasting gratitude I owe them for the cordial support they gave me while I served with them, and for their earnest sympathy and unfaltering confidence during the most trying and darkest period of my life. I esteem it the highest honor to have belonged to this little army, and regard every officer and soldier connected with it as a personal friend, from whom neither time nor circumstances can ever estrange me. After incredible labor and exposure, wading through the swamps and in many places dragging wagons and artillery by hand, we appeared before New Madrid on the 3d of March, and at once drove in the pickets and outposts of the enemy and closely invested the place. I append hereto my official report of the operations against New Madrid, the reports of division and brigade commanders, and my official correspondence with General Halleck by letter and telegraph. I also attach hereto a return of the force engaged, which exhibits in detail its entire organization and every regiment of which it was composed.

For report of division and brigade commanders, see appendix.

#### REPORT OF OPERATIONS WHICH RESULTED IN THE CAPTURE OF NEW MADRID.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
New Madrid, March 14, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit, for the information of the general commanding the department, the following report of the operations which resulted in the capture of this place: I arrived before the town with the forces under my command on Monday the 3d instant. I found the place occupied by five regiments of infantry and several companies of artillery. One bastioned earthwork, mounting fourteen heavy guns, about a half a mile below the town,

and another irregular work, at the upper end of the town, mounting seven pieces of heavy artillery, together with lines of intrenchments between them, constituted the defensive works. Six gunboats, carrying from four to eight heavy guns each, were anchored along the shore between the upper and lower redoubts. The country is perfectly level for miles around the place, and as the river was so high that the guns of the gunboats looked directly over the banks, the approaches to the town for several miles were commanded by direct and cross fire from at least sixty guns of heavy calibre. It would not have been difficult to carry the intrenchments, but it would have been attended with heavy loss, and we should not have been able to hold the place half an hour, exposed to the destructive fire of the gunboats. As there seemed no immediate hope of the appearance of our own gunboats, it became necessary to bring down a few heavy guns by land to operate against those of the enemy. They were accordingly sent for, and meantime, forced reconnoissances were pushed over the whole ground, and into several parts of the town. Some brisk skirmishes resulted, in which the enemy invariably retreated precipitately. It was found impossible to induce them to trust any considerable force of their infantry outside of their intrenchments. As soon as I found it would be necessary to await the arrival of our heavy guns, I determined to occupy some point on the river below, and establish our small guns, if possible, in such position as to blockade the river, so far as transports were concerned, and to cut off supplies and re-enforcements for the enemy from below. Point Pleasant, twelve miles below, was selected, as being in a rich agricultural region, and being the terminus of the plank road from the interior of Arkansas. I accordingly threw forward Colonel Plummer, eleventh Missouri, to that point, with three regiments of infantry, three companies of cavalry, and a field battery of 10-pounder Parrott and rifled guns, with orders to make a lodgement on the river bank, to line the banks with rifle-pits for a thousand men, and to establish his artillery in sunk batteries of single pieces between the rifle-pits. The arrangement was made to present as small a mark as possible to the shells of the gunboats, and to render futile the use of round shot from their heavy guns. Colonel Plummer marched with all speed, and after some cannonading from gunboats which he found there, he succeeded in making a lodgement, constructing his batteries and rifle-pits, and occupying them in sufficient force to maintain them against any open assault. After repeated and persistent cannonading from the gunboats, the enemy found it impossible to dislodge him, and he maintained obstinately his position, and the blockade of the river to transports, during the whole of our operations. Meantime the enemy continued every day to re-enforce New Madrid from Island No. 10 until, on the 12th, they had nine thousand infantry, besides a considerable force of artillery, and nine gunboats. The fleet was commanded by Commodore Hollins, the land forces by Generals McCown, Stewart, and Gantt.

On the 11th the siege guns were delivered to Colonel Bissell, engineer regiment, who had been sent to Cairo for the purpose. They were at once shipped to Sikeston, reached here at sunset on the 12th, were placed in battery during the same night, within eight hundred yards of the enemy's main work, so as to command that and the river above it, and opened fire at daylight on the 13th, just thirty-four hours after they were received at Cairo. One brigade, consisting of the tenth and sixteenth Illinois, under Colonel Morgan, of the tenth, was detailed to cover the construction of the battery, and to work in the trenches. They were supported by Stanley's division, consisting of the twenty-seventh and thirty-ninth Ohio, under Colonel Groesbeck, and the forty-third and sixty-third Ohio, under Colonel Smith. Captain Mower, first United States infantry, with companies A and H of his regiment, was placed in charge of the siege guns. The enemy's pickets and grand guards were driven in by Colonel Morgan from the ground selected for the battery without firing a shot, although the enemy fired several volleys of musketry. The work was prosecuted in silence, and with

the utmost rapidity, until, at 3 a. m., two small redoubts connected by a curtain, and mounting the four heavy guns which had been sent me were completed, together with rifle-pits in front and on the flanks for two regiments of infantry. Our batteries opened as soon as the day dawned, and were replied to in front and on the flanks by the whole of the enemy's heavy artillery on land and water. As our supply of ammunition for heavy artillery was very limited, I directed Captain Mower to fire only occasionally at the enemy's land-batteries, and to concentrate all his fire upon the gunboats. Our guns were served by Captain Mower with vigor and skill, and in a few hours disabled several of the gunboats, and dismounted three of the heavy guns in the enemy's main work. Shortly after our batteries opened, one of the 24-pounder guns was struck in the muzzle by a round shot from the enemy's batteries and disabled. The cannonading was continued furiously all day by the gunboats and land batteries of the enemy, but without producing any impression upon us. Meantime, during the whole day, our trenches were being extended and advanced, as it was my purpose to push forward our heavy batteries in the course of the night to the bank of the river. While the cannonade was thus going on on our right, I instructed General Paine to make a demonstration against the intrenchments on our left, and supported his movement by Palmer's division. The enemy's pickets and grand guards were driven into his intrenchments, and the skirmishers forced their way close to the main ditch. A furious thunder storm began to rage about 11 o'clock that night, and continued almost without intermission, until morning. Just before daylight, General Stanley was relieved in the trenches with his division by General Hamilton. A few minutes after daylight a flag of truce approached our batteries with information that the enemy had evacuated his works. Small parties were at once advanced by General Hamilton to ascertain whether such were the fact, and Captain Mower, first United States infantry, with companies A and H of that regiment, was sent forward to plant the United States flag over the abandoned works. A brief examination of them disclosed how hasty and precipitate had been the flight of the enemy. Their dead were found unburied, their suppers untouched standing on the tables, candles burning in the tents, and every other evidence of a disgraceful panic. Private baggage of officers, and knapsacks of men were left behind. Neither provisions nor ammunition were carried off. Some attempt was made to carry ammunition, as boxes without number were found on the bank of the river where the steamers had been landed. It is almost impossible to give any exact account of the immense quantities of property and supplies left in our hands. All their artillery, field batteries and siege guns, amounting to thirty-three pieces, magazines full of fixed ammunition of the best character, several thousand stand of superior small-arms, with hundred of boxes of musket cartridges, tents for an army of ten thousand men, horses, mules, wagons, intrenching tools, &c., are among the spoils. Nothing except the men escaped, and they only with what they wore. They landed on the opposite side of the river, and are scattered in the wide bottoms. I immediately advanced Hamilton's division into the place, and had the guns of the enemy turned upon the river, which they completely command. The flight of the enemy was so hasty that they abandoned their pickets, and gave no intimation to the forces at Island No. 10. The consequence is that one gunboat and ten large steamers, which were there are cut off from below, and must either be destroyed or fall into our hands. Island No. 10 must necessarily be evacuated, as it can neither be re-enforced nor supplied from below. During the operations here, the whole of the forces were at different times brought under the fire of the enemy, and behaved themselves with great gallantry and coolness. It seems proper, however, that I should make special mention of those more directly concerned in the final operations against the place. The tenth and sixteenth Illinois, commanded respectively by Colonels Morgan and J. R. Smith, were detailed as guards to the proposed trenches, and to aid in constructing them. They marched

from camp at sunset on the 12th, and drove in the pickets and grand guards of the enemy, as they were ordered, at shouldered arms, and without returning a shot, covered the front of the intrenching parties, and occupied the trenches and rifle-pits during the whole day and night of the 13th under furious and incessant cannonading from sixty pieces of heavy artillery. At the urgent request of their colonels, their regimental flags were kept flying over our trenches, though they offered a conspicuous mark to the enemy. The coolness, courage, and cheerfulness of these troops, exposed for two nights and a day to the furious fire of the enemy at short range, and to the severe storm which raged during the whole night of the 13th, are beyond all praise, and delighted and astonished every officer who witnessed it. The division of General Stanley, consisting of the twenty-seventh, thirty-ninth, forty-third, and sixty-third Ohio regiments, supported the battery from 2 o'clock a. m. on the 13th to daylight on the 14th, exposed to the full fury of the cannonade without being able to return a shot, and the severe storm of that night, and displayed coolness, courage, and fortitude, worthy of all praise. In fact the conduct of all the troops of this command so far exceeded my expectations, that I was astonished and delighted, and feel very safe in predicting for them a brilliant career in arms.

To General Stanley, who commanded in the trenches on the 13th, and to General Hamilton, who relieved him on the morning of the 14th, I am specially indebted, not only for their efficient aid on the last days of the operations here, but for their uniform zeal and co-operation during the whole of the operations near this place. Brigadier General Plummer, commanding at Point Pleasant, is entitled to special commendation for the bold and skilful manner in which he effected a lodgement at that place, under fire of the enemy's gunboats, and for the determined persistence with which he maintained himself and the blockade of the river for days under heavy fire of the enemy. Captain Mower, first United States'infantry, who, with two companies of his regiment (A and H,) had charge of the batteries and served the guns, I desire to present to your special notice. A more gallant and efficient officer is not to be found with this command, and his eminent services during the reduction of this place entitle him to special notice. Colonel J. W. Bissell, engineer regiment, rendered me most valuable service both before and during the bombardment of the place. He conducted the erection of the heavy batteries, and remained in them until the enemy evacuated the place. Major Lothrop, chief of artillery, has distinguished himself throughout the operations.

My personal staff, Major Butler, assistant adjutant general, Major C. A. Morgan and Captain L. H. Marshal, aides-de-camp, and Major Corse, inspector general, were prompt and efficient in conveying my orders under the fire of the enemy.

I transmit, enclosed, the reports of division and brigade commanders, immediately concerned in the final operations, as also of Captain Mower, commanding in the batteries, and of Major Lothrop, chief of artillery. Colonel J. W. Bissell, engineers, has been too incessantly occupied to make a written report, but desires to mention the following officers of his regiment, who displayed unusual gallantry: Lieutenant Colonel Adams, Captains Dean, Hill, and Tweeddale, and Lieutenants Odenbaugh, Randolph, and Besier. Our whole loss during the operations was fifty-one killed and wounded. A detailed list will be transmitted as soon as it can be made. The enemy's loss cannot be ascertained. A number of his dead were left unburied, and more than a hundred new graves attested that he must have suffered severely.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,

*Brigadier General Commanding.*

Brig. General G. W. CULLUM,

*Chief of Staff and of Engineers, Dep't of the Mississippi.*



As I have already stated New Madrid was the weak point of the system of defence on and around Island No. 10, and if New Madrid could be captured, we would gain a point on the Mississippi river, below the island, which would at once intercept communications and cut off re-enforcements and supplies sent by water. Neither troops nor supplies could reach its garrison in any other manner. New Madrid in our possession, furnished us a base of operations against the island, which made its capture a simple matter of time. Immediately upon the occupation of New Madrid, I began operations for the reduction of Island No. 10: I append hereto my official report and correspondence, as also the reports of division and brigade commanders, which give as full and complete a history of the operations against Island No. 10 as is necessary to a thorough understanding of the subject.

#### REPORT OF OPERATIONS WHICH RESULTED IN THE CAPTURE OF ISLAND NO. 10.

##### HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*Camp five miles from Corinth, Miss., May 2, 1862.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations which resulted in the capture of Island No. 10, and the batteries on the main shore, together with the whole of the land forces of the enemy in that vicinity. A brief sketch of the topography of the immediate neighborhood seems essential to a full understanding of the operations of the army.

Island No. 10 lies at the bottom of a great bend of the Mississippi, immediately north of it being a long narrow promontory on the Missouri shore. The river from Island No. 10 flows northwest to New Madrid, where it again makes a great bend to the south as far as Tiptonville, otherwise called Merriweather's landing, so that opposite New Madrid also is a long narrow promontory. From Island No. 8 across the land to New Madrid is six miles, while by river it is fifteen; so, likewise, the distance from Island No. 10 to Tiptonville is five miles, while by water it is twenty-seven. Commencing at Hickman, a great swamp, which afterwards becomes Reelfoot lake, extends along the left bank of the Mississippi, and discharges its waters into the river forty miles below Tiptonville, leaving the whole peninsula opposite New Madrid between it and the river. This peninsula therefore is itself an island, having the Mississippi river on three sides, and Reelfoot lake and the great swamps which border it on the other. A good road leads from Island No. 10 along the west bank of Reelfoot lake to Tiptonville. The only means of supply, therefore, for the forces at and around Island No. 10, on this peninsula, were by the river. When the river was blockaded at New Madrid supplies and re-enforcements were landed at Tiptonville, and conveyed across the neck of the peninsula by land. There was no communication with the interior except by a small flat-boat which plied across Reelfoot lake, a distance of two miles, and that through an opening cut through cypress swamps for the purpose. Supplies and re-enforcements, or escape to any considerable extent, were therefore impracticable on the land side. One mile below Tiptonville begin the great swamps along the Mississippi on both sides, and no dry ground is to be found, except in occasional spots, for at least sixty miles below. By intercepting the navigation of the river below Tiptonville, and commanding by heavy artillery the lowest point of dry ground near that place, the enemy would be at once cut off from his resources, and prevented from escaping. Immediately after the reduction of New Madrid this subject engaged my attention. The roads along the river, in the direction of Point Pleasant, followed a narrow strip of dry land between the swamps and the river, and were very miry and difficult. With much labor the heavy guns captured from the enemy at New Madrid were dragged by hand and established

in battery at several prominent points along the river, the lower battery being placed immediately opposite the lowest point of dry ground below Tiptonville. This extended my lines seventeen miles along the river. A week was thus passed in severe labor. The enemy, perceiving the consequence of establishing these batteries, attempted in every way by his gunboats to prevent their construction. They were therefore in every case established in the night. As soon as daylight unmasked our lowest battery the enemy saw at once that we must either be dislodged, or all reliable communication with his forces would be cut off. Five gunboats therefore at once advanced against the battery, which consisted of two 24-pound siege guns and two 10 pounder Parrotts, manned by a detachment of the first United States infantry, under Lieutenant Bates, and supported by General Palmer's division encamped one and a half mile in rear. Rifle-pits for five hundred sharpshooters were dug on the flanks of the battery close to the river bank, and were constantly occupied. The gunboats ran up to within three hundred yards, and a furious cannonade was kept up for an hour and a half, when they were repulsed with the loss of one gunboat sunk, several badly damaged, and many men shot down at their guns by our sharpshooters from the rifle-pits. Our loss was one man killed. From that time no attempt against the battery was made, and all communication from below with the forces near Island No. 10 cut off. One of the gunboats would occasionally, during a dark night, steal up close along the opposite shore to Tiptonville, but always at such a great risk that it was seldom undertaken. Neither supplies nor men could be taken up or carried off in this way.

Such was the condition of affairs on the 16th of March. The object for which the land forces had been moved upon New Madrid was accomplished in the capture of that place, and the blockade of the river to any supplies and re-enforcements for the enemy at and around Island No. 10. Meantime the flotilla had been firing at long range, both from the gun and mortar boats, at the batteries of the enemy on and opposite the island, for seven consecutive days, without any apparent effect, and without any advance whatever toward their reduction. This result was doubtless due to defective construction of the boats.

On the 16th of March I received your despatch directing me, if possible, to construct a road through the swamp to a point on the Missouri shore opposite Island No. 10, and transfer a portion of my force, sufficient to erect batteries at that point, to assist in the artillery practice on the enemy's batteries. I accordingly despatched Colonel J. W. Bissell, engineer regiment, to examine the country with this view, directing him at the same time, if he found it impracticable to build a road through the swamps and overflow of the river, to ascertain whether it were possible to dig a canal across the peninsula from some point above Island No. 10 to New Madrid, in order that steam transports might be brought to me, which would enable my command to cross the river. The idea of the canal was suggested to me by General Schuyler Hamilton in a conversation upon the necessity of crossing the river and assailing the enemy's batteries near Island No. 10 in the rear.

On the 17th of March I suggested to Commodore Foote, by letter, that he should run the enemy's batteries with one of his gunboats, and thus enable me to cross the river with my command, assuring him that by this means I could throw into the rear of the enemy men enough to deal with any force he might have. This request the commodore declined on the ground of impracticability. Colonel Bissell having reported a road impracticable, but that a route could be found for a channel sufficient for small steamers, I immediately directed him to commence the canal with his whole regiment, and to call on Colonel Buford, commanding the land forces temporarily with the flotilla, (which had been placed under my command,) for any assistance in men or material necessary for the work. Supplies of such articles as were needed, and four steamers of light draught, were sent for to Cairo, and the work begun. It was my purpose to

make the canal deep enough for the gunboats, but it was not found practicable to do so within any reasonable period. The work performed by Colonel Bissell and his regiment of engineers was beyond measure difficult, and its completion was delayed much beyond my expectations. The canal is twelve miles long, six miles of which are through very heavy timber. An avenue fifty feet wide was made through it by sawing off trees of large size four and a half feet under water. For nineteen days the work was prosecuted with untiring energy and determination, under exposures and privations very unusual even in the history of warfare. It was completed on the 4th of April, and will long remain a monument of enterprise and skill. During all this period the flotilla had kept up its fire upon the batteries of the enemy, but without making any progress toward their reduction. It had by this time become very apparent that the capture of Island No. 10 could not be made unless the land forces could be thrown across the river, and their works carried from the rear; but during this long delay the enemy, anticipating such a movement, had erected batteries along the shore from Island No. 10 entirely around to Tiptonville at every point where troops could be landed. The difficulty of crossing the river in force had therefore been greatly increased, and what would have been a comparatively safe undertaking three weeks before had become one full of peril. It is not necessary to state to you that the passage of a great river, lined with batteries and in the face of the enemy, is one of the most difficult and hazardous operations of war, and cannot be justified except in a case of urgent necessity. Such a case seemed presented for my action. Without this movement operations against Island No. 10 must have been abandoned, and the land forces at least withdrawn. It is but bare justice to say that, although the full peril of the movement was thoroughly understood by my whole command, there was not an officer or a man who was not anxious to be placed in the advance. There seemed little hope of any assistance from the gunboats. I therefore had several heavy coal barges brought into the upper end of the canal, which, during the progress of the work, were made into floating batteries. Each battery consisted of three heavy barges lashed together and bolted with iron. The middle barge was bulk-headed all round, so as to give four feet of thickness of solid timber both at the sides and in the ends. The heavy guns, three in number, were mounted on it, and protected by traverses of sand bags. It also carried eighty sharpshooters. The barges outside of it had a first layer in the bottom of empty water-tight barrels, securely lashed, then layers of dry cottonwood rails, and cotton bales packed close; they were then floored over at top to keep everything in its place, so that a shot penetrating the outer barges must pass through twenty feet of rails and cotton before reaching the middle one which carried the men and guns. The arrangement of water barrels and cotton bales was made in order that, even if penetrated frequently by the enemy's shot and filled with water, the outer barges could not sink. It was my purpose, when all was ready, to tow one or two of these batteries over the river to a point exactly opposite New Madrid, where swamps prevented any access to the river, and where the enemy therefore had been unable to establish his batteries. When near the shore the floating batteries with their crews were to be cut loose from the steamers and allowed to float down the river to the point selected for landing the troops. As soon as they arrived within short range of it they were to cast out their anchors, so as to hold the barges firmly, and open fire upon the enemy's batteries. I think that these batteries would have accomplished their purpose, and my whole force volunteered to man them. They were well provided with small boats to be kept out of danger, and even if the worst happened, and the batteries were sunk by the enemy's fire, the men would meet with no worse fate than capture.

On the 5th of April the steamers and barges were brought near to the mouth of the bayou which discharges into the Mississippi at New Madrid, but were kept carefully out of sight of the river while our floating batteries were being completed.

The enemy as we afterward learned had received positive advices of the construction of the canal, but were unable to believe that such a work was practicable. The first assurance they had of its completion was the appearance of the four steamers loaded with troops on the morning of the 7th of April.

On the 4th Commodore Foote allowed one of the gunboats to run the batteries at Island No. 10, and Captain Walke, United States navy, who had volunteered, (as appears from the commodore's order to him,) came through that night with the gunboat Carondelet. Although many shots were fired at him as he passed the batteries, his boat was not once struck. He informed me of his arrival early on the 5th.

On the morning of the 6th, I sent General Grauger, Colonel Smith, of the forty-third Ohio, and Captain L. H. Marshal, of my staff, to make a reconnoissance of the river below, and requested Captain Walke to take them on board the Carondelet and run down the river, to ascertain precisely the character of the banks and the position and number of the enemy's batteries. The whole day was spent in this reconnoissance, the Carondelet steaming down the river in the midst of a heavy fire from the enemy's batteries along the shore. The whole bank for fifteen miles was lined with heavy guns at intervals in no case exceeding one mile. Intrenchments for infantry were also thrown up along the shore between the batteries. On his return up the river, Captain Walke silenced the enemy's batteries opposite Point Pleasant, and a small infantry force under Captain L. H. Marshal landed and spiked the guns.

On the night of the 6th, at my urgent request, Commodore Foote ordered the Pittsburg also to run down to New Madrid. She arrived at daylight, having, like the Carondelet, come through untouched. I directed Captain Walke to proceed down the river at daylight on the 7th with the two gunboats, and, if possible, silence the batteries near Watson's landing, the point which had been selected to land the troops, and at the same time I brought the four steamers into the river and embarked Paine's division, which consisted of the tenth, sixteenth, twenty-second, and fifty-first Illinois regiments, with Houghtaling's battery of artillery. The land batteries of 32-pounders, under Captain Williams, first United States infantry, which I had established some days before opposite the point where the troops were to land, were ordered to open their fire upon the enemy's batteries opposite as soon as it was possible to see them. A heavy storm commenced on the night of the 6th, and continued with short intermissions for several days. The morning of the 7th was very dark, and the rain fell heavily until midday. As soon as it was fairly light our heavy batteries on the land opened their fire vigorously upon the batteries of the enemy, and the two gunboats ran down the river and joined in the action. I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of Captain Walke during the whole of these operations. Prompt, gallant, and cheerful, he performed the hazardous service assigned him with signal skill and success. About 12 o'clock m. he signalled me that the batteries near our place of landing were silenced, and the steamers containing Paine's division moved out from the landing and began to cross the river, preceded by the gunboats. The whole force designed to cross had been drawn up along the river bank, and saluted the passing steamers with cheers of exultation. As soon as we began to cross the river the enemy commenced to evacuate his position along the banks and the batteries along the Tennessee shore opposite Island No. 10. His whole force was in motion toward Tiptonville, with the exception of the few artillerists on the island, who in the haste of the retreat had been abandoned. As Paine's division was passing opposite the point I occupied on the shore, one of my spies, who had crossed on the gunboats from the silenced battery, informed me of this hurried retreat of the enemy. I signalled General Paine to stop his boats, and sent him the information, with orders to land as rapidly as possible on the opposite shore, and push forward to Tiptonville, to which point the enemy's forces were tending from every direction. I sent no force to occupy

the deserted batteries opposite Island No. 10, as it was my first purpose to capture the whole army of the enemy. At 8 or 9 o'clock that night (the 7th) the small party abandoned on the island, finding themselves deserted and fearing an attack in the rear from our land forces, which they knew had crossed the river in the morning, sent a message to Commodore Foote surrendering to him. The divisions were pushed forward to Tiptonville as fast as they were landed, Paine leading. The enemy attempted to make a stand several times near that place, but Paine did not once deploy his columns. By midnight all our forces were across the river and pushing forward rapidly to Tiptonville. The enemy, retreating before Paine and from Island No. 10, met at Tiptonville during the night in great confusion, and were driven back into the swamp by the advance of our forces, until, at 4 o'clock a. m. on the 8th, finding themselves completely cut off, and being apparently unable to resist, they laid down their arms and surrendered at discretion. They were so scattered and confused that it was several days before anything like an accurate account of their number could be made. Meantime I had directed Colonel W. L. Elliott, of the second Iowa cavalry, who had crossed the river after dark, to proceed as soon as day dawned to take possession of the enemy's abandoned works on the Tennessee shore, opposite Island No. 10, and to save the steamers if he possibly could. He reached there before sunrise that morning, (the 8th,) and took possession of the encampments, the immense quantity of stores and supplies, and of all the enemy's batteries on the main land. He also brought in about two hundred prisoners. After posting his guards and taking possession of the steamers not sunk or injured, he remained until the forces from the flotilla landed. As Colonel Buford was in command of these forces, Colonel Elliott turned over to his infantry force the prisoners, batteries and captured property, for safe-keeping, and proceeded to scour the country in the direction of Tiptonville along Reelfoot lake, as directed. It is almost impossible to give a correct account of the immense quantity of artillery, ammunition, and supplies of every description which fell into our hands. Three generals, two hundred and seventy-three field and company officers, six thousand seven hundred privates, one hundred and twenty-three pieces of heavy artillery, thirty-five pieces of field artillery, all of the very best character and of the latest patterns, seven thousand stand of small-arms, tents for twelve thousand men, several wharf-boat loads of provisions, an immense quantity of ammunition of all kinds, many hundred horses and mules, with wagons and harness, &c., are among the spoils. Very few, if any, of the enemy escaped, and only by wading or swimming through the swamps. The conduct of the troops was splendid throughout, as the results of this operation and its progress very plainly indicate. We have crossed this great river the banks of which were lined with batteries and defended by seven thousand men. We have pursued and captured the whole force of the enemy and all his supplies and material of war, and have again recrossed and reoccupied the camps at New Madrid, without losing a man or meeting with an accident. Such results bespeak efficiency, good conduct, high discipline, and soldierly deportment of the best character, far more conclusively than they can be exhibited in pitched battles or the storming of fortified places. Patience, willing labor, endurance of hardship, and privation for long periods, cheerful and prompt obedience, order and discipline, bravery and spirit, are the qualities which these operations have developed in the forces under my command, and which assure for them a brilliant and successful career in arms. It is difficult to express the feeling such conduct has occasioned me, fortunate enough to be the commander of such troops. There are few material obstacles within the range of warfare which a man of courage and spirit would hesitate to encounter with such a force.

To the division and brigade commanders, whose reports I transmit, I leave the grateful privilege of designating in detail the forces engaged in these operations. Generals Paine, Stanley, Hamilton, and Plummer crossed the river together

with a portion of General Granger's cavalry division, under Colonel W. L. Elliott's second Iowa cavalry. To all these officers I am deeply indebted for their efficient and cordial aid in every portion of our operations. They conducted their divisions with eminent skill and vigor, and to them I am largely indebted for the discipline and efficiency of this command. General Paine, fortunate in having the advance, exhibited conspicuous gallantry and vigor, and had the satisfaction to receive the surrender of the enemy. General Palmer was posted ten days before the final operations in support and in charge of the battery below Tiptonville. Throughout he was prompt and active in the discharge of his duties. Of Colonel Bissell, engineer regiment, and his regiment, I can hardly say too much. Untiring and determined, no difficulties discouraged them, and no labor was too much for their energy. They have conducted and completed a work which will be memorable in the history of this war.

My own personal staff, Major Butler, assistant adjutant general, Major Morgan and Captain Marshal, aides-de-camp, Major J. M. Corse, inspector general, and Surgeon O. W. Nixon, medical director, rendered me important service, and were in all respects zealous and efficient.

Our success was complete and overwhelming, and it gives me profound satisfaction to report that it was accomplished without loss of life.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Brig. General G. W. CULLUM,  
*Chief of Staff and of Engineers,  
Pittsburg Landing, Tennessee.*

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HEADQUARTERS, COMMERCE, MISSOURI,

*February 23, 1862.*

Brigadier General G. W. CULLUM, *Cairo:*

I arrived here last night with one hundred and forty men of the forty-seventh Illinois, having given orders to the fifty-ninth Indiana and the three companies of the forty-sixth Indiana, together with the forty-seventh Illinois, to follow me immediately. These regiments and companies were on board steamers War Eagle, Atlantic, and New Golden State, and ready to push out when I left. None of them have reached here, and I presume they neglected to obey their orders. I am here with a very small force, and I dislike to land the stores, &c., for fear of accident, until I have a force sufficient to make them secure. Will you please order the boats to leave at once for this place?

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY IN THE FIELD,

*Commerce, February 27, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: I march to-morrow morning, with a force about ten thousand strong, and will be in front of New Madrid on Sunday evening or Monday morning. Have requested General Cullum to advance strong force under Steele, as far as Oak Grove, to cover my flank and serve as a reserve in case of need. Most of the regimental baggage left here for want of transportation. Hope wagons will be sent here to bring it forward. Would suggest movement of gun and mortar boats toward Columbus on Sunday, to operate until I have occupied New Madrid.

JNO. POPE,  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY IN THE FIELD,

*Sikeston, March 1, 1862.*

General G. W. CULLUM: I reached here to-night with my command. This afternoon about 2 o'clock a portion of my advance guard, consisting of six companies of seventh Illinois cavalry, encountered reconnoitring party of the enemy about three miles south of this place. This party had been drawn up to engage a company of the first Illinois cavalry and a portion of the tenth Illinois infantry. These troops being so much exhausted by long pursuit of the enemy in the direction of Benton, gave place to the six companies of the seventh Illinois cavalry, which charged the enemy and completely routed him. The enemy had occupied a narrow causeway, pursued by the road, with three pieces of rifled artillery of small calibre. This battery was carried handsomely by the charge of the seventh Illinois, and has fallen into our possession. The enemy fled precipitately towards New Madrid, and was pursued to within four miles of that town. One captain, one lieutenant, and several privates were captured. The pieces of artillery are of small calibre, breech-loading, beautifully rifled, and handsomely mounted on four wheels, drawn by two horses each. They have an ingenious repeating apparatus at the breach, and were undoubtedly made for service in this swampy, low region. From the prisoners I learn that New Madrid is occupied by four brigades of infantry, numbering about ten thousand, nine hundred cavalry, and four batteries of field artillery; another brigade is expected to-night. The prisoners also state that the enemy is rapidly evacuating Columbus and occupying Island No. 10. My command is all up to this point, and well in hand. I shall push forward to-morrow, and, unless the enemy is more re-enforced than is now expected, I think we are more than a match for him. If consistent with your arrangements, I would be glad if a considerable force could be advanced from Bird's Point as far as Oak Grove so as to assure my communications. I was surprised on my arrival here, in view of your letter of the 25th, to find that all the force sent forward by you from Bird's Point have returned, for reasons which I am unable to understand.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant.

JNO. POPE,

*Brigadier General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY IN THE FIELD,

*Sikeston, March 1, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: A portion of our advance guard, consisting of six companies seventh Illinois cavalry, encountered reconnoitring force of the enemy three miles south of this place this afternoon. After a short skirmish the enemy fled precipitately towards New Madrid, leaving in our possession three pieces of rifled artillery. One captain, one lieutenant, and several privates were taken prisoners. From the prisoners I learn that New Madrid is occupied by four brigades of infantry, numbering about ten thousand, nine hundred cavalry, and four batteries of field artillery; another brigade is expected to-night. The prisoners also state that the enemy is rapidly evacuating Columbus and occupying Island No. 10. My command is all up to this point and well in hand. I shall push forward to-morrow, and, unless the enemy is more re-enforced than is now expected, I think we are more than a match for him. If consistent with your arrangements, I would be glad if a considerable force could be advanced from Bid's Point as far as Oak Grove, so as to assure my communications.

JNO. POPE,

*Brigadier General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY IN THE FIELD,  
Near New Madrid, March 3, 1862.

Major General HALLECK, *St. Louis*:

Arrived before this place with my whole force to-day at 1 p. m., pushed skirmishers of first division into the town, and occupied the upper portion of it immediately. There is only a small square earth redoubt near this place. The river is high and level with the banks, so that the gunboats, of which there are six, sweep the whole ground for a mile in front of the town. I think the enemy's whole force does not exceed five thousand men, all of whom were kept carefully out of sight. I can take the work by assault, but at much loss, and without the result desired, as the gunboats, owing to the extraordinary high water, could drive us out immediately. I ought to have siege guns, but in the absence of them I shall to-morrow night line the river bank above the town with narrow rifle-pits, and sink four pieces of rifled and Parrott artillery in batteries of single pieces between the pits. In this way I think we can hold our own along the shore against the gunboats, and absolutely close the river to transports. I shall to-morrow occupy strong position with my command, so as to support the rifle-pits and batteries. I do not know if this will succeed, but it seems the best I can do without heavy artillery. The river is so high that the hulls of the gunboats are plainly visible, and their guns look over the bank with a sweep for direct solid shot of at least a mile and a half. I stopped no small-arms of any kind at Commerce, and shall order them to Cairo if any are there. My regiments all came armed. If the rebel gunboats leave here I take the works.

JNO. POPE,  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
Near New Madrid, March 4.

General CULLUM: I send enclosed a rough sketch of the country in this vicinity. The water in the river is so high as to be very nearly on a level with the highest banks, and all the swamps and lowlands are deep in water. The country above New Madrid is overflowed for miles back into the country. The swamps below New Madrid are swimming from the back waters of the bayous, &c. The only communication with Point Pleasant is close to the river bank, and over an open country. Throughout the whole distance from the mouth of the bayou above town, down to Point Pleasant and many miles below, the gunboats look over the banks when lying against the shore. There are six gunboats here anchored along the shore at points to cross their fire over the whole range of their guns. In hasty intrenchments, from the mouth of the bayou around to the fort below, there are probably five or six thousand men. The guns of the gunboats look directly on to these intrenchments from one end to the other at a few yadsrs' distance. The railroad from Sikeston lies along a narrow causeway corduroyed, with impenetrable swamps on each side. There is a road also from Charleston along a narrow ridge of the same kind, but it is now totally impassable from the overflow for two or three miles on each side of several bayous, which it crosses. It is practicable to get to Point Pleasant by taking the road to Weaversville, and back to the Point, a distance of twenty-seven miles; but it would be impracticable to prevent forces from going down in transports, and the gunboats could drive our troops entirely back into the road to Weaversville. The dry land is less than half a mile wide from below Point Pleasant to the bayou above New Madrid. Such is the state of facts. The high water is a



most serious difficulty; it prevents any movements except on narrow main roads, and enables the gunboats thoroughly to command the whole practicable ground along the river. Siege artillery under present circumstances is indispensable for any effective results. With five or six heavy guns I could establish batteries to make New Madrid untenable and the river impassable by anything except gunboats. I can, at considerable loss, take the intrenchments of the enemy, but I could not hold them twenty minutes. The object, therefore, would not be accomplished, and we would lose many men. The plan I intended yesterday to adopt is rendered impracticable by the high water. The river is still rising and the ground becoming more difficult. I presume you are well informed of matters at Island No. 10. It is overflowed in many places, and nearly so everywhere. I cannot believe that there will be serious difficulty in passing it with gunboats. I understand that there are but eight infantry regiments on the island. If the gunboats were away from here or the water low, New Madrid would not have detained me an hour. I will keep the enemy busy and uneasy, and practice the troops by constant and harassing skirmishes either until the water goes down or heavy guns reach me. Please have one hundred thousand rations thrown forward to Sikeston as soon as the railroad is completed.

I am, general, very respectfully,

JNO. POPE,  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Near New Madrid, March 4, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: Upon examination of ground north of the bayou where I had intended to establish batteries and rifle-pits, I find that during the night the river rose so rapidly as to overflow the whole of it. It is somewhat lower than the ground south of the bayou and is now untenable. I send to-night at dark a column of twenty-five hundred infantry, with artillery and cavalry, to Point Pleasant, nine miles below, to effect the same purpose. This operation must of necessity to take off some of the gunboats from here, in which case I will carry the intrenchments. I find on close reconnoissance that there are intrenchments hastily constructed within the town from the mouth of the bayou half a mile above. There are about four regiments of infantry, and some field artillery now in it, and the gunboats anchored so that their guns look into every part of the intrenchments at very short distances. I will interrupt the navigation at Point Pleasant, and if the opportunity presents I will carry their works. I do not know what re-enforcements can be thrown here from Island No. 10; probably not enough to endanger us if the island is threatened by the gunboats. If I had troops, it would be easy to interrupt entirely the navigation of the river by transports, by establishing a large central force south of this place, and having small movable columns of five hundred men and two pieces of artillery each to be posted just outside of range of gunboats habitually, and to move in on the river whenever a steamer passed and sink her. Half a dozen or a dozen points on the river within twenty-five miles could stop navigation or compel at least seven or eight gunboats to watch that extent of river line. By having a strong central force within supporting distance of these small columns, and upon which they would retreat if menaced by the landing of forces above or below them, the operation would be safe. It would, however, require thirty thousand men effectually to put it in operation. While the enemy can hold New Madrid by means of gunboats, (as can be done with this high stage of water on the river,) it would be easy to land troops and threaten our communications if not endanger our whole force, if it were separated into small detachments. I

will, if possible, maintain the blockade at Point Pleasant until the heavy artillery can be sent. I can, as I have informed you, carry the works here, but it would be done with heavy loss while the river is so high that the guns of the boats look over the bank, and with our artillery it would be nearly impossible to hold them without great loss. I presume you are thoroughly informed concerning affairs at Island No. 10; but from what I know, it will be easy for the gunboats to shell the troops out of the island altogether and pass down to this place. If not able completely to stop the navigation of the river, I will, at least, make it very dangerous from to-morrow.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

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[By telegraph from St. Louis.]

CAIRO, *March 7, 1862.*

General POPE, *Army in the field:*

After securing the roads so as to prevent the enemy's advance north you will withdraw your remaining forces to Sikeston, and thence to Bird's Point or Commerce, for embarkation. They will proceed up the Tennessee to re-enforce General C. F. Smith. Good luck.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*New Madrid, March 6, 1862.*

General CULLUM: Colonel Plummer, who was sent with three thousand men to occupy Point Pleasant last night, has not yet been able to effect a lodgement on the banks for his rifle-pits and batteries on account of finding two gunboats at that place. A third has joined them since from below. Plummer's sharpshooters occupy the town, and were attempting, when I last heard, to drive the artillerymen of the gunboats from their pieces. How they will succeed I cannot yet tell. I made a strong demonstration upon the works here this afternoon, driving in the enemy's skirmishers and his whole force below the bank and down upon the water. The enemy's loss was about twenty-five killed, ours one killed and four wounded. There are now here and at Point Pleasant eight gunboats which we cannot take of course, and which render the town here untenable, even if in our possession. I hope to see our gunboats in a day or two, in which case everything here will fall into our hands. I hope Plummer, by to-morrow morning, will effect his lodgement. Meantime the practice here is excellent for the troops. I give them a smart skirmish every day. The importance of making a lodgement at Point Pleasant instead of this place will be apparent to you when you examine the peculiar bend of the river and the position of Island No. 10. It is only five miles across by land from the island to a point on the river below and nearly opposite to Point Pleasant, to which boats can come up and take off the garrison without being molested by us at New Madrid. I shall use all possible exertions. Will you communicate the substance of this letter to General Halleck?

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*New Madrid, March 8, 1862.*

Brigadier General CULLUM: The forces under Colonel Plummer at Point Pleasant have made good their lodgement, and the gunboats after repeated efforts have failed to make any impression upon them. Two 10-pounder Parrotts and two 13-pound English rifled guns are now in position at that place, and to transport vessels the river is effectually closed. Two attempted to pass up last night, but were driven back, one of them badly crippled. Supplies for the enemy are now completely cut off from this part of Missouri or from below. They can get none in the narrow space to which they are circumscribed. I made another strong demonstration here yesterday, forcing my skirmishers into the middle of the town, and driving the enemy's infantry down to the shore. The troops are in fine spirits and are improving wonderfully. The enemy is re-enforcing heavily from above, two large steamboats having arrived in the course of the night heavily loaded with troops.

Please hurry forward the five infantry regiments as rapidly as possible, as I must assure Plummer's position against any attack whatever. I thank you heartily for your friendly congratulations upon my promotion.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*New Madrid, March 9, 1862.*

Colonel J. B. PLUMMER: The commanding general directs me to say to you that he has received your letter this morning, and is much gratified at your success in establishing and maintaining your position. He sends to-day your tents and baggage with ten thousand (10,000) rations of coffee. Six of your wagons have returned to Sikeston for the knapsacks of your regiment, and will join you as soon as practicable. The general directs that you send to this post Lieutenant Gow of the engineers. He also suggests that you dig wells, as this command has succeeded in getting pure water in that way.

I am, colonel, respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. A. MORGAN,  
*Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*New Madrid, March 9, 1862.*

General CULLUM: I send Colonel J. W. Bissell, engineer regiment, to Cairo, to see you in relation to the siege guns. If we can get them here, matters will soon be settled. Colonel Bissell can get as many as are necessary to me in three days. Of course I prefer such as are mounted on carriages, but I should prefer the rifled thirty-twos if they could be had. One or two shell guns of large calibre will be very useful.

I have the honor to request that four Parrott guns, 24-pounders, now at St. Louis arsenal, and belonging to the Missouri light artillery, be sent here at once. If I had had these guns I should not have been delayed here as I have been, and if you can get these four and any other field-guns of large calibre for me, our operations on the river will be greatly advantaged both here and elsewhere. I hope you will use your influence in the matter. Requisitions for ammunition for the field batteries have been sent to St. Louis, which I hope will be hastened forward to us. No further news from below.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*New Madrid, March 9, 1862.*

General CULLUM: The occupation of Point Pleasant has been entirely successful. A large quantity of stores and supplies have fallen into our hands, and the passage of transports up and down the river entirely prevented. I will be much obliged to you if you will send the siege guns, with a full supply of ammunition, forward to Sikeston as soon as possible. When they arrive and are placed in position we will be able to drive off the gunboats, and it will then require but a short time for us to carry the intrenchments.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*New Madrid, March 9.*

DEAR PLUMMER: First let me congratulate you upon your confirmation by the Senate as brigadier general. The news has just reached here. I have sent urgently for the siege guns, and will send you some as soon as they reach here; also two regiments of infantry. You must hold on if possible. If necessary, I will transfer my whole force to Point Pleasant. Fire away with your artillery at transports, but do not waste ammunition, especially artillery ammunition, on the gunboats. I think the battery on the opposite shore can do you no harm. Strengthen your camp by every possible means. Surround it with rifle pits, and put every possible obstruction in the way of an enemy. You may rely upon every assistance I can give.

Respectfully and truly yours,

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*Brigadier General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*New Madrid, March 10, 1862.*

Commanding officer of ENGINEERS, at *Sikeston*:

The general commanding directs that you remain at Sikeston until the arrival of the siege guns, which are expected from Bird's Point to-day. As soon as they arrive you will use your whole force to unload and move them forward to this place. An artillery officer and horses will be sent to Sikeston to take charge of the pieces. You will render him every assistance in your power. You will march your command forward with the guns, and make such repairs on the road as are necessary to bring them forward without delay. The guns are much needed here, and the general commanding relies on your using every effort to bring them forward as rapidly as possible.

Respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

C. A. MORGAN, *Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS MISSISSIPPI DISTRICT,  
*New Madrid, March 11, 1862.*

General CULLUM: I received last night your letter of yesterday morning. You have doubtless seen Colonel Bissel since. I am anxious to get the siege guns as soon as possible. With them I can settle matters without the aid of the gun-

boats from Cairo. The enemy, finding he could make no impression on the force at Point Pleasant, has withdrawn his batteries from the opposite shore, and ceased to pass up and down the river.

Transports are only able to pass when masked closely by at least two gunboats for each steamer, and then only by passing close to the opposite shore. He is landing troops four miles below Point Pleasant, on the opposite shore, and marching them across the neck of land, and then recrossing to Island No. 10. In this way considerable re-enforcements have been thrown on to the island within a day or two. From the island this place has also been considerably re-enforced, until the enemy's force here cannot be much short of eleven thousand men. As soon as I can drive off the gunboats, all the forces there will be taken.

I am very anxious (for service on the river) to have larger field-guns. The 20-pounder Parrotts are exactly the gun we want, and by having several batteries of them, our efficiency would be a thousand times increased. Our smaller guns have not range enough to cover the whole breadth of the river with certainty. With enough of the 20-pounder Parrotts we can pass below, and mask every work the enemy can erect or has erected on the river. I am sure you will aid me in the matter. I send an open order for the disposition of troops within this district. General Paine, for some singular reason, has sent fragments of regiments here, detailing two companies from one, four from another, &c., where one single regiment taken together would have been sufficient, and have given us full regiments here. I have endeavored, in the order enclosed, to correct this, but before having it executed submit it to you that I may not interfere with arrangements of yours. I wish the whole affair at Commerce broken up. The sick ought to be sent somewhere to be taken care of. I need staff officers, especially medical officers, more than I can tell.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*New Madrid, March 12, 1862.*

General PAINE: I have directed Colonel Elliott to report to you at daylight to-morrow morning with the second Iowa cavalry, and also a battery of four pieces, now encamped with General Hamilton's division. I desire you to hold your division in readiness to march at daylight to-morrow morning with one day's cooked rations, full supply of ammunition, and everything in complete order for fighting. As soon as you perceive Hamilton's division (on your right) in motion you will march your division to the road leading into New Madrid, through the centre of our lines, and down that road until you are barely out of range of the enemy's gunboats. You will there remain until further orders. You will be careful to keep your pickets on the bayou road as far towards the enemy as possible, that our left may not be turned without due warning. Form your command in columns of division, doubled on the centre, on each side of the road leading into New Madrid, and keep them well in hand, so that you can advance against the enemy at the shortest notice, being careful always to march well to the rear, so as to be quite out of range, and not to draw the enemy's fire. I wish you, an hour after dark to-night, to re-enforce the lower pickets, along the bayou, with four companies of sharpshooters, and direct them to feel their way in towards the town, and drive in the enemy's pickets, so as to distract his attention from the work on the battery on our

right. They had best keep up the enemy's alarm on our left in this way the greater part of the night. Orders will be sent to you in time for further movements.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,

*Brigadier General Commanding.*

Brigadier General E. PAINE,

*Commanding Fourth Division.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*New Madrid, March 13, 1862.*

General SCHUYLER HAMILTON: I have directed the brigade of Colonel Slack, of Palmer's division, to report to you in marching order, with their blankets and one day's cooked rations, at 3 o'clock a. m. You will please march at that hour with your division, and relieve the division of General Stanley so that the change can be made before daylight; Colonel Slack's brigade will relieve Colonel Morgan's in the trenches and rifle-pits. Be good enough to call on me some time this evening, as I desire to have some conversation with you. You understand of course that you will command all the forces in the trenches, as well as your own division.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,

*Brigadier General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*New Madrid, March 13, 1862.*

General CULLUM: Our guns have arrived, were placed in battery, and opened this morning. We require more 24-pounder ammunition. I send Lieutenant Kelly with orders to bring two hundred more rounds to a gun—that is, six hundred rounds of twenty-four ammunition, and two hundred of 8-inch howitzer. We may get along here without it, but we may want it exceedingly. Will you please have it forwarded, without the least delay, by Lieutenant Kelly, to Sikeston, where I have wagons to bring it down immediately. Our batteries are hard at work.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,

*Brigadier General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS MISSISSIPPI DISTRICT,

*Near New Madrid, March 13, 1862*

General CULLUM: I established last night the heavy guns in position, and opened at daylight. At this hour (two o'clock p. m.) the gunboats are still holding on, though several of them are injured. Our loss has been one officer killed and six men wounded. The heavy guns are established within eight hundred yards of the enemy's lower redoubt, and I shall, under the circumstances, be obliged to work on towards the river by trenches, so as to establish the heavy battery directly on the bank. This will require a day or two. The enemy will not be able to dislodge us from our present position, nor from any other, as they depend and must depend altogether on the gunboats. There are now nine gunboats here, and it is apparent that the enemy means to make a

stand here as long as possible. I will commence to-night to push approaches towards the river, and move forward the battery as soon as I can. The enemy continues to re-enforce from above, but I think not heavily. If the gun and mortar-boats were here, to drive off the gunboats of the enemy, we could easily deal with his land forces. The 20-pounder Parrotts will help us greatly. We must also have more 24-pounder and 8-inch howitzer ammunition as soon as possible. Also two or three more heavy guns, if possible. The troops are in fine spirits, and exhibit wonderful gallantry.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*New Madrid, March 14, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: New Madrid is in our possession. Our lines were drawn closely around the works all day yesterday, under furious cannonading from nine gunboats, and from heavy batteries on land. Last night the place was evacuated under cover of the furious storm which raged all night. All of their artillery, field-batteries, and siege guns, an immense quantity of military stores, tents, wagons, horses, mules, &c., have fallen into our hands. The enemy carried off nothing except his men, who were landed immediately opposite in the wide bottom and dispersed. Hamilton's division is now entering the place.

JNO. POPE,  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

[By telegraph from headquarters, St. Louis.]

CAIRO, *March 14, 1862.*

Major General JNO. POPE, *New Madrid:*

I congratulate you and your command on the success which has crowned your toils and exposures. You have given the final blow to the rebellion in Missouri and proved yourselves worthy members of the brave army of the west.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*New Madrid, March 14, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: Our success has been even greater than I reported. Twenty-five pieces of heavy artillery, 24-pounders, and rifled thirty-twos; two batteries of field artillery; an immense quantity of fixed ammunition; several thousand stand of small-arms, with hundreds of boxes of musket-cartridges; three hundred mules and horses; tents for an army of twelve thousand men, and an immense quantity of other valuable property, of not less value than a million of dollars, have fallen into our hands. The men only escaped, but the enemy's whole force is demoralized and dispersed in the swamps on the opposite side of the river. The enemy abandoned the works so hurriedly as to leave all the baggage of officers and knapsacks of men, their dead unburied, their suppers on the tables, and the candles burning in the tents. The furious thunder-storm which raged all night enabled him to get across the river without being discov-

ered. Our heavy battery was established during the night of the 12th, within eight hundred yards of the enemy's works, and opened at daylight on the 13th, just thirty-four hours after the guns were delivered to us at Cairo. During the whole day yesterday our lines were drawn closer and closer around their works, under the furious fire of sixty pieces of heavy artillery. The fear of an assault upon their works at daylight induced them to flee precipitately during the night. Many prisoners have been taken and the colors of several Arkansas regiments. I believe that there are no troops at Island No. 10, but shall know certainly during the night. Our forces behaved admirably. Our loss has been about fifty killed and wounded. Commodore Hollins was in command of the fleet, and Generals McCown, Stewart, and Gantt, of the land forces. The gunboats went down the river. I have twenty-five heavy guns in the two works of the enemy's, which command every foot of the river.

JNO. POPE,  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*New Madrid, March 17, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: Your despatch of this date received. Will take immediate steps to obey your instructions. Think I shall get up with less trouble than you suppose. River blockaded by heavy guns here, between here and Point Pleasant, and five miles below Point Pleasant. Have caught six large transports and five gunboats above my lower battery of heavy guns, which will be ours or destroyed. Very few troops on Island No. 10; all on main land. My spies opposite Island No. 10 reported to me yesterday and day before that enemy were leaving island for main land, which led me to believe that they were evacuating.

JNO. POPE,  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*New Madrid, March 17, 1862.*

General CULLUM: If Commodore Foote can run past the batteries of Island No. 10 with two or three gunboats, and reach here, I can cross my whole force and capture every man of the enemy at Island No. 10, and on the main land. I shall send a messenger to him, suggesting it; but for fear of accident, you had perhaps best send him this letter. He had best be careful in approaching this place, in case he gets past the battery, and display a white flag some distance off.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*New Madrid, March 17, 1862.*

General PALMER: On no account permit the 24-pounder gun to be fired at Point Pleasant. You will defeat my whole object by letting the enemy know the gun is there. I was surprised to learn from Colonel Bissell that you had thought even of firing it at gunboats, or any other boats. Once for all, my object is to establish this heavy battery, without the knowledge of the enemy, at a point



below or nearly opposite Tiptonville, so as to command the place where troops can be shipped. By getting the guns quietly into position near the lower Riddle farm to-night the gunboats will be above you, and can be dealt with. The transports lying there can be destroyed at daylight, before they can get out of the way. If you fire the 24-pounder at Point Pleasant, my whole purpose is defeated.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,

*Brigadier General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*New Madrid, March 18, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: As soon as daylight unmasked my heavy battery below Point Pleasant, the enemy moved with five gunboats to within three hundred yards, and attempted to dislodge us. A furious cannonade was kept up for an hour and a half, when the gunboats rapidly retreated out of range. One gunboat was sunk and several badly damaged. Many of the gunners were shot down from our rifle-pits. We lost not a single man. Our lower battery is so placed that it commands the upper end of the overflowed landing, on east side of the river, and no communication from below with the enemy is now possible. They are shut up in the bend of the river, with no egress whatever, except by a road from Tiptonville to Union City, which crosses Reelfoot lake, two miles wide, and with only small flats. If I had the means to cross the river with my command, I could bag the whole of them. I made reconnoissance across peninsula to-day towards Island No. 8. Party not returned. Will write fully by mail to reach you day after to-morrow.

JNO. POPE,

*Brigadier General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*New Madrid, March 18, 1862.*

General PLUMMER: It is possible that the enemy, who is moving his whole infantry force from Island No. 10 to Tiptonville, may attempt to cross in force and attack the lower battery, now supported by General Palmer. In that case you will at once march to his aid, leaving only your guns in battery, and your sharpshooters in the rifle-pits. The enemy's whole force is only about eight thousand five hundred infantry, with perhaps two batteries of light artillery: no match for Palmer and yourself united. I send down a full regiment of cavalry to report to you. Send three companies to General Palmer, and keep open constant and frequent communication with him and with me. There are two regiments of Michigan cavalry here, many of the companies armed with revolving rifles, who can serve admirably on foot, and can reinforce you, if necessary, in an hour. It is beyond measure important to maintain the heavy batteries below Point Pleasant. As long as they are there supplies are cut off, and there is no escape for the enemy. They cannot get off by land. Below Tiptonville the swamps begin, and it will not be possible to ship troops any lower down than that place. I rely much upon your skill and vigor, which if fairly exhibited for a few days, will secure us most important results.

Respectfully, general, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,

*Brigadier General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*New Madrid, March 18, 1862.*

General PALMER: I judge from what was stated to me by the officer of engineers who came up this morning that the 24-pounder siege gun which was placed in battery last night is too high up the river to accomplish the purpose for which it was designed. I have directed Lieutenant Colonel Adams to place the other guns in position about one and a half miles below where the other gun is, if a suitable place can be found there. The object is to command Tiptonville and the shore for a half a mile below, so as to prevent the embarkation of troops. It may be that the enemy will attempt to cross and come up on you from below. I send three companies of cavalry to you to enable you to keep out scouts, and keep yourself fully apprised of what is going on for some distance below you. You will use all vigilance, and be ready to support the guns with your whole force if necessary. Keep up constant communication with General Plummer, and advise him immediately of any movement of the enemy. He is instructed to move with his whole force to your assistance if necessary. It is of the last importance to the operations here that the battery of the two 24-pounder guns be maintained in its present position, and I will move the whole force from here for that purpose if necessary. If there be no suitable point below the gun in position for the one which I sent down last night, you will cause it to be placed in position near the other. But I must impress upon you that it is the landing at Tiptonville, and for a half a mile below it, which must be commanded by our guns to effect the purpose contemplated. Keep your mounted scouts along the river for at least four or five miles below you, to watch carefully whether the enemy make any attempt to cross. Their whole force in this vicinity, at Island No. 10, and elsewhere, does not exceed nine thousand infantry, with perhaps two batteries of light artillery—no match for yourself and Plummer united. Write to me regularly and fully two or three times a day.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO POPE,  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*St. Louis, March 21, 1862.*

GENERAL: Your despatch in relation to canal (without date) is just received. I heartily approve of your plan. Impress all the negroes you can find to assist in the work. If you can, in this way, turn and capture the enemy, it will be one of the most brilliant feats of the war. When occasion requires you will assume command of all the forces under Colonel Buford on the other side of the river, and all those at Columbus. Colonel Buford has a number (five, I think,) of large siege pieces; use them wherever you think they will be of most advantage. I will not attempt to hamper you with any minute instructions. The great object, you know, is to cut the enemy off from any chance of retreat by water. I leave you to accomplish this according to your own judgment, having full confidence in your ultimate success. Buell will effect a junction with Grant and Smith by Monday. We shall then have seventy thousand men at a single point on the Tennessee with which to cut the enemy's centre, destroy their railroad connexions, and thus cut off the retreat by land of Polk, McCown, &c. Unless the enemy is much stronger at Corinth than reported, I can see no chance of failure. There will probably be a big battle somewhere in that vicinity. Unfortunately, just as I am preparing additional re-enforcements for the army of the Tennessee to make everything still more certain, I have received official despatches of more troubles in New Mexico and the condition of Colonel Canby's

forces. This compels me immediately to fit out a column of five thousand men for Canby's assistance. I do it most willingly, for the government has shamefully neglected him, but at the same time it seriously interferes with my plan.

Yours, truly,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major General.*

Major General POPE, *New Madrid.*

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*New Madrid, March 19, 1862.*

Colonel J. W. BISSELL: Your two communications of yesterday have been received. If it indeed be impracticable to get a gunboat or two past the enemy's batteries, some other mode of dealing with him must be devised. I desire you, therefore, to make an examination of the peninsula opposite Island No. 10, to ascertain whether a short canal, not to exceed two miles in length, cannot be dug, so that boats can enter above Island No. 10 and come out into the river below it. A mere ditch, through which the water of the river can be started, will, at this stage of the river, wash into a deep channel in one night. I think, from the character of the ground and the high condition of the river, it may be feasible to do this in twenty-four hours, so that gunboats at least could pass through and enter the river below the island. Show this letter to Colonel Buford, who will furnish you every assistance. If the work can be done, lay off the line of it, and call on Colonel Buford for all his available men to do the digging. Of course, you will begin below, and not open the upper end to the river until the whole ditch is completed. Affairs below are in such condition that the presence of this force here is necessary. It is not possible, from your report, to get any part of it up to Island No. 10 or to Island No. 8, nor do I see what good result could be effected by carrying it there. Colonel Buford has men enough to establish and work his heavy guns if it be desirable to establish them in position. Write fully.

Respectfully, colonel, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*New Madrid, March 19, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: Have had the country examined between here and Islands No. 8 and No. 10. Had to be done in skiffs, as the whole region is under water. River rising rapidly and threatening to overflow this place. For the present it is impossible to get troops to Foote's assistance this side of river; they could not aid them, even if there. The only way to attack the works opposite Island No. 10 is by crossing the river here. Nearly whole of enemy's force now encamped at Tiptonville, five miles below Point Pleasant, and a little above my lower battery. Am having examination made to see if by digging across one or two ridges cannot connect Island No. 8 with river below Island No. 10 by uniting two bayous. If so, work will be done by as large a force as necessary to complete it in twenty-four hours. All the roads leading northeast from here are under water, in many places six feet deep, and rising. It is impracticable for the present to build road across peninsula—utterly so. Rebels are shut up in bend of river with only outlet across Reelfoot lake by flat-boat. Impracticable now, as lake is four miles wide in cypress timber. Capture of enemy, I think, only question of time. They have small supply of provisions,

and can get no more. Is it not possible for a couple of gunboats to run past Island No. 10, so I can cross my command over the river? Have urged Foote to try it.

JNO. POPE,  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*New Madrid, March 20, 1862.*

Colonel BUFORD: Colonel J. W. Bissell returns to Island No. 8 to-morrow to commence the work with which he is charged. He will require from you two steamers, which please allow him to select, as he knows precisely what I need, one regiment of infantry, which he will also designate, and at least four barges. I need not urge you to furnish these things without delay, and to aid him in every possible way. The operations here will soon be concluded if he completes his work successfully, and I have faith that he will do so. Subsistence for his men he will also need. From Commodore Foote he desires to borrow, for a time, three cutters to enable him to work in the swamps.

Please present my compliments to the commodore, and beg him to be kind enough to furnish Colonel Bissell with what he wishes. My lower battery sunk one of the enemy's transports which undertook to land supplies for the force near Tiptonville, (Merriweather's landing)

I am, colonel, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*New Madrid, March 21, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: I transmit, enclosed, a very rough sketch of the situation here. What is on the other side of the river is, of course, from hearsay. My great object is to get across the river, which I shall do as soon as possible. I expect the tugs and barges here by the canal on Monday.

The value of our gunboat flotilla has been altogether overestimated. As an auxiliary merely to land forces, to escort transports, to reconnoitre in advance of our movements, and to cover the landing of troops, gunboats can do admirable service. They cannot take any sort of battery on the shore, as I think you will find. The enemy's gunboats have wholly failed to dislodge even the hasty batteries and rifle-pits I have made. After five days bombarding, Commodore Foote has made no sort of impression. Nothing but the gunners and a few infantry have been left opposite Island No. 10. My impression is that the enemy is trying very hard to get off by river from Tiptonville. They have a very small supply of rations, and the country in the bend is very sparsely settled. One of their transports was sunk yesterday by our lower battery, in attempting to make a landing just below Tiptonville. It is a bare possibility that the men, by paddling down the swamps on logs, and wading where they can, may get off on boats below, but it will be without anything whatever. I have closed every exit from the bend by way of the river as far as guns will do it. The means of crossing are all I need. It would be of immense service for such operations on this river if you would send me the 20-pounder Parrotts. There are four at Jefferson barracks, and I suppose more in the city. One battery of them is at Sedalia or Lexington, and can well be spared from there. The 20-pounder Parrotts are better and more effective than the siege twenty-fours, and

can be used as field-batteries. The river is high and rising, and is nowhere less than a mile wide; in most parts it is at least a mile and a quarter. I will do all that is possible to keep things going.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,

*Brigadier General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*New Madrid, March 23, 1865.*

Major General HALLECK: Since yesterday our gunboats seem to have ceased their fire, and are waiting for us to reduce the batteries opposite Island No. 10. If I can cross this force it will be an easy matter, as the batteries are only earth parapets, open to the rear—such works as could be put up in twenty-four hours. The river is very high and rising still, and the current runs so furiously that a row-boat, manned by six oarsmen, which I sent out yesterday, was unable to stem it and floated down three miles. It was necessary to haul it back to the upper redoubt by land. The river is over a mile wide at every point—a distance too great for our guns to cover the landing on the opposite side. To cross this army under such circumstances, in the face of the enemy, will be a difficult and dangerous operation, and nothing except the utter failure of our gunboats to achieve what they promise, and the imperative necessity of taking the enemy's batteries, now that they have been assailed, would induce me to hazard such an operation with volunteers, without positive orders. The difficulties have much increased since I first determined upon such a movement, by the greatly increased velocity and fury of the current. The canal cannot be made deep enough for gunboats, and there will be nothing to cover our landing on the opposite bank. The movement must therefore be made under cover of darkness, which will greatly increase the danger and chance of confusion. I see well the necessity of carrying the enemy's works, now that the attack has begun, but it is distinctly to be understood that no manner of assistance has been, or, from appearances, can be rendered us by the gunboats of the flotilla. Commodore Foote declines to run any of his boats past the batteries, for fear of losing them. I have offered, through Colonel Bissell, engineers to secure the boat against damage from the enemy's fire, but Commodore Foote fears that the enemy may board her. Surely such a risk is much less than will be that of crossing a large force in frail boats, over a wide, swift river, in the face of an enemy, and without anything to cover the landing. I shall, however, carry out the operation, but I would respectfully suggest that if any plan of operations down this river has been made with the belief that our gunboat flotilla can dislodge the enemy from any batteries they choose to place on the main land or on the islands, it must of necessity fail. Unless the gunboats are able to perform what has been asserted for them, the line of the river is the strongest the enemy has. If the enemy have planted batteries on the upper end of any island below us, we will have the same delay and difficulty we have had here. I must disembark, pass round by land, establish batteries below the enemy, and wait until they are starved out, as it is not likely that other places will be found where canals can be dug, so as to bring transports below the enemy's batteries without passing in range. Even if such places could be found wherever the enemy established a battery, I would be obliged, as I am now, to cross without cover or the aid of gunboats, in the face of the enemy. Of course, if the land forces are to cross and recross this river at every battery of the enemy along its banks and on the islands, and carry their works, we must be delayed in our progress beyond all reason, and must certainly sustain some disaster. I write

you frankly the facts, as I know you desire to have them. The newspaper puffing concerning the gunboats has misled the public greatly. I think it has been a fact sufficiently well established by experience, that batteries on the water, especially where they have not the force to land and storm, cannot contend with redoubts on the land. The enemy here has been unable, with all his gunboats, to dislodge the riflemen and small artillery batteries I have established. Batteries of heavy guns would be still more difficult. The enemy exposes none of his men in the batteries, except those at the guns, and as he does not fear a land attack, or any attempt to storm on the part of the flotilla, he scarcely answers Commodore Foote's cannonade. Colonel Bissell, whom I sent up, informs me that the enemy only fired twice during the day he was there. I state these facts because I think it proper that it should be understood precisely what is the exact capacity of the naval flotilla in such operations, and because it seems to me that we are undertaking a most difficult line of operations, if the land forces are to be crossed and recrossed at every battery the enemy chooses to establish. The result of seven days' operations of the gunboats has plainly shown that they are not likely to reduce any of the enemy's batteries. I have also to complain that the corps of newspaper correspondents with the flotilla have been put in possession of my plans for bringing down boats here by digging a canal, and have published it in the newspapers. I fear to write anything, lest I see it in a day or two in all the newspapers in the country. My despatches to Colonel Buford and Commodore Foote concerning the blockade of the river below them were official, and not designed for publication. I regret to trouble you with such matters, but if my intentions and movements are published days in advance, by persons not under my control, I must cease to correspond with the forces above me.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

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[By telegraph from headquarters, St. Louis.]

CAIRO, *March 24, 1862.*

Major General JNO. POPE, *New Madrid:*

Yours of yesterday received. Commodore Foote will not attempt to run past the batteries and he cannot reduce them. If the crossing cannot be effected with safety it had better not be undertaken. The main object is accomplished by holding the enemy in position. If the idea of crossing is given up, send all the forces you can spare to Bird's Point to be transported up the Tennessee. We can there turn the enemy and cut off his retreat by land, while your guns command the river. If this meets your views I will also withdraw the forces from Hickman with the same object. The immediate reduction of these batteries is not important, but the failure in an attempt to cross your army over the river might be disastrous. I am decidedly in favor of the move up the Tennessee.

Answer.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major General.*

A true copy:

C. A. MORGAN,  
*Colonel and Acting Aide-de-Camp.*

NEW MADRID, *March 27, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: Your despatch of 24th received. I will take Island No. 10 within a week, trust me. As Commodore Foote is unable to reduce it, and unable to run his gunboats past it, I would ask, as the boats belong to the United States, that he be directed to remove his crews from two of them and turn over the boats to me. I will bring them here. I can get along without them, but will have several days delay. The railroad from Bird's Point to Sikeston under water, and route to Commerce impracticable from backwater of swamps. Troops could not be taken from here until the river is open. I am confident of success, and shall carefully provide against every danger in crossing the river.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*New Madrid, March 26, 1862.*

Flag-Officer A. H. FOOTE: I have directed Colonel Bissell, who is making slow but certain progress with his work, to deepen the channel sufficiently to enable one of your smallest gunboats to be brought through. The river here is so wide that our guns on this side cannot command the landing on the opposite bank, and I need a gunboat to lie near the opposite shore, to prevent the establishment of batteries or the use of field guns against our boats in crossing. The enemy's pickets line the opposite shore, from Island No. 10 all the way round to Tiptonville, (Merriweather's landing,) and any movement will be observed as soon as it is begun. Of course the frail steamers loaded with men are not suitable to effect the passage of the river, in the face of an enemy even with field-batteries. Your smallest gunboat will answer all purposes, and can be brought through, even if it be necessary to take off her guns temporarily. They can either be brought down in one of the steamers or barges, or we can arm her with thirty-twos (32s) and 8-inch howitzer here. I think the escape of the enemy nearly impossible. Certainly no baggage, nor any sort of artillery, or material of war can be carried off. My lower battery is two miles below Tiptonville, and commands the upper end of the overflowed lands on the east bank. It consists of two twenty-fours, and two 10-pounder Parrotts, well supported. From this place round to the lower battery the shore is lined with heavy guns, twenty-fours and thirty-twos.

I shall anxiously await your reply, in which I hope you will let me know the draught of your smallest gunboat, with and without guns. To cross this furious river, so wide that our batteries cannot cover the landing, in the face of an enemy with artillery, and on such frail vessels as we must use, is a very hazardous and difficult operation, only to be justified by the necessities of the case. Every means, therefore, must be taken to diminish the danger of any disaster, and your gunboat will render matters greatly more safe. When once my force is on the other side, I am a match for any enemy to be found there, in whatever numbers they are likely to have. Please communicate with me as soon as possible.

Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*New Madrid, March 26, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: Our canal progresses slowly but successfully. Much difficulty has been met with in sawing off trees below the water. It will

require three days to get the boats through yet. I fear no gunboat can be brought, but I will speedily fit up one that will carry a heavy shell gun or two, to cover our landing. Some delay is unavoidable, but I am confident of success. The enemy's gunboats keep very clear of us. I do not think it possible for the enemy to escape on transports from Tiptonville in the face of our heavy battery below. They cannot embark below Tiptonville, as the whole country is under water. Bragg is said to be at Island No. 10; doubtful.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

NEW MADRID, *March 28, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: Our canal approaches completion. It has been a great labor to cut through the swamps, but to-morrow brings us to the bayou which conducts to this place. During the progress of this work have had two heavy barges lashed together, strengthened all round with four feet thick of heavy timber, to be lined with bales of pressed hay, and to carry one columbiad and two Dahlgrens. Four steamers will be brought through immediately. I have no doubt of success in crossing and capturing everything.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[By telegraph from St. Louis, March 28, 1862.]

CAIRO, *March 28, 1862.*

General POPE, *New Madrid:*

I have telegraphed to Commodore Foote to give all the aid in his power. You have a difficult problem to solve. I will not embarrass you with instructions. I leave you to act as your judgement may deem best.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major General.*

A true copy :

C. A. MORGAN,  
*Colonel and acting Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*New Madrid, March 30, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: Our canal is finished. The barges and first steamer are in the bayou which conducts to this place; the other steamers are entering the cut above. The heavy work is done, and it only remains to cut out overhanging limbs and remove drift-wood in the bayou. Our floating battery is nearly ready and will carry three heavy guns. It will be anchored within five hundred yards of the opposite bank to cover landing. A gunboat or two would remove nearly all our difficulty in crossing, and I am sure they could be brought down without injury. Several river pilots are ready to bring them, and state that at this stage of water they can run down close to the Missouri shore without being within three-fourths of a mile of the batteries on Island No. 10. If we cannot get them we shall get along without. By Tuesday night it is expected that all our boats will be here. From all information, enemy's forces at Island No. 10 and in the bend does not exceed seven thousand. They seem to have



made no preparation to resist our crossing. Probably they do not believe it possible to get boats through from No. 8. Will keep you advised now of every movement.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*New Madrid, April 1, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: Was absent when your despatch arrived. Canal is finished and boats are now descending bayou to this place. Expect them here to-night. The enemy commenced erecting batteries at points of high land and landing places on the river; little serious to be feared from them. Our floating battery, properly placed, will deal easily with them or any other obstacle to landing. Have erected two batteries, of two thirty-twos each, about a mile and a half below the 24-pounder battery, opposite mouth of slough. (See sketch sent you.) These batteries cover handsomely the landing on opposite shore; I have no apprehensions of the result. Commodore Foote promises to run a couple of his gunboats past island to-night; if so, all difficulty is over. Troops in fine condition and can be relied on. Railroad to Sikeston under water, and road to Commerce bad. Best send everything for this command to Island No. 8, with orders to Colonel Buford to send it through the canal in barges or flats. Easy communication in this way for heavy stores. Do not be uneasy. No precaution will be omitted, and there is no fear of the result in this command. I telegraphed you yesterday that gunboats had again been repulsed by our heavy battery; one of them so badly damaged as to drift broadside down the river, unable to work her engines.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI,  
*New Madrid, April 2, 1862.*

Colonel THOMAS A. SCOTT: I greatly desire to see you before I begin final operations against Island No. 10, and the enemy on the opposite shore. I think that the public interests, as well as the complete success of my operations here, will be greatly promoted by a short interview with you. I would go up myself to see you but for reasons you will perhaps understand, and because what I desire to say can be best said and understood here, where you can have a satisfactory view of the whole ground. May I beg, therefore, that you will do me the favor to come down to-morrow. I will endeavor to make you as comfortable as our camp conveniences will allow.

Very respectfully and truly, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*New Madrid, April 2, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: I submit herewith two plans of crossing the river with this command, one of which will be adopted as circumstances dictate.

First plan, (without any assistance from Commodore Foote.) The road down the bend runs nearly due east, and intersects the road from Island No. 10 to

Tiptonville, at right angles about midway between those places. This road leaves the river at Watson's landing, one and a half or two mile below the slough, which makes the small island opposite this place. From Watson's landing to Tiptonville, or Island No. 10, is ten miles. I have thrown up a battery of four thirty-twos, flanked by rifle-pits for a thousand men, immediately opposite Watson's landing, or about one and a half mile below the battery of two twenty-fours thrown up some time since, to command the mouth of the slough. (See sketch I sent you.) The enemy has thrown up batteries and rifle-pits at Watson's landing, immediately opposite our battery of thirty-twos. I am extending our batteries and rifle-pits, and firing frequently, so as to draw his attention as much as possible to that point, and induce him to concentrate his opposition to our landing as much as possible at Watson's. As soon as everything is ready, I shall tow over in the night, to the shore of the small island immediately opposite to this place, our floating battery and drop it down along the shore until it enters the mouth of the slough, anchoring it half way across the slough, and within one hundred yards of the main shore, so that it will enfilade the bank of the river for a mile and a half below, and completely cover the high land at the mouth of the slough. At daylight, having one whole division of four infantry regiments and a battery of artillery on board the boats, I shall commence to cross, landing at the mouth of the slough, every man with a spade, to put himself at once into a rifle-pit. Our thirty-twos opposite Watson's landing, and our twenty-fours opposite mouth of slough, together with the floating battery, will cover the whole ground (all open cornfields) for half a mile back from the river with shells and round shot, and prevent any considerable body of the enemy from assembling against the first division which crosses. Once give that division a foothold on the bank, and covered by these batteries, and no force the enemy has can dislodge it. With this whole force on the other side, I shall at once advance and intersect the road from Island No. 10 to Tiptonville. Subsequent movements will, of course, depend upon circumstances. Our floating battery has been somewhat changed in plan since I telegraphed you. In addition to its defensive arrangements, I shall lash on each side of it a barge floored over with empty water-tight barrels, and loaded with cotton bales and dry cottonwood rails packed tight. The barges will be planked over the top with heavy planks, spiked to strong pieces, to prevent any of the barrels, bales of cotton, or rails escaping. These barges will float, even if filled with water. This arrangement will give twenty feet of cotton bales and tightly packed rails on each side of the barge carrying the guns, the sides and ends of which are four and a half feet thick, of heavy timber. This battery will carry one hundred and fifty riflemen, and will be well provided with row-boats in case of unforeseen accident. As it will be anchored in shoal water in the slough, and very near the shore, both of the main-land and of the island, the worst case for us that could happen will not occasion loss of life. If Commodore Foote will send us two of his gunboats, (which I hardly hope,) I shall continue to make a great show of preparation at the batteries opposite Watson's, and during the night will drop the transports and gunboats without lights down the river, close along the Missouri shore. Just below our battery of thirty-twos, they pass behind Island No. 11, and even in day-time would be out of danger. For half a mile along the shore, until they pass behind the island, they would be within range of the enemy's batteries opposite, but would run no risk in the night, as they cannot be seen and will not be heard. I propose to push them on down the river to a point opposite Tiptonville, marching the whole force down by land the same night, so as to embark and cross to Tiptonville at daylight, under cover of our two gunboats. This plan is perfectly feasible and free of danger, and would completely cut off everything in the bend and at the island. The enemy's gunboats could not for a moment contend with ours. There are no heavy guns of the enemy near Tiptonville, though without the cover of

our gunboats, their own gunboats, and field batteries, with the infantry force they have there, could effectually prevent our crossing. This plan, therefore, by far the easiest to execute, and the most complete in its results, depends upon getting two gunboats. If I had the gunboat fleet under my control I would have them very soon. There is not one chance in a thousand that either of them would be hit, or even seen, in the night. There are nine feet of water in the channel along the Missouri shore from Commodore Foote's flotilla to this place, in no part of which would the boats be nearer than three-fourths of a mile to the batteries of Island No. 10. I could tell you many strange and startling reasons given by the commodore for not risking it, such as his grave responsibility to the country for the security of St. Louis, Louisville, &c., &c. He says if the Benton were taken by the enemy, or in fact any of his iron-clad boats, which (as he says) are invincible fighting up stream, his whole fleet could be routed, and St. Louis and Louisville be at the mercy of the enemy from Island No. 10, &c., &c. It is useless to argue against such ideas; so I shall probably do the work with the army alone. Our canal has been a gigantic work; it has been infinitely more difficult than at first supposed. Six miles through a great forest of immense trees which had to be sawed off four feet under water, and then through cypress swamp, thickly studded with cypress knees, have furnished us with an amount of labor surpassing any one's belief who has not seen it. We have now a canal fifty feet wide, four feet deep, and six miles long, through which large steamers can pass, and all our supplies be delivered to us.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

NEW MADRID, April 2, 1862.

Major General HALLECK: Our boats are in the main bayou and ready to move into the river at a moment's notice. I keep them up the bayou, concealed from the enemy. I am only waiting to finish the floating battery which carries one 8-inch Columbiad and three thirty-twos. It will be finished by to-morrow night, and I think will be impregnable to any batteries the enemy can establish in any reasonable time. I have no hope of Commodore Foote. He has postponed trying to run any of his gunboats past Island No. 10 until some foggy or rainy night. The moon is beginning to make the nights light, and there is no prospect of fogs during this sort of weather. We must do without him. I will give you details of the manner I intend to cross by mail.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
New Madrid, April 5, 1862.

Commodore A. H. FOOTE: Your note of yesterday is just received. Captain Walke arrived safely with the Carondelet, not a shot having touched her. Officers and men are in good condition and anxious for service. I requested Colonel Scott, Assistant Secretary of War, to write you yesterday in relation to sending another one of the gunboats, and, with profound respect, I venture to urge you still further on the subject. I have not a doubt but that one of them could run the batteries to-night without any serious injury. Notwithstanding their inferior character, the enemy's gunboats pass and repass our batteries in the night with-

out injury. My best artillerists, officers of the regular army of many years' service, state positively that it is impossible in the night to fire with any kind of certainty the large guns, thirty-twos, of our batteries, especially at a moving object. The guns fired at the Carondelet passed two hundred feet above her. I am thus urgent, sir, because the lives of thousands of men and the success of our operations hang upon your decision. With the two boats all is safe; with one it is uncertain. The lives of the men composing this army are in my keeping, and I do not feel justified in omitting any steps to fortify this movement against any accident which might occasion disaster not to be repaired. Certainly the risk to a gunboat moving down in the night is not nearly so great, and involves no such consequences as the risk to ten thousand men crossing a great river in the presence of the enemy. You will excuse me, I am sure, if I seem urgent. A sense of duty alone impels me to present the facts to you as forcibly as possible.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*New Madrid, April 6, 1862.*

General E. PAINE: I desire you to march your division down to the river at the upper redoubt to take post at the steamboat landing of the town as soon as day dawns. Carry two days' cooked rations, the spades, shovels, axes, and everything complete for service. Load your command on the steamboats as soon as possible and await further orders. I will be down in person. Your supply of ammunition, over and above the full cartridge-boxes, you will have placed on one of the steamers, and when you disembark leave an officer in charge of it. Be prompt and up to time.

Respectfully, general, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*


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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*New Madrid, April 6, 1862.*

Captain HENRY WALKER: I am induced to believe, by the reports of General Granger and Colonel Smith, that you will be able to silence or take the upper batteries of the enemy on the opposite shore; I mean the batteries immediately opposite our batteries of thirty-twos. Commodore Foote sends another boat down to-night. I design to attempt the crossing with my force to-morrow, and I desire, if it meet your views, that the two gunboats go down as soon as day dawns, and silence the batteries specified, and to hold on near the shore until the troops disembark. As soon as you start, I will have the transports brought into the river and loaded with troops, which will cross the river and land near you as soon as the batteries are silenced. You will doubtless have to run close into them, and maintain your position so as to cover the whole ground in rear of the landing. Our batteries will be ordered to open as soon as day dawns, and to keep up their fire vigorously until the object is accomplished. I can cross three thousand five hundred men at a time. If you can thus silence those batteries in three hours or more, we have the rebels opposite in our hands. Call on Colonel Bissell, who is in the intrenchments near you, and he will give you thirty-two and sixty-four pounder ammunition.

Respectfully, captain, your obedient servant.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*



**MISSISSIPPI**  
 SHOWING THE SYSTEM  
 OF  
**REBEL FORTIFICATIONS**  
 ON THE  
**MISSISSIPPI RIVER**  
 AT  
**ISLAND NO. 10**  
 AND  
**NEW-MADRID,**  
 ALSO  
 THE OPERATIONS OF THE U.S. FORCES  
 UNDER  
**GENERAL JOHN ROPE**  
 AGAINST  
 THESE POSITIONS.



HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*New Madrid, April 7, 1862.*

Flag Officer A. H. FOOPE: I am happy to inform you that the Pittsburg has arrived untouched. I shall cross the river if possible to-day, and shall probably be prepared to assault the works near Island No. 10 by 2 o'clock p. m. to-morrow. May I beg that you will have a careful watch kept for us, that we may suffer no injury from your boats as we approach the rear of the enemy's batteries. With the aid of the two boats you have sent, and of the gallant officers who command them, I shall be able to effect the passage of the river with the necessary force, and without increasing the tremendous hazard which must otherwise have attended such an operation. Be pleased, sir, to accept my hearty good wishes.

Respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

NEW MADRID, *April 7, 1862—12 o'clock m.*

Major General HALLECK: Enemy's batteries silenced, and Paine's division has made good its lodgement on the other shore. Stanley's division follows immediately. All goes well.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*New Madrid, April 7, 1862.*

Captain HENRY WALKER: General Pope requests that as soon as the next division has crossed the river you proceed with the two gunboats to Tiptonville and the landing below, and endeavour to intercept the retreat of the rebels. You had best confer with General Palmer, commanding battery two miles below.

I am, captain, respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. A. MORGAN,  
*Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*In the field, April 7, 1862.*

General PAINE: The general commanding directs me to inform you that he has received reliable information of the evacuation of Island No. 10, and that you will probably find no force to oppose you. He wishes you, instead of waiting for General Hamilton, to march on Tiptonville. As soon as Stanley commences to cross he will follow you immediately. Keep a cloud of skirmishers in advance of your column.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

\_\_\_\_\_  
*Major and Aide-de-Camp.*

NEW MADRID, *April 7, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: Paine's, Stanley's, and Hamilton's divisions are across, together with three batteries of light artillery and a battalion of cavalry. Everything will be over by 12 to-night. The divisions of Paine and Stanley are on the march to Tiptonville. Rebel force in the bend rapidly retreating on

that place. Hamilton's division and the cavalry move forward at once. Do not believe there will be more than a skirmish. Am just embarking myself. You will not hear from me before to-morrow. All goes well and everybody in fine spirits. No. 10 will be ours before to-morrow night.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

CAMP ON EAST SIDE OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*April 7, 1862—7 p. m.*

Major General HALLECK : Enemy in rapid retreat, leaving artillery, baggage, supplies, sick, &c. Paine is near Tiptonville. Stanley within three miles of him. Hamilton three miles in rear of Stanley. Plummer at landing on this side. Our gunboats below Tiptonville on this bank. Think we shall bag whole force, though not certain. No escape for them below Tiptonville, except by wading shoulder deep in swamps. Whole command well in hand, and will move forward at daylight. Captured eleven heavy guns and enemy's famous floating battery, carrying fourteen guns, which drifted down from Island No. 10. I think rebels are trying desperately to escape. Many of them must be caught. Have already taken one hundred prisoners. Will occupy Island No. 10 early to-morrow unless enemy is assembled there in force. Capture it anyhow by evening. Send down all transports you can get at once. Do not believe enemy will make another stand this side of Memphis. If I can get transportation I will be in Memphis in seven days.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

CAMP ON EAST SIDE OF MISSISSIPPI RIVER,

*April 8, 1862—7 o'clock a. m.*

Major General HALLECK : Island No. 10 was hastily evacuated last night, and the forces are trying to get off. Whether they will succeed remains to be seen. Paine's division is in advance. I have not heard from it since last night. Everything the enemy had is ours at all events. It may be possible to get their men off by wading the swamps, but nothing in the way of baggage, supplies, or artillery of any description can go.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

*Tiptonville, April 8, 1862—9 a. m.*

Major General HALLECK : The advance, under General Paine, reached this place at daylight, driving the enemy before him. After sharp skirmishing, and frantic attempts to cross the swamps, the enemy was so furiously pressed by Paine that he laid down his arms. Two thousand prisoners, including General Mackall, formerly of the adjutant general's department, and staff, together with large quantities of siege and field artillery, tents, baggage, and immense quantities of supplies have fallen into our hands. Our troops are now scouring the country between here and Island No. 10. Many more prisoners will be taken in the course of the day. Everything has worked smoothly and well. The captured troops are from Louisiana and Arkansas.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*



NEW MADRID, *April 8, 1862*—7 p. m.

Major General HALLECK: Everything is ours. Few, if any, of the enemy escaped. Three generals, six thousand prisoners, an immense quantity of ammunition and of supplies, one hundred pieces of siege, and several batteries of field artillery, great numbers of small arms, tents, wagons, horses, &c., have fallen into our hands. Our success has been complete and overwhelming. The enemy's forces are from Louisiana, Arkansas, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Alabama. I will give to-morrow, by telegraph, a brief summary of our operations

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

[By telegraph from St. Louis, April 8, 1862.]

NEW MADRID, *April 8, 1862.*

Major General POPE: I congratulate you and your command on your splendid achievement. It exceeds in boldness and brilliancy all other operations of the war. It will be memorable in military history, and will be admired by future generations. You deserve well of your country.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major General.*

*Army of the Mississippi, Major General John Pope commanding.*

STAFF.—Major Speed Butler, assistant adjutant general; Major C. A. Morgan, aide-de-camp; Major E. F. Noyes, aide-de-camp; Captain L. L. Marshall, aide-de-camp; Major J. M. Corse, inspector general; Captain J. W. Taylor, assistant quartermaster; Captain J. A. Swain, assistant commissary of subsistence; Lieutenant J. W. Mott, acting assistant quartermaster.

FIRST DIVISION.—Brigadier General D. S. Stanley. *First brigade.*—Colonel John Groesbeck; thirty-ninth Ohio, Colonel Groesbeck; twenty-seventh Ohio, Colonel J. W. Fuller. *Second Brigade.*—Colonel J. L. K. Smith; forty-third Ohio, Colonel Smith; sixty-third Ohio, Colonel J. W. Sprague.

SECOND DIVISION.—Brigadier General S. Hamilton. *First Brigade.*—Colonel W. H. Worthington; fifth Iowa Infantry, Colonel Worthington; fifty-ninth Indiana infantry, Colonel J. J. Alexander. *Second brigade.*—Colonel N. Perczell; twenty-sixth Missouri infantry, Colonel G. B. Boomer; eleventh Ohio battery, Captain T. C. Sands.

THIRD DIVISION.—Brigadier General J. N. Palmer. *First brigade.*—Colonel J. R. Slack; forty-seventh Indiana, Colonel J. R. Slack; thirty-fourth Indiana, Colonel T. Ryan. *Second brigade.*—Colonel G. N. Fitch; forty-sixth Indiana infantry, Colonel Fitch; forty-third Indiana infantry, Colonel W. E. McLean; seventh Illinois cavalry, Colonel W. P. Kellogg; company G, first Missouri light artillery, Captain H. Hescoek.

FOURTH DIVISION.—Brigadier General E. A. Paine. *First brigade.*—Colonel J. D. Morgan; tenth Illinois infantry, Colonel Morgan; sixteenth Illinois infantry, Colonel R. T. Smith. *Second brigade.*—Fifty-first Illinois infantry, Colonel G. W. Cumming; twenty-sixth Illinois infantry, Colonel H. Dougherty; first Illinois cavalry, Major P. D. Jenkins; Yates's sharpshooters, Lieutenant Colonel D. E. Williams.

FIFTH DIVISION.—Brigadier General Plummer. *First brigade.*—Colonel John Briyner; forty-seventh Illinois infantry, Colonel Briyner; eighth Wis-

consin infantry, Colonel R. C. Murphy. *Second brigade*.—Colonel J. M. Loomis; twenty-sixth Illinois, Colonel Loomis; eleventh Missouri infantry, Lieutenant Colonel W. E. Pawtaker; company M, first Missouri light artillery, A. M. Powell.

CAVALRY DIVISION.—Brigadier General G. Granger; second Michigan cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel S. H. Gorham; third Michigan cavalry, Colonel J. K. Nusener.

ARTILLERY DIVISION.—Major W. L. Lothrop; second Iowa battery, Captain M. T. Spoor; third Michigan battery, Captain A. N. Dus; company F, second United States artillery, Lieutenant D. P. Mulling in charge; Ottawa light artillery, Captain C. Houghtaling; first Wisconsin artillery, battery No. 5, Captain O. F. Princey; first Wisconsin artillery, battery No. 6, Captain H. Dillens; first Wisconsin artillery, battery No. 7, Captain R. Griffith; Michigan light artillery, Captain S. De Golyers.

ENGINEERS REGIMENT OF THE WEST.—Colonel J. W. Bissell; fifteenth Wisconsin infantry, Colonel H. C. Heg; twenty-second Missouri infantry, \_\_\_\_\_; second Iowa cavalry, Colonel W. L. Elliott; fourth United States cavalry, Lieutenant M. J. Kelley; first United States infantry, Captain G. A. Williams; second Illinois cavalry, Captain Moore.

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## APPENDIX.

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### *Brigadier General S. Hamilton's report of operations at New Madrid.*

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Camp near New Madrid, March 22, 1862.*

SIR: I have to report that February 27, 1862, at Commerce, Missouri, I received orders to organize the first division of this army. The first brigade, under Colonel John Groesbeck, was composed of the thirty-ninth Ohio, Major Noyes commanding; forty-third Ohio, Colonel Smith commanding; and twenty-seventh Ohio, Colonel Fuller. Second brigade, Colonel J. B. Plummer commanding, was composed of the sixty-third Ohio, Colonel Sprague; twenty-sixth Illinois, Colonel Loomis; and eleventh Missouri, Lieutenant Colonel Pennybaker commanding; the seventh Illinois cavalry, under Colonel Kellogg; a detachment of the first United States infantry, under Captain Williams; two companies of engineer troops, (volunteers,) under Major Hasie and Captain Sands; eleventh Ohio battery were also attached to the first division.

The division marched from Commerce on the morning of the 28th of February, and reached Hunter's farm at midnight, the roads being almost impassable. The troops bivouacked that night in the rain and mud without a murmur. By order of General Pope, Colonel Kellogg's seventh Illinois cavalry was despatched in pursuit of Jefferson Thompson and his band. After a running fight, three light pieces of his artillery were captured and several prisoners taken, among them Captain James T. Hogane and Lieutenant D. B. Griswold, engineers Confederate States army. No official report of this affair, which was highly creditable to the seventh Illinois cavalry, was made to me.

Proceeding by easy stages, we reached New Madrid March 3d.

On the 2d of March Colonel J. L. Kirby Smith, forty-third Ohio, escorted by Colonel Kellogg's seventh Illinois cavalry, made a daring reconnoissance, penetrating into the town of New Madrid to within three-quarters of a mile of the enemy's intrenchments.

On the 3d the first division advanced upon the town. Kellogg's cavalry

forming the advanced guard and covering the flanks. Colonel Fuller's twenty-seventh Ohio deployed as skirmishers, supported by a section of Sands's eleventh Ohio battery, and closely followed by the whole division. The enemy's pickets were gallantly driven in by Colonel Fuller's regiment. The orders to the division were to feel the enemy, seizing any advantage which might offer. To this end the thirty-ninth Ohio was advanced by order of General Pope, as skirmishers on the right flank, and were pushed forward on a line with Colonel Fuller's twenty-seventh Ohio, to within one and a quarter mile of the enemy's principal work. Colonel Smith's forty-third Ohio, in line of battle, supported Colonel Fuller and protected the left flank of the division, supported by Sands's battery in the centre, while Colonel J. B. Plummer's brigade supported the right. The enemy withdrew to their intrenchments, but kept up an unremitting fire of solid shot and shell from five gunboats and their works, 24-pounder shot, shells from 32-pounders and 64-pounders, besides missiles from guns of smaller calibre. The troops, unable to reply, evinced a calmness and steadiness worthy of veterans. Reconnoissance having demonstrated that an assault of the enemy's works with the bayonet must have involved an unnecessary loss of life to our troops, it was, most prudently, not resorted to, though the bearing of the troops was such as to give reasonable hopes of success. On the other hand, it seemed doubtful whether, if taken, the works could be held against the fire of the enemy's gunboats.

Brigadier General Stanley arrived in camp on the evening of the 3d.

On the 4th a reorganization of divisions, &c., was made. General Stanley being from Ohio, the Ohio regiments passed from under my command. Having had evidence of their gallantry and coolness under fire, and feeling grateful for the cheerfulness with which both officers and men had responded to my efforts to enforce discipline and excite their ardor, I parted with them with regret. Their place, however, in the reorganization of brigades and divisions was well filled by the fifth Iowa, Lieutenant Colonel Matthies, and fifty-ninth Indiana, Colonel Alexander; Colonel Worthington commanding the brigade thus constituted.

On the night of the 4th Colonel Worthington, with four guns, and Colonel Smith's command from the forty-third Ohio, five companies of the fifth Iowa, and two companies of the fifty-ninth Indiana, drove in the enemy's outposts and opened a brisk fire on his positions. (See his report herewith.) The general commanding having decided to occupy Point Pleasant, seven miles below New Madrid, I cheerfully proposed Colonel J. B. Plummer and the second brigade of my (now) second division for this service. This brigade consisted of the eleventh Missouri, Lieutenant Colonel Pennybaker, and the twenty-sixth Illinois, Colonel Loomis. He proceeded on it on the 5th instant. At his request my aide-de-camp, Lieutenant William B. Gau, (volunteer,) engineers, accompanied him. The success which crowned Colonel Plummer's efforts reflected honor on the second division.

On the 6th, by direction of the commanding general, I detailed Major Robertson, in command of two companies of the fifth Iowa, and forty-sixth Indiana, Colonel Fitch, of General Palmer's division, temporarily attached to my division, to report to Colonel Gordon Granger, who pressed the enemy on my left vigorously, driving in his skirmishers, but was unable, from the want of heavy artillery, to make any serious impression on account of the heavy fire of the enemy's gunboats and the exposed character of the position, without undue exposure of our troops. (See Major Robertson's report herewith.)

On the 7th instant a demonstration was made by the first brigade of the second division in conjunction with General Stanley's division. (See report herewith.)

Colonel Plummer having received promotion as brigadier general, a reorganization again took place on the 11th instant, and the tenth Iowa and twenty-sixth

Missouri were constituted the second brigade of the second division, under Colonel Perczel.

On the 13th the second division was held in reserve as the support of the first division.

On the 14th, at 2 a. m., with Colonel Slack's brigade of General Palmer's third division, composed of the forty-sixth and forty-seventh Indiana, the second division was formed, to march to the relief of General Stanley's first division and the guards of the trenches. The darkness was palpable; the rain poured down in torrents; the men were obliged to wade through pools knee-deep. Silence having been strictly enjoined, the division hoping to have the honor of leading in the assault on the enemy's works, moved steadily forward with cheerful alacrity, those assigned to that duty taking post in the rifle-pits, half full of water, without a murmur. A heavy fog shrouded everything from view as the day dawned, and we waited anxiously its lifting in order to open fire on the enemy from our batteries. At 6 a. m. the evacuation of the place was reported, as stated in my report of the 14th instant, as general of the trenches. Under very considerable privations and hardships, under the severe ordeal of long exposure to the shot and shell of the enemy without power to reply, all the various regiments, both officers and men, who have been under my orders, have deserved commendation. The general commanding will have himself observed the creditable and zealous devotion to duty of the officers composing my staff, especially First Lieutenant William C. Russell, eighth Missouri, aide-de-camp and acting assistant adjutant general; Lieutenant William B. Gau, (volunteer,) engineers, aide-de-camp; First Lieutenant H. Seymour Burt, sixty-third Ohio, acting aide-de-camp, and Lieutenant James E. Merriman, acting aide-de-camp. I am informed by General Plummer that Lieutenant William B. Gau, (volunteer,) engineers, aide-de-camp, rendered to him very important services in the construction of the batteries at Point Pleasant.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SCHUYLER HAMILTON,

*Brig. Gen. Vols. U. S. A. Com'dg 2d Division.*

Major SPEED BUTLER,

*Assistant Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH IOWA INFANTRY,

*March 6, 1862.*

SIR: In obedience to orders received from Colonel W. H. Worthington, commanding the first brigade, second division, army of the Mississippi, to take two companies of the Iowa fifth infantry and three companies of the fifty-ninth Indiana infantry, I reported to Colonel Granger, of the third Michigan cavalry, and was by him ordered to deploy the two Iowa and two of the Indiana companies as skirmishers to attack the town of New Madrid on the north. Throwing out my skirmishers I advanced upon and engaged the enemy's pickets, about four hundred yards north of the town plat, in a large cornfield, driving them to their guard quarters within the town. Pressing closely upon them, and seeing they were supported by four or five hundred infantry and one piece of light artillery, I sheltered my men behind a fence, awaiting my support, the fortieth Indiana being designated for that purpose. After keeping my men thus protected for a length of time I sent word to Colonel Granger, by one of his aids, of my position and discoveries, and requested orders. I was ordered to retire to the middle of the field, which I did in good order. This position I held near an hour, when I received orders from Colonel Granger to withdraw my skirmishers and

return to camp. It affords me pleasure to compliment the promptness, energy, and coolness of the officers and men of my command throughout.

Our loss consisted of one man killed of the fifty-ninth Indiana, and two of the fifth Iowa wounded.

W. S. ROBINSON,  
*Major Fifth Iowa.*

Lieutenant R. F. PATTERSON,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Camp near New Madrid, March 14, 1862.*

SIR: In obedience to orders, the second division, with a brigade from General Palmer's division, commanded by Colonel Slack, relieved the guards of the trenches and General Stanley's first division before dawn this morning. At about 6 a. m. two deserters from the enemy reported that during the previous night the enemy, after spiking a portion of their guns, hastily retired. Examination proved the correctness of this report. Several of their dead were left unburied. Horses stood saddled and bridled, and public and private property gave evidence of the movement having been very hurried. Captain Joseph A. Mower, first United States infantry, and First Lieutenant Charles H. Fletcher, who, with companies A and H first infantry, had so gallantly and effectively served the siege pieces, were detailed, with detachments from the companies under their command, to occupy Fort Thompson, the principal work, and plant the stars and stripes upon the ramparts.

Inventories were immediately ordered to be made of the captured property, which including guns, ammunition, tents, horses, mules, wagons, intrenching tools &c., cannot fall far short of a half a million of dollars.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SCHUYLER HAMILTON,  
*Brig. Gen'l Vols., Comm'g Second Div., Gen'l of the Trenches.*

Major SPEED BUTLER,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 2D DIVISION ARMY MISSISSIPPI,  
*March 22, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my brigade in the attack upon New Madrid on the 7th instant. Being ordered by Major General Pope to repair with my brigade to a point in the rear of the upper portion of the town of New Madrid as near as could be reached without being exposed to the view of the enemy, and then await an attack to be made by General Stanley with his division upon the lower part of the town, and until he should have drawn off the troops from the upper fort, and all the gunboats with the exception of the one anchored at the mouth of the bayou, just above the upper portion of the town, with a view of then attempting to drive off, with my riflemen, the gunboats from the position then occupied, and effect a lodgment of my brigade within the trenches of the upper fort, and having arrived at the point designated by Lieutenant Kelly, of the United States cavalry, who was sent by General Pope as aid and guide, my brigade was formed in line of battle, and skirmishers advanced. I then awaited the attack by General Stanley. As

soon as he commenced firing upon the enemy they commenced throwing shells into the woods occupied by my troops, evidently expecting the main attack to come from that quarter. Instead of General Stanley's fire drawing the enemy's fire to the lower part of the town as expected, brought two boats from the lower fort in addition to the four gunboats lying at the upper fort when the attack was commenced. I then ordered a forward movement of my brigade, with a view to co-operate with and support the left of General Stanley's division. My skirmishers soon fell in with the sixty-third Ohio infantry, of General Stanley's division, and my brigade was halted. General Stanley himself soon appeared, to whom I reported. He, deeming it utterly impracticable to make a successful assault, with the gunboats in the position then occupied, ordered the entire command to take positions under cover of the woods, and sent to headquarters for further instructions. While waiting for these the enemy continued to throw shell over us. Upon the return of his messenger I was ordered by General Stanley to return to camp. This was done in perfect order by the troops comprising this brigade, the enemy in the mean time continuing to fire upon us.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. H. WORTHINGTON,

*Colonel Commanding First Brigade, Second Division.*

Lieutenant WM. C. RUSSELL,

*Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 2D DIVISION ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*March 22, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the expedition under my command on the night of the 4th instant: I left camp at 9 a. m. accompanied by Colonel Smith of the forty-third Ohio infantry, with his command and two guns of the Missouri and two of the Michigan artillery, together with five companies of the fifth Iowa infantry and two of the fifty-ninth Indiana infantry of my brigade. Proceeding cautiously, with my skirmishers on either side of my advance, to the suburbs of the town, I came upon the pickets of the enemy, who were posted in strong force, receiving their fire, which was immediately returned; we drove them back. The guns of the Michigan battery were immediately brought into position on the left side of the road leading into town, near an old church, and opened a fire of shell upon the town. In a few seconds the guns of the Missouri battery, supported by Colonel Smith's command, were brought into position upon the right side of the road, and opened fire immediately. The enemy responded with very heavy guns, and soon obtained our exact range and distance; but few of their shell exploded; their fire coming from one gunboat stationed at the lower fort, one opposite the town, and one above the town. Our firing continued until the ammunition of the artillery was nearly exhausted, when the entire command was withdrawn in good order to the camp. The conduct of all the troops engaged, both officers and men, was creditable to themselves and our command, this being the first time ever under fire. I regret to state that we lost one man killed, from company A of the fifth Iowa infantry, one arm broken in company I of the same regiment; these being the only casualties worthy of notice.

I am, sir, most respectfully yours,

W. H. WORTHINGTON,

*Colonel Commanding First Brigade Second Division.*

Lieutenant WM. C. RUSSELL,

*Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

## CAMP NEAR NEW MADRID,

*March 15, 1862.*

MAJOR: I have the honor to report, for the information of the major general commanding, that, in obedience to his order, I marched my division, consisting of the first brigade, twenty-seventh and thirty-ninth Ohio, Colonel Groesbeck commanding, and second brigade, forty-third and sixty-third Ohio, Colonel Smith commanding, at 3 o'clock a. m. the morning of the 13th to support the batteries and guards of the trenches opened before the enemy's fortifications about New Madrid. Arriving near daylight, I took command and found that, through the energy of Colonel Bissell, engineer regiment, Colonel Morgan commanding in the trenches, and Major Lothrop and Captain Mower in charge of the siege batteries, everything was ready to open at break of day. As day broke our batteries opened, and were immediately replied to by the enemy's batteries and gunboats, they firing at least ten guns to our one. Under this cannonade, by the order of the general, I changed the position of the division from the right to the left of the batteries, with some loss. Getting into position I threw my field batteries, Scar's and Darling's, back to a place of comparative safety, and was enabled to place the four Ohio regiments under such cover that their loss during twelve hours' cannonading was incredibly slight; round and rifled shot whizzing over and about them in showers. I mention it as a good proof of their soldier-ship, that they rested all day under this fierce cannonade without a murmur or sign of trepidation. Fortunately for them the ground was soft and swallowed the shot. When night came our firing and the enemy's ceased. During the stormy night I heard the enemy's boats constantly moving, but could not divine whether it was in evacuation or preparing to attack my left flank; I prepared for the latter contingency. At daybreak I was relieved by General Hamilton's division, and upon returning to my quarters learned of the enemy's precipitate evacuation of the place. I saw much to admire during the day in the conduct of our soldiers. My adjutant general, Captain Kellogg, and my aids, Lieutenants How, Newbold, and Edwards, rendered me valuable assistance by carrying orders and making observations under a pretty constant whiz of shot and shell. I will furnish a list of casualties so soon as reported to me.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. S. STANLEY,

*Brig. Gen'l U. S. V., Commanding First Division.*

Major SPEED BUTLER,

*Adjutant General, Army of the Mississippi.*

Certified copy:

SPEED BUTLER,

*Assistant Adjutant General.*

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HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, DIVISION No. 4,

*Camp near New Madrid, Mo., March 15, 1862.*

SIR: In compliance with the order of General Stanley of this date, I herewith make a report of the part taken by my brigade in the action of the trenches before New Madrid, on the night of the 12th and during the 13th instant.

At 5½ o'clock p. m., March 12, I received orders from General Paine, commanding division, (4th,) to report at General Pope's headquarters, with my brigade, at sundown, and there await further orders. Reporting at the hour indicated, I received orders from General Pope to march my command, consisting of the tenth Illinois, under Lieutenant Colonel John Tillson, and six companies of the sixteenth regiment Illinois volunteers, commanded by Colonel R. F. Smith, (and to whom I am much indebted for prompt and efficient aid,) under

the directions of Colonel Bissell, chief of engineers, and Major Lothrop, chief of artillery, to such a point as they might designate near New Madrid, and assist in erecting such works as they thought proper to construct. We arrived near the ground at 9 o'clock p. m., when the tenth Illinois, by order of Colonel Bissell, was thrown forward as skirmishers to secure the line of proposed operations, in securing which we reached the outer line of the enemy's pickets, who fired and withdrew. Moving cautiously forward beyond their abandoned picket post, two companies, A and B of the tenth Illinois, were thrown yet further forward as front and flanking skirmishers and picket guard, with strict orders to return no fire if fired upon, which order, and a similar one to the whole command, was implicitly obeyed, although we were repeatedly fired upon during the night by the enemy's pickets, who occupied a line not more than four hundred yards from our line of operations. The six companies of the sixteenth Illinois and the remaining eight companies of the tenth Illinois were detailed as working parties, under Colonel Bissell, serving the entire night, officers and men working with a will, and by daylight four siege guns had been placed in position, and trenches and rifle-pits constructed sufficient to protect the entire command. Soon after daylight our pickets were called in and our first gun fired, which was promptly returned, and thence during the whole day the firing from the rebel fortifications and gunboats was kept up with spirit and determination. Their guns were well served, aim and range accurate. At sundown the firing ceased, when the men, although wearied with labor and loss of rest, cheerfully and with spirit worked to extend and strengthen the line of defence. Company E of the tenth Illinois and part of two companies of the sixteenth Illinois were advanced as pickets, with instructions to watch and report the movements of the enemy in front. They reported continued movement and stir of the enemy during the entire night, both in the fort and on the gunboats and steamers, but whether they were being re-enforced, were strengthening their position, or proposed an evacuation of the place could not be ascertained. A violent storm set in about 11 o'clock, continuing, almost without intermission, during the balance of the night. About 4 o'clock a. m. I was relieved by General Stanley, with orders to return to camp.

In conclusion I will only add that great credit is due to officers and men for the promptness and coolness with which the works were constructed and defended. I have to mourn the loss of a valuable and efficient officer, Captain Lindsay H. Carr, of company H, tenth Illinois, who was killed while on the picket line early on the night of the 12th. Private Blockson, of company G, tenth Illinois, was slightly wounded.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

JAMES D. MORGAN,

*Colonel Commanding 1st Brigade 4th Division.*

Captain G. D. KELLOGG,

*Assistant Adjutant General.*

Certified copy :

SPEED BUTLER,

*Assistant Adjutant General.*

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HEADQR'S 1ST BRIGADE 1ST DIVISION, DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*New Madrid, Missouri, March 15, 1862.*

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report to the major commanding the first division the part taken in the late action before New Madrid by the brigade under my command, consisting of the twenty-seventh and thirty-ninth Ohio infantry, under Colonel Fuller and Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert respectively.



On the afternoon of the 12th instant I detailed companies A and F, twenty-seventh, and I and H, thirty-ninth Ohio, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Kennet twenty-seventh Ohio, to drive in the pickets of the enemy, hold an advanced position, and cover the parties detailed to plant our heavy artillery. He drove in the pickets and took the position assigned him, within eight hundred yards of the enemy's gunboats and principal fort.

At 3 o'clock on the morning of the 13th I moved forward with my brigade, and took position on the right of our artillery. The enemy's skirmishers immediately commenced firing upon us, but without doing any injury. A few minutes afterwards our artillery opened the engagement, and my brigade was ordered to fall back some two hundred yards, which it did in good order, under a heavy fire of shot and shell. While lying there five companies of the twenty-seventh Ohio were detached to take a position several hundred yards to the left, upon a road leading past the lower fort, to guard against any flank movement. I then moved the brigade a hundred yards to the left, and took position within easy supporting distance of the artillery, where the sloping bank of a bayou afforded considerable protection to the men. We remained in this place during the day. The firing ceased about sunset. Having thrown out a company of pickets in front of the extreme left, we remained in our position till daylight, when my brigade was relieved. I take pleasure in mentioning the good conduct of my command. It behaved with great coolness, although exposed the whole day to a heavy fire. Considering the closeness and rapidity of the firing the casualties were remarkably few, consisting of one killed and three badly wounded in the twenty-seventh, and one very slightly wounded in the thirty-ninth regiment.

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN GROESBECK,

*Colonel Commanding.*

Captain GEO. D. KELLOGG,

*Assist. Adj't Gen'l First Div., Dis't Mississippi.*

Certified copy :

SPEED BUTLER,

*Assistant Adjutant General.*

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HEADQUARTERS 2D BRIGADE 1ST DIVISION ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*Camp near New Madrid, Mo., March 15, 1862.*

GENERAL: In compliance with your instructions, I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the second brigade of your division, under my command, in the action of the day before yesterday, 13th instant:

The brigade reached a point in front of the enemy's lower fort, and within supporting distance of our siege batteries, a little after daylight, and was then placed in position, the forty-third Ohio in the road leading west from the town, and the sixty-third in the lane by which we marched to the position. Soon after the opening of the fire from the enemy, in response to one of our batteries, the brigade was moved forward a short distance, and placed under a low bank which ran, at that point, nearly parallel to the road, and forty or fifty yards in advance of it, and a company was deployed as skirmishers in front of the right. The ground between the road and the bank was wooded; in front and rear it was open. The men were here sheltered from a direct fire from the lower fort, but exposed to enfilading fire from gunboats, and apparently from some light pieces placed in or near the edge of the town. This fire, of rifle shells of large calibre, and 12-pounders, and spherical shot and shell, was exceedingly well aimed and heavy, and may, I think, be considered a fair test of the coolness and courage of the men composing the brigade. They received it,

in their exposed position, with entire composure. The forty-third having lost some men, and the fire increasing in severity, I withdrew the regiment to the road before mentioned, on the edge of the wood, about forty yards in rear of the bank, but the movement was evidently seen by the enemy, and their fire was directed with a good deal of precision upon the new position. I then placed this regiment in the cornfield on the left of the lane, about one hundred yards in rear of the sixty-third, and caused the men to lie down. Their position here not being visible to the enemy, they were exposed only to the direct fire from the fort at our batteries. The position of the sixty-third seemed to be concealed from the enemy, as the enfilading fire from our left did them no damage, but the direct fire, which was at times very heavy, passed close over their heads during the entire day. The position of the brigade was not changed until it was relieved by a portion of General Hamilton's division, on the morning of the 14th.

Early in the night of the 13th three companies of the forty-third, under Major Herrick of that regiment, were to the right and front, and deployed as skirmishers, the left resting near the right of the batteries, and the right refused, and a line of sentinels were then thrown in advance of them. These companies, except a small reserve, occupied a strip of forest in front of the right of position. About daylight the brigade having been relieved, in accordance with your instructions, I withdrew it to camp. I take great pleasure in saying that the officers and men who composed my command, without exception, merit high praise for their coolness under fire, but especially for their cheerful and soldier-like endurance of the fatigue of remaining thirty hours under arms, a large part of the time exposed to fire, and, for some hours of the night of the 13th instant, to a drenching rain. It would be unjust to omit mention of the fact that companies, A, D, G, F, and C of the forty-third Ohio, composing the right wing of that regiment, under command of Major W. F. Herrick, forty-third Ohio volunteers, were at work in the trenches during a great part of the night before the attack, and that no word or sign of complaint or discontent was heard or seen from any officer or soldier of those companies during the thirty-six hours of unremitting exposure and exertion. I will submit, at the earliest possible moment, a report of casualties.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. L. KIRBY SMITH,

*Col Forty third Ohio Vol. Inf., com'g Second Brigade.*

Brigadier General D. S. STANLEY,

*Commanding First Division.*

Certified copy :

SPEED BUTLER,

*Assistant Adjutant General.*

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CAMP BEFORE NEW MADRID, *March 15, 1862.*

MAJOR : I have the honor to report that, in compliance with orders from General Pope, I took command of the siege train on the evening of the 12th instant, and proceeded with it to the position that had been assigned. I had under my command companies A and H, United States infantry. I placed company H in the battery on the left (battery No. 1) in which were one 8-inch howitzer and one 24-pounder, and company A in the battery on the right, (battery No. 2.) This battery had two 24-pounders. I put this battery under the immediate command of Lieutenant Fletcher, commanding company A. Lieutenant Reeder was also with this company. I was directed by General Stanley to open fire on the enemy at daylight on the 13th, which I did from both batteries.

Our fire was briskly replied to by the fort, which was in front, and the gunboats, which took position both in front and towards our left flank. They threw rifled shot, shell, and round shot. At about 10 o'clock a. m. a round shot struck one of the guns in battery No. 1, breaking a piece out of it, and killing one man and wounding six. In the afternoon the gunboats withdrew from our front, and, taking position beyond the reach of our guns, kept up a steady fire, with occasional intermissions, until sundown.

On the morning of the 14th I was preparing to open fire again, when I received an order from General Hamilton not to fire, as a flag of truce was approaching. Shortly after General Hamilton arrived at the batteries, and desired me to take twenty men of my company, and ascertain whether or not the fort had been abandoned. Having no colors belonging to the first infantry, I was furnished with the regimental colors, of a regiment of volunteers, to raise upon the fort. I proceeded to the fort, and found that the enemy had deserted it. I raised the flag upon the ramparts and took possession of the works. I found that two of the enemy's guns had been dismounted and another struck and badly injured by our fire. I am unable to say what damage was done to the gunboats. Lieutenant Fletcher and Reeder displayed great zeal and activity, during the whole engagement, although they, as well as the whole command, were nearly exhausted by fatigue and exposure. I regret to have to state that Lieutenant Reeder, after having exhibited so much zeal in the performance of his duty, was unfortunately wounded by the accidental discharge of his revolver, and was consequently deprived of the opportunity of entering the enemy's works with his company. Sergeants Connelly and Downey, of company A, Corporal Youngman and Privates Morgan and Burke, of company H, performed their duty at the guns with great coolness and skill; First Sergeant Lobby, of company H, was very attentive to his duties, and deserves much credit, as do all of the men of the two companies.

I enclose herewith a list of the killed, wounded, and missing :

Killed—Private Mulligan, company A. Mortally wounded—Private McGann, company A; Private Johnson, company A; Private Peacock, company A. Seriously wounded—Private Clark company A; Private Lancy, company A. Slightly wounded—Private Jacks, company A. Missing—Private Barbour, company A. Total killed, wounded, and missing—8.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES C. MOWER.

*Captain First Infantry, Commanding Siege Train.*

Major SPEED BUTLER,

*Assistant Adjutant General,*

*General Pope's Corps d'Armée.*

'Certified copy :

SPEED BUTLER,

*Assistant Adjutant General.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY, CAMP NEAR NEW MADRID, MISSOURI,

*March 16, 1865.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the artillery under my command, during the investment and evacuation of New Madrid. Having been ordered by the general commanding to make a reconnoissance of the enemy's works, and select a position to plant a siege battery, I went down on the 11th instant with Captain S. H. Marshall, first infantry, and a squadron of dragoons, within about a half mile of the enemy's works. From this position (northwest from the town) I could see distinctly their gunboats and

lower fort. I determined at once, from my observation, where to plant the battery, and on the 12th instant went to the same point again, in company with Colonel Bissell, of the engineers, and Captain Marshall, to satisfy myself that I was not mistaken in the selection of the ground. Colonel Bissell and Captain Marshall thought the position to be a good one. The same evening, at dusk, Colonel Bissell and myself, with Colonel Morgan's brigade, the tenth and sixteenth Illinois regiments, went down within about five hundred yards in rear of the position where the battery was to be established. At this point one regiment was deployed as skirmishers, and the other furnished with spades and shovels. The skirmishers advanced about fifty yards in front of the men in rear with spades and shovels, until the latter arrived on the ground where the battery was to be established. In a few moments the work was laid out and the men put to work. At daylight the work was completed, and three 24-pounder siege-guns and one 8-inch howitzer put in position. This work was undoubtedly completed before the enemy had any knowledge of it. At daylight, in the morning, the enemy's forts and gunboats opened upon our battery, and kept up a constant cannonading until about 12 o'clock m. After this they continued to fire at intervals until sundown. Captain Mower, of the first infantry, and Lieutenant Reeder, with companies A and H, served the guns, and all conducted themselves in the most gallant and creditable manner. Captain Mower remained in the battery until the town was evacuated by the enemy, and then placed our siege-guns in the enemy's fort. During the investment of New Madrid, Captain A. M. Powell, first Missouri light artillery, Captain Henry Hiscock, same regiment, Captain N. Y. Spoor, second Iowa light artillery, Captain Sands, eleventh Ohio light artillery, and Lieutenant Darling's battery, company F, second artillery, United States army, were frequently under the enemy's fire, and all behaved in a very creditable manner. Captain Powell, a few days after our arrival in front of New Madrid, was detached from the command and went to Point Pleasant with Colonel Plumer.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. L. LATHROP,

*Major 1st Missouri Light Artillery, Commanding Artillery.*

Major SPEED BUTLER,

*Assistant Adjutant General.*

Certified copy :

SPEED BUTLER,

*Assistant Adjutant General.*

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## PART II.

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OPERATIONS AGAINST CORINTH; ACTION OF THIRD OF MAY; OCCUPATION OF MONTEREY; BATTLE OF FARMINGTON; GENERAL ELLIOTT'S CAVALRY RAID; EVACUATION OF CORINTH; PURSUIT OF THE ENEMY; CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL HALLECK CONCERNING REPORTED CAPTURE OF TEN THOUSAND PRISONERS.

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The moment Island No. 10 and the forces defending it were in our possession I telegraphed for transports to embark my force for operations against the enemy's defences at Fort Pillow. The whole force was so speedily embarked that we arrived in front of Fort Pillow on the 14th of April, just seven days after the capture of Island No. 10. The same problem, though not so difficult of

solution, was presented to us at Fort Pillow as at Island No. 10; but the progress of the operations at the latter place had made it very manifest that the gunboats were not able to reduce the land batteries of the enemy, and that the line of the Mississippi was the enemy's strongest line of defence. I have been greatly surprised during the war that the rebels did not make greater efforts to strengthen this line, and did not devote a much more considerable force to its defence. Every position occupied on the river required for its reduction one of the most hazardous operations of war, in the crossing of a great river in frail transports in the face of an active and vigilant enemy. The operation of crossing a wide, deep, and swift river, with a considerable army, by such means, is in itself very dangerous; but when it has to be done in the face of an enemy fully supplied with artillery, it becomes a task of exceeding peril, which I think should never be undertaken except from the pressure of absolute necessity. It cannot be claimed for the rebels that they made anything like a vigorous defence of the line of the Mississippi river; but feeble as was their resistance, the reduction of every place they did occupy on its banks was recognized as a labor of exceeding hazard. It was very apparent that the moment we arrived in front of Fort Pillow the whole labor of reduction would again fall upon the land forces. The gunboats took up the same relative position as at Island No. 10, two miles above the place, and began to fire upon the works with as little result as before. As I foresaw a long delay and much difficulty of the same character as at Island No. 10, and as I did not know the necessities of the situation elsewhere, I informed General Halleck of the circumstances by telegraph, and received from him an order to leave a small force with the gunboat fleet and proceed immediately up the Tennessee river with the bulk of my command, and report to him at Pittsburg Landing. I left with the fleet two Indiana regiments under command of Colonel Fitch, and with the remainder of my forces reported to General Halleck, at Pittsburg Landing, on the 21st of April. I was instructed to land my command at Hamburg, three miles above, and form the left wing of the combined armies designed for the reduction of Corinth. It would be tedious to recount in detail the slow approaches towards Corinth. It is enough to say that we were occupied from the 23d of April until the 29th of May in reaching that place. Many small skirmishes occurred from day to day, but no battle, and in fact no affair of any considerable magnitude.

On the 3d of May my advance, under General Paine, closely supported by the main body, occupied the village of Farmington, four miles from Corinth, after a sharp skirmish on the heights immediately north of the village. The advanced forces were, however, withdrawn the same night behind Seven-mile creek, as I was informed that the rest of General Halleck's army was not ready to move, and that he did not wish to bring on a general engagement. A brief report of this skirmish is appended:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Near Farmington, May 3, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: The reconnoissance sent toward Farmington found the enemy four thousand five hundred strong, with four pieces of artillery and some cavalry, occupying strong position in front of the town. Our forces advanced at once to the assault, and after a sharp skirmish carried the position in handsome style. The enemy left thirty dead upon the field, and their tents and baggage, the cavalry in pursuit towards Corinth. Another portion of the cavalry, when I last heard, was in pursuit of their train of wagons towards the railroad. A considerable force under General Paine has pushed south to the railroad, and by this time destroyed it. The whole affair was very handsome, one regiment charging the battery and their infantry line at double-quick. The enemy fled in wild confusion, the regiment of cavalry which I sent

through also to Booneville took possession of the town, tore up the railroad track and destroyed two bridges. The troops are all returning, and will bivouack to-night two miles this side of Farmington in rear of a small difficult creek. I propose to move forward my whole force four and a half miles to-morrow to this creek, which will place me within five miles of Corinth in a strong position, with a deep miry creek in front. If you do not approve please telegraph me immediately, as my arrangements are all made to move in the morning. I will telegraph you again as soon as I hear the result of the cavalry pursuit. We have a good many prisoners; can't tell yet how many. Our loss two killed and twelve wounded.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Near Farmington, May 4, 1862.*

Major General HALLRCK: My command has advanced and occupies strong position one mile and a half this side of Farmington, with bad creek in front and an impenetrable jungle and swamp on our left. Enemy has massed considerable force on railroad south of Farmington, evidently fearful of our crossing Memphis and Charleston, and intercepting Mobile and Ohio road. He has some sort of work there; will see what it is to-morrow, and probably dislodge him. I hope Buell's forces will keep pace on our right. I have a good many prisoners; what had I best do with them?

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

On the 8th of May I again occupied Farmington with my whole force, and pushed forward on a reconnoissance with two divisions, on two separate roads, to the enemy's intrenchments, around Corinth, without meeting any considerable resistance. My command was, however, again drawn back behind Seven-mile creek, as I was again informed that the rest of the army was not ready to advance; I left, however, one brigade of four regiments under General J. M. Palmer, as a grand guard on the south side of the creek, about one mile north of Farmington. It is proper to say that the small streams in the vicinity of Corinth are bordered on both sides by wide swamps, which are passed by rough corduroy roads.

On the morning of the 9th of May, the enemy, in heavy force, sallied from Corinth, with the purpose of beating or checking my command, which they understood to be considerably in advance of and separated from the main army. It so happened that the attack on Palmer's brigade was made just as it was being relieved by Plummer's brigade; so that there were eight regiments on the south side of the creek. As these troops were full of spirit, and anxious to meet the enemy, they accepted the proffered battle against a force five times their strength. The action raged fiercely all day, the two brigades holding their own until at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, finding that the enemy had turned both flanks, I withdrew them to the north side of the creek. My whole force was under arms within one and a half mile, but I was forbidden by General Halleck to advance, and instructed, if the enemy pressed the small force under Palmer too heavily, to withdraw it. I did so, as above stated, greatly to the dissatisfaction of Palmer's command, and of my whole corps. A brief report of this affair is appended:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Near Farmington, May 9, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: The enemy, twenty thousand strong, drove in our pickets beyond Farmington, and advanced against the brigades occupying the farther side of the creek in front of my camp. The brigades held on for five hours, until finding them heavily pressed in front and on the flanks, and that I could not sustain them without passing the creek with my whole command, which was contrary to your orders and which would have drawn on a general engagement, I withdrew them to this side in good order. The conduct of the troops was excellent and the withdrawal was made by them very reluctantly. The enemy made a demonstration to cross, but have abandoned the movement, as we cannot be dislodged unless our right is turned, of which there is constant danger while the interval between Buell and myself is so great. The line I suggested this morning is the proper one, I think, for Buell and myself, and whenever you decide to have it occupied, I am ready and able to force my way to Farmington and the railroad. Our loss was considerable, though I cannot yet tell how great. The enemy, being much exposed, suffered very severely, one of his batteries being completely disabled and his infantry line driven back several times. My command is eager for the advance. About 4 p. m. General Nelson arrived within a mile with his division, but has returned to his camp. My force is in line of battle, and will be withdrawn at sunset.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

The two brigades behaved with conspicuous firmness and gallantry and retired slowly and reluctantly from the field.

At length, on the 28th of May, we made another short advance from Farmington, which I had again occupied a few days before, and after a sharp skirmish, in which Stanley's division was alone engaged, we occupied a position in almost immediate contact with the outer intrenchments of the enemy and, according to custom during these operations, proceeded to fortify. It seems proper for me to state here that the day previous I sent out the first of the cavalry raids which I believe was made during the war. Colonel (now Brevet Major General) W. L. Elliott was instructed to proceed with his own regiment (the 2d Iowa cavalry) and the 2d Michigan cavalry, commanded by Colonel (now Major General) P. H. Sheridan, by way of Burnsville and Jacinto, and make a descent upon the Mobile and Ohio railroad, if possible, as far as forty miles south of Corinth. This raid was conducted with great vigor and complete success by General Elliott. He struck the railroad at Booneville, thirty miles south of Corinth, tore up the track and the telegraph lines and captured a train of cars loaded with ammunition and small-arms, which he destroyed. He also captured, and for want of means to bring them off paroled, two thousand of the enemy, mostly convalescents. He returned to my headquarters and reported the command on the 31st of May, the day that Early completed the evacuation of Corinth. I append his report.

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF KANSAS,  
*Fort Leavenworth, October 21, 1865.*

COLONEL: In compliance with instructions from the major general commanding the department, I have the honor to submit the following report of a cavalry expedition, made from the army of the Mississippi, near Corinth, upon the communications of the enemy south of Corinth. A detailed report was made on my return to the army, and forwarded through Brigadier General (now major general) Gordon Granger, United States volunteers, commanding cavalry division, and

copy left with the records of the brigade. Not having with me the orders under which I marched, and not having retained for my own use a copy of my report, I am unable to give as full and accurate an account of the expedition as was originally given, but can give with accuracy the main facts.

On the 27th of May, 1862, I received from General Granger written instructions detailing for the service my brigade; he at the same time made known to me the wishes of Major General Pope, that the Mobile and Ohio railroad should be cut south of Corinth, and as much damage as possible inflicted upon the road and rolling stock. My brigade consisted of my own regiment, the second Iowa cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel Edward Hatch commanding, and the second Michigan cavalry, Colonel P. H. Sheridan commanding; the latter was assigned to and joined the regiment the evening of the 27th of May, 1862.

About 11 p. m. on the 27th May, 1862, with ten (10) companies second Iowa cavalry, aggregate about five hundred, and the second Michigan cavalry, aggregate about four hundred, the march was commenced from the rear of left of the army near Farmington, Mississippi, then investing Corinth, Mississippi, by a detour in the direction of Eastport and east of Iuka, on the Memphis and Charleston railroad, and crossing this road about five miles east of that place, encountering only small parties of the enemy's cavalry, which were driven off or captured to avoid disclosing the object of the expedition.

About 10 p. m. on the 28th of May the command bivouacked near the junction of the roads from Fulton and Jacinto, and south of Iuka.

Early on the 29th of May the command marched in the direction of Jacinto, leaving that road and taking a more southerly road for Cartersville, with the intention of striking the Mobile and Ohio railroad at or near Baldwin, halting at Paden's mills during the excessive heat of the day, and resuming the march about 4 o'clock p. m. Over the swamps it was necessary in many places to dismount and carry fence rails to pass the horses over. The march was continued until about 9 o'clock p. m., when, from information brought by my guide and from negroes, I learned that the extensive trestle work and stores at Baldwin were defended by a considerable force of infantry with artillery. I at once continued to march for the station at Booneville, Mississippi, arriving within a mile of the place about two hours before daylight on the 30th of May. The command was ordered to keep very quiet and not to light fires, in order to reach the station unobserved; a small party was at the same time despatched to cut the telegraph wires between Booneville and Corinth, and another to cut the wires south of Booneville. The command approached the station deployed in the following order, viz: second Iowa cavalry on the right, second Michigan cavalry on the left, with one battalion of latter in rear, under command of Captain A. P. Campbell, with small parties thrown forward to the west side of the railroad as pickets while the work of destruction was going on.

The following property was destroyed, viz: one engine, about twenty-five box cars loaded with arms, estimated at eight thousand to ten thousand stand; ammunition, clothing, quartermaster's stores, horse equipage, one or two platform cars, having on them one iron and two brass field-pieces, large depot building, well filled with material of war of all kinds, including a large amount of fixed ammunition, as the explosion for three or four hours indicated; I estimate the value of the property destroyed will exceed a half million of dollars; two culverts, and the track for about one mile was torn up in several places. I was informed by General J. B. McPherson, United States volunteers, engineer in charge of railroads at Corinth, that my attack upon the railroad secured to him a large number of engines (nine or ten in number) and over one hundred cars which the enemy could not run to the south, and were used to supply the army near Corinth from Columbus, Kentucky. Between fifteen hundred and two thousand prisoners were captured, consisting of sick and convalescents; from eight hundred to one thousand of the latter were armed, but were surprised and



surrounded before they could make any resistance; a cavalry force appeared in my right rear preparing to charge, when I prepared for counter charge, but they were soon put to rout by the battalion of the second Michigan cavalry, under command of Captain Campbell, attacking them in flank. My command remained about two hours, continuing to destroy property; being satisfied that the flames had got too far ahead to be extinguished, the return march was commenced, and the same route was followed to near Paden's mill from there a more easterly course was taken to the Fulton road, near which the command bivouacked for the night, men and animals being much exhausted for want of rest during the two preceding days and nights.

On the 31st of May the command marched for Corinth, passing through Iuka. It was here I had the first rumors of the evacuation of Corinth by the rebels, which became more authentic as I approached Corinth.

I reached camp near Farmington on the evening of the 31st of May, having marched by the route taken about two hundred miles. The conduct of officers and men throughout the whole march was excellent, and I cannot speak in too high terms of the assistance rendered me by my regimental commanders, Colonel P. H. Sheridan, second Michigan cavalry, and Lieutenant Colonel Edward Hatch, second Iowa cavalry. This expedition was the first one of the kind made since the commencement of the war, and being successful, has been frequently practiced to its close. Many prisoners were taken, but only such as were mounted were brought to camp, about two hundred in number. The casualties in my command were few, not to exceed six—one wounded, and five captured while on vidette duty on the approaches to Booneville.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. L. ELLIOT,

*Brig. and Bvt. Major Gen'l U. S. V., late Col. 2d Iowa Cavalry.*

Lieutenant Colonel J. Mc. C. BELL,

*A. A. G., Headquarters Department of Missouri, St. Louis, Mo.*

On the 29th of May no movement of the army was made, and during that day and night the enemy, leaving his skirmishers in our front to cover his movement, evacuated Corinth. We entered the place, without opposition, early on the morning of May 30. As my command, being on the left of our line, was nearest the line of retreat of the enemy, I was re-enforced by a division from Buell's corps, and instructed to push forward in pursuit. I accordingly marched as soon as practicable, and found the rear-guard of the enemy posted behind Tusculumbia creek, about seven miles south of Corinth. This creek is a considerable stream, bordered on both sides by dismal and impenetrable swamps. The corduroy roads, on which alone they could be passed, the enemy had partly destroyed, and had entirely destroyed the bridge over the creek itself. Our advance was therefore checked for a time, but by next morning succeeded in passing the stream and renewed the pursuit. From Tusculumbia creek I returned to my camp on Clear creek, where for several days I was confined to my tent with illness. I left General Rosecrans in command of the troops and directed him to push forward after the enemy and keep me advised of the situation by courier as often as possible. He followed the enemy as rapidly as he could, preceded by Generals A. J. Smith and Granger with the cavalry.

I overtook the command on the 7th of June near Booneville, about thirty miles south of Corinth. I found that the whole force of the enemy had halted behind what was known as Twenty-mile creek. Their main body seemed to be at and in front of the town of Baldwin, twenty miles south of Booneville, while their left was thrown forward toward Blackland, not more than ten miles distant from our advance. As soon as I ascertained the position of affairs I resolved to attack by threatening the enemy near Baldwin, on the direct and main road from Booneville, and at the same time to throw my whole force on his left by

way of Blackland. Orders were accordingly given in detail for the movement of the several divisions at daylight next morning, and all preparations made for battle. I communicated my purpose to General Halleck, but he thought it best to make no attack and accordingly disapproved and countermanded the movement. A day or two afterwards the enemy resumed his retreat toward Okolona, and was followed by the cavalry of my command as far as Gun Town, sixteen miles south of Booneville. As soon as the further 'retreat of the enemy was made known to General Halleck, he directed me to post a sufficient force at proper points to cover the front of the army, and to place my command in camp at some convenient point until further orders. As the water was very scarce and very bad everywhere south of Tuscombta creek, my command was drawn back to Clear creek, and encamped along that stream within four miles of Corinth on the 12th of June.

It becomes my duty in this place, and it is with pain that I feel obliged to perform it, to invite attention to an error which it has always been my purpose to correct as soon as it could be done without injury to the public interests. The day after my command reached its permanent camp on Clear creek, (the 12th of June,) I saw in the newspapers that day received the following publication :

" GENERAL HALLECK'S HEADQUARTERS,  
" June 4, 1862.

" General Pope, with forty thousand men, is thirty miles south of Corinth, pushing the enemy hard. He already reports ten thousand prisoners and deserters from the enemy, and fifteen thousand stand of arms captured. Thousands of the enemy are throwing away their arms. A farmer says that when Beauregard learned that Colonel Elliott had cut the railroad on his line of retreat, he became frantic, and told his men to save themselves the best way they could. We have captured nine locomotives and a number of cars; one of the former is already repaired and is running to-day. Several more will be in running order in two or three days. The result is all I could possibly desire.

"H. W. HALLECK,  
" Major General Commanding.

"Hon. E. M. STANTON,  
" Secretary of War."

I copy this despatch in full, though it is only concerning the first part of it that I have any remarks to make. I need scarcely say, after this preface, that I never made such a report, nor anything like it, as is stated in the despatch above quoted. I was very much surprised when first I saw it in the papers, and immediately pointed it out to my adjutant general and other officers of my staff, who were equally surprised with myself. So far from being thirty miles south of Corinth on the date of this despatch, I was sick in my tent, not four miles distant from General Halleck's headquarters, from the 2d until the 7th of June, and was in telegraphic communication with him during the whole of that time, so that I think he must have known the fact. I sent General Halleck no reports by telegraph or otherwise, except abstracts of such as were forwarded to me by courier from Generals Rosecrans and Granger. There is but one despatch thus sent which mentions numbers at all, and that is the following :

" HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
" Near Danville, June 3, 1862.

" Major General HALLECK : The two divisions in the advance under Rosecrans are slowly and cautiously advancing on Baldwin this morning, with the cavalry on both flanks. Hamilton, with two divisions, is at Rienzi, and between there and Booneville, ready to move forward should they be needed.

One brigade from the reserve occupies Danville. Rosecrans reports this morning that all testimony shows that the enemy has retreated from Baldwin, but he is advancing cautiously. The woods for miles are full of stragglers from the enemy, who are coming in in squads. Not less than ten thousand men are thus scattered about, who will come in within a day or two.

"JNO. POPE,  
"Major General Commanding."

This despatch contains the substance of reports both from Generals Rosecrans and General Granger, but it contains neither the word deserter, prisoner, nor capture.

As was well known, the woods on both sides of the line of pursuit were thronged with stragglers from Beauregard's army, lagging behind or making their way to their homes in Tennessee, northern Mississippi, Kentucky, and Arkansas. It was supposed that many of them would come into our lines, but no attempt was made to capture them. Very few did come in at all, as it turned out. The estimate of the number of these stragglers was not mine, but General Granger's, who was in advance with his cavalry; but from General Buell's estimate, and what I saw and heard myself afterward, I am satisfied that General Granger's estimate was much within bounds. Upon this despatch, probably, General Halleck's extraordinary statement is made, if in fact he himself ever sent the despatch to the Secretary of War, above quoted. I say "if," because it will be noticed in the appended correspondence between him and myself on this subject, that he does not admit that he sent such a despatch.

I submit the correspondence in question, which I think will be conclusive on the subject so far as I am concerned:

"WASHINGTON, D. C., July 3, 1865.

"GENERAL: The war has now ended, and the events and incidents connected with it are passing into history. As I do not wish that any report or misconception which has been circulated to my prejudice, and which is susceptible of explanation, should stand recorded against me, and as the reasons which actuated me in preserving silence until this time no longer exist, I desire to invite your attention to a despatch published in the newspapers, dated at Corinth, Mississippi, June 4, 1862, purporting to have been sent by you to the Secretary of War, and containing substantially the following words, viz: 'General Pope is thirty miles south of Corinth, pushing the enemy hard. He already reports ten thousand prisoners and deserters and fifteen thousand stand of arms captured,' &c. I do not know that you ever sent such a despatch; but as I do know that I never made such a report, I infer that if you sent the despatch in question you must have done so under a very great misapprehension. I have, therefore, to request that you furnish me a copy of any report made by me upon which such a despatch as that in question was sent. I have full records of all my letters, despatches, and reports to you during the operations at Corinth, and no such report is among them.

"I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

"JNO. POPE, Major General.

"Major General H. W. HALLECK,

"United States Army, Washington, D. C."

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[Reply.]

"WASHINGTON, July 5, 1865.

"GENERAL: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 3d instant. As my papers are all boxed up for transportation to California,

I am not able to refer to the despatches to which you allude, nor can I trust my memory in regard to communications made more than three years ago further than to say that I never reported to the Secretary of War despatches received from you which were not so received.

“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“H. W. HALLECK,

“Major General.

“Major General JOHN POPE, *Present.*”

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[Reply.]

“WASHINGTON, D. C., July 5, 1865.

“GENERAL: Your note, in reply to my letter of yesterday’s date, was received this afternoon too late to be answered before you left the city.

“I regret that you did not see fit to make the very brief examination of your files necessary to make it plain to you that the correction asked for in my letter was due to me. I was at least entitled to an assurance that such examination should be made at the earliest practicable moment. Certainly the three weeks which you are to pass in New York afford ample time to inspect very fully all your papers bearing on the subject of my letter. As you do not promise an examination now, or at any other time, I am constrained to say to you that the statement which, trusting to your memory and without inspection of your files, you do make is altogether unsatisfactory, and leaves me at a loss to determine whether you are to be understood as denying that you sent the despatch to the Secretary of War, which was the subject of my letter, or whether, in the face of my positive denial, you mean to insist that the despatch was a correct transcript, or anything like it, of a report made to you by me. If it be your purpose to make such a statement, as an answer to my deliberate and unqualified assertion that no such report as that attributed to me was ever made by me, it becomes more necessary than ever that you should examine your files and furnish me with the papers I ask for. In short, general, I utterly deny that the despatch purporting to have been sent by you to the Secretary of War was based upon any report from me such as is therein stated, and I therefore call upon you either to disavow this despatch or to furnish me with a copy of the report attributed to me. In almost any other case this question could be easily and conclusively decided by a reference to the official files at the headquarters of the department which you then commanded; but I have ascertained, general, that when you left the west you ordered that portion of the despatches and reports concerning the operations around Corinth, which bore upon this question, to be cut out of the official books and brought with you to Washington, leaving the official records in St. Louis mutilated and incomplete.

“These despatches thus taken are believed to be in your possession. It is not necessary for me to comment upon this transaction further than to say that it manifestly leaves the question I make with you to be settled by my files and those now in your possession, together with the evidence of officers, telegraphic operators, and others whose duties and position enable them to speak with knowledge on the subject.

“I trust, general, that you understand that this correspondence has not been begun by me without due consideration, nor without abundant testimony to maintain my position on the question involved. You must, therefore, see that the matter cannot be disposed of by such a note as yours of this date. The case between us is very simple. You are believed to have sent a despatch to the Secretary of War asserting that I had made certain reports. I deny, utterly, that I did so. The onus of proof is therefore with you, and I might well be

contented to rest the matter here, but it is proper to inform you that I have abundant evidence to establish the negative of the statement contained in the despatch attributed to you as far as that despatch relates to me. My main purpose in writing to you on the subject was to give you the opportunity to explain the matter in a manner that, while it would relieve me from the misconception arising from your despatch, would leave unimpaired the personal relations which have always existed between us. It is my wish to maintain those relations if possible; but you must be aware that I cannot long do so unless you act towards me in the same spirit of frankness in which my letter of yesterday was written. It will afford me real satisfaction, upon the receipt of the copy of the report attributed to me in the despatch in question, accompanied by such an explanation as a spirit of frankness and candor would dictate, to recall and destroy this letter. Such explanation is, however, due to me, and I trust sincerely that you will not leave New York, where I understand you are to remain three weeks, without making the brief examination of your files necessary to a full explanation of the subject. I send the original of this to you by the hands of Major Scott, your staff officer, and a copy by mail to the care of John C. Hamilton, esq. I will leave for St. Louis Friday, the seventh instant, at which place any communication will reach me

"I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

"JNO. POPE,

*"Major General.*

"Major General H. W. HALLECK,

*"United States Army, New York, N. Y."*

To this letter no reply has been received.

I had resolved when this war began that I would never during its continuance resort to the newspapers for any justification of myself from charges or statements made against me, and never suffer myself to be drawn into personal controversies with other officers which might impair my usefulness or theirs, or in any other manner obstruct, in the slightest degree, the prosecution of the war. I have steadfastly maintained this resolution until, the war having ended, a settlement of such personal matters can no longer be attended with consequences injurious to the public interests.

I was called to Washington immediately after this despatch from General Halleck was made public, and my relations to him during the operations in front of Washington needed to be so close and harmonious, in the face of the extraordinary difficulties which confronted us, that it would have shown neither wisdom nor patriotism to have opened a controversy at that time, if, indeed, I had not previously resolved against it. I preferred, therefore, to bear unmerited reproach rather than make an explanation which might have done far more injury to the country than any temporary misconception could do to me. I freely admit that I was deeply pained at the continued and unjust flings which were made at me in the newspapers and in public speeches on account of this despatch. Even if it had been true that I made such a report, ordinary consideration for an officer who had done his duty with zeal and fidelity, and who, at that very time, was daily hazarding his life in the discharge of that duty, should have induced every patriotic man rather to excuse or explain away than dwell upon a matter that could have no other result than to injure, unnecessarily and cruelly, my personal character at a time when I was employed by the government on service vital to the country, and without the time or the means to offer a reply. I confess, too, that I was greatly surprised to find that any considerable number of intelligent people could have allowed themselves to believe that an officer occupying my position, and who certainly was not in any manner responsible for the public disappointment at the result of the operations around Corinth, and was without any motive for such an act, should make a report which would disgrace him in

the eyes of every officer and soldier of his command, and in a few days in the eyes of the whole country. I would greatly have preferred to explain this matter in some other way that would seem less harsh, but the course taken by General Halleck leaves me no alternative except to publish my correspondence with him on the subject. If he really sent the despatch in question, he must have done so under some grievous mistake, which he will no doubt make clear hereafter.

As the termination of the campaign against Corinth severed my connection with the army of the Mississippi, which I had organized and commanded with so much satisfaction, it is proper for me to record here the names of the principal officers who commanded in that army. I regret that it is not appropriate in such a paper to record the name of every officer and soldier in that gallant little army. To them, and to those officers herein mentioned, I desire here to return my thanks for the cordial support I always received from them, and for the zeal and efficiency which crowned every operation of that army with such signal success.

I append the official correspondence, the reports of division and brigade commanders, and other subordinate officers. They give a clear and detailed account of the various skirmishes and small affairs in which my command was engaged during the operations near Corinth.

#### ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

##### *Major General John Pope Commanding.*

STAFF.—Major Speed Butler, assistant adjutant general; Major C. A. Morgan, aide-de-camp; Major E. F. Noyes, aide-de-camp; Captain L. H. Marshall, aide-de-camp; Major J. M. Corse, inspector general; Captain J. W. Taylor, assistant quartermaster; Captain J. A. Swain, assistant commissary of subsistence; Lieutenant J. W. Mott, acting assistant quartermaster.

FIRST DIVISION.—Brigadier General D. S. Stanley. *First brigade.*—Colonel John Groesbeck; thirty-ninth Ohio, Colonel Groesbeck; twenty-seventh Ohio, Colonel J. W. Fuller. *Second brigade.*—Colonel J. L. K. Smith; forty-third Ohio, Colonel Smith; sixty-third Ohio, Colonel J. W. Sprague.

SECOND DIVISION.—Brigadier General S. Hamilton. *First brigade.*—Colonel W. H. Worthington; fifth Iowa infantry, Colonel Worthington; fifty-ninth Indiana infantry, Colonel J. J. Alexander. *Second brigade.*—Colonel N. Perczell; twenty-sixth Missouri infantry, Colonel G. B. Boomer; eleventh Ohio battery, Captain T. C. Sands.

THIRD DIVISION.—Brigadier General J. N. Palmer. *First brigade.*—Colonel J. R. Slack; forty-seventh Indiana, Colonel J. R. Slack; thirty-fourth Indiana, Colonel T. Ryan. *Second brigade.*—Colonel G. N. Fitch; forty-sixth Indiana infantry, Colonel Fitch; forty-third Indiana infantry, Colonel W. E. McLean; seventh Illinois cavalry, Colonel W. P. Kellogg; company G, first Missouri light artillery, Captain H. Hiscock.

FOURTH DIVISION.—Brigadier General E. A. Paine. *First brigade.*—Colonel J. D. Morgan; tenth Illinois infantry, Colonel Morgan; sixteenth Illinois infantry, Colonel R. T. Smith. *Second brigade.*—Fifty-first Illinois infantry, Colonel G. W. Cummings; twenty-sixth Illinois infantry, Colonel H. Dougherty; first Illinois cavalry, Major P. D. Jenkins; Yates's sharpshooters, Lieutenant Colonel D. E. Williams.

FIFTH DIVISION.—Brigadier General Plummer. *First brigade.*—Colonel John Briyuer; forty-seventh Illinois infantry, Colonel Briyuer; eighth Wisconsin infantry, Colonel R. C. Murphy. *Second brigade.*—Colonel J. M. Loomis; twenty-sixth Illinois, Colonel Loomis; eleventh Missouri infantry, Lieutenant Colonel W. E. Pawtaker; company M, first Missouri light artillery, Captain A. M. Powell.

CAVALRY DIVISION.—Brigadier General G. Granger; second Michigan cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel S. H. Gorham; third Michigan cavalry, Colonel J. K. Nusener.

ARTILLERY DIVISION.—Major W. L. Lothrop; second Iowa battery, Captain M. T. Spoor; third Michigan battery, Captain H. N. Dus; company F, second United States artillery, Lieutenant D. P. Mulling, in charge; Ottawa light artillery, Captain C. Houghtaling; first Wisconsin artillery, battery No. 5, Captain O. F. Primey; first Wisconsin artillery, battery No. 6, Captain H. Dillens; first Wisconsin artillery, battery No. 7, Captain R. Griffith; Michigan light artillery, Captain S. De Golyers.

ENGINEERS' REGIMENT OF THE WEST.—Colonel J. W. Bissell; fifteenth Wisconsin infantry, Colonel H. C. Heg; twenty-second Missouri infantry, \_\_\_\_\_; second Iowa cavalry, Colonel W. L. Elliott; fourth United States cavalry, Lieutenant M. J. Kelley; first United States infantry, Captain G. A. Williams; second Illinois cavalry, Captain Moore.

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Near Farmington, May 5, 1862.*

Colonel John C. KELTON: I have the honor to transmit, enclosed, the report of General D. S. Stanley, of the capture of Monterey and the enemy's baggage and tents. Enclosed with his reports are the reports of Colonel W. S. Elliott, second Iowa cavalry, and Major Love.

Respectfully, colonel, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Near Farmington, May 5, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: Deserter from enemy's lines just in; says he belongs to Hardee's division, now east of Corinth and quite near intrenchments; says that the troops are going into the works. Thinks they will not hold the whole army, mules, and wagons inside. No big guns mounted south of Memphis and Charleston road, but that intrenchments extend from Mobile and Ohio road round by the east to Memphis and Charleston road west of town. South side of town open. Hardee's whole division has been laying on its arms in line of battle inside the intrenchments ever since skirmish day before yesterday at Farmington. I am having a sketch of the ground east and south of Corinth made from his information which I will send you.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Near Farmington, May 5, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: Another deserter just in from Bragg's command confirms everything said to you in my last telegram. Says that Mansfield Lovell is assigned to the defence of the Memphis side of Corinth, and is expected every moment with his forces. Says, as do all the other prisoners, that they are badly fed and that there is much dissatisfaction in their army.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

May 6, 1862.

Major General HALLECK: General Paine writes that Major Rewalt, seventh Illinois cavalry, who is with the advanced pickets, reports that from all indication now, the rebels are leaving Corinth. I will ascertain the facts as soon as I can.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

Near Farmington, May 7, 1862.

Major General HALLECK: Reports from the pickets assume such a form and come so continuously that the enemy is evacuating Corinth, that I think an examination in force will be desirable. It is certain that early as last Thursday trains were leaving on both roads, of twenty and thirty cars each, loaded with supplies, and since that time men have not been permitted to go to the depot. A great quantity of subsistence stores have been carried off. I instructed General Paine to make as close examination last night as possible without moving his command, but have no report from him. If one of Buell's divisions, say Nelson's, which is nearest to me, can be sent with two days' rations in haversacks to occupy my camp I will make a reconnoissance to day with my whole force. Please advise me.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

NEAR FARMINGTON, May 7, 1862.

Major General HALLECK: I only want Buell to watch my right carefully during the reconnoissance, that no force may interpose between us.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

May 7, 1862.

Major General HALLECK: Nelson is considerably in rear of my right, and his advanced pickets are not as far to the front as my encampment. He is also far to my right with Chambers creek between us. From my right to his pickets on Chambers creek is full a mile and a half, and the country between is high and rolling, with a road leading to Nichols ford on Seven-mile creek. He must cross Chambers's creek very early in the morning and advance as far as Seven-mile creek on my right, or he can neither give me assistance in case of need nor even watch my right. There is entirely too much interval between us in view of my movement to-morrow. As Hardee's force is laying outside the intrenchments and along the railroad, a considerable force will be necessary to drive him in, and my movement will carry me still further from Nelson. If he cannot be moved across Chambers's creek early in the morning, I think, perhaps, my attack on Hardee had best be postponed until he can do so. Unless Hardee is driven into his works no satisfactory reconnoissance can be made, and it will require my whole command to do so. My whole command will be ready to-morrow morning at 7 o'clock, with one day's rations. My flag of truce has not yet returned.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*



HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
 May 8, 1862.

Major General D. C. BUELL: I intend to move forward upon Corinth by the Farmington road, resting my left as near as possible upon the railroad. My reserves will occupy the high ground in front of Farmington. My wish is that Nelson cross Chambers's creek with his infantry, at least, and advance as far as the right and front of my camp, so as to cover the road by way of Nichol's ford. I shall leave in my camp one field battery and four 30-pounder Parrotts, with proper supports. Will you please direct Nelson to report to me the exact position he takes up, and to be ready in case of emergency, keeping behind Seven-mile creek, unless a pressing necessity arises, of which I will notify him.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
 May 8, 1862.

General D. S. STANLEY: The general commanding directs that the second brigade of your command bivouack to-night near the creek, and on the side toward Farmington, throwing out pickets so as to enclose the town. They will be relieved in the morning. General Buford, officer of the day, will post the pickets and will be there for that purpose.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,  
 C. A. MORGAN, *Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
 May 8, 1862.

Major General HALLECK: We have pushed our reconnoissance to the enemy's works, and the position of his batteries on the east side pretty well determined. There are bodies of the enemy all along the railroad on the south side. It was too far for me to venture across the railroad, while support was so far distant, and my flanks accessible by the three roads from Corinth. I will send you a sketch of the enemy's batteries and the roads early in the morning. There seems no doubt that he is in force at Corinth, though it is hard to tell without assaulting the intrenchments. I think my command ought to be advanced to this place to clear the railroad and make me secure on the left. I will write you at length. We have lost several men killed and wounded. The troops are returning to camp, but a brigade will occupy Farmington. The enemy, it is evident, will not stand outside of his intrenchments. All the roads are obstructed by felled trees.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
 Near Farmington, May 8, 1862.

Major General HALLECK: I hardly know what to report to you, as my own opinion is not clear. Judging from the very feeble resistance offered to our advance on any of the roads leading to Corinth, and the ease with which close reconnoissance was made, I incline to think either that the enemy is evacuating, or that he desires to draw us on this road. His resistance was very feeble; few troops could be seen, and the intrenchments were examined from a very near point. If he be in force I am too far away from Buell to make such an advance

as to demonstrate the true state of the case. To-day I had to use only one division in the close examination, one being held in reserve while the other was advanced toward the railroad so as to secure the left flank of the first. I must again say that my mind is not made up. I regret to report the loss of Major Applington, seventh Illinois cavalry, killed to-day. I will write you my views.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*May 9, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: I transmit, enclosed, some maps exhibiting pretty fairly the condition of things in and about Corinth, and also on my right as far as Nelson's division. I will send you, as soon as it is possible, the sketch showing the position and character of the enemy's works and batteries, on and near the roads leading from Farmington. You will see that the approaches from the east will be difficult, and that the difficulties probably increase as we proceed south across the Memphis and Charleston railroad. I would suppose that the best position for Buell's line would be the Purdy and Farmington road. How far beyond Buell this road would be useful in this respect I do not know. By establishing Buell from the forks of the road from Farmington to Nichols, and from Farmington to Purdy, his left would rest on Farmington, while my force would be established with the right resting on Farmington and the left on the railroad. We should thus be secure on the left flank, be near enough to operate without difficulty or delay, and occupy a line along which communications would be direct and easy. I submit it for your consideration. My command is all in rear of Seven-mile creek, except one brigade, which is on the opposite side, and one-half mile this side of Farmington, so as to support the pickets in advance of the town. This brigade is not camped but bivouacked, and will be relieved every twenty-four hours. I am not likely to be taken at a disadvantage, and trust you will not be uneasy about us.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Near Farmington, May 9, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: The enemy's skirmishers have commenced to drive in our pickets beyond Farmington, and from the reports, are appearing in some force. I will advise you further very soon. I presume it is only a demonstration on the town. I have a brigade and battery on the other side of the creek to support pickets.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*May 9, 1862.*

Major General BUELL: Enemy is forming pretty strong line of battle at Farmington, having driven in our pickets. Please march Nelson's division in this direction immediately and be ready.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS NEAR FARMINGTON,

May 9, 1862.

Major General HALLECK: The enemy is felling timber on my left and rear, about where a road conducts across Seven-mile creek, to the high lands toward the railroad. I have a strong cavalry picket, a regiment of infantry, and a section of artillery on the road about three miles from my left.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS NEAR FARMINGTON,

May 9, 1862.

Major General HALLECK: All is quiet. Our pickets occupy the bridge across Seven-mile creek, which is half a mile in the swamp, and near the further side. My impression is that the enemy has retired, but he may possibly be massing forces on our left, as the cars have been very busy last night and to-day as far as Glendale. I shall have early notice if it is so.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

May 9, 1862.

*To Division Commanders:*

The discharge of a piece of artillery at these headquarters will from this time forth be the signal for the immediate assembling of this entire command under arms and at their posts.

By order of General Pope:

C. A. MORGAN, *Aide-de-Camp.*

NEAR FARMINGTON, May 10, 1862.

Major General HALLECK: Enemy fell back last night to Corinth. Our pickets are again advanced to Farmington.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*Near Farmington, May 10, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: Deserter from Louisiana regiment in skirmish yesterday just in. Rebel force thirty-five thousand, under Bragg, Van Dorn, Hardee, and Price, with thirty-five pieces of artillery. Their purpose was to overwhelm my command and pursue to Tennessee river. We are supposed to number ten thousand. Their loss was heavy both in officers and men. Our loss I will report as soon as I can get returns. The country is clear to Farmington and beyond.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*May 10, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: All quiet in my front. My pickets occupy Farmington as usual, the grand guards being in the hills beyond the creek. I can cross without difficulty any day. I had the whole country on my left as far as the railroad thoroughly scoured by cavalry to-day. No signs of any enemy or that he had been there recently. I am making several crossings of the creek at different places, and can readily pass it any day you name.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*Near Farmington, May 11, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: Our cavalry is in Farmington, and has scoured the country for a mile and a half beyond the town toward Corinth, without finding any sign of the enemy. He has evidently withdrawn his pickets from our front. I will reconnoitre to-morrow with cavalry.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*Near Farmington, May 13, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: In compliance with your directions, I displayed large force of cavalry and artillery this morning beyond Farmington, and in one direction advanced to the railroad, in the other toward Corinth, crossing the first creek one and a half mile below Farmington. Met no opposition toward railroad, and only a few pickets in the other. Did the movement on the right encounter opposition?

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*NEAR FARMINGTON, *May 14, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: I have received your message to mass my command on Seven-mile creek. Do you mean in front of or behind it? You direct me to rest my right on Nichols's ford. Buell's whole command is between me and Nichols's ford. Is there not some mistake?

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*HEADQUARTERS, NEAR FARMINGTON, *May 15.*

Major General BUELL: Despatch just received. Occasionally see a few mounted pickets of the enemy about a mile beyond Farmington towards Corinth. Have driven them in several times within a day or two, and find no force behind them for at least two miles west of Farmington. Sent a reconnoissance to the railroad southwest of Farmington yesterday morning; found nobody. Everything quiet as the grave. Party followed railroad towards Corinth. Have driven them

in several times. Party found small trestle bridge on railroad towards Corinth. Burned it and then walked in to within two miles of town; heard enemy's reveille. Nearly all the drums beat south of Memphis and Charleston road, in direction of Mobile and Ohio road. I hold firmly to the opinion that there will be no serious opposition met with.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS, FARMINGTON, *May 15.*

Major General HALLECK: Negro servant of an officer of forty-sixth Ohio, who was captured by the enemy in late battle, escaped from Corinth at 2 p. m. yesterday, and came into my camp last night, says that troops were ordered to cook five days' rations in Corinth day before he left; that provisions, artillery carriages, &c., had been sent down the Mobile and Ohio road; that officers' baggage was sent to the railroad depot, in large quantities, to be ready to send off; that he heard the officers say that some movement was coming off; whether in advance or retreat he did not know; that there was great stir and running about in town yesterday—much more than usual; that one regiment marched through town, with its baggage, going south; heard them say that they were driven out of their camp, north of the town. The negro evidently designs to tell the truth, but how far his information is valuable I don't know. He is now on his way to join his regiment on the right, and will stop and report to you.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*May 7, 1862.*

Brigadier General E. PAINE: You will move immediately with your division, without tents or baggage, as heretofore directed, and occupy the ground on right of Farmington, pointed out to you by General Granger, who will mark out your line and the intrenchments you are to throw up. You will begin to work upon them as soon as your force is in line, and continue the work rapidly. They must be so far completed to-night as to be capable of making a good defence in the morning.

Respectfully, general, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*May 19, 1862.*

Major General BUELL: It is my purpose to-day to push my grand guards, of two regiments and a section of artillery each, to the first creek, about one and a quarter mile in front of my lines, and cut out avenues to them, so that my heavy artillery will have clear range. I cannot well move them forward unless your left division can do the same. Please advise me as soon as possible.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Farmington, May 20, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: One and a half mile in front of my right is the high ridge on the east side of the first creek towards Corinth. This point is the highest ground this side of Corinth, and will be within one and a half mile of the enemy's works. I can throw forward my right to occupy it, which will give me a line diagonal to the one now occupied. The operation will be secure if Buell moves forward his two left divisions to the same point. Our heavy batteries can then be established in good range. As you are aware, I have reconnoitred the ground in my front, some time since, to within half a mile of the enemy's works. The reconnoissance will be made at 7 o'clock in the morning. But I desire to know whether I had not better take intrenching tools and hold on.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS, FARMINGTON,  
*May 22, 1862.*

Major General BUELL: I send a division from my right this morning to make reconnoissance beyond first creek. Please notify Nelson and Wood that they may look out for the right of this division, which will rest on the direct road to Corinth. Brigadier General Crittenden is also notified of the reconnoissance.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*May 21, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: The enemy advanced in some force on the left of my command this morning. They drove in the cavalry videttes, but did not advance upon the infantry pickets. I sent out a force to meet them but they retired. I have sent a regiment and a half of cavalry to Yellow creek this morning to look after the cavalry reported to be in that vicinity. I gave them orders to return by way of Hamburg, and to destroy the bridge over Chambers' creek, on the Sulphur Spring road.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Farmington, May 22, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: The cavalry force I sent to Yellow creek has returned. It went as far as Tennessee river, passing between Yellow and Indian creeks. There was no enemy, nor had there been, anywhere in that region. The country was almost impassable. The command then went to luka and returned along the railroad as far as Glendale. At Barnesville a few mounted pickets were seen and pursued for several miles in the direction of Jacinto, where there is a regiment of cavalry under McNeill, formerly of the "Rifles." The pickets were undoubtedly from that regiment.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Farmington, May 24, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: The regiments had best move out at once, as fast as they arrive, to my old camp on Seven-mile creek, three miles in rear of Farmington. Can you tell me who is the senior officer with them, and whether they have their transportation? They had best move out rapidly, bringing ten days' rations, so as to clear the landing and the road for the others. The enemy's pickets have almost disappeared from my front, and have ceased to fire for twenty-four hours. There have been no drums beat on my left for the same period, and no running of trains from Corinth. I am sending out some companies of skirmishers and a couple of howitzers, to-day, on the road leading from my left to Corinth. You will therefore understand the cause of any artillery firing you may hear.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS, FARMINGTON,  
*May 24, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: Affair this afternoon resulted in complete rout of three of enemy's regiments, with loss of knapsacks, blankets, and haversacks. Several of enemy killed and wounded, and six prisoners taken. The regiment fled in confusion across the creek. Our loss four wounded.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Farmington, May 26, 1862.*

General G. T. BEAUREGARD: In accordance with instructions from Major General Halleck, commanding this department, I send into your lines one brigade surgeon, four regimental surgeons, and two assistant surgeons. A list of them is herewith enclosed.

In answer to inquiries from Colonel Jordan, of your staff, it gives me pleasure to inform you that Captain Cameron, of your army, who was captured near this place, on the 3d of May, is not wounded, and is now a prisoner in my hands. I shall be glad to exchange him for Captain McMichael, assistant adjutant general, who was captured by your forces at Shiloh.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Farmington, May 26, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: The firing you hear is from a strong force I have sent to drive the enemy across the first creek on the left-hand Corinth road. The enemy was in some force near the creek, but are retiring. There was a report of the advance of the enemy in some force on my left to-day, but it has not been verified.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Farmington, May 26, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: A considerable force of the enemy is massed in front of (south of) our left in the direction of the railroad. At least three regiments were seen on the Danville road. It is possible that the enemy means to attack my left in the morning. I shall be ready.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Farmington, May 27, 1862.*

General GORDON GRANGER: You will send a brigade of cavalry, to proceed by some secluded route, to a point on the Mobile and Ohio railroad, at least forty miles south of Corinth, with instructions to destroy the railroad bridges, trestle-works, telegraph wires, &c., wherever it is practicable, and to render the railroad useless as far as possible.

In your orders to the officer commanding the brigade, you will give him the necessary instructions as to his movements, being careful that he is to return by a different route from that pursued in his forward movement.

Respectfully,

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Farmington, May 27, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: You no doubt heard last night the signal guns and rockets of the enemy. From midnight until daylight they were running trains rapidly—I think south—on the Mobile road. I think there were not more than six regiments and a battery on our left yesterday, and they only supports to their pickets. I send to-day two regiments of cavalry to push through Iuka in the night, and destroy a heavy covered bridge on the Mobile road, forty-five miles south of Corinth. One of my cavalry regiments returned from Iuka last night. I think this expedition will be a surprise, and will meet with little opposition so far from Corinth. They will be at the place by daylight to-morrow morning. As they will be ordered to return by a different road they will run no risk of ambush.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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FARMINGTON, *May 27, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: I will send an officer to you to-night, to lay before you my views of your order. I will be ready to execute it at an early hour to-morrow.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Farmington, May 27, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: A white woman, living near the railroad east of this place, left Corinth night before last. She asserts positively that the enemy



were leaving Corinth in the direction of Memphis, and it is fully believed by men whom we have as scouts, and who know the woman well. I give you this for what it is worth.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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FARMINGTON, *May 27, 1862.*

Major General BUELL: I have, but have sent an officer to General Halleck to explain my views. I don't quite like the orders.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Farmington, May 28, 1862.*

Major General BUELL: I shall move forward on the south or left-hand road from this place to Corinth. One division of seven thousand men will occupy this bank of Bridge creek, with its left resting on the road, its right extended towards Boxe's. Two other divisions of equal strength will occupy the line of the road *en echelon*, facing to the southwest, the other division occupying that part of my intrenchments which are refused, and the whole well closed, so that our left will present an unbroken line of battle, looking toward the railroad. My heavy batteries will be established on the highlands along the creek in front of my first division.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS, FARMINGTON,  
*May 28, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: My command is drawn up, and will march in ten minutes. My heavy batteries will be ready to open by 3 p. m. I sent you a despatch yesterday, stating that I had sent two regiments of cavalry to destroy railroad bridges, &c., forty-five miles south of Corinth. They are to be there early this morning. They are commanded by Colonel Elliot, and will undoubtedly perform the service at some portion of the road to-day.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS, *May 28, 1862.*

General STANLEY: Feel in with your skirmishers toward the battery on your left, and see what you can do with it. I will send the sharpshooters from Paine's right to turn it on its right. Have your columns ready to march; and if you deem it practicable, carry the nearest work. Leave at least one brigade to watch your right and rear, and if you need more, call on Morgan or General Paine, who are just in your rear. If by waiting for the 30-pounder Parrotts you can silence the battery, wait, and don't attempt to storm; meantime put Colonel Bissell to work for the Parrotts, and your own men to digging rifle-pits.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

MAY 28, 1862.

General PAINE: Send your sharpshooters in the direction of the enemy's battery, which has just fired, and see what it is. Let them lay under cover and pick off the gunners. Stand ready to support Stanley should he decide to storm it.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*Farmington, May 28, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: The result of the operations to-day was the occupation of the line I suggested in my communication through General Hamilton last night. Along this line I am now strongly intrenched, and can hold my ground. I am throwing up a battery to-night of 20-pounder Parrotts, within five hundred yards of the work which annoyed us to-day, and will open from it at daylight. I have also ordered a reconnoissance in force at daylight to the right and rear of the work toward the railroad. The enemy left thirty dead on the ground, whom we have buried, many wounded, now in our hospitals, and three officers and nineteen men prisoners. Our loss is about twenty-five killed and wounded.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*Farmington, May 29, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: It is just reported to me that the enemy has evacuated the intrenched position he occupied yesterday on my left and front. I am pushing forward my skirmishers and will telegraph again directly.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*May 29, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: The intrenched works of the enemy have not been abandoned, although the guns have been withdrawn, and are limbered up in the rear, supported by a heavy infantry force. The work is just south of the Memphis and Charleston railroad, which is much nearer than supposed. The railroad runs through a deep cut in front of the battery. Behind it and between the two railroads the forces of Van Dorn and Price are massed. I can bring on a battle immediately if you desire it. I will post my heavy Parrotts so as to play upon the work. I would suggest that my only further advance under present circumstances must be in the direction of the railroad, where I should meet Van Dorn and Price and a part, at least, of Hardee's forces. I have not yet heard from the expedition down the Mobile and Ohio railroad. The reconnoissance I sent out this morning developed the enemy in heavy force in front of Hamilton, on the right of the intrenched position of the enemy.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

May 30—1.20 a. m.

Major General HALLECK: The enemy is re-enforcing heavily by trains in my front and on my left. The cars are running constantly, and the cheering is immense every time they unload in front of me. I have no doubt, from all appearances, that I shall be attacked in heavy force at daylight.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

May 30—6 a. m.

General HALLECK: All very quiet since 4 o'clock. Twenty-six trains le during the night. A succession of loud explosions followed by dense black smoke in clouds. Everything indicates evacuation and retreat. I am pushing forward my skirmishers in several directions toward Corinth. Will telegraph you again in a few minutes.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General.*

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

May 30—7.15 a. m.

Major General HALLECK: I am in possession of the enemy's intrenched position, an embrasured work of seven guns. Four regiments are feeling their way into Corinth and are now within three-quarters of a mile of the town. The whole country here seems to be fortified.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

May 30—8.25 a. m.

Major General HALLECK: The enemy evacuated yesterday and last night. They marched down the Mobile railroad. Their sick went in the cars towards Memphis. I am pushing into the town. My skirmishers are now in the outskirts.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General.*

## HEADQUARTERS, CORINTH,

May 30—8.40 a. m.

Major General HALLECK: My advance, the thirty-ninth Ohio and forty-second Illinois, entered the town and planted the United States flag on the courthouse at 6.40 this morning. They were the first troops in the place. I am throwing forward my cavalry and artillery in pursuit. The enemy retired by the Mobile road.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS  
E MISSISSIPPI,  
*Farmington, May 30—11.10 a. m.*

Major General HALLECK: My command will move at once. Price and Van Dorn retreated to the southeast, whether toward Danville or further east I cannot yet say. Our 20-pounder Parrotts enfiladed their camp yesterday, killing and wounding eighty men, as prisoners informed me. Nearly a hundred horses were found in their camp killed by our fire. I ordered Captain Williams yesterday afternoon to fire four shells from his 30-pounder Parrott battery, in the direction of the town. One of them destroyed a locomotive and killed the engineer, within a few yards of the depot. I have not heard from Elliott, though I am informed by prisoners that it was known yesterday afternoon that the Mobile road had been destroyed forty miles south. I shall be at my old headquarters until 4 o'clock.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS, FARMINGTON,  
*May 30, 1862—12.45 p. m.*

Major General HALLECK: The advance of my cavalry detachment came upon the extreme rear-guard of the enemy eight miles from Corinth on the Mobile and Ohio road, in the act of burning the bridge. They were at once dispersed with loss of forty prisoners. The fire was put out. The cavalry is pushing on.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*June 1, 1862.*

General GRANGER: As General Smith has gone to Jacinto, there is no occasion for you to go in that direction. You will give every assistance in your power to General Rosecrans to repair the bridge across Tuscumbia river in your front, cross as soon as you possibly can to Danville with your cavalry and artillery, and follow the enemy toward Booneville.

Report your progress to me frequently.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*June 1, 1862.*

Major General STANLEY: The general commanding directs that you move forward with your command to-morrow morning at daylight, taking with you two days' cooked rations, leaving behind all baggage and a sufficient guard for your camp. You will send forward a staff officer to announce your approach to General Rosecrans, and proceed onward with your command to Booneville and there await orders, unless you receive other orders from General Rosecrans. If you find a brigade of General Paine's division encamped on the other side of Tuscumbia river, you will direct it to go forward and rejoin its division.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. A. MORGAN,  
*Major and Aide-de-camp.*

OLD DANVILLE ROAD, *June 1, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: The advance of Rosecrans's command has passed Rienzi and will reach Booneville to-night. They are preceded by the cavalry. Prisoners and deserters represent the enemy scattering in all directions. A large force has gone to Oxford, in Lafayette county, about seventy-five miles from Corinth. Their retreat is becoming very disorderly and confused.

JOHN POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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NEAR DANVILLE, *June 1, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: Express just in from General Rosecrans. He thinks whole army of enemy is at Baldwin, and asks to have his right supported by advancing Thomas's command toward Blackland, within supporting distance. It is certain that there is a very heavy force of the enemy in front of Rosecrans; much too heavy for him to engage. He has taken up defensive position, and evidently apprehends the possibility of attack. I do not think this likely; but if you design to attack, it will be well to advance both Buell and Thomas. I shall advance with my whole force in the morning, unless I am otherwise ordered. Please advise me to-night what you propose, that I may give Rosecrans his orders.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*On Danville Road, June 1, 1862.*

General ROSECRANS: Your note and diagrams just received. Hamilton moves forward early in the morning. I need not urge on you to be careful, about attacking until support is near. Send back, early in the morning, some orderlies as far as Danville to point out the road to Hamilton, and one to report to me for the same purpose. I will be up some time to-morrow. Forward to me reports from the cavalry as soon as you receive them.

Respectfully,

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*On Danville Road, June 1, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: By noon to-morrow my command will be in position, as follows: The cavalry in advance; General Rosecrans with one division near Baldwin, his other division near Booneville; General Hamilton with one division at Rienzi, the other beyond Danville; General Sherman with his own and Davies's division on Tuscumbia creek. If the enemy is in force at Baldwin, which I do not anticipate, my command will be more than a match for him, and I will at once attack. I think it will not be advisable to push the pursuit beyond Baldwin, because of the difficulty of supplying the command.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*On Danville Road, June 1, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: It is certain now that the point selected to unite all Beauregard's forces was Baldwin, thirty miles from Corinth, on the Mobile and Ohio railroad. A considerable force and supplies were assembled there on the 29th, but when Elliott destroyed the track and burned the cars at Booneville, they retreated south, after destroying the stores collected there. All the roads on which the enemy retired from Corinth centre at Baldwin. I have several deserters who left there yesterday. The troops were passing through in great confusion and disorder, and scattered parties of forty and fifty together in the woods were trying to make their way south.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Near Danville, June 1, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: It gives me great pleasure to report the brilliant success of the expedition under Colonel Elliott, second Iowa cavalry, which I sent out on the 28th instant. After forced marches day and night through a very difficult country, and obstructed by the enemy, he finally succeeded in reaching the Mobile and Ohio railroad at Booneville, at 2 o'clock a. m. on the 30th. He destroyed the track, in many places, both south and west of the town, blew up one culvert, destroyed switches and track, burned up depot and locomotive and train of twenty-six cars, loaded with supplies of every kind; destroyed ten thousand stand of small-arms, three pieces of artillery, and a great quantity of clothing and ammunition, and paroled two thousand prisoners, who could not keep up with his cavalry. The enemy had heard of his movement, and had a train of box and flat cars, carrying artillery and five thousand infantry, running up and down the road to prevent him from reaching it. The whole road was lined with pickets. For several days Colonel Elliott's command subsisted on meat alone, such as they could find in the country. For daring and dash this expedition has been distinguished in the highest degree, and entitles Colonel Elliott and his command to high distinction. Its results will be embarrassing to the enemy, and will contribute greatly to their loss and demoralization. He reports the roads full of small parties of the retreating enemy scattering in all directions.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*June 2, 1862.*

Major General ROSECRANS: As soon as you get one command of your division across, advance it with two days' rations as far as Booneville, should the cavalry which precedes you find any considerable force there. I have ordered General Granger to cross as soon as possible with cavalry regiment and a battery and pursue the enemy to Booneville. Hold your command in readiness, so that as soon as he reports any considerable resistance, you can advance to Booneville. Do not move forward until you hear from him.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
Near Danville, June 2, 1862.

Major General HALLECK: My advance passed through Booneville this morning at 5 o'clock, and are now doubtless near Baldwin. My command is so disposed that within four hours I can concentrate forty thousand men. I am interposed between the two main bodies of the enemy, retreating on both sides of the Mobile and Ohio railroad. It was their intention to meet at Baldwin and use the railroad. No considerable portion of them will be able to do so. I am strong enough to take care of myself, as my forces are disposed. If the enemy still attempts to form a junction at Baldwin, I can easily prevent it and beat him in detail. I have no idea an effort of the kind will be made, but that his forces will scatter still more I feel satisfied.

JNO. POPE,  
Major General Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
June 2, 1862.

Major General HALLECK: The cavalry under General Granger has come up with the rear-guard of the enemy, five or six thousand strong, posted on the opposite side of a difficult creek, two miles this side of Baldwin. General Rosecrans will be up with him to-night with fifteen thousand men, and Hamilton will follow closely with twelve thousand more. I shall move forward the divisions of Generals Sherman and Davies to Rienzi, if necessary. As I have informed you, I shall not urge the pursuit beyond Baldwin, which is the enemy's first large depot, thirty-five miles from Corinth. General Granger has taken and continues to take a great many prisoners, and one regiment is now in pursuit of large trains four miles west of the railroad, which he reports that he will certainly capture.

JNO. POPE,  
Major General Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
Near Danville, June 2, 1862:

General ROSECRANS: I do not wish the pursuit of the enemy to be pushed beyond Baldwin. Should your cavalry ascertain that the enemy has retired from that place (unless you receive undoubted information that large bodies are on the east or west of the railroad, and in rear of Baldwin,) you will return to this camp with your force. So soon as you decide to return, notify General Hamilton, who will at once retrace his steps also. Send all the cavalry back by different roads, and scour the country on both sides of the railroad to their camps as soon as they have pushed forward beyond Baldwin, far enough to know, if possible, where the enemy really is. Under no circumstances advance beyond Baldwin, until you are certain that your flanks and rear are secure. I do not know of any state of affairs which would make a further advance beyond Baldwin necessary. As soon as you can ascertain that the enemy has left the place, (which you can do by pushing on your cavalry,) you will retrace your steps to this camp. It is reported to me, on what Colonel Elliott seems to consider good authority, that when he destroyed the railroad at Booneville, fifteen locomotives and trains were intercepted between that point and Corinth. I can

hardly believe it; but perhaps you had best, as you return, have the track examined between Booneville and Rienzi. I have directed Hamilton to do the same between Rienzi and this crossing.

Respectfully, general, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Near Danville, June 3, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: The two divisions in the advance under Rosecrans are slowly and cautiously advancing on Baldwin this morning with the cavalry on both flanks. Hamilton, with two divisions, is at Rienzi, and between there and Booneville, ready to move forward should they be needed. One brigade from the reserve occupies Danville. Rosecrans reports this morning that all testimony shows that the enemy has retreated from Baldwin, but he is advancing cautiously. The woods, for miles, are full of stragglers from the enemy who are coming in in squads. Not less than ten thousand men are thus scattered about, who will come in within a day or two.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*June 3, 1862.*

General ROSECRANS: Press the enemy at least as far as Baldwin. Call up your whole force if you deem it necessary. If you require more let me know and I will advance the whole army, if necessary. Urge the pursuit at least as far as Baldwin, and further if you find it desirable or practicable. Baldwin is on the Mobile and Ohio road about ten miles beyond Booneville. The various roads upon which the enemy retreated from Corinth unite at that point, and you may find a heavy force there. My impression is that you had best call up your second division. Keep me advised.

Respectfully,

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*June 3, 1862.*

General ROSECRANS: General Hamilton has sent me your order to him to move forward, from which I infer that you expect an action. You have not advised me, nor have I heard from you to-day. So soon as you receive this note, despatch a courier to me with all speed giving me in detail the condition of affairs in front. If the enemy be in force at Baldwin, you ought, I think, to know it by this time. I desire, if it be necessary, to move forward the divisions of Sherman and Davies, but you do not keep me advised, and I am in the dark as to your movements. If you find the enemy in force at or near Baldwin, it will be easy to move forward the whole force I have here. You have not acknowledged the receipt of my despatches instructing you to go no further than Baldwin, but as soon as you have driven the enemy from that place to return forthwith to this camp. Lest you have not received them, I here repeat the order.

Respectfully, general, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*



HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
Near Danville, June 3—8 p. m.

Major General HALLECK: General Rosecrans at 3 p. m. was near Baldwin. I gather from his despatch, part of which he failed by mistake to send, that the enemy is posted in force at Baldwin. His despatch, from the omission mentioned, is not clear, so as to leave me in doubt whether this is so or the place abandoned. Polk is at Okolona, it is said, with thirty-five thousand men. I can advance to Baldwin with my whole force and attack if you think best, though from the difficulty of hauling supplies I cannot remain there. The bridges are destroyed and the roads must be made through several swamps. Please advise me of your wishes, as I have made every preparation to advance in the morning. I shall hear further from Rosecrans before morning. He has full thirty thousand men now with him.

JNO. POPE,  
Major General Commanding.

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
June 4—2 a. m.

General ROSECRANS: Troops are advancing to your assistance. I will be up to-morrow with Sherman and Davies. Buell will advance two divisions. We are surely sufficient for any enemy in front. Examine the position carefully, and assure yourself of the enemy's force and the best means to get at him. I will be with you by 2 p. m.

Respectfully,

JNO. POPE,  
Major General Commanding.

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
Booneville, June 4, 1862—6.50 p. m.

Major General HALLECK: Enemy developed in considerable force in the direct road to Baldwin, on the road to Blackland and between, with infantry and artillery posted. As you desired the divisions of Davies and T. W. Sherman to join Buell, I have left them both at Rienzi, through which place he will pass. So soon as I learn that you have ordered Buell forward to Blackland, I will advance and force the passage of Twenty-mile creek. From Corinth to Baldwin by wagon road is forty-one miles.—(See sketch.) The enemy made no resistance until we reached Twenty-mile creek.

JNO. POPE,  
Major General Commanding.

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
Booneville, June 5—5 a. m.

Major General HALLECK: I have carefully examined the ground, and shall, at daylight to-morrow morning, assault by way of Blackland, moving upon that place in three columns—from Booneville, from Rienzi, and from a point between. It will require the best part of to-day to dispose the troops for that purpose and repair the roads so as to make them practicable in our front. The enemy's right is very strong and inaccessible.

JNO. POPE,  
Major General Commanding.

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

June 5, 1862.

Major General HALLECK: I shall attack the enemy to-morrow morning by way of Blackland, marching on that point in three columns, as follows: Two divisions, under Rosecrans, from Booneville, two divisions, under T. W. Sherman, from Rienzi; two divisions, under Hamilton, from a point half-way between Booneville and Rienzi. There will probably be a sharp engagement on Twenty-mile creek and beyond, in direction of Baldwin. The enemy is in strong force behind the creek, his right especially covered by jungle and swamp. I have carefully examined the whole ground, and shall assault with my whole force. I think, to provide for every contingency, at least two divisions should be advanced to Rienzi early to-morrow from Buell or Sherman. I do not know that they will be needed, but it will be safe to have them there.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS, Booneville, June 5, 1862.

Major General HALLECK: I think, to make our operations perfectly secure to-morrow, it will be well to advance T. W. Sherman to-day as far as possible—say to Kossuth—with orders to march towards Blackland at daylight to-morrow morning by the direct road from Kossuth. It is impossible to ascertain the force of the enemy beyond Twenty-mile creek. It was large yesterday, Bragg commanding the left wing. If my operations are successful, I shall, at an early hour to-morrow, fall upon him with my whole force. If not surprised, he will be so nearly so as to secure us great advantage. I suggest Sherman's movement that every precaution may be taken. Your despatch of this date just received. If you prefer that my attack be not made, telegraph me immediately, as I am preparing for it.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

Booneville, June 5, 1862.

Brigadier General T. W. SHERMAN: It is my purpose to move upon the enemy through Blackland, as follows: Two divisions from Booneville, two divisions from a point half-way between Booneville and Rienzi, by what is known as Smith's road, and your two divisions by the road from Rienzi. The movement of these three columns will be begun this afternoon at 4 o'clock, so that all the divisions will bivouack to-night within five miles of Blackland. This will necessitate an advance towards that place of at least six miles by your command this evening. I send you a sketch of the country. You will bivouack near the point marked Smith's; Rosecrans will rest a little in advance of you at the forks of the road to Kossuth. At early daylight you will move forward with your command to Blackland, in fighting order. Your future movements and position will there be designated. I will send you two companies of cavalry with an officer who has been on the road. Throw forward these companies in advance, so as to cover your movement. They will rest at least a mile in your front, with their pickets well thrown out, so as to prevent any reconnoissance of your line. Caution them that General Rosecrans is in front on the left. You will take two days' cooked rations in haversacks, your ammunition wagons, and ambulances. Send back your train immediately to bring up without delay three days' more rations to you, but not a particle of baggage of any kind. This

supply will be ordered to follow you through Rienzi to Blackland. Organize at least one hundred pioneers to a brigade to precede each division with axes and spades to put the road in order. Buell will advance two divisions to-morrow morning to Rienzi. Colonel Carlin will advance from Danville to Smith's. Keep up your communication with the column of Rosecrans, which I shall accompany.

Respectfully, general, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Booneville, June 7, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: Do you not think there is some danger that Beauregard is throwing all his forces into Virginia, and that they may get there before we know it? We cannot learn anything of the movements of his forces behind the strong pickets in front of us without attacking them in strong force. I have sent an active, enterprising officer with a cavalry force to pass around the left of the forces in front of us at least five miles outside of their extreme pickets, and to penetrate near enough to the railroad at or near Guntown to see what is going on. I have also sent spies far round for the same purpose. I cannot, of course, tell what success they will meet with. There will be no attack or forward movement from here, as matters now stand, unless you send orders. I think a visit of a day or two from you will be very desirable.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Booneville, June 8—midnight.*

Major General HALLECK: The battalion of cavalry I sent out toward Baldwin this morning has just returned, having passed through that place and gone three miles further south. The enemy has retreated, and passed through Guntown last night. They have lost, from desertion of the Tennessee, Kentucky, and Arkansas regiments, near twenty thousand men since they left Corinth. All the regiments yet left from those States passed down closely guarded on both sides by Mississippi and Alabama troops. It is believed by the people of the country that Beauregard cannot reach Columbus with more than half the forces which he brought away from Corinth. They represent the whole country east and north of Corinth filled with parties of soldiers returning to their homes in Tennessee and Kentucky. The regiment of cavalry I sent out at sunset will go on as far as Guntown.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Booneville, June 9, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: Many of the prisoners of war desire to take the oath of allegiance and return home. Shall they be permitted to do so? The deserters, who are and have been coming in in considerable numbers, I have permitted to go on to Hamburg, and find their way home as best they could. The prisoners of war, who at first desired to be exchanged, wish also now to

take the oath. I do not know how you desire to treat such cases. I have just heard from Colonel Sheridan. He is in Baldwin with his regiment, and has pushed his advance towards Guntown. The enemy drove away and carried off everything for miles around. Many families, even those of wealth, are destitute and starving. Nothing whatever has been left them. The cavalry I sent out passed many fine houses of persons in good circumstances, where the women and children were crying for food. Everything had been taken, and all the male members of the family carried off and forced into the army. They represent the enemy as suffering greatly for food.

JNO. POPE, *Major General.*

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CAMP NEAR BOONEVILLE, MISSISSIPPI,

June 9, 1862.

Major General HALLECK: I have just received the following despatch from Colonel Fitch, commanding land forces at Memphis:

"OFF CITY OF MEMPHIS,

"June 6, 1862.

"Major General POPE: The rebel fleet was found moored at this place, and fired upon our rams and gunboats at 5.30 to-day. After an engagement of an hour and a half all but one of the rebel boats were sunk or captured. I take military possession of the city at 3 p. m.

"G. N. FITCH,

"Colonel Commanding Brigade."

JNO. POPE, *Major General.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

June 10, 1862.

Major General HALLECK: I received yesterday your despatch concerning the selection of a camp for this command. Between Tuscumbia and Twenty-mile creek there is no water except in wells, mostly artesian, and sluggish, muddy streams through the swamps, which a few days of dry weather and use will render utterly unfit for stock even. The water throughout this strip of land is bad and scarce. In view of the sanitary condition of this force, which already begins to have a very serious sick-list, I would suggest an immediate return to the camp on the north side of Tuscumbia creek, on Clear creek. This latter creek is a clear, running brook of excellent water, twenty-five or thirty feet wide, with many springs along the banks, and with no swamp land whatever in the neighborhood. It affords fine water to drink and abundance for bathing purposes. There is no such stream between Tuscumbia creek and Guntown. The water of Tuscumbia creek and Twenty-mile creek is bad. They are both dull, sluggish streams of muddy water, in the midst of wide, tangled swamps. Unless there are some immediate objects with which this arrangement would interfere, I am altogether in favor of moving back to Clear creek. In case an advance movement is to be made towards Columbus, the distance to be overcome is only ten miles more than from Fort Rienzi, not material in such a movement. I would, therefore, respectfully suggest the following arrangement of this force: The main body to camp on Clear creek, one brigade to occupy Rienzi, one battalion of cavalry to occupy Booneville, with pickets as far as the lower crossing of Twenty-mile creek, (Jacinto road,) another battalion of cavalry at Blackland, with pickets at Baldwin, and one cavalry regiment at Jacinto. The whole of the approaches to Corinth would be thus covered from the direction of Columbus. Undoubtedly the proper line of operations from that direction towards

Corinth is through Blackland, as you will see, I think, by inspecting the map. At Rienzi, most of the roads concentrate. At the camp on Clear creek the health of my command would greatly improve, and their instruction could be carried on with hopes of success. Should these views meet your approval, you will please telegraph me at once, as I desire to commence the movement as soon as possible. Water is already beginning to be scarce, and our well-digging has not been successful.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE, *Major General.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Near Danville, June 27, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: A spy whom I sent some days ago to Okolona has just returned. The enemy is scattered along the whole road from Columbus up to Tupello, sixteen miles below Guntown. They are disorganized, mutinous, and starving. He reports the woods full of deserters belonging to the northern counties of Mississippi. Nearly the whole of the Tennessee, Arkansas, and Kentucky troops have left. A large rear-guard has been strung along perpendicular to the road for twenty miles, driving the stragglers and all the cattle of every description before them. The spy reports that the whole army is utterly demoralized and ready to throw down their arms. The Alabama troops have heard of Wood and Negley's movements and are clamorous to go home. From all accounts I do not doubt the utter disintegration of Beauregard's force. A small rear-guard of his troops is at Tupello, sixteen miles south of Guntown, the nearest troops to us of the enemy. My command is now encamping here, and will be in position by sunset.

JNO. POPE, *Major General.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Near Danville, June 12, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: If any portion of Beauregard's army has left this country, except the numerous deserters who have returned to their homes, the testimony of agents and deserters is worthless. I myself do not doubt that of what is left of his army, two-thirds is now scattered along the road to Columbus, for sixty miles, in no condition for service anywhere. Beauregard may possibly have thirty-five thousand reliable troops, though I consider that a large estimate, but they are fully occupied in securing his rear, protecting the artillery and supplies, and preventing the entire dispersion of the remainder. Without abandoning everything they have except their arms no considerable portion of them can now be transferred elsewhere. Such at least is my opinion from all the information I can obtain.

JNO. POPE, *Major General.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*New Danville, June 12, 1862.*

Brigadier General A. ASBOTH: You will take post with your brigade and battery of artillery at Rienzi. As you will probably occupy that position for some time, you will be careful to select a strong position for your command, and throw up such earthworks as may be necessary to enable you to make a vigorous defence against any assault until the troops from this place can be advanced to your support. The cavalry is posted in front of you as follows: At

Blackland, one battalion, with a strong picket at Baldwin; one battalion at Booneville, with a strong picket at the lower crossing of Twenty-mile creek, and one cavalry regiment at Jacinto. I send you a sketch of the country, exhibiting the position of the forces. The commanding officers are instructed to keep you informed of all matters of importance which may become known to them. You will keep me advised fully and frequently of all matters pertaining to your command, and transmit any important news from the cavalry advance by telegraph. I have directed a telegraph operator to report to you, and open an office at Rienzi. Although there is little to be apprehended from a flying and demoralized enemy, I nevertheless enjoin upon you the most vigilance. You will keep your command well in hand, and adopt every precaution usual in the face of an enemy.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

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### PART III.

#### ASSIGNMENT TO COMMAND OF THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA; VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN; LETTERS AND DESPACHES.

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In compliance with telegraphic instructions, I proceeded to Washington city and reported in person to the Secretary of War on the — of June, 1862. The President left the city for West Point that same afternoon, and was absent for several days. On his return it was determined to unite in one army the departments and armies under Generals Frémont, Banks, and McDowell. On the 26th of June this consolidation was made and designated the army of Virginia, to the command of which I was specially assigned in the same order. At that date General McClellan occupied a position on both banks of the Chickahominy with the army of the Potomac, and it was hoped that his operations against Richmond, so long delayed, might be facilitated by vigorous use of the army of Virginia. My first plan, therefore, was to unite the different corps of that army, then widely scattered, and advance by way of Charlottesville, upon the James river, above Richmond, with the purpose to distract the attention of the enemy and to draw sufficient force from his army in front of Richmond, to enable General McClellan to complete his movement against it successfully. I at once ordered the concentration of my corps, but during their march toward the designated point of junction, began the disastrous and disorderly retreat of General McClellan to Harrison's Landing. This result at once changed the whole plan of campaign marked out for the army of Virginia. A day or two after the army of the Potomac reached Harrison's Landing, I was called before a cabinet meeting to consult about measures for its relief. I do not know that it would be proper for me to divulge the conversation which took place on that occasion, further than my own part in it is concerned. It seemed very plain that something must be done, and that speedily. General McClellan was loudly calling for re-enforcements, and stated that "much over rather than under one hundred thousand" were necessary before he could resume operations against Richmond. I had not under my command one-half of this force. I stated to the President and cabinet that I stood ready to undertake any movement, however hazardous, to relieve the army of the Potomac; that, as was suggested, I would march from Fredericksburg direct upon Richmond with my whole force, and give battle, so as to relieve

the army of the Potomac, but that the whole army of the enemy was between General McClellan and myself, and such a movement was in violation of the first principles of war, and the most hazardous that could be undertaken. I also stated that only under one condition would I be willing to make such a movement. That condition was that such peremptory orders should be sent to General McClellan, and, in addition, such measures taken in advance, that it would not be possible for him to evade, on any pretext, making a vigorous attack upon the enemy with his whole army the moment he heard that I was engaged. In face of the extraordinary difficulties which existed, and of the terrible responsibility about to be thrown upon me, I considered it my duty to state plainly to the President that I felt too much distrust of General McClellan to risk the destruction of my army, if it were left in his power, under any circumstances, to exhibit the feebleness and irresolution which had hitherto characterized his operations. These forebodings, as I think will be shown hereafter, were amply warranted and fully confirmed by subsequent transactions. Meantime I issued an order to the army under my command, with the purpose to create in it a feeling of confidence and a cheerful spirit which were sadly wanting. Certain expressions in that order were construed by General McClellan and his friends, and by political partisans, as an attack upon the army of the Potomac, and much bitterness of feeling was aroused by industrious representations that such was the purpose of my order. I have only to say here what was at the time well-known to all the officers around me, that I never had the slightest thought of the army of the Potomac in my mind, and that I had no intention to reflect upon it in any manner whatever. The expressions so widely complained of, such as lines of retreat, bases of supplies, &c., were such as were current in the army under my command, or were actually quoted from despatches received by me from officers in reply to my orders to them to move forward toward Culpeper. This statement, containing nothing not well known at the time to all officers with whom I had personal intercourse, is due to the officers and soldiers of the army of the Potomac, but not to those who, for personal or partisan purposes, used my order to create hostility and prejudice which could only embarrass the joint operations of the two armies and prepare disaster for the country. As it has also been widely believed that I set out with a large army to capture Richmond, and, of course, failed in so doing, it is proper for me to submit here an extract from my testimony before your honorable committee, delivered July 8, 1862, three weeks before I joined the army at Warrenton.

WASHINGTON, July 8, 1862.

General John Pope sworn and examined :

By Mr. GOOCH :

Question. What is your position and rank in the army ?

Answer. I am a major general of volunteers, now commanding the army of Virginia.

Question. What does that include ?

Answer. It includes the forces that were under General Frémont, in the Mountain department, the forces under General Banks, in the department of the Shenandoah, the forces under General McDowell, in the department of the Rappahannock, and the forces within the intrenchments around Washington city.

Question. Will you state to the committee the amount of the troops now under your command, and the objects you have in view to accomplish ; what is being done, and about to be done with that force ?

Answer. I have a movable force, aside from the few troops that are here around Washington and in the intrenchments, of about forty-three thousand men. That is exclusive, also, of a small force that is in the Kanawha valley, too far from the seat of operations here to be of any use in the present service.

This command, when concentrated, was designed by me, when I first came here and learned the condition of things, and before the late reverses before Richmond, to march upon Gordonsville and Charlottesville, and the southern extremity of the Shenandoah valley, and thence upon Richmond on the western side. In the course of that march I intended to destroy the railroads from Charlottesville to Lynchburg, and from Richmond to Lynchburg; then having arrived in the vicinity of Richmond, I proposed to aid the forces there in every possible way, in the reduction of that place. That is what I proposed in the beginning. The reverses which have occurred within a few days there, and which have caused the retreat of our forces to a point from which they are not accessible from this direction, and which, by interposing the whole body of the enemy between them and Washington, may, perhaps, endanger the safety of the capital, has made it necessary to make some other disposition of my forces. I am, therefore, now assembling them at points on the east side of the Blue Ridge, and at the outlets of the passes into the Shenandoah valley, and at points on the east side of the Blue Ridge, some twenty-five or thirty miles south of Front Royal, and immediately in front of the passes leading through the Blue Ridge into the Shenandoah valley, occupying Culpeper Court-house with cavalry, and at a point 20 miles in front, in the direction of Richmond, so that, in case any of the enemy's troops succeed in penetrating into the valley of the Shenandoah I occupy such a position that, by marching upon Gordonsville, I have a shorter distance to march than they will have in turning back, and shall be able to cut them off completely. At the same time I shall be in such a position that in case the enemy advance in any considerable force towards Washington, I shall be able to concentrate all my forces for the defence of this place, which I propose to defend, not by standing on the defensive at all, or confronting the enemy and intrenching myself, but I propose to do it by laying off on his flanks and attacking him from the moment that he crosses the Rappahannock, day and night, until his forces are destroyed, or mine. I have no apprehension, with my troops stationed in that position, although I have but forty-three thousand men, that even eighty thousand of the enemy would be able to get to Washington at all. I have a small force intrenched at Winchester for the protection of the immediate neighborhood, and partly to protect the railroad there, more at the request of General Wool than because I believe it is necessary to have it there. With that exception my whole command is being now concentrated, and is now in the immediate neighborhood of the points I have designated. They have all been marching for the last four or five days, and some of them are now encamped where I intend to place them, and the bulk of them will be in the places assigned by them to-morrow.

Question. What will then be the distance of the main body of your forces from Richmond?

Answer. It will be a long distance; probably ninety miles. I would very gladly march upon Richmond with the force I have, but that the forces of General McClellan are so placed as to be twenty miles on the other side of Richmond, so that the enemy, if they have anything like the force they are supposed to have—and I suppose they have a large force, judging from the battles of the last few days—would be able to come out and overwhelm the small force I have before General McClellan's army would be able to hear or know anything at all about it, and, as I am made responsible for the security of the city, I scarcely feel justified in running the hazard I would do in that case.

Question. The position you are now taking is the one which you deem the best to occupy for the time being, for the defence of Washington and the whole valley of the Shenandoah?

Answer. Yes, sir; it is a position quite near to the southern outlet of the valley, quite near to the lines where they have always been in the habit of enter



ing the valley, and where I shall be within striking distance of the lines of their access to the valley.

Question. Is not that also the easiest point to defend the valley?

Answer. Yes, sir; and greatly the best. The mistake has been in keeping the troops in the lower end of the valley, instead of interposing them between the enemy and the valley. I have supposed that the best point at which to interpose our troops is between Richmond and the valley itself.

Question. What will be the number of troops left in the intrenchments about Washington?

Answer. In numbers they will be about twelve thousand; in condition they are very poor, indeed. They consist of new regiments, perfectly raw, and broken fragments of old regiments sent here to recruit. The force is not an effective one by any means.

By Mr. ODELL:

Question. Are you placing your force with regard to the approach of the enemy toward this city as well as towards the valley?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. So that in either case you would be within striking distance?

By Mr. WRIGHT:

Question. Is it your design to act upon the defensive alone?

Answer. Not at all.

Question. So that you mean to attack?

Answer. I mean to attack them at all times that I can get the opportunity. If I were to confront them with the force that I have, and go to building intrenchments, &c., they could flank me on either side, and force me back without my being able to offer any resistance of any consequence. There is a possibility that they may send a large force this way, if the command of General McClellan be in a perilous condition, or where it can be held by an inconsiderable force and prevented from coming out. They may do that, but I do not think it very likely that they will attempt to move on this place just now. But if they should come this way with a very large force, it seems to me that the only sort of defence of Washington I can afford, with the force I have, is to lie off upon the flanks of their army and attack them day and night at unexpected times and places, so as to prevent them from advancing. It will be hard work, but I do not see anything else so likely to prevail against them.

By Mr. COVODE:


Question. Would you not in all these movements feel embarrassed with the knowledge that while you are moving forward on the enemy you are looked upon as the protector of the capital here?

Answer. No, sir; for I am fully convinced I am doing the best I know to effect that object. It is not necessary, in my opinion, in order to protect the capital, that I should interpose myself between the enemy and the place itself; in fact, it would be the very worst policy to do so now, for wherever I could put myself, they could place themselves between me and the capital by attacking my flanks. By laying off on their flanks, if they should have only forty thousand or fifty thousand men, I could whip them. If they should have seventy thousand or eighty thousand men, I would attack their flanks and force them, in order to get rid of me, to follow me out into the mountains, which would be what you would want, I should suppose. They could not march on Washington with me lying with such a force as that on their flanks. I should feel perfectly satisfied that I was doing the best I could with my force, to dispose of them in that way. There is a sufficient force in the intrenchments here to protect the city against any sudden dash upon it, even of a considerable force.

It will be seen from this extract, which antedates the beginning of my campaign and even my assumption of personal command, precisely what were the plans with which I began that campaign, and the effective forces which could be devoted to it. Meantime General Halleck had been appointed general in chief of the army. He proceeded at once to Harrison's Landing to confer with General McClellan and inspect his army. General Halleck knew well my opinion of General McClellan, and my apprehensions of the result of any plan of campaign depending upon his co-operation for its success. I assumed personal command of the army of Virginia, at Warrenton, on the 29th of July, 1862. I append hereto my official report of the campaign of that army. I know of nothing which makes any change of the views set forth in the report necessary, although many incidents might be more strongly stated now than would have been judicious at the time. It is hardly necessary here to say that my opinions, freely expressed to the President and his cabinet, and which were, I believe, the opinion of most officers not connected with General McClellan, were entirely opposed to the project of sending all or any considerable part of the army of Virginia to join him by water. I believed then, as I am sure now, that it was not possible to do so without exposing Washington city to almost certain capture. I know it has been asserted over and over again by General McClellan and others, that the enemy would never detach from Richmond any considerable force for an advance upon Washington, so long as the army of the Potomac remained at Harrison's Landing; but the fact was that Lee did detach Jackson with a large force, which he continued to re-enforce, before General McClellan began to evacuate Harrison's Landing at all; in fact, before he had any order to do so. Jackson was at Gordonsville on the 4th of August, the day that General McClellan received orders to withdraw from the Peninsula; and the battle of Cedar Mountain was fought on the 9th of August, by the three corps under Jackson—his own, Ewell's, and A. P. Hill's, supported by Longstreet's corps behind the Rapidan. This battle was fought at a distance of more than one hundred miles from Richmond, only five days after General McClellan received his order to withdraw and five days before he commenced to do so or had embarked a man. While he was occupied in proving to General Halleck that the enemy would not advance upon Washington so long as he remained at Harrison's Landing, the enemy had already reached a position more than a hundred miles distant from Richmond, and fought a considerable battle. The arguments used at the time were also most signally refuted in the summer of 1864, when Lee, although his army was nearly battered to pieces by the continuous battles from the Rapidan to Petersburg, and although he was closely invested in Richmond by a much larger force and a much more formidable commander than General McClellan, really did detach a heavy force which advanced to the intrenchments around Washington and would have captured the city, except for the timely arrival of heavy detachments from General Grant's army. I present these remarks in preface of my report that it may be clearly seen what were the views and purposes of the operations of the army of Virginia. I still believe that the plan of operations was the best under the circumstances, and it is now sufficiently manifest that whether the plan itself be considered good or bad, it only failed of complete success by the unexplained delay and purposed failure of General McClellan and certain of his officers. I had myself little expectation of a junction of the army of the Potomac with the army of Virginia, so long as General McClellan commanded the former, and had it in his power to withhold it; but I did believe that he would not be able to defeat a junction of those two armies for three whole days under the immediate eyes of the President and general-in-chief, and in spite of their reiterated and urgent orders. My official report, which follows, is a careful and exact record of the operations of the army under my command in the execution of this plan, substantiated by the orders, letters, and telegrams embodied in it which were sent and received at the time,

# MAP OF THE FIELD OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA

during the Months of July and August 1862.



Report of Maj Gen. John Pope to the Committee on the Conduct of the War.



## CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA.—GENERAL POPE'S OFFICIAL REPORT.

NEW YORK, *January 27, 1863.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the army under my command during the late campaign in Virginia:

Several of the reports of corps commanders have not yet reached me, but so much time has elapsed since the termination of the campaign that I do not feel at liberty to withhold this report longer. The strange misapprehension of facts concerning this campaign, which, though proceeding from irresponsible sources, has much possessed the public mind, makes it necessary for me to enter more into detail than I should otherwise have done, and to embody in the report such of the despatches and orders sent and received as will make clear every statement which is contained in it.

On the 26th day of June, 1862 by special order of the President of the United States, I was assigned to the command of the army of Virginia. That army was constituted as follows:

First corps, under Major General Frémont; 2d corps, under Major General Banks; 3d corps, under Major General McDowell. In addition to these three corps a small unorganized force under Brigadier General Sturgis was posted in the neighborhood of Alexandria, and was then in process of being organized for field service. The forces in the intrenchments around Washington were also placed under my command. All the disposable movable forces consisted of the three corps first named. Their effective strength of infantry and artillery, as reported to me, was as follows:

Frémont's corps, eleven thousand five hundred strong; Banks's corps reported at fourteen thousand and five hundred, but in reality only about eight thousand; McDowell's corps eighteen thousand four hundred, making a total of thirty-eight thousand men. The cavalry numbered about five thousand, but most of it was badly mounted and armed, and in poor condition for service. These forces were scattered over a wide district of country, not within supporting distance of each other, and many of the brigades and divisions were badly organized, and in a demoralized condition. This was particularly the case with the army corps of Major General Frémont, a sad report of which was made to me by General Sigel when he relieved General Frémont in command of the corps.

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,  
*War Department, Washington, D. C., June 30, 1862.*

[Time received, 1.45 p. m.]

MIDDLETOWN, *June 30—1.10 p. m.*

[Extract.]

Major General JOHN POPE: \* \* \* The troops forming 1st corps are not in good condition. They are weakened and poorly provided. The organization is not complete, and the whole cavalry force consists of not more than eight hundred (800) effective men and horses. They are scarcely sufficient for picket and patrol duty, so that I can hardly make a reconnaissance. \* \* \* \* \*

F. SIGEL,

*Major General Commanding.*

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

My first labors were directed to the reorganization of some of the divisions and brigades of that corps, and to supplying the whole with much of the material absolutely necessary for troops in the field.

The corps of Banks and Frémont were in the valley of the Shenandoah, between Winchester and Middletown, the bulk of the forces being in the vicinity of the latter place. One division of McDowell's corps was at Manassas Junction, with its advance thrown forward to Catlett's station. The other division was posted in the vicinity of Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg.

When I first assumed command of these forces the troops under Jackson had retired from the valley of the Shenandoah and were in rapid march toward Richmond, so that at that time there was no force of the enemy of any consequence within a week's march of any of the troops assigned to my command.

It was the wish of the government that I should cover the city of Washington from any attacks from the direction of Richmond, make such dispositions as were necessary to assure the safety of the valley of the Shenandoah, and at the same time so to operate upon the enemy's lines of communication in the direction of Gordonsville and Charlottesville as to draw off, if possible, a considerable force of the enemy from Richmond, and thus relieve the operations against that city of the army of the Potomac. The first object I had in view was to concentrate, as far as possible, all the movable forces under my command, and to establish them in such positions as best to effect the objects set forth. It seemed to me that the security of the Shenandoah valley was not best attained by posting troops within the valley itself, but that the necessary results could be better accomplished, and the other objects with which I was charged best promoted, by concentrating these forces at some point or points from which, if any attempts were made to enter the valley of the Shenandoah from Richmond, I should be able, by rapid marching, to interpose between such force and the main body of the enemy, and cut off its retreat. I felt confident, and this confidence was justified by subsequent results, that no considerable force of the enemy would attempt to enter the valley of the Shenandoah while the forces under my command were so posted as to be able without difficulty to intercept its retreat and fall upon its rear. I accordingly sent orders to Major General Sigel, commanding the 1st corps, to move forward from Middletown, cross the Shenandoah at Front Royal, and pursuing the west side of the Blue Ridge, to take post at Sperryville, by passing through Luray gap. At the same time I directed Major General Banks, crossing the Shenandoah at the same point, to move forward and take post between six and ten miles east of Sperryville. General McDowell was ordered to move Ricketts's division of his corps from Manassas Junction to Waterloo bridge, the point where the turnpike from Warrenton to Sperryville crosses the upper Rappahannock. King's division of the same corps it was thought best to leave at Fredericksburg, to cover the crossing of the Rappahannock at that point, and to protect the railroad thence to Aquia creek, and the public buildings which had been erected at the latter place. While I yielded to this wish of the War Department, the wide separation of this division from the main body of the army, and the ease with which the enemy would be able to interpose between them, engaged my earnest attention and gave me very serious uneasiness. While these movements were in progress, commenced the series of battles which preceded and attended the retreat of General McClellan from the Chickahominy toward Harrison's landing. When first General McClellan began to intimate by his despatches that he designed making this movement towards James river, I suggested to the President of the United States the impolicy of such a movement, and the serious consequences which would be likely to result from it, and urged upon him that he should send orders to General McClellan that if he were unable to maintain his position upon the Chickahominy, and were pressed by superior forces of the enemy, to mass his whole force on the north side of that stream, even at the risk of losing much materiel of war, and endeavor to make his way in the direction of Hanover Court House; but in no event to retreat with his army further to the south than the White House, on York river. I stated to the President that the retreat to

James river was carrying General McClellan away from any re-enforcements that could possibly be sent him within a reasonable time, and was absolutely depriving him of any substantial aid from the forces under my command; that by this movement the whole army of the enemy would be interposed between his army and mine, and that they would then be at liberty to strike in either direction, as they might consider it most advantageous; that this move to James river would leave entirely unprotected, except in so far as the small force under my command was able to protect it, the whole region in front of Washington, and that it would then, therefore, be impossible to send any of the forces under my command to re-enforce General McClellan, without rendering it certain that the enemy, even in the worst case for themselves, would have the privilege and power of exchanging Richmond for Washington city; that to them the loss of Richmond would be trifling, while the loss of Washington to us would be conclusive, or nearly so, in its results upon this war. I was so deeply impressed with these views that I repeatedly and earnestly urged them upon the President and the Secretary of War. After General McClellan had taken up his position at Harrison's landing, I addressed to him a letter, stating my position and the distribution of the troops under my command, and requesting, in all earnestness and good faith, to write me fully and freely his views, and to suggest to me any measures which he thought desirable to enable me to co-operate with him, or to render any assistance in my power in the operations of the army under his command. I stated to him that I had no object except to assist his operations, and that I would undertake any labor and run any risk for that purpose. I therefore desired him to feel no hesitation in communicating freely with me, as he might rest assured that every suggestion that he would make would meet all respect and consideration at my hands, and that so far as it was in my power to do so I would carry out his wishes with all energy, and with all the means at my command. In reply to this communication, I received a letter from General McClellan, very general in terms, and proposing nothing toward the accomplishment of the purpose I had suggested to him. It became apparent that, considering the situation in which the army of the Potomac and the army of Virginia were placed in relation to each other, and the absolute necessity of harmonious and prompt co-operation between them, some military superior both of General McClellan and myself should be called to Washington and placed in command of all the operations in Virginia. In accordance with these views, Major General Halleck was called to Washington and placed in general command. Many circumstances, which it is not necessary here to set forth, induced me to express to the President, to the Secretary of War, and to General Halleck, my desire to be relieved from the command of the army of Virginia, and to be returned to the western country. My services, however, were considered necessary in the projected campaign, and my wishes were not complied with. I accordingly took the field in Virginia with grave forebodings of the result, but with a determination to carry out the plans of the government with all the energy and with all the ability of which I was master. Previous to taking the field, I issued the following orders, which set out very fully the policy which I considered advisable, and which at the time received the sanction of the government, and, so far as I know, the approval of the country:

GENERAL ORDERS }  
No. 5. }

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Washington, July 18, 1862.*

Hereafter, as far as practicable, the troops of this command will subsist upon the country in which their operations are carried on. In all cases supplies for this purpose will be taken by the officers to whose department they properly belong, under the orders of the commanding officer of the troops for whose use they are intended. Vouchers will be given to the owners, stating on their face that they will be payable at the conclusion of the war, upon sufficient testimony

being furnished that such owners have been loyal citizens of the United States since the date of the vouchers. Whenever it is known that supplies can be furnished in any district of the country where the troops are to operate, the use of trains for carrying subsistence will be dispensed with as far as possible.

By command of Major General Pope :

GEO. D. RUGGLES,

*Colonel, Assistant Adjutant General and Chief of Staff.*

Official :

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

GENERAL ORDERS }  
No. 6. }

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Washington, July 18, 1862.*

Hereafter, in any operations of the cavalry forces in this command, no supply nor baggage trains of any description will be used, unless so stated specially in the order for the movement. Two days' cooked rations will be carried on the persons of the men, and all villages or neighborhoods through which they pass will be laid under contribution in the manner specified by General Orders No. 5, current series, from these headquarters, for the subsistence of men and horses. Movements of cavalry must always be made with celerity, and no delay in such movements will be excused hereafter on any pretext. Whenever the order for the movement of any portion of this army emanates from these headquarters, the time of marching and that to be consumed in the execution of the duty will be specifically designated, and no departure therefrom will be permitted to pass unnoticed without the gravest and most conclusive reasons. Commanding officers will be held responsible for strict and prompt compliance with every provision of this order.

By command of Major General Pope :

GEO. D. RUGGLES,

*Colonel, Assistant Adjutant General and Chief of Staff.*

Official :

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

GENERAL ORDERS }  
No. 7. }

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Washington, July 20, 1862.*

The people of the valley of the Shenandoah, and throughout the region of operations of this army, living along the lines of railroad and telegraph, and along the routes of travel in rear of the United States forces, are notified that they will be held responsible for any injury done to the track, line or road, or for any attacks upon trains or straggling soldiers by bands of guerillas in their neighborhood. No privileges and immunities of warfare apply to lawless bands of individuals not forming part of the organized forces of the enemy, nor wearing the garb of soldiers, who, seeking and obtaining safety on pretext of being peaceful citizens, steal out in rear of the army, attack and murder straggling soldiers, molest trains of supplies, destroy railroads, telegraph lines and bridges, and commit outrages disgraceful to civilized people and revolting to humanity. Evil-disposed persons in rear of our armies, who do not themselves engage directly in these lawless acts, encourage them by refusing to interfere or give any information by which such acts can be prevented or the perpetrators punished. Safety of life and property of all persons living in the rear of our advancing armies depends upon the maintenance of peace and quiet among themselves, and of the unmolested movement through their midst of all pertaining to the military



service. They are to understand distinctly that this security of travel is their only warrant of personal safety. It is, therefore, ordered that whenever a railroad, wagon-road, or telegraph is injured by parties of guerillas, the citizens living within five miles of the spot shall be turned out in mass to repair the damage, and shall, besides, pay the United States, in money or in property, to be levied by military force, the full amount of the pay and subsistence of the whole force necessary to coerce the performance of the work during the time occupied in completing it. If a soldier or a legitimate follower of the army be fired upon from any house, the house shall be razed to the ground, and the inhabitants sent prisoners to the headquarters of this army. If such an outrage occur at any place distant from settlements, the people within five miles around shall be held accountable and made to pay an indemnity sufficient for the cause. Any persons detected in such outrages, either during the act or at any time afterward, shall be shot without awaiting civil process. No such acts can influence the result of this war, and they can only lead to heavy afflictions to the population to no purpose. It is therefore enjoined upon all persons, both for the security of their property and the safety of their own persons, that they act vigorously and cordially together to prevent the perpetration of such outrages. While it is the wish of the general commanding this army that all peaceably-disposed persons, who remain at their homes and pursue their accustomed avocations, shall be subjected to no improper burden of war, yet their own safety must of necessity depend upon the strict preservation of peace and order among themselves, and they are to understand that nothing will deter him from enforcing promptly, and to the full extent, every provision of this order.

By command of Major General Pope:

GEO. D. RUGGLES,

*Colonel, Assistant Adjutant General and Chief of Staff.*

Official :

Lieutenant Colonel SMITH,

*Aide-de-Camp.*

GENERAL ORDERS }  
No. 11. }

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,

*Washington, July 23, 1862.*

Commanders of army corps, divisions, brigades, and detached commands, will proceed immediately to arrest all disloyal male citizens within their lines, or within their reach, in rear of their respective stations. Such as are willing to take the oath of allegiance to the United States, and will furnish sufficient security for its observance, shall be permitted to remain at their homes, and pursue in good faith their accustomed avocations. Those who refuse shall be conducted south, beyond the extreme pickets of this army, and be notified that if found again anywhere within our lines, or at any point in rear, they will be considered spies, and subjected to the extreme rigor of military law. If any person, having taken the oath of allegiance as above specified, be found to have violated it, he shall be shot, and his property seized and applied to the public use. All communication with any persons whatever living within the lines of the enemy is positively prohibited, except through the military authorities, and in the manner specified by military law; and any person concerned in writing or in carrying letters or messages in any other way, will be considered and treated as a spy within the lines of the United States army.

By command of Major General Pope.

GEO. D. RUGGLES,

*Colonel, Assistant Adjutant General and Chief of Staff.*

Official :

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

The order requiring the troops to subsist upon the country in which their operations were conducted has, with a wilful disregard of its terms, been construed greatly to my discredit, as authorizing indiscriminate robbery and plunder. Yet the terms of this order are so specific as to the manner and by whom all property or subsistence needed for the use of the army should be seized, and the order is so common in the history of warfare, that I have been amazed that it could be so misinterpreted and misunderstood. It is, therefore, submitted here for the calm examination of the government and of the public. I believed then, and believe now, that the policy there laid down was wise and just, and was well calculated to secure efficient and rapid operations of the army; and in case of reverse, to leave the enemy without the means of subsisting in the country over which our army had passed, and over which any pursuit must be conducted. The long delay and embarrassment of the army under General Lee, in its subsequent movements towards Washington, occasioned largely by the want of supplies taken from the country under this order, fully justified its wisdom. It was determined before I left Washington to take the field in Virginia, that the union of the armies of Virginia and of the Potomac was absolutely essential both to the safety of the national capital and to the further successful prosecution of the operations against Richmond. The mission of the army under my command, therefore, was to cover, as far as possible, the front of Washington, and make secure the valley of the Shenandoah, and so to operate upon the enemy's lines of communication to the west and northwest as to force him to make such heavy detachments from his main force at Richmond as would enable the army of the Potomac to withdraw from its position at Harrison's landing, and to take shipping for Aquia creek or for Alexandria; and if, as was feared, the enemy should throw his whole force in the direction of Washington, it became my duty to resist his advance at all hazards, and so to delay and embarrass his movement as to gain all the time possible for the arrival of the army of the Potomac behind the Rappahannock. Meantime before the arrival of General Halleck, I instructed General King, at Fredericksburg, to send forward detachments of his cavalry to operate upon the line of the Virginia Central railroad, and as far as possible to embarrass and destroy communication between Richmond and the valley of the Shenandoah. Several cavalry expeditions which that officer dispatched for the purpose were completely successful, and succeeded in breaking up the railroad at several points upon several occasions. At the same time I directed Major General Banks to send forward an infantry brigade, with all his cavalry, to march rapidly upon Culpeper Court House, and after taking possession of that place, to push forward cavalry toward the Rapidan, in the direction of Gordonsville.

On the 14th of July, after this movement was successfully accomplished, I directed General Banks to push forward during the night of that day, the whole of his cavalry force under Brigadier General Hatch from Culpeper, with orders to take possession of Gordonsville, and to destroy the railroad for ten or fifteen miles east of that place, with a portion of this force, while the remainder should be pushed forward in the direction of Charlottesville to destroy the railroad bridges and interrupt that line of communication as far as practicable. At that time there was no force of the enemy at Gordonsville or in the vicinity, and the whole operation, as ordered, was not only easily practicable, but would have been attended with serious consequences to the enemy; but to my surprise and dissatisfaction, I received, on the 17th of July, from General Banks, a report that General Hatch had taken with him infantry, artillery, and trains of wagons, and that, in consequence of bad roads, he had at that date only succeeded in going as far as Madison Court House.

Meantime, on the 16th of July, the advance of Jackson's forces, under Ewell, had reached Gordonsville, and the proposed movement, as ordered, became impracticable. No satisfactory explanation has ever been made to me of the de-

parture from my orders on the part General Hatch. Finding it no longer practicable to occupy Gordonsville as I had designed, I sent orders to General Banks to direct General Hatch to select from his own cavalry and that of General McDowell, which I had sent forward, fifteen hundred to two thousand of the best mounted men, and to proceed from Madison Court House around the west side of the Blue Ridge, to a point whence he could make an easy descent upon the railroad west of Gordonsville, and, if successful, to push forward to Charlottesville, and if possible destroy the railroad between that place and Lynchburg. In compliance with this order, General Hatch commenced to make the movement, as directed, but abandoned it very soon after he started, and returned by the way of Sperryville to his post. As soon as I had received the report of this second failure, I relieved General Hatch from the command of the cavalry of General Banks's corps, and sent Brigadier General Buford to report to General Banks as the chief of cavalry of his corps.

On the 29th of July I left Washington, and, after reviewing Ricketts's division of McDowell's corps at Waterloo bridge, repaired to the headquarters of General Banks, a few miles southeast of Little Washington. All preparations having been completed, I instructed General Banks to move forward on the 7th of August, and take post at the point where the turnpike from Sperryville to Culpeper crosses the Hazel river. General McDowell was ordered on the day previous to move forward with Ricketts's division from Waterloo bridge to Culpeper Court House, so that on the 7th of August all the infantry and artillery forces of the army of Virginia were assembled along the turnpike from Sperryville to Culpeper, and numbered about twenty-eight thousand men. General King's division, as I have before stated, was left on the Lower Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg, and was not then available for active operations in the direction of Gordonsville. The cavalry forces covering the front of the army on that day were distributed as follows: General Buford, with five regiments, was posted at Madison Court House, with his pickets along the line of the Rapidan, from Burnett's ford as far west as the Blue Ridge. General Sigel had been directed to post a brigade of infantry and a battery of artillery at the point where the road from Madison Court House to Sperryville crosses Robertson's river, as a support to the cavalry of General Buford, in front of him. General Bayard, with four regiments of cavalry, was posted near Rapidan station, the point where the Orange and Alexandria road crosses Rapidan river, with his pickets extended as far to the east as Raccoon ford, and connecting with General Buford on his right at Burnett's ford. From Raccoon ford to the forks of the Rappahannock, above Palmouth, the Rapidan was lined with cavalry pickets. On the top of Thoroughfare mountain, about half-way between Generals Bayard and Buford, was established a signal station, which overlooked the whole country as far south as Orange Court House.

GENERAL ORDERS }  
No. 13. }

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Near Sperryville, Va., August 6, 1862.*

Hereafter, in all marches of the army, no straggling or lagging behind will be allowed. Commanders of regiments will be held responsible that this order is observed, and they will march habitually in the rear of their regiments—company commanders in the rear of their respective companies. They will suffer no men of their command to fall behind them on any excuse, except by a written permit of the medical officer of their regiment, that they are too sick to perform the march, and therefore must ride in ambulances. Medical officers will be held responsible that no such written pass is improperly given. Regimental trains will march in rear of the divisions to which the regiments belong in the order of precedence of the regiments in that division. Brigade and division supply trains will follow in the rear of the respective army corps to which they belong. Ambulance and

ammunition wagons will follow in rear of their respective regiments, and under no consideration whatever, will any wagon or other vehicle be placed in the column of march, other than as herein before specified.

Officers and soldiers of this army will habitually carry two days' cooked rations upon their persons when ordered to perform a march. It is recommended to commanders of corps d'armee that in all cases when it is practicable the shelter tents and knapsacks of the men be carried in the wagons. At least one hundred rounds of ammunition per man will be carried habitually in the cartridge-boxes and on the persons of the men, and any captain of a company whose men at any time are deficient in this amount of ammunition will be arrested and reported to the War Department for dismissal from the service. A proper staff officer will be sent from these headquarters to inspect the troops while on the march, who will report to the major general commanding any violation of or departure from the provisions of this order. Neither officer nor soldier will be permitted to leave his command while on a march, or enter any house, without a written permit from his brigade commander. Where soldiers are obliged for necessary purposes to leave the ranks while on the march, they will turn over their musket and accoutrements to the next man on their right, who will carry the arms and accoutrements and be responsible for them till the owners shall have again taken their places in the ranks.

Commanders of corps will prescribe the number of rounds of artillery ammunition to be carried with each battery; but in no case shall any battery be left with less than two hundred rounds for each gun. As good order and discipline are essential to the success of any army, a strict compliance with the provisions of this order is enjoined upon all officers and soldiers of this command, and they are expected and required to report to their superior officers every departure from them. While the major general commanding the army will see to it that every soldier is kindly cared for and supplied with everything necessary for his comfort, he takes occasion to announce to the army that the severest punishment will be inflicted upon every officer and soldier who neglects his duty, and connives at or conceals any such neglect of duty or disobedience of orders on the part of any other officer or soldier. Commanders of the army corps will see that this order is published immediately after the receipt at the head of every regiment in their command.

By command of Major General Pope:

R. O. SELFRIDGE,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

Official:

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

On the 7th I proceeded to Sperryville and inspected the corps of Major General Sigel. I remained at Sperryville until 4 o'clock in the afternoon of that day, during which time I received several reports from the front that the enemy was crossing the Rappahannock at several points between the railroad crossing of that river and Liberty Mills.

I reached Culpeper Court House on the morning of 8th of August. The town had been occupied for several days by Crawford's brigade of General Bank's corps, and on the 7th Pickett's division of McDowell's corps had also reached there from Waterloo bridge.

During the whole of the morning of the 8th I continued to receive reports from General Bayard, who was slowly falling back in the direction of Culpeper Court House from the advance of the enemy, and from General Buford, who also reported the enemy advancing in heavy force upon Madison Court House. My instructions required me to be careful and keep my communications good with Fredericksburg, and by no means to permit the enemy to interpose between me

and that place. Although during the whole of the 8th of August it was very doubtful, from the reports of Generals Bayard and Buford, whether the enemy's movement was in the direction of Madison Court House or Culpeper, I considered it advisable, in view of my relations with Fredericksburg, to concentrate my whole force in the direction of Culpeper, so as to keep myself constantly interposed between the main body of the enemy and the lower fords of the Rappahannock. Early in the day I pushed forward Crawford's brigade of Banks's corps in the direction of Cedar or Slaughter mountain, to support General Bayard, who was falling back in the direction, and to assist him, as far as practicable, in determining the movements and the forces of the enemy. I sent orders also to General Banks to move forward promptly from Hazel river to Culpeper Court House, and also to General Sigel to march at once from Sperryville to the same place. To my surprise I received, after night on the 8th, a note from General Sigel, dated at Sperryville at 6.30 o'clock that afternoon, asking me by what road he should march to Culpeper Court House. As there was but one road between those two points, and that a broad stone turnpike, I was at a loss to understand how General Sigel could entertain any doubt as to the road by which he should march. This doubt, however, delayed the arrival of his corps at Culpeper Court House several hours, and rendered it impracticable for that corps to be pushed to the front, as I had designed, on the afternoon of the next day.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Culpeper Court House, August 8, 1862.*

GENERAL: The general commanding directs me, in reply to your despatch of this date 6.50 p. m., inquiring what road you shall take, to say that you are to march direct to Culpeper Court House by the turnpike. He is surprised that you make this inquiry after his definite instructions of this morning. He directs that you reach this point by 12 m. to-morrow.

With great respect, general, your obedient servant,

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

Major General SIGEL,  
*Commanding First Army Corps.*

A true copy: \*

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

Early on the morning of the 9th of August, I directed General Banks to move forward toward Cedar mountain with his whole corps, and to join the brigade of that corps, under General Crawford, which had been pushed forward on the day previous. I directed General Banks to take up a strong position at or near the point occupied by that brigade, to check the advance of the enemy, and to determine his forces and the character of his movements as far as practicable. The consolidated report of General Banks's corps, received some days previously, exhibited an effective force of something over fourteen thousand men. Appended herewith will be found the return in question. It appeared subsequently, however, that General Banks's forces at that time did not exceed eight thousand men. But although I several times called General Banks's attention to the discrepancy between this return and the force he afterward stated to me he had led to the front, that discrepancy has never been explained, and I do not yet understand how General Banks could have been so greatly mistaken as to the forces under his immediate command.

	Infantry.	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Total.
First army corps . . . . .	10, 550	948	1, 730	13, 228
Second army corps . . . . .	13, 343	1, 224	4, 104	18, 671
Third army corps . . . . .	17, 604	971	2, 904	21, 479
Total . . . . .	<u>41, 497</u>	<u>3, 143</u>	<u>8, 738</u>	<u>53, 378</u>
Deduct infantry brigade stationed at Winchester . . . . .			2, 500	
Deduct regiment and battery at Front Royal . . . . .			1, 000	
Deduct cavalry unfit for service . . . . .			<u>3, 000</u>	
				<u>6, 500</u>
Total . . . . .				<u><u>47, 878</u></u>

(See correspondence on the subject with General Banks.)

NOTE.—Instead of fourteen thousand five hundred infantry and artillery, Banks had only about eight thousand, from his report to me after the battle of Cedar mountain.

I certify that this is a true copy of the consolidated morning report of the army of Virginia, dated July 31, 1862, commanded by Major General Pope.

MYER ASCH,

*Captain and Aide-de-Camp.*

I directed him when he went forward from Culpeper Court House, if the enemy advanced to attack him on the strong position which I had instructed him to take up, that he should push his skirmishers well to the front and notify me immediately. Three miles in his rear and within easy supporting distance, Ricketts's division of McDowell's corps had been posted at the point where the road from Madison Court House to Culpeper intersects the road from Culpeper to Cedar mountain. This division was so posted because it was not certain whether a considerable force of the enemy was not advancing on Culpeper from the direction of Madison Court House, General Buford having reported to me very early on the morning of the 9th from Madison Court House that the enemy was in heavy force on his right, his left, and partly on his rear, and that he was retreating in the direction of Sperryville.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,

*Culpeper Court House, August 8, 1862.*

One division of the enemy (Elzey's) crossed the Rapidan to-day, at Barnett's ford about five miles west of the railroad crossing and rested at Robertston's river. This is probably a reconnoissance in force, but it may possibly be an advance upon Culpeper. One division of McDowell's and the whole of Banks's corps are here to night. Sigel's will be here to-morrow morning, when I will push the enemy again behind the Rapidan, and take up a strong position as you suggest in your despatch of this date. I will be very careful that my communications with Fredericksburg are not interrupted. We captured to-day about forty prisoners from the enemy, our loss being one cavalry soldier killed, and one wounded. I have directed King to march to-morrow and cross the Rapidan on the plank road at Germania mills, or Ely's ford just below it. It is about thirty-five miles from Fredericksburg to this point.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

Major General HALLECK, *Washington.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

[Received at headquarters 2d army corps, 8.40 a. m., 9th August.]

MADISON COURT HOUSE, August 8.

Major General BANKS: All of my force is withdrawn from Madison Court House, and is in retreat toward Sperryville. The enemy is in force on both my right and left, and in my rear. I may be cut off.

- JOHN BUFORD,  
*Brigadier General.*

Received by signal, 8 a. m., Fairfax, Virginia.

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMY CORPS, ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Culpeper Court House, August 9, 1862.*

GENERAL: I have just received a letter from the colonel of the Rhode Island cavalry, who says: "All is quiet in front of us. The enemy is always before my videttes; on my left there is, perhaps, a regiment of rebel infantry. In a word, I do not believe the enemy to be in force in our front. General Bayard has just ordered me to march to repulse the enemy."

Very respectfully, general, your obedient servant,

IRVIN McDOWELL,  
*Major General Commanding 3d A. C., A. V.*

Major General POPE, &c.

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

Desultory artillery firing had been kept up all day on the 9th in the direction of General Banks's corps, but I continued to receive, during the whole of that day, reports from General Banks, that no considerable force of the enemy had come forward; that his cavalry had been ostentatiously displayed, but that he did not believe that the enemy was in sufficient force to make any attack upon him. As late as 5 o'clock in the afternoon General Banks wrote me substantially to the same effect; but before I had received this last note the artillery firing had become so rapid and continuous that I feared a general engagement was going on, or might be brought on at any moment. I therefore instructed General McDowell to move forward Ricketts's division rapidly to the field, and accompanied that division myself. At no time during the day did General Banks express any apprehension of attack in force by the enemy, nor did he ask or intimate that he needed re-enforcements.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA, SECOND CORPS,  
*August 9, 1862—2.25.*

Major General POPE: General Williams's division has taken position on the pike, the right on a heavy body of woods; General Augur on the left, his left resting on a mountain occupied by his skirmishers. He will soon be in position. The enemy shows his cavalry (which is strong) ostentatiously. No infantry seen, and not much artillery. Woods on left said to be full of troops. A visit to the front does not impress that the enemy intends immediate attack. He seems, however, to be taking positions.

N. P. BANKS.

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, SECOND CORPS,

*August 9, 1862—4.50.*Colonel RUGGLES, *Chief of Staff*:

About 4 o'clock shots were exchanged by the skirmishers. Artillery opened fire on both sides in a few minutes. One regiment of rebel infantry advancing, now deploying in front as skirmishers. I have ordered a regiment on the right, Williams's division, to meet them, and one from the left, Augur's, to advance on the left and in front.

5 p. m.—They are now approaching each other.

N. P. BANKS.

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

General Sigel's corps began to march into Culpeper Court House late in the afternoon, and just as I was leaving that place, having been delayed several hours by General Sigel's singular uncertainty as to what road he ought to pursue. I had given orders a number of days previously that all the troops belonging to the army of Virginia should be ready to march at the shortest notice, and should habitually keep two days' cooked rations in their haversacks. Notwithstanding this order, General Sigel's corps arrived in Culpeper without any rations, and was unable to move forward until provisions could be procured from McDowell's train, and cooked at Culpeper Court House. I had received no report from General Banks of his operations at Cedar mountain, but I had sent forward Brigadier General Roberts, chief of cavalry, of my staff, and had directed him to report to General Banks in the early part of the day of the 9th, and to advise freely with him as to the operations of his corps. General Roberts as well as General Banks, was fully advised of my wishes, and that I desired General Banks merely to keep the enemy in check, by occupying a strong position in his front until the whole of the disposable force under my command should be concentrated in the neighborhood. General Roberts reported to me that he had conferred freely with General Banks, and urgently represented to him my purposes, but that General Banks, contrary to his suggestions and my wishes, had left the strong position which he had taken up and had advanced two miles to assault the enemy, believing that they were not in considerable force and that he would be able to crush their advance before their main body could come up from the direction of the Rapidan. He accordingly threw forward his whole corps into action against superior forces of the enemy, strongly posted and sheltered by woods and ridges. His advance led him over the open ground, which was everywhere swept by the fire of the enemy, concealed in woods and ravines beyond. Notwithstanding these disadvantages his corps gallantly responded to his orders, and assaulted the enemy with great fury and determination. The action lasted about an hour and a half, and during that time our forces suffered heavy loss, and were gradually driven back to their former position, at which point, just at dusk, Ricketts's division, of McDowell's corps, came up and joined in the engagement. As soon as I arrived on the field, at the head of Ricketts's division, I directed General Banks to draw in his right, which was much extended, and to mass the whole of his right wing at the centre of his line, pushing forward at the same time Ricketts's division to occupy the ground thus vacated. The enemy followed Banks as he retired with great caution, and emerging from the woods which had sheltered him all day, attempted to push forward to the open ground in front of our new line. A sharp artillery engagement immediately commenced, when the enemy was driven back to the woods, principally by the batteries of Ricketts's division. The artillery firing was kept up until near midnight of the 9th. Finding that



Banks's corps had been severely cut up and was much fatigued, I drew it back to the rear, and pushed forward the corps of Sigel, which had begun to arrive, to occupy the woods on the left of the road, with a wide space of open ground in his front. Ricketts's division was also drawn back to the cover of the woods and behind the ridges in the open ground on the right of Sigel. These dispositions were completed about daybreak on the morning of the 10th. Banks's corps, reduced to about five thousand men, was so cut up and worn down with fatigue that I did not consider it capable of rendering any efficient service for several days. I therefore directed General Banks, or in his absence General Williams, who succeeded to the command, to assemble his corps on the road to Culpeper Court House, and about two miles in rear of our front, to collect his stragglers, send back his wounded to Culpeper Court House, and proceed as rapidly as possible to put the corps in condition for service. In consequence of the vigorous resistance of the night previous, and the severe loss of the enemy in trying to advance before daylight of the 10th, Jackson drew back his forces toward Cedar mountain, about two miles from our front. Our pickets were immediately pushed forward, supported by Milroy's brigade, and occupied the ground.

The day of the 10th was intensely hot, and the troops on both sides were too much fatigued to renew the action. My whole effective force on that day, exclusive of Banks's corps which was in no condition for service, was about twenty thousand artillery and infantry, and about two thousand cavalry; General Buford, with the cavalry force under his command, not yet having been able to join the main body. I had telegraphed General King at Fredericksburg to move forward on the 8th, by the lower fords of the Rappahannock and Stevensburg, to join me. A large part of his command had just returned from a very fatiguing expedition against the Central railroad, but he marched forward promptly and joined the main body late in the evening of the 11th. The whole day was spent by both armies in burying the dead and in bringing off the wounded. Although, even after King joined me, my whole effective force was barely equal to that of the enemy, I determined, after giving King's division one night's rest, to fall upon him at daylight on the 12th, on his line of communications, and compel him to fight a battle, which must have been entirely decisive for one army or the other. But during the night of the 11th, Jackson evacuated the positions in front of us, and retreated rapidly across the Rapidan, in the direction of Gordonsville, leaving many of his dead and wounded on the field and along the road from Cedar mountain to Orange Court House. No materiel of war nor baggage trains were lost on either side, but the loss of life on both sides was severe. Brigadier Generals Geary, Augur, and Carroll were badly wounded, and Brigadier General Prince was captured by accident. Very many of our best field and company officers were killed or wounded. From the verbal reports and statements of General Banks and others, the Massachusetts regiments behaved with especial gallantry, and sustained the heaviest losses, but the conduct of the whole corps of General Banks was beyond all praise. Although I regret that General Banks thought it expedient to depart from my instructions, it gives me pleasure to bear testimony to his gallant and intrepid conduct throughout the action. He exposed himself as freely as any one under his command, and his example went far to secure that gallant and noble conduct which has made his corps famous. Generals Williams, Geary, Augur, Carroll, Gordon, Crawford, and Green, behaved with distinguished gallantry. General Prince, who led his brigade throughout the action with coolness and courage, was captured after dark, while passing from one portion of his command to the other. As I have not received any report from General Banks, it is not in my power to mention the field and company officers who distinguished themselves under his immediate eye in action; but as soon as his report is received, I will transmit it to the government, and endeavour to do justice to every officer and soldier who

belonged to his corps. Brigadier General Roberts, chief of cavalry, of my staff, accompanied General Banks throughout the day, and rendered most important and gallant service. No report of killed and wounded has been made to me by General Banks. I can, therefore, only form an approximation of our losses in that battle. Our killed, wounded, and prisoners amounted to about one thousand and eight hundred men, besides which fully one thousand men straggled back to Culpeper Court House and beyond, and never entirely returned to their commands. A strong cavalry force, under Generals Buford and Bayard, pursued the enemy to the Rapidan, and captured many stragglers. The cavalry forces immediately resumed their original position, and again occupied the Rapidan from Raccoon ford to the base of the Blue Ridge.

On the 14th of August, General Reno, with eight thousand men of the forces which had arrived at Falmouth under General Burnside, joined me. I immediately pushed forward my whole force in the direction of the Rapidan, and occupied a strong position, with my right, under Major General Sigel, resting on Robertson's river, where the road from Cedar mountain to Orange Court House crosses that stream; my centre, under General McDowell, occupied both flanks of Cedar mountain; and my left under General Reno, a position near Raccoon ford, and covering the road from that ford to Stevensburg and Culpeper. I began again, immediately, to operate with my cavalry upon the enemy's communications with Richmond.

From the 12th to the 18th of August, reports were constantly reaching me of large forces of the enemy re-enforcing Jackson from the direction of Richmond, and by the morning of the 18th I became satisfied that nearly the whole force of the enemy from Richmond was assembling in my front, along the south side of the Rapidan, and extending from Raccoon ford to Liberty mills. The cavalry expedition sent out on the 16th, in the direction of Louisa Court House, captured the adjutant general of General Stuart, and was very near capturing that officer himself. Among the papers taken was an autograph letter of General Robert Lee to General Stuart, dated Gordonsville, August 15th, which made manifest to me the position and force of the enemy, and their determination to overwhelm the army under my command before it could be re-enforced by any portion of the army of the Potomac. I held on to my position thus far to the front, for the purpose of affording all the time possible for the arrival of the army of the Potomac at Aquia and Alexandria, and to embarrass and delay the movements of the enemy as far as practicable.

On the 18th of August it became apparent to me that this advanced position, with the small force under my command, was no longer tenable in the face of the overwhelming forces of the enemy. I determined, accordingly, to withdraw behind the Rappahannock with all speed, and, as I had been instructed, to defend, as far as practicable, the line of that river. I accordingly directed Major General Reno to send back his trains on the morning of the 18th, by the way of Stevensburg to Kelly's or Barnett's ford, and as soon as the trains had gotten several hours in advance, to follow them with his whole corps, and take post behind the Rappahannock, leaving all his cavalry in the neighborhood of Raccoon ford to cover this movement. General Banks's corps, which had been ordered on the 12th to take position at Culpeper Court House, I directed, with its trains preceding it, to cross the Rappahannock at the point where the Orange and Alexandria railroad crosses that river; General McDowell's train was ordered to pursue the same route, while the train of General Sigel was directed through Jefferson to cross the Rappahannock at Warrenton Sulphur Springs. So soon as these trains had been sufficiently advanced, McDowell's corps was directed to take the route from Culpeper to Rappahannock ford, while General Sigel, who was on the right and front, was directed to follow the movement of his train to Sulphur Springs.

These movements were executed during the day and night of the 18th

and the day of the 19th, by which time the whole army, with its trains, had safely recrossed the Rappahannock, and was posted behind that stream, with its left at Kelly's ford and its right about three miles above Rappahannock station, General Sigel having been directed, immediately upon crossing at Sulphur Springs, to march down the left bank of the Rappahannock, until he connected closely with General McDowell's right.

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH, WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, August 18, 1862.*

General POPE: I fully approve your movement. I hope to push a part of Burnside's forces to near Barnett's ford by to-morrow night to assist you in holding that pass. Stand firm on the line of the Rappahannock till I can help you. Fight hard, and aid will soon come.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Rappahannock Station, August 20, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: Your despatch of yesterday received last night. I shall mass my whole force along what is known as Marsh run, about two and a half or three miles northeast of Rappahannock ford, occupying Kelly's ford, with an advanced guard from my left, Rappahannock ford with an advanced guard from the centre, and picketing strongly with cavalry the fords above me as far as the road from Sperryville to Warrenton. If the enemy attempt to turn my right by the way of Sulphur Springs, they will probably march direct on Warrenton, from which place a good turnpike conducts to Washington. Such a movement, however, will expose their flank and rear, and you may be sure I will not lose the opportunity. My right will be considerably refused along the railroad as far, at least, as Bealton station. What relations with me will the corps of Fitz John Porter have? I should like to know exactly. I am going out to post my command. I have heard from Reno. He crossed safely yesterday at Kelly's ford and Barnett's ford. The enemy so far has made no movement in advance. I think they are not yet ready, for want of transportation for supplies, to cross the Rapidan.

JNO. POPE, *Major General.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

Early in the morning of the 20th, the enemy drove in our pickets in front of Kelly's ford and at Rappahannock station; but, finding we had covered these fords, and that it would be impracticable to force the passage of the river without heavy loss, his advance halted, and the main body of his army was brought forward from the Rapidan. By the night of the 20th, the bulk of his forces confronted us from Kelly's ford to a point above our extreme right.

During the whole of the 21st and 22d, efforts were made by the enemy at various points to cross the river, but they were repulsed in all cases. The artillery firing was rapid and continuous during the whole of those days, and extended along the line of the river for seven or eight miles. Finding that it was not practicable to force the passage of the river in my front, the enemy began slowly

to move up the river for the purpose of turning our right. My orders required me to keep myself closely in communication with Fredericksburg, to which point the army of the Potomac was being brought from the peninsula, with the purpose of re-enforcing me from that place by the line of the Rappahannock. My force was too small to enable me to extend my right further without so weakening my line as to render it easy for the enemy to break through it at any point. I telegraphed again and again to Washington, representing this movement of the enemy towards my right, and the impossibility of my being able to extend my lines so as to resist it without abandoning my connections with Fredericksburg. I was assured on the 21st that if I would hold the line of the river two days longer, I should be so strongly re-enforced as not only to be secure, but to be able to resume offensive operations; but, on the 25th of August, the only forces that had joined me, or were in the neighborhood, were two thousand five hundred men of the Pennsylvania reserves, under Brigadier General Reynolds, who had arrived at Kelly's ford, and the division of General Kearney, four thousand five hundred strong, which had reached Warrenton Junction. The line of the Rappahannock is very weak and scarce opposes any considerable obstacle to the advance of an army. It is but a small stream above the forks, and can be crossed by good fords every mile or two of its whole length. The movement of the enemy towards my right occasioned me much uneasiness in consequence of the instructions which bound me to keep in close communication with Fredericksburg; but I instructed General Sigel, who occupied the right of my line, and who expressed great apprehension that his flank would be turned, and proposed to withdraw from his position towards the railroad, to stand firm and hold his ground, and to allow the enemy to cross at Sulphur Springs and develop himself on the road toward Warrenton; that, as soon as any considerable force had crossed at that place, I would rapidly mass my army during the night and throw it upon any force of the enemy which attempted to march in the direction of Warrenton. The whole of the cavalry under Brigadier Generals Buford and Bayard was pushed considerably to the right of General Sigel, in the direction of Fayetteville and Sulphur Springs, to watch the movements of the enemy in that direction, and to picket the river as far up as possible. General Sigel was ordered, if any force of the enemy attempted to cross below Sulphur Springs, to march at once against it and to notify me, as I was determined to resist the passage of the river at any point below the springs. Copies of my despatches to the general-in-chief, and of his replies, the despatches from General Sigel, and any orders to him given during the 20th, 21st, 22d, and 23d of August, are appended, which show completely the condition of things, my understanding of the movements of the enemy, and the dispositions which I made and proposed to make in relation to them.

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UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH.

[Received August 21, 1862, from War Department, Washington.]

General POPE: I have telegraphed General Burnside to know at what hour he can re-enforce Reno. Am waiting his answer. Every effort must be made to hold the Rappahannock. Large forces will be in to-morrow.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Rappahannock Station, August 21, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: The enemy has made no further advance since yesterday afternoon, but his cavalry pickets are in plain view of our front. After full examination of the ground I have determined to maintain the line of the Rappahannock, instead of Marsh creek. I have accordingly occupied advanced and commanding positions on the south side of the river, and have three bridges, besides the fords, to connect with them. The main body of my command is posted along the north side of the river, having easy access to the front. I have masked the fords above and below me with infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and have no concern about any attack in the front, though, as previously suggested, my right can be turned at considerable distance above me. This, however, will require time, and will be, besides, a hazardous operation. We drew back behind the Rappahannock in perfect order, without leaving any article whatever.

JNO. POPE, *Major General.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,  
*War Department, Washington, August 21, 1862.*

General POPE: I have just sent General Burnside's reply. General Cox's forces are coming in from Parkersburg, and will be here to-morrow and next day. Dispute every inch of ground, and fight like the devil, till we can re-enforce you. Forty-eight hours more and we can make you strong enough. Don't yield an inch if you can help it.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Rappahannock Station, August 22, 1862—12 o'clock m.*

COMMANDING OFFICER *Warrenton Junction* :

Keep your cavalry scouring the roads and pick up stragglers. You will keep them under guard at Catlett's station, or use them for fatigue duty.

By order of Major General Pope :

GEO. D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Rappahannock Station, August 22, 1862—12 o'clock m.*

Major General HALLECK: The number of stragglers leaving this army just now, and the ease with which they escape, are becoming serious. Can they not be arrested and confined in prison at Washington, as I have not at present the means to bring them here, or to keep them when I get them?

JNO. POPE, *Major General.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,

*August 22, 1862—10.30 a. m.*

Major General HALLECK : It is very apparent that the enemy is moving, with a view of turning our right. He has no forces further east than Stevensburg, and everything is tending up the river. I presume he will cross, if possible, at Sulphur Springs, on the pike to Washington. I would suggest that all the forces being sent from Fredericksburg be pushed forward immediately as far as this place, as I think there is no danger whatever on the lower fords of the Rappahannock. A captured letter from General Robert Lee to General Stuart, dated at Gordonsville, August 15, clearly indicates their movement. We had several handsome skirmishes yesterday, in one of which one of our cavalry regiments, on the south side of the river, charged over a regiment of rebel infantry, dispersing them and driving them into the woods. Seventy head of the enemy's beef cattle and seven horses were captured. There has been heavy artillery firing all this morning, the enemy not yet having finished his preparation for attack. My whole force is massed and well in hand. We have had a great many casualties within the last two days of skirmishing and cannonading. I cannot tell how many.

JNO. POPE, *Major General.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de Camp.*

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,

*Rappahannock Station, August 22, 1862—5 o'clock p. m.*

Major General HALLECK : I think that the troops of Heintzelman and Cox had best be landed from the train at Bealton station, Kearney on or near Licking river, say two miles southwest of Warrenton Junction. The enemy has made no attempt to-day to cross the river. His movement up toward our right seems to have been continued all day. I have little doubt if he crosses at all, it will be at Sulphur Springs. Under present circumstances I shall not attempt to prevent his crossing at Sulphur Springs, but will mass my whole force on his flank in the neighborhood of Fayetteville. By undertaking to defend the crossing at Sulphur Springs I would much extend my lines and remove myself too far from the re-enforcements that are arriving by railroad. Before the enemy can be fairly across the river with any considerable force, I shall be strong enough to advance from Fayetteville upon his flank.

JNO. POPE, *Major General.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de Camp.*

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,

*Rappahannock Station, August 22—6.30 o'clock p. m.*

Major General HALLECK : Everything indicates clearly to me that the enemy's movement will be upon Warrenton by way of Sulphur Springs. If I could know with anything like certainty by what time to expect troops that are starting from Alexandria, I could act more understandingly. I have not heard of the arrival of any of the forces from Fredericksburg at the fords below, though I have withdrawn nearly the whole of Reno's forces from Kelly's ford. I cannot move against Sulphur Springs just now without exposing my rear to the heavy

force in front of me, and having my communication with the forces coming up the Rappahannock intercepted, and most likely the railroad destroyed. I think it altogether well to bring Franklin's force to Alexandria. Lee made his headquarters at Culpeper last night. He has the whole of his army in front of me. Its numbers you can estimate as well as myself. As soon as his plans are fully developed I shall be ready to act.

JNO. POPE, *Major General.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Rappahannock Station, August 22, 1862—9 p. m.*

Major General HALLECK : Scouts report a heavy force moving up across Hedgeman river, on the Sperryville and Little Washington pike toward Warrenton; also crossing at Sulphur Springs. I think a brigade should be sent to guard the railroad bridge at Cedar run, and that Heintzelman's corps should be hurried forward with all possible despatch.

JNO. POPE, *Major General.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*August 22—9.15 p. m.*

General HALLECK : Reports from our forces near Sulphur Springs just in. Enemy was crossing river to-day at Sulphur Springs, and on the road from Warrenton to Sperryville. He is still in heavy force at Rappahannock ford and above, and my rear is entirely exposed if I move towards Sulphur Springs or Warrenton. I must do one of two things—either fall back and meet Heintzelman behind Cedar run, or cross the Rappahannock with my whole force and assail the enemy's flank and rear. I must do one or the other at daylight. Which shall it be? I incline to the latter, but don't wish to interfere with your plans.

JNO. POPE, *Major General.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH.

[Rec'd August 22, 1862, from War Department, Washington, August 22, 1862—11 p. m.]

Major General POPE : I think the latter of your two propositions the best. I also think you had better stop Heintzelman's corps, and the troops of Sturgis and Cox, as they arrive to-morrow at Warrenton Junction, instead of taking them to Bealton.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

## UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH.

[Rec'd August 22, 1862, from Manassas—10.04 p. m.]

General POPE: We will continue to forward troops to Manassas unless you order otherwise; but beyond this point trains will be held to wait your orders, or until further information is received.

HAUPT.

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Rappahannock Station, August 23, 1862—2.20 a. m.*

Major General HALLECK: As nearly as I can learn the facts, the enemy's cavalry made a raid from the direction of Warrenton upon our wagon trains at Catlett's, and seem to have done some considerable damage to them through the gross carelessness of the guard, which was amply sufficient to protect them. Please hurry forward Heintzelmen, as the enemy may reach Warrenton Junction before he does. Please push forward, also, all the troops moving up from Fredericksburg, with orders to cross the Rappahannock at the various fords, and march rapidly on Stevensburg. My movement will be made to-morrow, as soon as I find the enemy has passed a sufficient number of his troops over the river. The troops coming up from Fredericksburg should be hastened forward with all despatch to Stevensburg and Brandy station. It will be well, also, to send with them immediately a train of bread, sugar, coffee, and salt, as our railroad communications may be unsafe for a few days.

JNO. POPE, *Major General.*

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST CORPS, ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*August 23, 1862.*

Major General POPE, *Commanding Army of Virginia:*

There is no doubt that the enemy has out-flanked us, and that his army crosses near Sulphur Springs and Fox's or Lawson's ford. I therefore must instantly beg you to send General Reno's division to Fayetteville, which will be good and necessary for all emergencies; but it should be done to-night, and immediately. General Banks, instead of marching to Lawson's ford, as directed by me, has not done it, and the enemy is therefore crossing at Fox's ford, from which ford General Bayard retired an hour ago. From Fayetteville General Reno can advance to Lawson's ford, or maintain his position until you have made your proper arrangements. It would be, according to my opinion, the best to withdraw the 1st corps towards Bealton or my original position near Beverly ford, to enable us to concentrate all our forces in a central position. General Reno would cover this movement, and we would gain one day.

I am, general, respectfully yours,

F. SIGEL,  
*Major General, Commanding First Corps.*

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp*



## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,

*August 23, 1862.*

Major General SIGEL: Your despatch just received. General Buford is at Fayetteville, and will watch any movement of the enemy towards that place or towards your right. Stand firm and let the enemy develop towards Warrenton. Re-enforcements are constantly arriving in our rear. I do not wish any further extension of our lines to the right, but I desire the enemy to cross as large a force as he pleases in the direction of Warrenton. When I wish to concentrate on the railroad I will cover your movement back. Be under no concern, but keep your whole command ready to march at a moment's notice. Send word to Bayard to keep his position as far up the river as possible, and check, if you find it necessary, any attempt of the enemy to cross Lawson's ford.

By order of General Pope:

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,

*August 23, 1862—7.15 a. m.*

Major General SIGEL: The river has risen here six feet, and is entirely impassable at any ford. I have no doubt it is the same all the way up the river, as the main portion of the storm was above. The enemy, therefore, on this side is cut off from those on the other, and there is no fear of this position. You will accordingly march at once upon Sulphur Springs and thence towards Waterloo bridge, attacking and beating the enemy wherever you find them. Banks's corps, and the force under General Reno, will accompany and support you. McDowell, with his whole corps, marches direct on Warrenton, and you will be brought together in that neighborhood to-night. Move promptly up the river. The other troops will be close behind you. You ought to be in the neighborhood of Waterloo bridge before sunset. I will accompany McDowell's corps, and communicate further with you in the course of the day. You will have an effective force of twenty-five thousand men. Leave nothing behind you.

JNO. POPE, *Major General.*

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

Finding that the continued movement of the enemy to my right, while heavy masses of his force still confronted me at Rappahannock station, would within a day, if allowed to continue, either render my position on the Rappahannock wholly untenable, or force me to give battle to the enemy in my front and on my right, I determined, on the afternoon of the 22d, to mass my whole force, to recross the Rappahannock by the bridges and fords near Rappahannock station, and by Kelly's ford below, and to fall on the flank and rear of the long column of the enemy which was passing up the river toward our right. I accordingly made the necessary orders on the night of the 22d of August. The attempt would have been dangerous, but no recourse was left me except to make this attack, to retire to Warrenton Junction and abandon the line of the Rappahannock, or to retire in the direction of Fredericksburg and abandon the Orange and Alexandria railroad, and the direct approaches to Washington city. I determined, therefore, to hazard the result, and to fall furiously with my whole army on the flank and rear of the enemy.

During the night of the 22d a heavy rain set in, which, before day dawned on the 23d, had caused the river to rise six or eight feet, carried away all our bridges, and destroyed all the fords on the river. To recross the Rappahannock, and to make the attack as proposed, was no longer practicable; but the rise in the river which had prevented this movement I believed would also prevent the retreat of that portion of the enemy which had crossed at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo bridge, according to the reports which had been sent me by General Sigel.

Early on the morning of the 23d, therefore, I massed my whole force in the neighborhood of Rappahannock station, with the purpose of falling upon that portion of the enemy which had crossed above me, and was then supposed to be between Sulphur Springs, Waterloo bridge and the town of Warrenton. As the river was too high to be crossed, and was likely to remain so for at least thirty-six hours, I had no fear that the enemy would be able to interpose between me and Fredericksburg, or to make any attempt upon the Orange and Alexandria railroad north of the Rappahannock. I directed General Sigel to march with his whole corps upon Sulphur Springs, supported by Reno's corps and Banks's corps, to fall upon any body of the enemy that he might encounter, and to push forward along the river to Waterloo bridge. I directed General McDowell to move at the same time directly upon the town of Warrenton, so that from that point he would be able, if necessary, to unite with General Sigel on the road from that place to Sulphur Springs, or to Waterloo bridge. To the corps of General McDowell I had attached the Pennsylvania reserves, under Brigadier General Reynolds, the first of the army of the Potomac that had joined my command.

On the night of the 22d of August a small cavalry force of the enemy, crossing Waterloo bridge and passing through Warrenton, made a raid upon our trains at Catlett's station, and destroyed four or five wagons in all, belonging to the train of my own headquarters. At the time this cavalry force attacked at Catlett's, and it certainly was not more than three hundred strong, our whole army trains were parked at that place and were guarded by not less than fifteen hundred infantry and five companies of cavalry. The success of this small cavalry party of the enemy, although very trifling, and attended with but little damage, was most disgraceful to the force which had been left in charge of the trains. General Sigel moved, as ordered, slowly up the Rappahannock, in the direction of Sulphur Springs, on the 23d, and first encountered a force of the enemy near the point where a small creek called Great Run puts into the Rappahannock, about two miles below the Sulphur Springs. The enemy was driven across the stream but destroyed the bridges.

The heavy rains had caused this small creek to rise so much that it was not then fordable, so that the night of the 23d and part of the morning of the 24th were spent by General Sigel in rebuilding the bridges. On the night of the 23d, also, the advance of McDowell's corps occupied Warrenton, a cavalry force of the enemy having retreated from there a few hours before.

On the morning of the 24th, General Sigel, supported by Generals Reno and Banks, crossed Great Run and occupied the Sulphur Springs, under a heavy fire of artillery from batteries which the enemy had established all along the south side of the Rappahannock. The bridge which had been built at Sulphur Springs, and upon which the forces of the enemy which had crossed a day or two previous escaped from the advance of General Sigel, was destroyed, and General Sigel pushed forward, with the force supporting him, in the direction of Waterloo bridge. Meantime, I had despatched Brigadier General Buford with a heavy cavalry force from Warrenton, on the morning of the 24th, to reconnoitre the country in the vicinity of Waterloo bridge, and to interrupt the passage of the river at that point as far as possible. It was then believed by General Sigel, who so reported

to me, that a considerable force of the enemy was on the north side of the Rappahannock, and was retiring from his advance in the direction of Waterloo bridge.

By noon of the 24th, General Buford reported to me that he had occupied Waterloo bridge, without finding any force of the enemy, and he did not believe that there was any force between that place and Sulphur Springs. I directed him to destroy the bridge at Waterloo, and to maintain his position until the arrival of the advance of General Sigel. I at once informed General Sigel of these facts, and directed him to push forward his advance to Waterloo. Milroy's brigade, constituting the advance of his corps, reached Waterloo late in the afternoon of the 24th. On that afternoon the whole force of the enemy was stretched along the line of the river, from the Rappahannock station to Waterloo bridge, with his centre, and I think his main body, in the vicinity of Sulphur Springs. During the day of the 24th, a large detachment of the enemy, numbering thirty-six regiments of infantry, with the usual number of batteries of artillery and a considerable cavalry force, marched rapidly to the north in the direction of Rectortown. They could be plainly seen from our signal stations, established at high points along the Rappahannock; and their movements and force were reported to me from time to time by Colonel J. S. Clark, of General Banks's staff, who, on that day, and for many preceding and succeeding days, gave me most valuable and reliable information. I am glad to express here my appreciation of the valuable services of this officer.

On the night of the 24th, my forces were distributed as follows: Ricketts's division, of McDowell's corps, on the road from Warrenton to Waterloo bridge, and about four miles east of Waterloo; King's division, of the same corps, between Warrenton and the Sulphur Springs; Sigel's corps, near the Rappahannock, with his advance at Waterloo, and his rear in the direction of Sulphur Springs. In his rear, and immediately in contact with him, was Banks's corps; while Reno's corps was east and very near the Sulphur Springs.

I was satisfied that no force of the enemy was on the north side of the Rappahannock; but I feared that during the next day—by which time the river would have fallen sufficiently to be passable at any of the fords—the enemy would make an attempt to cross at Rappahannock station, or at the fords between that point and Sulphur Springs. Yet, as we were confronted at Waterloo bridge and Sulphur Springs by the main body of the enemy, still moving toward our right, and as the heavy column mentioned previously was marching with all speed in the direction of White Plains and Salem, and from those points would be able to turn out right by the direction of Thoroughfare gap, or even north of that place, it was with the greatest reluctance, and only because I felt bound to do so under my instructions, that I took measures again to assure my communications with Fredericksburg.

I append herewith orders and despatches sent and received during the 23d and 24th of August, which will of themselves furnish a succinct account of the movements here set forth, and all the information and assurances upon which those movements were made.

#### HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,

*August 23, 1862—7.35 a. m.*

Major General BANKS: You will accompany and support General Sigel in his forward movements toward Sulphur Springs and Waterloo bridge. General Reno will follow you closely for the same purpose. McDowell's corps marches immediately upon Warrenton. The river has risen six feet, and is no longer passable by the enemy. His forces on this side are cut off from those on the other, and we will march against those on this side, and the whole force will unite between Warrenton and Waterloo bridge. Call in Crawford at once, and

leave nothing behind you. Follow Sigel very closely, and keep constant communication with him, as also with General Reno in your rear. Be quick, for time is everything.

JNO. POPE, *Major General.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Rappahannock Station, August 23, 1862—9 a. m.*

Major General HALLECK : The heavy storm of yesterday and last night has caused the river to rise six feet. There are no longer any fords, and the bridges are carried away. I succeeded in time in withdrawing my advanced forces from the south side of the river. The movement across the river on the enemy's flank and rear is therefore impossible. The enemy's forces on this side, which have crossed at Sulphur Springs and Hedgeman's river, are cut off from those on the south side. I march at once with my whole force on Sulphur Springs, Waterloo bridge, and Warrenton, in the hope to destroy these forces before the river runs down. The rain still continues, and I think we are good for thirty-six hours. As soon as I have effected this purpose, which I expect to do by an early hour to-morrow, I shall move back, detaching a large force to reopen my communications at Catlett's and send forward supplies. If Heintzelman and Cox move quickly it will be easy to hold the Rappahannock, leaving the enemy much damaged by his attempt to turn our right. You may not hear from me before to-morrow night.

JHO. POPE, *Major General.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*August 23, 1862—11 a. m.*

General REYNOLDS : You will please, on arriving at Rappahannock station, follow the route taken by the army corps of General McDowell, passing Brigadier General Tower, who is in command of the rear-guard, and whom you will find near the railroad station. Please keep well closed and close up to the rear of McDowell's corps. Our march is to Warrenton, about ten miles distant, which you must make to-night.

By order of Major General Pope, commanding army of Virginia :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Near Warrenton, August 23, 1862—10 p. m.*

Major General HALLECK : My advance entered the town about an hour ago ; the enemy evacuated it on our approach. They fell back toward Hedgeman's,

river and Sulphur Springs. At the latter place my left was engaged about sunset, and now awaits daylight. I shall move rapidly at daylight upon Sulphur Springs and Waterloo bridge. If the enemy is really in large force on this side of the Rappabannock he will be trapped, as the river is very high behind him. I will communicate to-morrow

A true copy :

JNO. POPE, *Major General.*

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*August 24, 1862—5 a. m.*

Major General SIGEL, *Commanding, &c. :*

The advance division of McDowell's corps occupied Warrenton last night without opposition. The head of his column was pushed just outside the town, on the road to Sulphur Springs, ready to move forward to that point should it be necessary. I am pushing a reconnoissance toward Waterloo bridge to see what is there. Communicate fully to me through Captain Merrill, who will hand you this note, the condition of things in front of you. Our work must be finished here to-day. We have no time to spare. Provisions will be in Warrenton this morning.

A true copy :

JNO. POPE, *Major General.*

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH.

[Received August 24, 1862, from Alexandria, August 24, 1862.]

[Extract.]

To Major General POPE : \* \* \* \* \* Thirty thousand (30,000) troops or more demand transportatation. It is clear that the sudden demand exceeds the capacity of the road. We can mange twelve thousand (12,000) troops per day, with supplies, if no accident occurs. The new troops might march ; the veterans go in cars ; horses driven. Baggage, tents &c., wait until they can be forwarded ; supplies take precedence.

HAUPT.

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,  
*Alexandria, August 25, 1862.*

[Extract.]

Major General POPE : \* \* \* \* \* We expect to clean out all the troops now here, and all that are expected to-day. \* \* \*

H. HAUPT.

## HEADQUARTERS FIRST CORPS,

*Near Waterloo bridge, August 25, 1862—1.40 p. m.*Colonel George D. RUGGLES, *Chief of Staff:*

Colonel Beardsley reports the enemy's cavalry at Sulphur Springs, and the village occupied by the enemy's infantry. Colonel Beardsley had been sent by me to Sulphur Springs, with some cavalry and mountain howitzers. The main force of the enemy is advancing on this place (Waterloo bridge.) General Reno should send me the 20-pounder Parrotts. I could use them here excellently.

I am, colonel very respectfully,

F. SIGEL,

*Major General Commanding First Corps.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,

*Warrenton, August 24, 1862—3.45 p. m.*Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief, Washington:*

I arrived in Warrenton last night; the enemy had left two hours previously. Milroy's brigade, the advance of Sigel's corps, came upon the enemy late yesterday afternoon near Great run, about four miles from Warrenton Sulphur Springs, and near the mouth of it. A sharp action took place, which lasted till after dark, the enemy being driven across Great river, but destroying the bridge behind him. Early this morning General Buford reached Waterloo bridge, which was defended by a considerable force of the enemy and one piece of artillery. He took possession of the bridge and destroyed it. Sigel's force advanced again on the left this morning, and when last heard from was pursuing the enemy in the direction of Waterloo bridge. His column was being shelled from the opposite bank of the river, which is still too deep to be forded. The enemy has made no advance against Rappahannock station since we left, though yesterday morning, while we were withdrawing our forces from the opposite side of the river, he brought forward his column of infantry and attempted to carry the heights we were leaving by storm. He was, however, repulsed with considerable loss. We have had a continuous engagement, principally with artillery, along the whole line of the river for eight or ten miles, during the last three days. No force of the enemy has yet been able to cross, except that now enclosed by our forces between Sulphur Springs and Waterloo bridge, which will no doubt be captured, unless they find some means, of which I know nothing, of escaping across the river between those places. Early to-morrow, after clearing this side of the river, I shall move back a considerable part of this force to the neighborhood of Rappahannock station. By that time the river will doubtless be fordable again. I shall leave a corps of observation here to watch the crossings at Waterloo and Sulphur Springs. The forces arriving from Washington and Alexandria will be assembled, I think, on Licking river, between Germantown and the railroad, with a reserve for the force at Warrenton, somewhere between Warrenton Junction and this place, until you are ready to begin a forward movement. I cannot form an estimate of the forces of the enemy. He has been developed in heavy force, by simultaneous reconnoissances, along a line of nine miles from the railroad crossing of the Rappahannock, as far, at least, as Sulphur Springs. I should like to have some idea of the forces which are coming here, and your plans of organizing them, that they may be assigned and posted in some order. Our losses during the last three days have been quite heavy, among the killed being Brigadier General Bohlen, commanding a brigade in Sigel's corps. The whole tendency of the enemy since he appeared in front of us at Rappahannock station

has been toward our right, but how far his movement in that direction will extend I am not able to say. I shall to-morrow remove my headquarters to some central point, probably Warrenton Junction.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Warrenton, August 24, 1862.*

GENERAL: To-night, or at an early hour in the morning, you will please send spies and scouts around by Front Royal to Thornton's gap and into the valley of the Shenandoah to ascertain whether any of the enemy's forces are moving in that direction. Send at least two or three reliable men for that purpose, and instruct them that if they find any difficulty in returning to you, they shall go into Winchester and communicate their information to General White. You will receive instructions as to your movements in the morning.

By order of General Pope :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

Major General SIGEL, *Commanding, &c.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST CORPS, ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Near Waterloo Bridge, Va., August 24, 1862.*

Colonel GEO. D. RUGGLES, *Chief of Staff, Army of Virginia :*

The first corps is in bivouack at Waterloo bridge, with the exception of an infantry brigade left at Sulphur Springs, as rear guard, together with a brigade of General Banks and one of General Reno.

General Banks's corps is on the Sulphur Springs road, about four miles from the springs, and General Reno is at or near the fork of the Warrenton road. To judge from the appearance of the camp-fires and camps, I am certain that the enemy's main army is encamped on the other side of the river, perhaps two miles from the river, with the advance at Amissville and the rear opposite Sulphur Springs.

F. SIGEL,  
*Major General Commanding First Corps.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*August 25, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK: Your despatch just received. Of course I shall be ready to recross the Rappahannock at a moment's notice. You will see from the positions taken that each army corps is on the best roads across the river. You wished forty-eight hours to assemble the forces from the Peninsula behind the Rappahannock, and four days have passed without the enemy yet being permitted to cross. I don't think he is ready yet to do so. In ordinary dry weather the Rappahannock can be crossed almost anywhere, and these crossing

places are best protected by concentrating at central positions to strike at any force which attempts to cross. I had clearly understood that you wished to unite our whole forces before a forward movement was begun, and that I must take care to keep united with Burnside on my left, so that no movement to separate us could be made. This withdrew me lower down the Rappahannock than I wished to come. I am not acquainted with your views, as you seem to suppose, and would be glad to know them as far as my own position and operations are concerned. I understand you clearly that, at all hazards, I was to prevent the enemy from passing the Rappahannock. This I have done, and shall do. I don't like to be on the defensive if I can help it, but must be so as long as I am tied to Burnside's forces, not yet wholly arrived at Fredericksburg. Please let me know, if it can be done, what is to be my own command, and if I am to act independently against the enemy. I certainly understood that, as soon as the whole of our forces were concentrated, you designed to take command in person, and that, when everything was ready, we were to move forward in concert. I judge from the tone of your despatch that you are dissatisfied with something. Unless I know what it is, of course I can't correct it. The troops arriving here come in fragments. Am I to assign them to brigades and corps? I would suppose not, as several of the new regiments coming have been assigned to army corps directly from your office. In case I commence offensive operations I must know what forces I am to take and what you wish left, and what connection must be kept up with Burnside. It has been my purpose to conform my operations to your plans, yet I was not informed when McClellan evacuated Harrison's landing, so that I might know what to expect in that direction; and when I say these things in no complaining spirit I think you know well that I am anxious to do everything to advance your plans of campaign. I understood that the army was to maintain the line of the Rappahannock until all the forces from the Peninsula had united behind that river. I have done so. I understood distinctly that I was not to hazard anything except for this purpose, as delay was what was wanted.

The enemy this morning has pushed a considerable infantry force up opposite Waterloo bridge, and is planting batteries, and long lines of his infantry are moving up from Jeffersonville towards Sulphur Springs. His whole force, as far as can be ascertained, is massed in front of me, from railroad crossing of Rappahannock around to Waterloo bridge, their main body being opposite Sulphur Springs.

JNO. POPE, *Major General.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

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UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH.

[Received August 26, 1862, from War Department—11.45 a. m.]

[Extract.]

Major General POPE: Not the slightest dissatisfaction has been felt in regard to your operations on the Rappahannock. The main object has been accomplished in getting up troops from the Peninsula, although they have been delayed by storms. Moreover, the telegraph has been interrupted, leaving us for a time ignorant of the progress of the evacuation. \* \* \* \* \*

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*



## HEADQUARTERS THIRD CORPS,

August 25—11.25 a. m.

COLONEL: Enclosed you will please find reports of Colonel Clark, aide-de-camp, from the signal corps station, of the movements of the enemy on the south side of Hedgeman or Rappahannock river. The facts are reported as having been observed by himself, and can be relied upon as being as near the truth as the distance will permit. It seems to be apparent that the enemy is threatening, or moving upon the valley of the Shenandoah, *via* Front Royal, with designs upon the Potomac—possibly beyond. Not knowing whether you have received this information, I forward it for the consideration of the commanding general.

Respectfully, &amp;c.,

N. P. BANKS,

*Major General Commanding.*

Colonel RUGGLES,

*Assistant Adjutant General and Chief of Staff.*

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

## WARRENTON JUNCTION,

August 25, 1862—9.30 p. m.

Major General SIGEL, *Commanding First Corps:*

You will force the passage of the river at Waterloo bridge to-morrow morning at daylight, and see what is in front of you. I do not believe there is any enemy in force there, but do believe that the whole of their army has marched to the west and northwest. I am not satisfied either with your reports or your operations of to-day, and expect to hear to-morrow early something more satisfactory concerning the enemy. Send back and bring up your provision trains to your command, but no regimental trains or baggage of any description. You will consider this a positive order, to be obeyed literally. You will communicate with me by telegraph from Warrenton.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

Sent in the care of General McDowell, at Warrenton.

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

## WARRENTON JUNCTION,

August 25, 1862—9.30 p. m.

Major General McDOWELL, *Warrenton:*

I believe that the whole force of the enemy has marched for the Shenandoah valley, by way of Luray and Front Royal. The column which has marched to-day towards Gaines's Crossroads has turned north, and when last seen was passing under the east base of Buck mountain, towards Salem and Rectortown. I desire you, as early as possible in the morning, holding Reynolds in reserve at Warrenton or vicinity, to make a reconnoissance with your whole corps, and ascertain what is beyond the river at Sulphur Springs. There is no force of the enemy between here and Culpeper, or at Culpeper. I send you a despatch

for General Sigel, which please read and send to him immediately. Communicate with me frequently by telegraph from Warrenton.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

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UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH.

[Received August 26, 1862, from headquarters 3d corps—3.30 p. m., Warrenton.]

Major General POPE: General Sigel's bridge train has arrived. I think it may be useful. General Milroy burned the bridge at Waterloo before he retired from that place last night, and Buford says that the fords near Waterloo are bad. I have directed the available forces of Sigel's cavalry, with a section of his artillery, to report to General Buford this afternoon on the Waterloo road, with three days' cooked rations. I have directed Buford to march at dawn to-morrow toward Chester gap, to ascertain what direction the enemy have taken on our right, whether to Rectortown or Front Royal, through Chester gap. He will either take the Carter Church road, up the left bank of Carter's run, or the road direct from this place to Chester gap, as inquiries to be made this p. m. shall determine. However persons may have differed as to the force at Waterloo, Sulphur Springs, or elsewhere, all agree in one thing—the movement of the enemy toward our right from Rappahannock to Waterloo. Battalions, trains, batteries, all have the same direction. The force of the enemy now seems to be above Sulphur Springs. Under these views, in addition to Sigel's corps, now here, I beg to suggest that Hooker and Kearney be marched at once in this direction, instead of the direction of Rappahannock station, for, whether we attack them, or they attack us, the contest must come off, it seems to me, as things now stand, above rather than below Sulphur Springs. If they could make a march this p. m. toward either Sulphur Springs or Waterloo bridge, it would be a movement, I think, in the right direction. What is the enemy's purpose it is not easy to discover. Some have thought that he means to march around our right through Rectortown to Washington. Others think that he intends going down the Shanandoah, either through Thornton's or Chester gap. Either of these operations seems too hazardous for him to undertake with us in his rear and flank. Others that it was his object to throw his trains around into the valley, to draw his supplies from that direction, and have his front looking to the east rather than to the north. It is also thought that while a portion of his force has marched up the immediate right bank of the Rappahannock, a larger portion has gone through Culpeper up the Sperryville road. No doubt these various suppositions may have occurred to you, but I have thought it not inappropriate to recapitulate them here with reference to the concentration of forces in this direction, which I have herein suggested. Cannonading at Sulphur Springs still continues about the same. I have ordered Buford to send you a regiment of cavalry. I can't get hold of Bayard.

IRVIN McDOWELL.

I have just received your telegrams of 2.20 and 3.15 p. m. I trust that Buford's reconnoissance to-morrow will obtain the information you desire concerning the movements of the enemy across Sperryville pike, in the direction of Gaines's Crossroads and Salem. I also received from General Banks's signal officer the account of this movement. With reference to your inquiries as to what has

occurred to make the presence of Cox desirable, I made the suggestion, first because in the general order issued, he was ordered to join Sigel at Fayetteville. As Sigel was here, and, as I understood, Cox was arriving in the cars, I thought if it could be done, time would be gained by his being landed here rather than Warrenton Junction.

IRVIN McDOWELL,  
*Major General Commanding.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH.

[Received August 26, 1862, from near Waterloo bridge—2.45 p. m.]

General POPE : Trains and troops still passing over the same route. A deserter just come in says Longstreet's corps, embracing Anderson's, Jones's, Kemper's, Whitney's, and Evans's divisions, are located in the woods back of Waterloo bridge; think Hill's division at Jefferson; Jackson's corps somewhere above Longstreet's. He appears truthful and I credit his story. The entire district from Jefferson to Culpeper, Sperryville, and as far as Barber's, covered with smoke and lines of dust. The deserter reports the arrival last evening of the greater portion of Longstreet's corps at its present position.

JOHN S. CLARK,  
*Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

On the 23d I received a despatch from the general-in-chief, informing me that heavy re-enforcements would begin to arrive at Warrenton Junction the succeeding day, and on the 24th I received despatches from Colonel Haupt, the railroad superintendent at Alexandria, who informed me that thirty thousand men, ordered forward to join me, had demanded transportation from him, and that they would all be shipped that afternoon or early the next morning. The force which I thus expected was, as reported to me, to consist of the division of General Sturgis, ten thousand strong; the division of General Cox, seven thousand strong; the corps of General Heintzelman, ten thousand strong; and the corps of General Franklin, ten thousand strong. By the night of the 25th it became apparent to me that I could no longer keep open my communications with Fredericksburg, and oppose the crossing of the Rappahannock, at Rappahannock station, without abandoning the road from Warrenton to Washington, and leaving open to the enemy the route through Thoroughfare gap, and all other roads north of the Orange and Alexandria railroad. As the main body of his force was constantly tending in that direction, I determined no longer to attempt to mask the lower fords of the Rappahannock, but to assemble such forces as I had along the Warrenton turnpike, between Warrenton and Gainesville, and give battle to the enemy on my right or left, as he might choose. I therefore directed McDowell to occupy Warrenton with his own and Sigel's corps, supporting him by Banks's corps from the direction of Fayetteville. I pushed Reno forward to occupy a point near the Warrenton turnpike, and about three miles to the east of that town. I sent orders to General Porter, who had reported to me by note from the neighborhood of Bealeton station, to push forward and join Reno. Heintzelman's corps, which had reached Warrenton Junction, was ordered to remain for the present at that point, it being my purpose to push forward that

corps, as soon as practicable, to Greenwich, about half-way between Warrenton and Gainesville. I sent orders to Colonel Haupt to direct one of the strongest divisions being sent forward to take post in the works at Manassas Junction, and requested General Halleck to push Franklin with all speed to Gainesville; that he could march quite as rapidly as he could be transported by rail, with the limited means of railroad transportation in our possession, and that his baggage and supplies could be sent forward to Gainesville by rail. I also sent orders to the colonel commanding at Manassas Junction, for the first division that reached there from Alexandria to halt and take post in the works at that place, and directed him to push forward all of his cavalry in the direction of Thoroughfare gap, to watch any movements the enemy might make from that direction. I had instructed General Sturgis, commanding at Alexandria, on the 22d of August, to post strong guards along the railroad from Manassas Junction to Catlett's station, and requested him to superintend this in person. I also directed General Kearney, who reached Warrenton Junction on the 23d, to see that sufficient guards were placed all along the railroad in his rear. After these precautions and assurances I had thought, and confidently expected, that by the afternoon of the 26th Franklin would have been at or near Gainesville; one division would have been occupying the works at Manassas Junction; and that the forces under Sturgis and Cox would have been at Warrenton Junction, whence they could at once have been pushed north in the direction of Warrenton turnpike. The orders for the disposition of the forces under my command were sent, and the movements made, so far as practicable, during the day of the 26th.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD CORPS,

*Warrenton, August 26—9 p. m.*

Major General POPE: An intelligent negro has just come in to General Buford from White Plains, and reports the advance of the enemy's column at that place. He says he saw, himself, at that place to-day, at 12 o'clock, two batteries of artillery, two regiments of cavalry, four regiments of infantry, and that they were moving in the direction of Thoroughfare gap. The man's story is evidently to be relied upon. General Buford says his statements are confirmed by his scouts, who report large trains passing up through Orleans to White Plains.

IRVIN McDOWELL,  
*Major General.*

A true copy:

JNO. POPE, *Major General.*

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WARRENTON JUNCTION,

*August 26, 1862—8 p. m.*

Major General McDOWELL, *Warrenton:*

Fitz John Porter, with Sykes's and Morell's divisions, will be within two miles and a half of Warrenton, on the Fayetteville road, to-morrow night. See if you cannot have the crossroads repaired, so that he can get from his position into the Sulphur Springs road with his artillery, if he should be needed. Will use all efforts to have Sturgis and Cox within three miles of you to-morrow night, and have requested General Halleck to push forward Franklin at once, carrying his baggage and supplies by railroad to the point where the Manassas Gap railroad intersects the Warrenton turnpike. From that position he can either advance to your support or prevent your right from being turned from the

direction of the Manassas Gap railroad. I think our fight should be made at Warrenton, and if you can postpone it for two days everything will be right.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
Warrenton Junction, August 26, 1862—3.20 p. m.

Major General HEINTZELMAN, *Commanding, &c.* :

The major general commanding the army of Virginia directs me to send you the enclosed communication, and to request that you put a regiment on a train of cars and send it down immediately to Manassas, to ascertain what has occurred, repair the telegraph wires, and protect the railroad there until further orders.

With great respect, general, your obedient servant,

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
August 26, 1862—12 p. m.

General McDOWELL: General Sigel reports the enemy's rear guard at Orleans to-night, with his main force encamped at White Plains. You will please ascertain very early in the morning whether this is so, and have the whole of your command in readiness to march; you had best ascertain to-night, if you possibly can. Our communications have been interrupted by the enemy's cavalry near Manassas. Whether his whole force, or the larger part of it, has gone round, is a question which we must settle instantly, and no portion of his force must march opposite to us to-night without our knowing it. I telegraphed you an hour or two ago what dispositions I had made, supposing the advance through Thoroughfare gap to be a column of not more than ten or fifteen thousand men. If his whole force, or the larger part of it, has gone, we must know it at once. The troops here have no artillery, and if the main forces of the enemy are still opposite to you, you must send forward to Greenwich to be there to-morrow evening with the two batteries of artillery, or three if you can get them, to meet Kearney. We must know at a very early hour in the morning, so as to determine our plans.

JNO. POPE, *Major General.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

About 8 o'clock at night on the 26th, the advance of Jackson's force having passed through Thoroughfare gap, cut the railroad in the neighborhood of Kettle run, about six miles east of Warrenton Junction. The cavalry force which I had sent forward to Thoroughfare gap on the morning of the 26th made no report to me. The moment our communications were interrupted at Kettle run, I was satisfied that the troops which had been promised me from the direction

of Washington had made no considerable progress. Had Franklin been even at Centreville on the 26th, or had Cox and Sturgis been as far west as Bull run on that day, the movement of Jackson through Thoroughfare gap upon the railroad at Manassas would have been utterly impracticable. So confidently did I expect, from the assurances which I had time and again received, that these troops would be in position, or, at all events, so far advanced towards me, that Jackson's movements towards White Plains, and in the direction of Thoroughfare gap, had caused but little uneasiness; but on the night of the 26th it was very apparent to me that all these expected re-enforcements had utterly failed me; and that upon the small force under my own immediate command I must depend alone for any present operations against the enemy. It was easy for me to retire in the direction of the lower fords of the Rappahannock to Fredericksburg, so as to bring me in immediate contact with the forces there or arriving there; but by so doing I should have left open the whole front of Washington; and after my own disappointment of the re-enforcements which I had expected, I was not sure that there was any sufficient force, in the absence of the army under my command, to cover the capital. I determined, therefore, at once to abandon the line of the Rappahannock, and throw my whole force in the direction of Gainesville and Manassas Junction, to crush the enemy who had passed through Thoroughfare gap, and to interpose between the army of General Lee and Bull run. During the night of the 26th, the main body of the enemy still occupied their positions from Sulphur Springs to Waterloo bridge and above; but towards morning on the 27th I think their advance moved off in the direction of White Plains, pursuing the route previously taken by Jackson, and, no doubt, with a view of uniting with him eastward of the Bull Run range. From the 18th of August until the morning of the 27th the troops under my command had been continuously marching and fighting night and day, and during the whole of that time there was scarcely an interval of an hour without the roar of artillery. The men had had but little sleep, were greatly worn down with fatigue, had had little time to get proper food or to eat it, had been engaged in constant battles and skirmishes, and had performed services, laborious, dangerous, and excessive, beyond any previous experience in this country. As was to be expected, under such circumstances, the numbers of the army under my command had been greatly reduced by death, by wounds, by sickness, and by fatigue, so that on the morning of the 27th of August I estimated my whole effective force (and I think the estimate was large) as follows: Sigel's corps, nine thousand; Banks's corps, five thousand; McDowell's corps, including Reynolds's division, fifteen thousand five hundred; Reno's corps, seven thousand; the corps of Heintzelman and Porter, (the freshest, by far, in that army,) about eighteen thousand men; making in all fifty-four thousand five hundred men. Our cavalry numbered, on paper, about four thousand; but their horses were completely broken down, and there were not five hundred men, all told, capable of doing such service as should be expected from cavalry. The corps of Heintzelman had reached Warrenton Junction, but without wagons, without artillery, and with only forty rounds of ammunition to the man, and without even horses for the general and field officers. The corps of Porter had also reached Warrenton Junction, with a very small supply of provisions and but forty rounds of ammunition for each man.

On the morning of the 27th, in accordance with the purpose previously set forth, I directed McDowell to move forward rapidly on Gainesville by the Warrenton turnpike, with his own corps and Sigel's and the division of Reynolds, so as to reach that point during the night. I directed General Reno, with his corps, followed by Kearney's division of Heintzelman's corps, to move rapidly on Greenwich, so as to reach there that night, to communicate at once with General McDowell, and to support him in any operations against the enemy in the vicinity of Gainesville. I moved forward along the railroad towards Manassas

Junction, with Hooker's division of Heintzelman's corps, leaving orders for General Porter to remain with his corps at Warrenton Junction until relieved by General Banks, who was marching to that place from Fayetteville, and as soon as he was relieved to push forward also in the direction of Gainesville, where, at that time, I expected that the main collision with the enemy would occur.

GENERAL ORDERS }  
No. —. }

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
Warrenton Junction, August 27, 1862.

The following movement of troops will be made, viz :

Major General McDowell, with his own and Sigel's corps, and the divisions of Brigadier General Reynolds, will pursue the turnpiko from Warrenton to Gainesville, if possible, to-night.

The army corps of General Heintzelman, with the detachment of the 9th corps, under Major General Reno, leading, will take the road from Catlett's station to Greenwich, so as to reach there to-night or early in the morning. Major General Reno will immediately communicate with Major General McDowell, and his command, as well as that of Major General Heintzelman, will support Major General McDowell in any operations against the enemy.

Major General Fitz John Porter will remain at Warrenton Junction until he is relieved by Major General Banks, when he will immediately push forward with his corps in the direction of Greenwich and Gainesville, to assist the operations on the right wing.

Major General Banks, as soon as he arrives at Warrenton Junction, will assume the charge of the trains, and cover their movement towards Manassas Junction. The train of his own corps, under escort of two regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery, will pursue the road south of the railroad, which conducts into the rear of Manassas Junction. As soon as all the trains have passed Warrenton Junction he will take post behind Cedar run, covering the fords and bridges of that stream, and holding the position as long as possible. He will cause all the railroad trains to be loaded with the public and private stores now here, and run them back towards Manassas Junction as far as the railroad is practicable. Whenever a bridge is burned, so as to prevent the further passage of the railroad trains, he will assemble them all as near together as possible, and protect them with his command until the bridges are rebuilt. If the enemy is too strong before him before the bridge is repaired, he will be careful to destroy entirely the trains, locomotives, and stores, before he falls back in the direction of Manassas Junction. He is, however, to understand that he is to defend his position as long as possible, keeping himself in constant communication with Major General Porter on his right. If any sick, now in hospital at Warrenton Junction, are not provided for, and able to be transported, he will have them loaded into the wagon train of his own corps (even should this necessitate the destruction of much baggage and regimental property) and carried to Manassas Junction. The very important duty devolved upon Major General Banks, the major general commanding the army of Virginia feels assured that he will discharge with intelligence, courage, and fidelity.

The general headquarters will be with the corps of General Heintzelman until further orders.

By command of Major General Pope :

GEO. D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

The army trains of all the corps I instructed to take the road to Warrenton Junction and follow in the rear of Hooker's division towards Manassas Junction, so that the road pursued by the trains was entirely covered from any possible interruption by the enemy.

On the afternoon of the 27th a severe engagement occurred between Hooker's division and Ewell's division of Jackson's forces. The action commenced about four miles west of Bristow's station. Ewell was driven back along the railroad, but still confronted Hooker, at dark, along the banks of Broad run immediately in front of Bristow station, at which point I arrived at sunset. The loss in this engagement was about three hundred killed and wounded on each side, the enemy leaving his dead, many of his wounded, and much of his baggage on the field of battle. The railroad had been torn up and the bridges burned in several places between Bristow station and Warrenton Junction. I accordingly directed Major General Banks to cover the railroad trains at Warrenton Junction until General Porter's corps had marched from that place, and then to run back the trains as far as practicable, and, covering them with his troops, to repair the bridges as fast as possible. I also directed Captain Merrill, of the engineers, with a considerable force, to repair the railroad track and bridges as far as possible in the direction of Bristow station. The road was accordingly put in order from Warrenton Junction to Kettle run, during the 27th, and the trains ran back to that point early next day.

At dark on the 27th General Hooker reported to me that his ammunition was nearly exhausted; that he had but five rounds to a man left. I had by that time become convinced that the whole force under Jackson, consisting of his own, A. P. Hill's and Ewell's divisions, was south of the turnpike, and in the immediate neighborhood of Manassas Junction. General McDowell reached his position during the night of the 27th, as did also Kearney and Reno, and it was clear on that night that we had interposed completely between Jackson and the main body of the enemy, which was still west of the Bull Run range, and in the neighborhood of White Plains. Thinking it altogether likely that Jackson would mass his whole force and attempt to turn our right at Bristow station, and knowing that Hooker, for want of ammunition, was in little condition to make long resistance, I sent back orders to General Porter, about dark of the 27th, to move forward at 1 o'clock in the night, and report to me at Bristow by daylight in the morning, leaving instructions in some detail for Banks, who was expected at Warrenton Junction during that night or early in the morning. The orders for all these movements are herewith appended. General Porter failed utterly to obey the orders that were sent to him, giving as an excuse that his men were tired, that they would straggle in the night, and that a wagon train proceeding eastward in the rear of Hooker's division would offer obstructions to his march. He, however, made no attempt whatever to comply with this order, although it was stated to him, in the order itself, that his presence was necessary on all accounts at daylight, and that the officer delivering the despatch was instructed to conduct him to the field.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,

*Bristow Station, August 27, 1862—6.30 p. m.*

GENERAL: The major general commanding directs that you start at 1 o'clock to-night, and come forward with your whole corps, or such part of it as is with you, so as to be here by daylight to-morrow morning. Hooker has had a very severe action with the enemy, with a loss of about three hundred killed and wounded. The enemy has been driven back, but is retiring along the railroad. We must drive him from Manassas and clear the country between that place and Gainesville, where McDowell is. If Morell has not joined you, send him word to push forward immediately; also send word to Banks to hurry forward with all speed to take your place at Warrenton Junction. It is necessary on all accounts that you



should be here by daylight. I send an officer with this despatch, who will conduct you to this place. Be sure to send word to Banks, who is on the road from Fayetteville, probably in the direction of Bealeton. Say to Banks, also, that he had best run back the railroad train to this side of Cedar run. If he is not with you, write him to that effect.

By command of General Pope :

GEO. D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

Major General F. J. PORTER, *Warrenton Junction.*

P. S.—If Banks is not at Warrenton Junction, leave a regiment of infantry and two pieces of artillery as a guard till he comes up, with instructions to follow you immediately upon his doing so.

If Banks is not at the Junction, instruct Colonel Clary to run the trains back to this side of Cedar run, and post a regiment and a section of artillery with it.

By command of General Pope :

GEO. D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

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HEADQUARTERS, *Bristow, August 27, 1862—9 p. m.*

Major General KEARNEY : At the very earliest blush of dawn push forward with your command with all speed to this place. You cannot be more than three or four miles distant. Jackson, A. P. Hill, and Ewell, are in front of us. Hooker has had a severe fight with them to-day. McDowell marches upon Manassas Junction from Gainesville to-morrow at daybreak. Reno upon the same place at the same hour. I want you here at day-dawn, if possible, and we shall bag the whole crowd. Be prompt and expeditious, and never mind wagon trains or roads till this affair is over. Lieutenant Brooks will deliver you this communication. He has one for General Reno and one for General McDowell. Please have these despatches sent forward instantly by a trusty staff officer, who will be sure to deliver them without fail, and make him bring back a receipt to you before daylight. Lieutenant Brooks will remain with you and bring you to this camp. Use the cavalry I send you to escort your staff officer to McDowell and Reno.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Bristow Station, August 22, 1862—9 p. m.*

Major General McDOWELL : At daylight to-morrow morning march rapidly on Manassas Junction with your whole force, resting your right on the Manassas Gap railroad, throwing your left well to the east. Jackson, Ewell, and A. P. Hill, are between Gainesville and Manassas Junction. We had a severe fight with them to-day, driving them back several miles along the railroad. If you will march promptly and rapidly at the earliest dawn of day upon Manassas

Junction, we shall bag the whole crowd. I have directed Reno to march from Greenwich at the same hour upon Manassas Junction, and Kearney, who is in his rear, to march on Bristow at daybreak. Be expeditious and the day is our own.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Bristow Station, August 28, 1862—10.40 a. m.*

GENERAL : Major General Pope directs me to say that as soon as the railroad trains and all public property shall have been safely run back from Warrenton Junction you will move your command back to Kettle Run bridge, where you will find the railroad obstructed and the railroad trains stopped. You will there take the same measures to save the public property from attack by the enemy as directed in copy of General Orders from these headquarters sent to you yesterday, through Major General Porter.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

Major General BANKS, *Warrenton Junction.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

There were but two courses left open to Jackson, in consequence of this sudden and unexpected movement of the army. He could not retrace his steps through Gainesville, as it was occupied by McDowell, having at command a force equal, if not superior to his own. He was either obliged, therefore, to retreat through Centreville, which would carry him still further from the main body of Lee's army, or to mass his forces, assault us at Bristow station, and turn our right. He pursued the former course, and retired through Centreville. This mistake of Jackson's alone saved us from the serious consequences which would have followed this disobedience of orders on the part of General Porter.

At 9 o'clock on the night of the 27th, satisfied of Jackson's position, I sent orders to General McDowell to push forward at the very earliest dawn of day toward Manassas Junction from Gainesville, resting his right on the Manassas Gap railroad, and throwing his left well to the east. I directed General Reno to march at the same hour from Greenwich, direct upon Manassas Junction, and Kearney to march at the same hour upon Bristow. This latter order was sent to Kearney to render my right at Bristow perfectly secure against the probable movement of Jackson in that direction. Kearney arrived at Bristow about 8 o'clock in the morning. Reno being on the left, and marching direct upon Manassas Junction, I immediately pushed Kearney forward in pursuit of Ewell, toward Manassas, followed by Hooker. General Porter's corps did not arrive at Bristow until half-past 10 o'clock in the morning, and the moment he found that Jackson had evacuated Manassas Junction he requested permission to halt at Bristow and rest his men. Sykes's division, of Porter's corps, had spent the whole day of the 27th, from 10 o'clock in the morning until daylight of the 28th, in camp at Warrenton Junction. Morell's division, of the same corps, had arrived at Warrenton Junction during the day of the 27th, and also remained

there during the whole of that night. Porter's corps was by far the freshest in the whole army, and should have been, and I believe was, in better condition for service than any troops we had. General McDowell reported to me afterwards that he had given orders for the movement of his command upon Manassas Junction at 2 o'clock at night, in accordance with the directions I had sent him, but that General Sigel, who commanded his advance, and was at Gainesville, instead of moving forward from Gainesville at daylight, as he was ordered, was absolutely with his advance in that town as late as 7½ o'clock in the morning. Meantime, beginning about 3 o'clock in the morning of the 28th, Jackson commenced evacuating Manassas Junction, and his troops were marching from that point in the direction of Centreville until 10 or 11 o'clock in the day. If the whole force under McDowell had moved forward as directed, and at the time specified, they would have intercepted Jackson's retreat toward Centreville by 8 o'clock in the morning, and I do not believe it would have been possible for Jackson to have crossed Bull run, so closely engaged with our forces, without heavy loss.—(See McDowell's report concerning the delay of General Sigel.)

I reached Manassas Junction, with Kearney's division and Reno's corps, about 12 o'clock on the day of the 28th, less than an hour after Jackson, in person, had retired. I immediately pushed forward Hooker, Kearney, and Reno upon Centreville, and sent orders to Fitz-John Porter to come forward to Manassas Junction. I also wrote to McDowell and stated the facts, so far as we were then able to ascertain them, and directed him to call back the whole of his force that had come in the direction of Manassas Junction, and to move forward upon Centreville. He had, however, without my knowledge, detached Ricketts's division in the direction of Thoroughfare gap, and that division was no longer available in his movement toward Centreville.

Late in the afternoon of the the 28th Kearney drove the enemy's rear-guard out of Centreville and occupied that town, with his advance beyond it, about dark. The enemy retreated through Centreville, one portion of his force taking the road by Sudley Springs, and the other pursuing the Warrenton turnpike toward Gainesville, destroying the bridges on that road over Bull run and Cub run; McDowell, with his whole force, consisting of his own corps, (except Ricketts's division,) Sigel's corps, and the division of Reynolds, marching in the direction of Centreville, encountered the advance of Jackson's force retreating toward Thoroughfare gap, about 6 o'clock on the evening of the 28th. A severe action took place between King's division, of McDowell's corps, and the advance of Jackson, which was terminated by darkness. Each party maintained its ground. Gibbon's brigade, of King's division, which was in the advance of that division, sustained the brunt of the action, but was supported handsomely by Doubleday's brigade, which came into action shortly after. This engagement and its result were reported to me near Centreville about 10 o'clock that night. I felt sure then, and so stated, that there was no escape for Jackson. I accordingly sent orders to General McDowell, as also to General King, several times during the night of the 29th, and once by his own staff officer, to hold his ground at all hazards, and prevent the retreat of Jackson to the west, and that at daylight in the morning our whole force from Centreville and Manassas Junction would be up with the enemy, who must be crushed between us. I also sent orders to General Kearney to push forward at 1 o'clock that night, cautiously, from Centreville along the Warrenton turnpike, to drive in the pickets of the enemy, and to keep closely in contact with him during the night; to rest his left on the Warrenton turnpike, and throw his right well to the north, if possible across Little River turnpike; at daylight in the morning to assault vigorously with his right advance; and that Hooker and Reno would be up with him very shortly after day-dawn. I sent orders to General Porter, whom I supposed to be at Manassas Junction, where he should have been, in compliance with my

orders of the day previous, to move upon Centreville at the earliest dawn, and stated to him the position of the forces, and that a severe battle would undoubtedly be fought during the morning of the 29th. The only apprehension I had at that time was, that Jackson might attempt to retreat to the north, in the direction of Leesburg, and for the purpose of preventing this, I directed Kearney to keep closely in contact with him during the whole of the night of the 28th. My force was so disposed that McDowell, Sigel, and Reynolds, whose joint forces amounted to about twenty-five thousand men, were immediately west of Jackson, and between him and Thoroughfare gap, while Kearney, Hooker, Reno, and Porter, about twenty-five thousand strong, were to fall on him from the east at daylight in the morning or very shortly after. With this disposition of troops we were so far in advance of Longstreet, that, by using our whole force vigorously, we should be able to crush Jackson before Longstreet could by any possibility reach the scene of action.

To my great disappointment, however, I learned toward daylight, on the morning of the 29th, that King's division had fallen back in the direction of Manassas Junction, thus leaving open the road to Thoroughfare gap, and making new movements and dispositions of troops immediately necessary.

I submit herewith the reports of Generals, King, Gibbon, and Doubleday, of the action of the evening of the 28th, as also a detailed report of General McDowell. The orders directing all these movements are also appended, and they bring the operations of the army up to the 29th of August.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Bristow Station, August 28, 1862—10.50 a. m.*

Colonel CLARY, *Chief Quartermaster Army of Virginia :*

Major General Pope directs that all the wagon trains be kept closed up and close in rear of the troops. You will accordingly give instructions to the various subordinate quartermasters, including regimental quartermasters, to keep their trains closed and immediately in rear of the troops. Please see that this order is executed.

By command of Major General Pope :

GEO. D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Bristow Station, August 28, 1862—11 a. m.*

SIR : Major General Pope directs that you take measures to hunt up the wounded of the enemy, and to provide for them the same as for our own soldiers.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

Surgeon McPARLIN,  
*Medical Director Army of Virginia.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
Bristow Station, August 28, 1862—11.10 a. m.

Lieutenant F. J. SHUNK, *Chief of Ordnance, Army of Virginia* :

The major general commanding directs that one or two boxes of ammunition be thrown into every wagon that passes the railroad train where the ammunition now is, no matter to whom the wagon or wagon train belongs.

By command of Major General Pope :

GEO. D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de Camp.*

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SPECIAL ORDERS }  
No. —.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
August 28, 1862.

The trains will come forward in the following order, viz: 1st, Heintzelman's; 2d, McDowell's; 3d, Sigel's; 4th, Porter's.

All the supply and regimental trains will be sent forward to this place as rapidly as possible, ammunition being forwarded in advance of all other supplies.

By command of Major General Pope :

GEO. D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
Bristow Station, August 28, 1862—11.20 a. m.

Colonel CLARY, *Chief Quartermaster Army of Virginia* :

The major general commanding directs that one or two boxes of ammunition be thrown into every wagon that passes the railroad train where the ammunition now is, no matter to whom the wagon or wagon train belongs. He also directs that the railroad trains be unloaded into the passing wagon trains in the same manner, commencing first to unload the ammunition as herein before directed.

By command of Major General Pope :

GEO. D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
Manassas Junction, August 28, 1862—1.20 p. m.

Major General McDOWELL: I sent you a despatch a few minutes ago, directing you to move on Gum Springs to intercept Jackson. Since then I have received your note of this morning. I will this evening push forward Reno to Gainesville, and follow with Heintzelman, unless there is a large force of the enemy at Centreville, which I do not believe. Ascertain, if you can, about this. I do not wish you to carry out the order to proceed to Gum Spring if you consider it

too hazardous, but I will support you in any way you suggest, by pushing forward from Manassas Junction across the turnpike. Jackson has a large train, which should certainly be captured. Give me your views fully. You know the country much better than I do. Come no further in this direction with your command, but call back what has advanced thus far.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Near Bull Run, August 28, 1862—9.50 p. m.*

GENERAL: General McDowell has intercepted the retreat of the enemy and is now in his front, Sigel on the right of McDowell. Unless he can escape by by-paths leading to the north to-night he must be captured. I desire you to move forward at 1 o'clock to-night, even if you can carry with you no more than two thousand men, though I trust you will carry the larger part of your division. Pursue the turnpike from Centreville to Warrenton. The enemy is not more than three and a half miles from you. Seize any of the people of the town to guide you. Advance cautiously and drive in the enemy's pickets to-night, and at early dawn attack him vigorously. Hooker shall be close behind you. Extend your right well toward the north and push forward your right wing well in the attack. Be sure to march not later than one, with all the men you can take.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General KEARNEY.

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Near Bull Run, August 28, 1862—10 p. m.*

GENERAL: General McDowell has intercepted the retreat of the enemy. Sigel is immediately on his right, and I see no possibility of his escape. I have instructed Kearney to push forward cautiously at 1 o'clock to-night until he drives in the pickets of the enemy, and to assault him vigorously at daylight in the morning. It is of the last importance that Hooker should be close in his rear. I desire, therefore, that Hooker shall march at 3 o'clock to-night, taking the turnpike from Centreville to Warrenton, and resting on that road one and a half mile beyond Centreville, as reserve for Kearney. Send a copy of this despatch to Hooker immediately, and I beg you particularly to see that Hooker marches at the hour specified, even if he should have to do so with one-half of his men. I shall rely upon this.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General HEINTZELMAN.

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

The losses in King's division, in the action of the evening of the 28th, were principally in Gibbon's brigade of that division, and numbered ——. Gibbon's brigade consisted of some of the best troops in the service, and the conduct of both men and officers was gallant and distinguished. The report of General King, herewith appended, exhibits his high opinion of the conduct of this brigade, and of the officers who distinguished themselves in that action. The disposition of the troops on the west of Jackson having failed through Ricketts's movement towards Thoroughfare gap, and the consequent withdrawal of King, an immediate change in the disposition and the proposed movements of the troops for the succeeding day became necessary, and about daylight on the morning of the 29th, shortly after I received information of the withdrawal of King's division, I sent orders to General Sigel, who was in the neighborhood of Groveton supported by Reynolds's division, to attack the enemy vigorously as soon as it was light enough to see, and bring him to a stand, if it were possible for him to do so. I instructed General Heintzelman to push forward from Centreville towards Gainesville at the earliest dawn, with the divisions of Hooker and Kearney, and directed General Reno to follow closely in his rear, to use all speed, and as soon as they came up with the enemy to establish communication with Sigel, and attack with the utmost promptness and vigor. I also sent orders to Major General Fitz John Porter, at Manassas Junction, to move forward with the utmost rapidity, with his own corps and King's division of McDowell's corps, which was supposed to be at that point, upon Gainesville, by the direct road from Manassas Junction to that place. I urged him to make all speed, that he might come up with the enemy and be able to turn his flank near where the Warrenton turnpike is intersected by the road from Manassas Junction to Gainesville. Shortly after sending this order I received a note from General McDowell, whom I had not been able to find during the night of the 28th, dated at Manassas Junction, requesting that King's division might not be taken from his command. I immediately sent a joint order to Generals McDowell and Porter, directing them, with their two corps, to march with all speed towards Gainesville, on the direct road from Manassas Junction. This order, which is appended, sets forth in detail the movements they were directed to make :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Near Bull Run, August 29, 1862—3 a. m.*

GENERAL : McDowell has intercepted the retreat of Jackson. Sigel is immediately on the right of McDowell. Kearney and Hooker march to attack the enemy's rear at early dawn. Major General Pope directs you to move upon Centreville, at the first dawn of day, with your whole command, leaving your trains to follow. It is very important that you should be here at a very early hour in the morning. A severe engagement is likely to take place, and your presence is necessary.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
GEO. D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

Major General PORTER.

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Near Bull Run, August 29, 1862—5 a. m.*

GENERAL : I sent you some verbal orders by Colonel Smith last night. News from the front, received since, makes it necessary to modify them. You

will accordingly move rapidly on Centreville by the road past these headquarters. Upon arriving at Centreville you will take the turnpike towards Warrenton, and push forward rapidly. You will find the whole corps of Heintzelman in front of you. Pass his stragglers, and keep well up with his command; pushing rapidly towards any heavy firing you may hear.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

Major General RENO.

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

GENERAL ORDERS }  
No. 5.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Centreville, August 30, 1862.*

Generals McDOWELL and PORTER : You will please move forward with your joint commands towards Gainesville. I sent General Porter written orders to that effect an hour and a half ago. Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno are moving on the Warrenton turnpike, and must now be not far from Gainesville. I desire that, as soon as communication is established between this force and your own, the whole command shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back behind Bull run, at Centreville, to-night. I presume it will be so on account of our supplies. I have sent no orders of any description to Ricketts, and none to interfere in any way with the movements of McDowell's troops, except what I sent by his aide-de-camp last night, which were, to hold his position on the Warrenton pike until the troops from here should fall upon the enemy's flank and rear. I do not even know Ricketts's position, as I had not been able to find out where General McDowell was until a late hour this morning. General McDowell will take immediate steps to communicate with General Ricketts, and instruct him to rejoin the other divisions of the corps as soon as practicable. If any considerable advantages are to be gained by departing from this order it will not be strictly carried out. One thing must be had in view—that the troops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull run to-night, or by morning. The indications are that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direction at a pace that will bring them here by to-morrow night or next day. My own headquarters will be for the present with Heintzelman's corps, or at this place.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,

*August 29—4.30 p. m.*

Major General PORTER : Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's right flank. I desire you to push forward into action at once, on the enemy's flank, and, if possible, on his rear, keeping your right in communication with General Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you engage their flank. Keep heavy reserves, and use your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you are



obliged to fall back, do so to your right and rear, so as to keep you in close communication with the right wing.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,

*In the field, August 29, 1862—5 p. m.*

GENERAL : I would prefer that you send your trains direct to Manassas Junction and Centreville. The road is clear and there is no difficulty about it. Send them through as soon as you can. Send back working parties to try and get the railroad in sufficient good order that the trains may be worked back to Bull run. This is of the last importance, and you cannot get it done too soon. Work night and day at it.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General BANKS.

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

Sigel attacked the enemy about daylight on the morning of the 29th, a mile or two east of Groveton, where he was soon joined by the divisions of Hooker and Kearney. Jackson fell back several miles, but was so closely pressed by these forces that he was compelled to make a stand, and to make the best defence possible. He accordingly took up a position with his left in the neighborhood of Sudley Springs, his right a little to the south of Warrenton turnpike, and his line covered by an old railroad grade which leads from Gainesville in the direction of Leesburg. His batteries, which were numerous, and some of them of heavy calibre, were posted behind the ridges in the open ground on both sides of Warrenton turnpike, while the mass of his troops was sheltered in dense woods behind the railroad embankment. I arrived on the field from Centreville about noon, and found the two armies confronting each other, both considerably cut up by the sharp action in which they had been engaged since daylight in the morning. Heintzelman's corps occupied the right of our line, in front or west of Sudley Springs road. General Sigel was on his left, with his line extended a short distance south of the Warrenton turnpike, the division of General Schenck occupying the high ground to the left of the road. The extreme left was occupied by Reynolds. General Reno's corps had reached the field, and most of it had been pushed forward into action, leaving four regiments in reserve, and in rear of the centre of our line. Immediately after I reached the ground, General Sigel reported to me that his line was weak ; that the divisions of Schurz and Steinwehr were much cut up, and ought to be drawn back from the front. I informed General Sigel that this was utterly impossible, as there were no troops to replace them, and that he must hold his ground ; that I would not again push his troops into action, as the corps of Porter and McDowell were moving forward from Manassas Junction, on the road to Gainesville, and must very soon be in position to fall upon the enemy's right flank, and probably upon his rear. I rode to the front of our line, and inspected it from right to left, giving the same information to Generals Heintzelman and Reno. The troops were accordingly suffered to rest in their positions, and to resupply themselves with ammu-

dition. From 12 until 4 o'clock very severe skirmishes occurred constantly at various points on our line, and were brought on at every indication the enemy made of a disposition to retreat. About 2 o'clock in the afternoon several pieces of artillery were discharged on the extreme right of the enemy's line, and I fully believed that Generals Porter and McDowell had reached their positions, and had become engaged with the enemy. I did not hear more than three shots fired, and was at a loss to know what had become of those two corps, or what was delaying them, but I received information shortly afterwards that General McDowell was advancing to join the main body by the Sudley Springs road, and would probably be up with us in two hours. At half-past 4 o'clock I sent a peremptory order to General Porter to push forward at once into action on the enemy's right, and if possible to turn his rear, stating to him, generally, the condition of things on the field in front of me. About 5½ o'clock, when General Porter should have been coming into action, in compliance with this order, I directed Generals Heintzelman and Reno to attack the enemy. The attack was made with great gallantry, and the whole of the left of the enemy was doubled back towards his centre, and our own forces, after a sharp conflict of an hour and a half, occupied the field of battle, with the dead and wounded of the enemy in our hands. In this attack Grover's brigade, of Hooker's division, was particularly distinguished by a determined bayonet charge, breaking two of the enemy's lines, and penetrating to the third before it could be checked. By this time General McDowell had arrived on the field, and I pushed his corps immediately to the front, along the Warrenton turnpike, with orders to fall upon the enemy, who was retreating towards the pike from the direction of Sudley Springs. The attack along the turnpike was made by King's division at about sunset in the evening, but by that time the advance of the main body of the enemy, under Longstreet, had begun to reach the field, and King's division encountered a stubborn and determined resistance at a point about three-fourths of a mile in front of our line of battle.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,

*In the field, near Bull Run, August 29, 1862—8.50 p. m.*

GENERAL: Immediately upon the receipt of this order, the precise hour of receiving which you will acknowledge, you will march your command to the field of battle of to-day and report to me in person for orders. You are to understand that you are expected to comply strictly with this order, and to be present on the field within three hours after its receipt, or after daybreak to-morrow morning.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

Major General F. J. PORTER.

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

While this attack was going on the forces of Heintzelman and Reno continued to push back the left of the enemy in the direction of Warrenton turnpike, so that about 8 o'clock in the evening the greater portion of the field of battle was occupied by our army. Nothing was heard of General Porter up to that time, and his forces took no part whatever in the action, but were suffered by him to lie idle on their arms, within sight and sound of the battle, during the whole day. So far as I know he made no effort whatever to comply with my orders or to take part in the action. I do not hesitate to say that if he had discharged his duty as became a soldier, under the circumstances, and had made a vigorous attack on the enemy, as he was expected and directed to do, at any time up to 8 o'clock that night, we should have utterly crushed or captured the larger por-

tion of Jackson's force before he could have been, by any possibility, sufficiently re-enforced to have made an effective resistance. I did not myself feel for a moment that it was necessary for me, having given General Porter an order to march towards the enemy in a particular direction, to send him, in addition, specific orders to attack, it being his clear duty, and in accordance with every military precept, to have brought his forces into action wherever he encountered the enemy, when a furious battle with that enemy was raging during the whole day in his immediate presence. I believe, in fact I am positive, that at 5 o'clock on the afternoon of the 29th General Porter had in his front no considerable body of the enemy. I believed then, as I am very sure now, that it was easily practicable for him to have turned the right flank of Jackson, and to have fallen upon his rear; that if he had done so, we should have gained a decisive victory over the army under Jackson before he could have been joined by any of the forces of Longstreet, and that the army of General Lee would have been so crippled and checked by the destruction of this large force as to have been no longer in condition to prosecute further operations of an aggressive character.

Our losses during the 29th were very heavy, but no separate returns of killed and wounded for that day have been made to me. I believe, from all I could learn from corps commanders, and so reported, that our loss during that day was not less than six thousand or eight thousand killed and wounded, and I think the estimate will be confirmed by the general reports, which cover the losses during the battles of the 27th, 28th, 29th, and 30th of August, and the 1st of September. My estimate of the loss of the enemy, reported to the department on the morning of the 30th, was based upon the statements made to me by Generals Hooker and Kearney, who had been over the whole field on the left. General Hooker estimated the loss of the enemy as at least two to one, and General Kearney as at least three to one of our own.

Every indication, during the night of the 29th, and up to 10 o'clock on the morning of the 30th, pointed to the retreat of the enemy from our front. Paroled prisoners of our own, taken on the evening of the 29th, and who came into our lines on the morning of the 30th, reported the enemy retreating during the whole night in the direction of and along the Warrenton turnpike; Generals McDowell and Heintzelman, who reconnoitred the positions held by the enemy's left on the evening of the 29th, confirming this statement. They reported to me that the positions occupied by the enemy's left had been evacuated, and that there was every indication that he was retreating in the direction of Gainesville.

On the morning of the 30th, as may be supposed, our troops, who had been so continually marching and fighting for so many days, were in a state of great exhaustion. They had had little to eat for two days previous, and artillery and cavalry horses had been in harness and saddle continuously for ten days, and had had no forage for two days previous. It may easily be imagined how little these troops, after such severe labors, and after undergoing such hardships and privation, were in condition for active and efficient service. I had telegraphed to the general-in-chief on the 28th our condition, and had begged of him to have rations and forage sent forward to us from Alexandria with all despatch. I informed him of the imminent need of cavalry horses to enable the cavalry belonging to the army to perform any service whatever. About daylight of the 30th I received a note from General Franklin, herewith appended, written by direction of General McClellan, and dated at 8 o'clock p. m. on the 29th, informing me that rations and forage would be loaded into the available wagons and cars at Alexandria as soon as I would send back a cavalry escort to bring out the trains.

AUGUST 29, 1862—8 p. m.

*To Commanding Officer at Centreville:*

I have been instructed by General McClellan to inform you that he will have all the available wagons at Alexandria loaded with rations for your troops, and all of the cars, also, as soon as you will send in a cavalry escort to Alexandria as a guard to the train.

Respectfully,

W. B. FRANKLIN,  
*Major General Commanding Sixth Corps.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

Such a letter, when we were fighting the enemy, and Alexandria was swarming with troops, needs no comment. Bad as was the condition of our cavalry, I was in no situation to spare troops from the front, nor could they have gone to Alexandria and returned within the time by which we must have had provisions or have fallen back in the direction of Washington. Nor do I yet see what service cavalry could have rendered in guarding railroad trains. It was not until I received this letter that I began to feel discouraged and nearly hopeless of any successful issue to the operations with which I was charged; but I felt it to be my duty, notwithstanding the desperate condition of my command from great fatigue, from want of provisions and forage, and from the small hope that I had of any effective assistance from Alexandria, to hold my position at all hazards and under all privations, unless overwhelmed by the superior forces of the enemy. I had received no sort of information of any troops coming forward to my assistance since the 24th, and did not expect on the morning of the 30th that any assistance would reach me from the direction of Washington; but I determined again to give battle to the enemy on the 30th, and at least to lay on such blows as would cripple him as much as possible, and delay as long as practicable any further advance toward the capital. I accordingly prepared to renew the engagement.

BULL RUN, *August 30, 1862—6.30 a. m.*

COLONEL: You will immediately send to Alexandria an officer to bring out all supplies of forage and stores, forage particularly, required for this command. The stores will be brought to Fairfax by rail, and thence by wagon to Centreville. The officers sent by you will obtain from the commanding officer at Alexandria the escort necessary to protect the trains.

By command of General Pope:

GEO. D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

Colonel CLARY,  
*Chief Quartermaster Army of Virginia.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

At that time my effective forces, greatly reduced by losses in killed, wounded, missing, and broken-down men, during the severe operations of the two or three days and nights previous, the sharp actions of Hooker, King, and Ricketts on the 27th and 28th, and the furious battle on the 29th, were estimated by me and others as follows: McDowell's corps, including Reynolds's division, twelve thousand men; Sigel's corps, seven thousand; Reno's corps, seven thousand; Heitzelman's corps, seven thousand; Porter's corps, which had been in no engagement, and was, or ought to have been, perfectly fresh, I estimated at about twelve thousand men, including the brigade of Piatt, which formed a part of

Sturgis's division, and the only portion that ever joined me; but of this force the brigades of Piatt and Griffin, numbering, as I understood, about five thousand men, had been suffered to march off at daylight on the 30th for Centreville, and were not available for operations on that day. This reduced Porter's effective force in the field to about seven thousand men, which gave me a total force of forty thousand men. Banks's corps, about five thousand strong, was at Bristow station in charge of the railroad trains and of a portion of the wagon trains of the army still at that place. Between 12 and 2 o'clock in the day I advanced the corps of Porter, supported by King's division of McDowell's corps, to attack the enemy along the Warrenton turnpike; at the same time I directed Heintzelman and Reno, on our right, to push forward to the left and front toward Warrenton turnpike, and attack the enemy's left in flank if possible. For a short time, Ricketts's division of McDowell's corps was placed in support of this movement on our right. It was necessary for me to act thus promptly and make the attack, as I had not the time, for want of provisions and forage, to await an attack from the enemy, nor did I think it policy to do so under the circumstances.

During the whole night of the 29th, and the morning of the 30th, the advance of the main army, under Lee, was arriving on the field to re-enforce Jackson, so that by 12 or 1 o'clock in the day we were confronted by forces greatly superior to our own; and these forces were being every moment largely increased by fresh arrivals of the enemy from the direction of Thoroughfare gap. Every moment of delay increased the odds against us, and I therefore advanced to the attack as rapidly as I was able to bring my forces into action. Shortly after General Porter moved forward to the attack by the Warrenton turnpike, and the assault on the enemy was begun by Heintzelman and Reno on the right, it became apparent that the enemy was massing his troops as fast as they arrived on the field on his right, and was moving forward from that direction to turn our left, at which point it was plain he intended to make his main attack. I accordingly directed General McDowell to recall Ricketts's division immediately from our right, and post it on the left of our line. The attack of Porter was neither vigorous nor persistent, and his troops soon retired in considerable confusion. As soon as they commenced to fall back the enemy advanced to the assault, and our whole line, from right to left, was soon furiously engaged. The main attack of the enemy was made upon our left, but was met with stubborn resistance by the divisions of General Schenck, General Milroy, and General Reynolds, who, shortly after the action began, were re-enforced on the left and rear by the whole of Ricketts's division. The action raged furiously for several hours, the enemy bringing up his heavy reserves and pouring mass after mass of his troops upon our left. So greatly superior in number were his forces that, while overpowering us on our left, he was able to assault us with superior forces on our right. Porter's forces were rallied and brought to a halt as they were retiring to the rear. As soon as they could be used I pushed them forward to support our left, and they there rendered distinguished service, especially the brigade of regulars under Colonel Buchanan. Tower's brigade of Ricketts's division was pushed forward into action in support of Reynolds's division, and was led forward in person by General Tower with conspicuous skill and gallantry. The conduct of that brigade, in plain view of all the forces on our left, was especially distinguished, and drew forth hearty and enthusiastic cheers. The example of this brigade was of great service, and infused new spirit into all the troops who witnessed its intrepid conduct. Reno's corps was also withdrawn from its position on our right centre late in the afternoon, and was thrown into action on our left, where it behaved with conspicuous gallantry. Notwithstanding these great disadvantages, our troops held their ground with the utmost firmness and obstinacy. The loss on both sides was very heavy. By dark our left had been forced back about half or three-quarters of a mile, but still remained

firm and unbroken and still covered the turnpike in our rear. About 6 o'clock in the afternoon I heard accidentally that Franklin's corps had arrived at a point about four miles east of Centreville and twelve miles in our rear, and that it was only about eight thousand strong.

The result of the battle of the 30th, the very heavy losses we had suffered, and the complete prostration of our troops from hunger and fatigue, made it plain to me that we were no longer able, in the face of such overwhelming odds, to maintain our position so far to the front; nor could we have been able to do so under any circumstances, suffering as were the men and horses from fatigue and hunger, and weakened by the heavy losses incident to the uncommon hardships which they had suffered. About 8 o'clock at night, therefore, I sent written instructions to the commanders of corps to withdraw leisurely towards Centreville, and stated to them what route each should pursue, and where they should take post. General Reno was instructed, with his whole corps, to cover the movement of the army toward Centreville. The withdrawal was made slowly, quietly and in good order, no pursuit whatever having been attempted by the enemy. A division of infantry, with its batteries, was posted to cover the crossing at Cub run.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Battle-field, near Groveton, August 30, 1862—9 a. m.*

Colonel CLARY, *Chief Quartermaster Army of Virginia :*

Major General Pope directs that you send two hundred and fifty (250) wagons to Major General Banks, in order that he may remove his sick and public property from his present position to Centreville or vicinity.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Near Groveton, August 30.*

COLONEL : General Pope directs that all the wagons at Centreville be unloaded there, and the property stored. The wagons will then be sent to Sangster's station to haul subsistence stores from that place to Centreville.

By command of Major General Pope :

GEO. D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

Colonel BECKWITH,  
*Chief Commissary.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,

August 30, 1862—6 p. m.

General FRANKLIN: Post your command, and whatever other troops you can collect, and put them in the fortifications at, and other strong positions around, Centreville, and hold these positions to the last extremity.

By command of General Pope:

GEO. D. RUGGLES

*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

AUGUST 30—6.45 p. m.

Colonel CLARY: You will immediately put all the wagons, and everything that interferes with the range of artillery from the works at Centreville, a good distance to the rear, on the other side of the town—out of range of artillery from the works.

By command of Major General Pope:

GEO. D. RUGGLES,

*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

AUGUST 30, 1862—3 p. m.

[To be opened and read by Generals Kearney and Hooker.]

GENERAL: Retire to Centreville to-night with your command. If possible go by the way of Sudley's ford. General Reno commands the rear-guard on the turnpike by which the balance of the army will fall back. Upon your arrival at Centreville, you will assemble your command on the north side of that town. Early in the morning proper positions will be assigned you.

By command of Major General Pope:

GEO. D. RUGGLES,

*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

General HEINTZELMAN.

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

SPECIAL ORDERS }  
No. —. }

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,

*Centreville, August 30, 1862.*

The prisoners of war now at this place will be sent to-morrow to Washington city, under guard of one regiment of infantry, to be furnished for this purpose by Major General McDowell.

By command of Major General Pope:

GEO. D. RUGGLES,

*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

CENTREVILLE, August 30, 1862—9.45 p. m.

Major General HALLECK, *General in-Chief*:

We have had a terrific battle again to-day. The enemy, largely re-enforced, assaulted our position early to-day. We held our ground firmly until 6 o'clock p. m., when the enemy, massing very heavy forces on our left, forced back that wing about half a mile. At dark we held that position. Under all the circumstances—both horses and men having been two days without food, and the enemy greatly outnumbering us—I thought it best to move back to this place at dark. The movement has been made in perfect order and without loss. The troops are in good heart, and marched off the field without the least hurry or confusion. Their conduct was very fine. The battle was most furious for hours without cessation, and the losses on both sides very heavy. The enemy is badly whipped, and we shall do well enough. Do not be uneasy. We will hold our own here. The labors and hardships of this army for two or three weeks have been beyond description. We have delayed the enemy as long as possible without losing the army. We have damaged him heavily, and I think the army entitled to the gratitude of the country. Be easy; everything will go well.

JNO. POPE, *Major General*.

P. S.—We have lost nothing—neither guns nor wagons.

AUGUST 30, 1862—6.30 p. m.

General BANKS: Destroy the public property at Bristow, and fall back upon Centreville at once. Destroy all the railroad property. Your troops at Bristow will withdraw through Brentsville. Your troops at Manassas and between there and Bristow will withdraw to Centreville.

By command of Major General Pope:

GEO. D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff*.

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp*.

The exact losses in this battle I am unable to give, as the reports received from the corps commanders only exhibit the aggregate losses during the whole of the operations from August 22d to September 2d. Before leaving the field that night I sent orders to General Banks, at Bristow station, to destroy the railroad trains and such of the stores in them as he was unable to carry off, and join me at Centreville. I had previously sent him orders to throw into each wagon of the army trains as much as possible of the stores from the railroad cars, and to be sure to bring off with him, from Warrenton Junction and Bristow station, all the ammunition and all the sick and wounded that could be transported, and for this purpose, if it were necessary, to throw out the personal baggage, tents, &c., from the regimental trains. These several orders are appended. At no time during August 28, 29, 30, and 31, was the road between Bristow station and Centreville interrupted by the enemy. The whole of the trains of the army were on that road, in charge of General Banks, and covered and protected by his whole corps. If any of these wagons were lost, as I believe none were, it was wholly without necessity. I enter thus specifically into this matter, and submit the orders sent to General Banks, and his subsequent report to me, because no part of the misrepresentation of this campaign has been greater than the statement of our heavy loss of wagons and supplies. The orders submitted will show conclusively that every arrangement was made, in the utmost detail, for the security of our trains and supplies, and I am quite



convinced that General Banks is not the man to neglect the duty with which he was charged.

I arrived at Centreville between 9 and 10 o'clock on the night of the 30th. On the same night I sent orders to the corps commanders to report to me in person as early after daylight as possible on the morning of the 31st, and on that morning the troops were directed to be posted as follows: Porter was to occupy the intrenchments on the north or right of Centreville; Franklin on his left in the intrenchments; in rear of Centreville, between Franklin and Porter, as a support, was posted the corps of Heintzelman; Sigel occupied the intrenchments on the left and south side of the town, with Reno on his left and rear. Banks was ordered to take post as soon as he arrived, on the north side of Bull run, and to cover the bridge on the road from Centreville to Manassas Junction; Sumner, as soon as he arrived, was ordered to take post between Centreville and Chantilly and to occupy Chantilly in force; McDowell was posted about two miles in the rear of Centreville, on the road to Fairfax Court House.

Ammunition trains and some provisions were gotten up on the 31st, and all corps commanders were notified, by special orders to each, that the ammunition trains were parked immediately in the rear of Centreville, and were directed to send officers to procure such ammunition as was needed in their respective corps. I directed the whole of the trains of the army to be unloaded at Centreville, and sent to Fairfax station to bring up forage and rations. We remained during the whole day of the 31st resting the men, getting up supplies of provisions, and resupplying the commands with ammunition.

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1862—11 a. m.

MY DEAR GENERAL: You have done nobly. Don't yield another inch if you can avoid it. All reserves are being sent forward. Couch's division goes to-day, part of it went to Sangster's station last night with Franklin and Sumner, who must be now with you. Can't you renew the attack? I don't write more particularly for fear the despatch will not reach you. I am doing all in my power for you and your noble army. God bless you and it. Send me news more often if possible.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

Major General POPE.

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

[Circular.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Camp near Centreville, August 31, 1862.*

Commanders of army corps will forthwith establish suitable grand guards in front of the positions they respectively hold, and have outposts thrown forward which shall furnish a line of sentinels covering the entire army. Those on the flanks will furnish a grand guard for the flanks. The advanced position this side of Cub run will only be held as an outpost, and the division now there will be withdrawn.

By command of Major General Pope:

GEORGE D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

A true copy:

[Circular to corps commanders.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Centreville, August 31, 1862—8.30 a. m.*

GENERAL: The major general commanding the army of Virginia directs me to instruct you to take measures immediately to bring forward and distribute ammunition for your command.

1. Men should be selected to guide the wagons to the troops to be supplied, to report to Lieutenant Colonel Smith, aide-de-camp, at these headquarters.
2. A report of the amount and kind of ammunition required in your command should be made to Lieutenant Colonel Smith.
3. Empty wagons should be collected and sent to report to Lieutenant Colonel Smith.

With great respect, general, your obedient servant,

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

A true copy:

E. HAIGHT,  
*Captain and Aide-de-Camp.*

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[Circular.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Centreville, August 31, 1862.*

Commanding officers of army corps will send back to Alexandria all wagons appertaining to their trains, except those absolutely necessary to haul subsistence stores and ammunition from Fairfax Court House to this place for their respective corps. This movement will be under charge of Colonel Clary, chief quartermaster, army of Virginia.

By command of Major General Pope:

GEO. D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Centreville, August 31, 1862—10.45 o'clock a. m.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

Our troops are all here, and in position, though much used up and worn out. I think perhaps it would have been greatly better if Sumner and Franklin had been here three or four days ago; but you may rely upon our giving them as desperate a fight as I can force our men to stand up to. I should like to know whether you feel secure about Washington, should this army be destroyed. I shall fight it as long as a man will stand up to the work. You must judge what is to be done, having in view the safety of the capital. The enemy is already pushing a cavalry reconnoissance in front of Cub run, whether in advance of an attack to-day I do not yet know. I send you this that you may know our position and my purpose.

JOHN POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

SPECIAL ORDERS }  
No. —. }

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Centreville, August 31, 1862.*

Carrol's brigade of Ricketts's division will proceed at once to Fairfax station, and take post as a guard for commissary stores at that point. The commanding officer of these troops will report upon his arrival at Fairfax station to Colonel E. G. Beckwith, chief commissary army of Virginia.

By command of Major General Pope:

GEO. D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Centreville, August 31, 1862.*

SIR: Major General Pope directs you at once to send two regiments of infantry and two pieces of artillery, to escort the wagon train now en route to Alexandria, as far as Cloud's mills.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

COMMANDING OFFICER *Forces at Fairfax Court House.*

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

CENTREVILLE, *August 31.*

DEAR GENERAL: Your despatch of 11 a. m. has been received, and I thank you for your considerate commendation. I would be glad to have it in such shape that the army might be acquainted with it. We shall fight to the last. The whole secession army engaged us yesterday. I had a letter from Lee this morning. Ewell is killed; Jackson badly wounded; other generals of less note wounded. The plan of the enemy will undoubtedly be to turn my flank. If he does so, he will have his hands full. My troops are in good heart. I need cavalry horses terribly. Send me ten thousand, in lots, and under strong escort. I have never yet received a single one.

JOHN POPPE, *Major General.*

Major General HALLECK.

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

The enemy's cavalry appeared in force in front of our advance at Cub run, during the morning of the 31st, but made no attempt to cross, and no attack upon our troops posted there. A few pieces of artillery were fired, but with no result on either side.

The whole force that I had at Centreville, as reported to me by the corps commanders, on the morning of the 1st of September, after receiving the corps of Sumner and Franklin, was as follows: McDowell's corps, 10,000 men; Sigel's corps, about 7,000; Heintzelman's corps, about 6,000; Reno's, 6,000; Banks's, 5,000; Sumner's, 11,000; Porter's, 10,000; Franklin's, 8,000; in all, 63,000 men. From these forces two brigades, as I before stated, had been

sent to Fairfax station, to guard the trains and the depot at that place, which makes it necessary to deduct 4,000 men. It is proper for me to state here, and I do it with regret and reluctance, that at least one-half of this great diminution of our forces was occasioned by skulking and straggling from the army. The troops which were brought into action fought with gallantry and determination, but thousands of men straggled away from their commands, and were not in any action. I had posted several regiments in rear of the field of battle on the 29th of August, and although many thousand stragglers and skulkers were arrested by them, many others passed around through the woods, and did not rejoin their commands during the remainder of the campaign. I had telegraphed to the general-in-chief, from Rappahannock station, on the 22d, that this practice of straggling was very common, and was reducing our force considerably even at that time. I also sent orders on the same day to General Sturgis to arrest all stragglers arriving in Alexandria; to confine them in military prisons, and to bring them to speedy trial. The active and incessant movements of the army prevented me, during the whole of this campaign, from giving that attention to the subject, except in orders, which ought to be and must be given to it, to preserve efficiency and discipline among any troops. Our cavalry at Centreville was completely broken down, no horses whatever having reached us to remount it. Generals Buford and Bayard, commanding the whole of the cavalry force of the army, reported to me that there were not five horses to the company that could be forced into a trot. It was impossible, therefore, to cover our front with cavalry, or to make cavalry reconnoissances, as is usual and necessary in front of an army. I directed General Sumner, on the morning of the 1st of September, to push forward a reconnoissance of two brigades toward the Little River turnpike, to ascertain if the enemy were making any movements in the direction of Germantown or Fairfax Court House.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Camp near Centreville, September 1, 1862—3 a. m.*

Major General SUMNER: The reconnoitring party of cavalry which you sent out yesterday morning, under Captain Haight, has, as I am informed, been captured by the enemy's cavalry. It is essential that your right be carefully watched. I desire you at daylight to push a reconnoissance of not less than one brigade, supported if necessary by a second, toward the north of your position, to the Little River turnpike, and beyond. The direction of your reconnoissance should be as nearly due north as practicable, and should be pushed not less than five miles. It is of great importance that this reconnoissance should be made at an early hour in the morning. The orderly whom you sent to me left me without any permission, so that I find it very difficult to find your headquarters. Please send him back.

JOHN POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

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[Circular.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Centreville, September 1, 1862.*

GENERAL: The major general commanding directs me to inform you that a large supply of ammunition has arrived since yesterday—say one hundred and twenty wagons, and that near the earthwork, close in rear of Centreville, an

officer will be found, charged with its distribution. The ammunition will be kept in the wagons in which it came, so as to be sent forward to the troops to be supplied immediately when required.

Major general commanding, &c.

With great respect, general, your obedient servant,

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*September 1—5.45 a. m.*

GENERAL: The reconnoissance is only designed to ascertain whether there is any considerable movement of the enemy's infantry towards our right and rear. We have no cavalry—not a horse that can possibly perform service, and it may be necessary, in order to obtain the information I desire, to drive off the enemy's cavalry. I do not care that the brigade shall be pushed further than the Little River turnpike, while skirmishers are thrown still further, in order fully to ascertain whether the enemy is making any movement toward Germantown and Fairfax Court House. I do not wish any engagement brought on at present on that ground, but when the information required shall have been obtained by the brigade, withdraw it.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General E. V. SUMNER.

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

The enemy was found moving again slowly toward our right; heavy columns of his forces being in march toward Fairfax along Little River pike. The main body of our forces was so much broken down and so completely exhausted, that they were in no condition, even on the 1st of September, for any active operations against the enemy; but I determined to attack at daylight on the 2d of September, in front of Chantilly. The movement of the enemy had become so developed by the afternoon of the 1st, and was so evidently directed at Fairfax Court House, with a view of turning my right, that I made the necessary disposition of troops to fight a battle between the Little River pike and the road from Centreville to Fairfax Court House. I sent General Hooker early in the afternoon to Fairfax Court House, and directed him to assemble all the troops that were in the vicinity, and to push forward to Germantown with his advance. I directed McDowell to move back along the road to Fairfax Court House, as far as Difficult creek, and to connect by his right with Hooker. Reno was to push forward to the north of the road from Centreville to Fairfax, in the direction of Chantilly. Heintzelman's corps was directed to take post on the road between Centreville and Fairfax, immediately in the rear of Reno. Franklin took post on McDowell's left and rear; Sumner was posted on the left of Heintzelman, while the corps of Sigel and Porter were directed to unite with the right of Sumner; Banks was instructed with the wagon trains of the army to pursue the old Braddock road and come into the Alexandria turnpike in the rear of Fairfax Court House. Just before sunset on the 1st the enemy attacked us on our right, but was met by Hooker, McDowell, Reno, and Kearney's division of Heintzelman's corps. A very severe action occurred in the midst of a

terrific thunder-storm, and was terminated shortly after dark. The enemy was driven back entirely from our front, but during that engagement we lost two of our best and one of our most distinguished officers—Major General Kearney and Brigadier General Stevens, who were both killed while gallantly leading their commands, and in front of their line of battle. It is unnecessary for me to say one word in commendation of two officers who were so well and widely known to the country. Words cannot express my sense of the zeal, the gallantry and sympathy of that most earnest and accomplished soldier, Major General Kearney. In him the country has suffered a loss which it will be difficult, if not impossible, to repair. He died as he would have wished to die, and as became his heroic character.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

Washington, D. C., September 1, 1862.

General POPE: Yours of last evening was received at 4 a. m. this morning. I want to issue a complimentary order, but as you are daily fighting, it could hardly be distributed. I will do so very soon. Look out well for your right, and don't let the enemy get between you and the forts. We are strengthening the line of defence as rapidly as possible. Horses will be sent to you to-day. Send despatches to me as often as possible. I hope for an arrival of cavalry to-day.

Yours truly,

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

P. S.—Acknowledge hour of receipt of this.

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

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CENTREVILLE, September 1—8.50 a. m.

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief:*

All was quiet yesterday, and so far this morning; my men all resting. They need it much. Forage for our horses is being brought up. Our cavalry is completely broken down, so that there are not five horses to a company that can raise a trot. The consequence is that I am forced to keep considerable infantry along the roads in my rear to make them secure, and even then it is difficult to keep the enemy's cavalry off the roads. I shall attack again to-morrow if I can—the next day certainly. I think it my duty to call your attention to the unsoldierly and dangerous conduct of many brigade and some division commanders of the forces sent here from the Peninsula. Every word and act and intention is discouraging, and calculated to break down the spirits of the men and to produce disaster. One commander of a corps who was ordered to march from Manassas Junction to join me near Groveton, although he was only five miles distant, failed to get up at all; and worse still, fell back to Manassas without a fight, and in plain hearing, at less than three miles distance, of a furious battle which raged all day. It was only in consequence of peremptory orders that he joined me next day. One of his brigades, the brigadier general of which professed to be looking for his division, absolutely remained all day at Centreville, in plain view of the battle, and made no attempt to join. What renders the whole matter worse, these are both officers of the regular army, who do not hold back from ignorance or fear. Their constant talk, indulged in publicly and in promiscuous company, is that "the army of the Potomac will not fight;" that they are demoralized by withdrawal from the Peninsula, &c. When such

example is set by officers of high rank, the influence is very bad among those in subordinate stations. You have hardly an idea of the demoralization among officers of high rank in the Potomac army, arising in all instances from personal feeling in relation to changes of commander-in-chief and others. These men are mere tools or parasites, but their example is producing, and must necessarily produce, very disastrous results. You should know these things, as you alone can stop it. Its source is beyond my reach, though its effects are very perceptible and very dangerous. I am endeavoring to do all I can, and will most assuredly put them where they shall fight or run away. My advice to you (I give it with freedom, as I know you will not misunderstand it) is, that in view of any satisfactory results you draw back this army to the intrenchments in front of Washington, and set to work in that secure place to reorganize and re-arrange it. You may avoid great disaster by doing so. I do not consider the matter except in a purely military light, and it is bad enough and great enough to make some action very necessary. Where there is no heart in their leaders, and every disposition to hang back, much cannot be expected from the men. Please hurry forward cavalry horses to me under strong escort. I need them badly—worse than I can tell you.

JOHN POPE, *Major General.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Near Centreville, September 1, 1862.*

GENERAL: General Pope directs you to establish your grand guards on the pike from Centreville to Warrenton. An outpost of one regiment of infantry and two pieces of artillery of Reynolds's division has been ordered to take post on the same road.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

Major General FRANKLIN.

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Near Centreville, September 1, 1862.*

The OFFICER *commanding the forces around Fairfax Court House :*

General Pope directs that you furnish one regiment of infantry as an escort for a wagon train from Fairfax Court House to Fairfax station. Lieutenant Devens, ninth infantry, will call for the escort as he proceeds through the town.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Centreville, September 1, 1862—11 o'clock a. m.*

Major General HALLECK: The enemy is deploying his forces on the Little River pike, and preparing to advance by that road on Fairfax Court House. This movement turns Centreville, and interposes between us and Washington, and will force me to attack his advance, which I shall do as soon as his movement is sufficiently developed. I have nothing like the force you undoubtedly suppose, and the fight will be necessarily desperate. I hope you will make all preparations to make a vigorous defence of the intrenchments around Washington.

JOHN POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

CENTREVILLE, *September 1, 1862—12 m.*

Major General McDOWELL: You will march rapidly back to Fairfax Court House with your whole division, assuming command of the two brigades now there, and immediately occupy Germantown with your whole force, so as to cover the turnpike from this place to Alexandria. Jackson is reported advancing on Fairfax with twenty thousand men. Move quickly.

JOHN POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Centreville, September 1, 1862—1 p. m.*

Major General HOOKER: You will at once proceed to Germantown, assume command of the troops arriving at Fairfax Court House, together with the brigades now under command of Colonels Torbert and Hincks.

By command of Major General Pope:

GEO. D. RUGGLES,

*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Centreville, September 1, 1862—12.30 p. m.*

Colonel A. T. TORBERT, *commanding brigade near Fairfax Court House:*

Move your brigade at once to Germantown, and join it to the one under Colonel Hincks at that place. Major General Hooker is assigned to the command of the forces arriving at Fairfax Court House from Washington, together with those stationed at Germantown.

By command of Major General Pope:

GEO. D. RUGGLES,

*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*



NEAR CENTREVILLE, *September 1, 1862—4 p. m.*

Major General McDOWELL: If you hear a battle raging to-night near Centreville, advance to the north, keeping your communications open with Reno, and near to him; also, by the right with Hooker, who will advance his left to your right.

By command of Major General Pope:

GEO. D. RUGGLES,

*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

GENERAL ORDERS }  
No. —.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Fairfax Court House, September 1, 1862.*

The army corps of Heintzelman, Sigel, Sumner, Porter, and Reno, as soon after daylight as possible, will begin to draw slowly to their right in the direction of Fairfax Court House, until they come closely in contact with each other. Major General Reno will follow as closely as possible the line of the old railroad now occupied by him, the others along the pike. He will notify those in his rear of his exact position, and every step of his movements, and will ask support if he needs it. They will not be more than half a mile in rear of him. If any severe engagement should occur at any point of the line, the army corps commanders nearest on the right and left will immediately send forward a staff officer to report to the general commanding the troops of the attack, and to notify him that they stand ready to support him if he needs it. For the present the general headquarters will be established at Fairfax Court House.

By command of Major General Pope:

GEO. D. RUGGLES,

*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Centreville, September 1, 1862—2 p. m.*

Colonel TORBERT: Send back word immediately to Alexandria to hurry up Couch's division, and all the troops coming from Washington to Germantown. They must be at Germantown as early this afternoon as possible—certainly to-night. They must take up strong positions there. There is no doubt the enemy is approaching you. Hold on to your position to the last. The whole army is on the move to join you.

By command of Major General Pope:

GEO. D. RUGGLES,

*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

A true copy:

T. C. H. SMITH,

*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

On the morning of the 2d of September, the enemy still continuing his movements toward our right, my whole force was posted behind Difficult creek, from Flint Hill to the Alexandria turnpike. Although we were quite able to maintain

our position at that place until the stragglers could be collected and the army, after its labors and perils, put into condition for effective service, I considered it advisable, for reasons which developed themselves at Centreville, were communicated to the general-in-chief, and are set forth herewith, that the troops should be drawn back to the intrenchments in front of Washington, and that some re-organization should be made of them, in order that earlier effective service should be secured than was possible in their condition at that time. I received orders about 12 o'clock on the 2d of September to draw back the forces within the intrenchments, which was done in good order, and without any interruption by the enemy.

FAIRFAX COURT HOUSE, *September 2, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK, *Washington :*

As I expected, the enemy last evening attacked my right furiously in the direction of Fairfax Court House, but were repulsed with heavy loss. Our loss was also severe. General Stevens being killed and Kearney missing. The enemy has not renewed the attack this morning, but is undoubtedly again beating around to the northeast. Your telegram of this date is just received, and its provisions will be carried out at once.

JOHN POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

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[Circular.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Fairfax Court House, September 2, 1862.*

The following movements of troops will at once be made, in accordance with the instruction from the War Department, viz :

1. Banks's corps will march by the Braddock road and Annandale, and take post at or near Fort North.
2. The corps of Franklin and Hooker will pursue the Little River pike towards Alexandria.
3. Heintzelman's corps, the Braddock road towards Fort Lyon.

McDowell's corps, the road by Fall's Church, Little River and Columbia pike towards Forts Craig and Tyllinghast. The corps of Porter, Sumner, and Sigel, *via* Vienna, toward the Chain bridge. These three latter corps will keep well closed up, and within easy supporting distance of each other. The cavalry under General Buford will follow and cover the march of the three corps of Porter, Sumner and Sigel; and Bayard the troops marching on the road south of it. Sumner will bring up the rear on the route he is ordered to pursue. Hooker will cover the rear on the Little River pike, and Banks the rear on the Braddock road. General Banks will call in the forces from Sangster's and Fairfax stations, and will break up the depot at the latter place, shipping all stores by rail to Alexandria. The wagon trains, except such as are in immediate use by the corps, will pursue the Little River pike to Alexandria. The commanding officers of the corps will send forward a capable officer to Alexandria to take charge of their respective trains, and will conduct them to the headquarters of their respective corps. The medical director will take immediate steps to have all the sick and wounded carried back to Alexandria. General Reno will take up the line of march immediately by the Little River turnpike to Alexandria.

The commanders of these various army corps will send forward, several hours in advance, staff officers to notify General McClellan of their approach to the points which they are to occupy.

By order of Major General Pope :

GEO. D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Fairfax, September 2, 1862.*

Major General HALLECK : The whole army is returning in good order, without confusion, or the slightest loss of property. The enemy has made no advances this morning, owing, no doubt, to his severe loss last evening. Three army corps pursue the route *via* Vienna to Chain bridge, covered by all the effective cavalry; ten corps by the Braddock road. These last corps are ordered to break up the depot at Fairfax station, call in the troops from Sangster's and elsewhere on the railroad, and move back to Alexandria. Our whole wagon train is far in advance of us towards the same place. Our whole force is less than sixty thousand men. Everything is being safely moved back to the intrenchments. When the stragglers can be assembled our force will be largely increased. I shall leave here with the last, and encamp to-night near Ball's Cross-roads.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

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NEW YORK, *January 27, 1863.*

A despatch was received from Major General Banks, on the 2d of September, stating that the wagon trains in his charge had all been brought in safely. Nothing lost. This despatch has been mislaid.

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*Ball's Cross-roads, September 2, 1862—7.10 p. m.*

Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief, Washington :*

I arrived here safely. Command coming in on the road without much molestation. Some artillery firing on the roads toward Vienna and Chain bridge, but nothing of a serious character so far as I can learn. Within an hour all the commands on the other roads will be in camp within the intrenchments; the three corps on the Vienna and Chain Bridge roads by to-morrow morning. I await your orders. The enemy still continue to beat around to the north. I do not myself believe that any attack here is contemplated. The troops are very weary, but otherwise in good condition.

•JOHN POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

The reasons which induced me, before I took the field in Virginia, to express to the government my desire to be relieved from the command of the army of Virginia, and to return to the west, existed in equal if not greater force at this time, than when I first stated them. I accordingly renewed urgently my application to be relieved. The government assented to it with some reluctance, and I was transferred to the department of the northwest, for which department I left Washington on the 7th of September.

It seems proper for me, since so much misrepresentation has been put into circulation as to the support I received from the army of the Potomac, to state precisely what forces of that army came under my command, and were, at any time, engaged in the active operations of the campaign. Reynolds's division of Pennsylvania reserves, about two thousand five hundred, joined me on the 23d of August, at Rappahannock station. The corps of Heintzelman and Porter, about eighteen thousand strong, joined me on the 26th and 27th of August, at Warrenton Junction. The Pennsylvania reserves, under Reynolds, and Heintzelman's corps, consisting of the divisions of Hooker and Kearney, rendered most gallant and efficient service in all the operations which occurred after they had reported to me. Porter's corps, from unnecessary and unusual delays, and frequent and flagrant disregard of my orders, took no part whatever, except in the action of the 30th of August. This small fraction of twenty thousand five hundred men was all of the ninety-one thousand veteran troops from Harrison's landing which ever drew trigger under my command, or in any way took part in that campaign. By the time the corps of Franklin and Sumner, nineteen thousand strong, joined me at Centreville, the original army of Virginia, as well as the corps of Heintzelman, and the division of Reynolds, had been so much cut up in the severe actions in which they had been engaged, and were so much broken down and diminished in numbers by the constant and excessive duties they had performed, that they were in little condition for any effective service whatever, and required and should have had some days of rest, to put them in anything like condition to perform their duties in the field.

Such is the history of a campaign, substantiated by documents written during the operations, and herein embodied, which has been misunderstood to an extent perhaps unparalleled in the history of warfare. I submit it here to the public judgment, with all confidence that it will be fairly and deliberately considered, and a just verdict pronounced upon it, and upon the army engaged in it. Upon such unbiased judgment I am very willing (setting aside any previous record I have made during the war) to rest my reputation as a soldier. I shall submit cheerfully to the verdict of my countrymen, but I desire that that verdict shall be rendered upon a full knowledge of the facts. I well understood, as does every military man, how difficult and how thankless was the duty devolved upon me, and I am not ashamed to say that I would gladly have avoided it if I could have done so consistently with my sense of duty to the government. To confront, with a small army, vastly superior forces; to fight battles without hope of victory, but only to gain time, and to embarrass and delay the forward movement of the enemy, is, of all duties, the most hazardous and the most difficult that can be imposed upon any general or any army. While such operations require the highest courage and endurance on the part of the troops, they are, perhaps, unlikely to be understood or appreciated, and the results, however successful, have little in them to attract popular attention and applause. At no time could I have hoped to fight a successful battle with the immensely superior force of the enemy which confronted me, and which was able at any time to out-flank me and bear my small army to the dust. It was only by constant movement, by incessant watchfulness and hazardous skirmishes and battles, that the forces under my command were not overwhelmed, while at the same time the enemy was embarrassed and delayed in his advance upon Washington until the forces from the Peninsula were at length assembled for the defence of the

city. I did hope that, in the course of these operations, the enemy might commit some imprudence, or leave some opening of which I could take such advantage as to gain at least a partial victory over his forces. This opportunity was presented by the advance of Jackson upon Manassas Junction; but, although the best dispositions possible, under the circumstances, were ordered, the object was frustrated in a manner and by causes which are now well understood. I am gratified to know that the conduct of the campaign, every detail of which was communicated, day by day, to the general-in-chief, was fully approved by him and by the government, and I now gladly submit the subject to the judgment of the country.

General Banks rendered most efficient and faithful service throughout the campaign, and his conduct at the battle of Cedar Mountain and the operations on the upper Rappahannock was marked by great coolness, intrepidity, and zeal. General McDowell led his corps during the whole campaign with ability and vigor, and I am greatly indebted to him for zealous and distinguished service, both in the battles of the 29th and 30th of August, and in the operations which preceded and succeeded those battles. General Sigel rendered useful service in reorganizing and putting in condition the 1st army corps of the army of Virginia, and made many valuable and highly important reconnoissances during the operations of the campaign. I cannot express myself too highly of the zealous, gallant, and cheerful manner in which General Reno deported himself from the beginning to the end of the operations. Ever prompt, earnest, and soldierly, he was the model of an accomplished soldier and gallant gentleman, and his loss has been a heavy blow to the army and to the country. General Heintzelman performed his duty faithfully and honestly, while the commanders of the divisions of his corps (Generals Kearney and Hooker) have that place in the public estimation which they have earned by many gallant and heroic actions, and which renders it unnecessary for me to do aught except pay this tribute to the memory of one and to the rising fame of the other. Generals Williams, Auger, Crawford, Green, Geary, Carrol, and Prince, of Banks's corps, have been already noticed for their gallant and distinguished conduct at Cedar Mountain. Generals King and Ricketts, of McDowell's corps, led their divisions throughout the operations with skill and efficiency, and General King, before he marched from Fredericksburg, rendered important service in organizing and despatching the expeditions which, on several occasions, broke up the line of the Virginia Central railroad. Generals Patrick, Doubleday, Gibbon, Hartsuff, Duryea, and Tower commanded their brigades in the various operations of the campaign with ability and zeal. The last-named officer especially was particularly distinguished by the long marches which he made, by his untiring activity, and by the distinguished gallantry he displayed in the action of the 30th of August, in which action he was severely wounded at the head of his brigade. General Hatch, after being relieved from the command of the cavalry of Banks's corps, was assigned to the command of an infantry brigade in King's division of McDowell's corps, and during part of the operations was in command of that division and rendered good service. Generals Schenck and Milroy, of Sigel's corps, exhibited great gallantry and zeal throughout the operations. They were engaged actively in the battles of the 29th and 30th of August, and their commands were among the last to leave the field of battle on the night of the 30th, General Schenck being severely wounded on that day. I must also mention in high terms the conduct of Generals Schurz, Stahl, and Steinwehr during the actions of the 29th and 30th. Generals Birney, Robinson, and Grover, of Heintzelman's corps, commanded their brigades during the actions of the 29th and 30th, and Birney during the action of the 1st of September, with zeal and gallantry, and Generals Birney and Grover were especially distinguished in the actions of the 29th and 30th of August, and Birney also in the engagement of the 1st of September. General Stevens, of Reno's corps, was zealous and active throughout

the operations, and distinguished himself in the most conspicuous manner during the battles of the 29th and 30th of August. He was killed at the head of his command in the battle near Chantilly on the 1st of September, and his death will be deeply felt by the army and the country. Lieutenant Colonel R. C. Buchanan, commanding a brigade of regulars of Porter's corps, was noticeable for distinguished service in the afternoon of the 30th of August. Of the conduct of the other officers commanding divisions or brigades of Porter's corps I know nothing, having received no report from that officer of the operations of his corps. Brigadier General John F. Reynolds, commanding the Pennsylvania reserves, merits the highest commendation at my hands. Prompt, active, and energetic, he commanded his division with distinguished ability throughout the operations, and performed his duties in all situations with zeal and fidelity. Generals Seymour and Meade, of that division, in like manner performed their duties with ability and gallantry, and in all fidelity to the government and to the army. General Sturgis arrived at Warrenton Junction on the 26th of August, with Piatt's brigade of his division, the only portion of that division which ever joined me. This brigade was temporarily attached to the army corps of Fitz John Porter, and although misled in consequence of orders to follow Griffin's brigade of that corps, which, for some unexplained reason, strayed from its corps to Centreville on the 30th of August, was led forward from that place by Generals Sturgis and Piatt as soon as it was discovered that Griffin did not intend to go forward to the field of battle, and reported to me late in the afternoon of that day. Shortly afterwards the brigade was thrown forward into action on our left, where they acquitted themselves with great courage. Brigadier General Sturgis, as well as General Piatt, deserve especial mention for the soldierly feeling which induced them, after being thus misled, and with the bad example of Griffin before their eyes, to push forward with such zeal and alacrity to the field of battle, and for the valuable services which they rendered in the action of the 30th of August. Generals Bayard and Buford commanded all of the cavalry belonging to the army of Virginia. Their duties were particularly arduous and hazardous, and it is not too much to say, that throughout the operations, from the first to the last day of the campaign, scarce a day passed that these officers did not render services which entitled them to the gratitude of the government. The detachment of the signal corps, with the various army corps, rendered most important service, and I cannot speak too highly of the value of that corps, and of the important information which, from time to time, they communicated to me. They were many times in positions of extreme peril, but were always prompt and ready to encounter any danger in the discharge of their duties. Brigadier General Julius White, with one brigade, was in the beginning of the campaign placed in command at Winchester. He was selected for that position because I felt entire confidence in his courage and ability, and during the whole of his service there he performed his duty with the utmost efficiency, and relieved me entirely from any apprehension concerning that region of country. He was withdrawn from his position by orders direct from Washington, and passed from under my command. I transmit herewith reports of corps, division, and brigade commanders, which will be found to embrace all the details of their respective operations, and which do justice to the officers and soldiers under their command. To my personal staff I owe much gratitude and many thanks. Their duties were particularly arduous, and at times led them into the midst of the various actions in which we were engaged. It is saying little when I state that they were zealous, untiring, and efficient throughout the campaign. To Brigadier General Roberts, in particular, I am indebted for services marked throughout by skill, courage, and unerring judgment, and worthy of the solid reputation as a soldier he has acquired by many years of previous faithful and distinguished military service. I desire, also, especially to mention Brigadier General Elliot, Surgeon McParlin, Colonel Beckwith, Lieutenant Colonel T. C. H. Smith, Captain Piper,

chief of artillery, Captain Merrill, of the engineers, and Lieutenant Schunk, chief of ordnance. I must also honorably mention the following members of my staff, the conduct of all of whom met my hearty approval, and merits high commendation: Colonels Macomb, Clary, Marshall, Butler, Morgan, and Welch; Majors Selfridge and Meline; Captains Asch, Douglas, Pope, Haight, Atcheson, De Kay, Piatt, Paine, and Strother. Mr. McCain, confidential telegraph operator at my headquarters, accompanied me throughout the campaign, and was at all times eminently useful and efficient. My personal escort, consisting of two small companies of the first Ohio cavalry, numbering about one hundred men, performed more arduous service, probably, than any troops in the campaign. As orderlies, messengers, and guards they passed many sleepless nights and weary days. Their conduct in all the operations, as in every battle, was marked by uncommon activity and gallantry. The reports of corps, division, and brigade commanders, herewith submitted, exhibit the loss in killed, wounded, and missing in their respective commands. No report of any description has been received from the army corps of Banks and Reno.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE, *Major General.*

Brigadier General G. W. CULLUM,

*Chief of Staff and Engineers, Headquarters of the Army.*

In order that it may be clearly known that on the night of the 29th of August we had gained a most decided success over the enemy, and that that success would have been a complete and overwhelming victory had Fitz-John Porter obeyed his orders or performed his duty with even ordinary fidelity, I submit the testimony of General McDowell before the Porter court-martial. That he is an intelligent and reliable witness, fully capable of forming a correct judgment on the facts before his eyes, no one will dispute.

General Porter was tried before a court of nine general officers of years and experience, who, after a patient investigation of forty-five days, pronounced that his wilful failure to obey his orders prevented the capture or destruction of the rebel army under Jackson on the 29th of August, 1862. The records of that trial have been published by Congress, and can be readily referred to.

*Examination of General McDowell before the Porter court-martial.*

By the judge advocate:

Question. What would probably have been the effect upon the fortunes of that battle if, between 5 and 6 o'clock in the afternoon, General Porter, with his whole force, had thrown himself upon the right wing of the enemy, as directed in this order of 4.30 p. m. of the 29th of August, which has been read to you?

Answer. Is it a mere opinion that you ask?

Question. Yes, sir.

Answer. I think it would have been decisive in our favor.

By the court:

Question. Please state the ground on which you formed the opinion that if the accused had attacked the right wing of the rebels, as he was ordered, the battle would have been decisive in our favor?

Answer. Because, on the evening of that day, I thought the result was decidedly in our favor, as it was. But, admitting that it was merely equally balanced, I think, and thought, that if the corps of General Porter, reputed one of the best, if not the best, in the service, consisting of between twenty and thirty regiments and some eight batteries, had been added to the efforts made by the others, the result would have been in our favor, very decidedly.

Question. Was there anything besides mere advantage in numbers from which that result would have followed?

Answer. A bad position.

Question. What particular advantage in position was there?

Answer. The position in which that force would have been applied, while the main body was so hotly engaged in front, would have been an additional powerful reason for so supposing.

It will be observed also that the plan of campaign actually pursued by the army of Virginia differed from the plan sketched in my testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War in the fact that, instead of falling back before Lee in the direction of the Blue Ridge and operating from there on the flank and rear of any force moving towards Washington, the line of retreat was in the direction of Bull run and Washington city. This change of plan was made by General Halleck's orders, which contemplated a junction of the army of the Potomac and the army of Virginia at some point on the Rappahannock, below Sulphur Springs; a junction which would readily have been made had General McClellan obeyed his orders with anything like zeal or alacrity. As I did not myself expect him to do so, it will be noted that, in my despatches to General Halleck, I indicated to him that I did not approve of being drawn back to a position behind the Rappahannock, so low down on that stream, and almost in the opposite direction from the line of retreat I had previously indicated.

My official report contains the following paragraph, which needed not to have been referred to, except for the subsequent action of General Frémont:

[Extract.]

"Many of the brigades and divisions (army of Virginia) were badly organized and in a demoralized condition. This was particularly the case with the army corps of Major General Frémont, a sad report of which was made to me by General Sigel when he relieved General Frémont in command of the corps."

In reply to this paragraph, General Frémont published a letter in the New York Tribune denying the facts, and asserting that General Sigel's despatches to me did not justify my statement. I insert here the full despatch of General Sigel, and also a despatch from General Schenck, who was left in command in the interval between General Frémont's departure and General Sigel's arrival.

*Copies of telegrams from Generals Sigel and Schenck.*

[From Middleton, July 5—1.30 a. m.—Time received, 1.35 a. m.]

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH, WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., July 5, 1862.

Colonel RUGGLES, *Chief of Staff to General Pope:*

In reply to your inquiries, I have to say that my transfer from a division which I had just succeeded in organizing, equipping, and making effective to the command of the 1st army corps, which I found to be in a very bad condition in regard to discipline, organization, construction of divisions and brigades, equipments, and to a great extent demoralized, has imposed severe labor upon me. In addition to this I have been greatly inconvenienced by the removal of all papers and documents by General Frémont, so that I have had to learn everything by direct inquiries and inspections. However, I have succeeded in arranging the corps into divisions and brigades, as follows:

First division, General Schenck commanding, consists of two brigades; first, commanded by General Stahle, consisting of four regiments of infantry, one battery, and two companies of cavalry; second brigade, Colonel McLean commanding, consists of the same as first brigade.



Second division, General Steinwehr; first brigade, Colonel Kolts, three infantry regiments, one company of cavalry, and one battery; second brigade, Colonel Floyd, two cavalry regiments and the reserve artillery, consisting of three batteries, this being the division of reserve.

3d division, General Schurz; first brigade, General Bohlen, three infantry regiments and one battery, one company of cavalry; second brigade, Colonel Kryzanowski, consisting of three infantry regiments and one battery, and one company of cavalry; independent brigade, General Milroy, consisting of four regiments of infantry, one battery, and three companies of cavalry. This will be the advance brigade.

Detached brigade, General Piatt, consisting of three infantry regiments, one battery, and the regiment of cavalry you mentioned; this brigade will proceed to Winchester to-morrow, where the cavalry regiment will have to join it; when this brigade is relieved from duty at Winchester, which I trust will be very soon, it will be joined to the independent brigade to form a division under General Milroy. This arrangement of the corps was made after consultation with all the generals in the corps; it seemed the only one that would give general satisfaction. The effective strength in detail will be sent to you to-morrow from the morning reports.

The division of General Blenker does not exist; one of his late brigades is attached to General Schenk's command; one was and is now attached to General Schurz's, and one forms a part of the division of reserve under General Steinwehr. The interests of the service required this reconstruction, as there were serious differences between the commanding officers of these brigades. Your order in regard to transportation is being strictly executed by Captain Justice. An engineer officer has been sent to Winchester to make the necessary preparations for intrenching the place. The brigade ordered to proceed to Winchester to-morrow would have been sent before had not your previous order directed me to send a brigade when we left this place.

F. SIGEL, *Major General.*

[Extract.]

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 28, 1862.

[From Middleton, Virginia, June 28, 1862—Received 3 p. m.]

Major General POPE: Colonel Tracy, assistant adjutant general of General Frémont, informs me that the correspondence with General Cox was by General Frémont; has taken away the telegrams, and there is no information here on file. The only other thing I can learn is that General Frémont, a few days ago, told Captain Piatt, my assistant adjutant general, that Cox was on the mountains with eight (8) or nine (9) thousand men, and fourteen thousand of the enemy opposed to him.

\* \* \* \* \*

I do not find, on my accession to the command, that things are in a good condition in this corps for immediate movement, but will labor and hurry to prepare as speedily as possible.

\* \* \* \* \*

The medical director, Doctor Suckley, is away on sick leave, and hospital and medical attendance deficient.

ROBERT C. SCHENCK,  
*Brigadier General Commanding First Army Corps.*

As the complete overthrow of Lee's army, or at least the entire frustration of his movement toward the Potomac, was defeated by the failure of the army of the Potomac to effect a junction in time with the army of Virginia on the live

of the Rappahannock, or even so far back as the line of Bull run, it becomes essential to history to know who was in fault for that failure. In his extraordinary report published more than a year after the close of these operations, General McClellan makes the following statement :

"It will be seen from what has preceded that I lost no time that could be avoided in moving the army of the Potomac from the Peninsula to the support of the army of Virginia; that I spared no effort to hasten the embarkation of the troops at Fort Monroe, Newport News, and Yorktown, remaining at Fort Monroe myself until the mass of the army had sailed; and that, after my arrival at Alexandria, I left nothing in my power undone to forward supplies and re-enforcements to General Pope. I sent, with the troops that moved, all the cavalry I could get hold of. Even my personal escort was sent out upon the line of the railway as a guard, with the provost and camp guards at headquarters, retaining less than one hundred men, many of whom were orderlies, invalids, members of bands, &c. All the headquarters teams that arrived were sent out with supplies and ammunition, none being retained even to move the headquarters camp. The squadron that habitually served as my personal escort was left at Falmouth with General Burnside, as he was deficient in cavalry."

On Wednesday, August 27, 1862, at 10 a. m., General Halleck telegraphed General McClellan to have Franklin's corps march in the direction of Manassas as soon as possible. It is proper here to state that the march referred to in this and the following despatches was a distance of twenty-five (25) miles, with choice of three or four good roads, all converging on those points (Manassas or Centreville.)

To the despatch of 10 a. m. General McClellan replied at 10.40 :

[Received at 10.40 m.]

"ALEXANDRIA, August 27, 1862—10.40 a. m.

"Telegram this moment received. I have sent orders to Franklin to prepare to march with his corps at once, and to repair here in person to inform as to his means of transportation. Kearney was yesterday at Rappahannock; Porter at Bealton, Kelly's, Barnett's, &c. Sumner will commence reaching Falmouth to-day. Williams's Massachusetts cavalry will be mostly at Falmouth to-day. I loaned Burnside my personal escort (one squadron fourth regulars) to escort down Rappahannock. I have just sent for Couch's division to come at once. As fast as I gain any information I will forward it, although you may already have it.

"GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, *Major General.*

"General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*"

At meridian, General Halleck telegraphed General McClellan the situation of the army under my command :

[Sent 12 m.]

"WAR DEPARTMENT,

"Washington, D. C. August 27, 1862.

"Telegrams from General Porter to General Burnside, just received, say that Banks is at Fayetteville; McDowell, Sigel, and Ricketts, near Warrenton; Reno on his right. Porter is marching on Warrenton Junction to re-enforce Pope. Nothing said of Heintzelman. Porter reports a general battle imminent. Franklin's corps should move out by forced marches, carrying three or four days' provisions, and to be supplied as far as possible by railroad. Perhaps you may prefer some other road than that to Centreville. Colonel Haupt has just tele-

graphed about sending out troops, &c. Please see him and give him your directions. There has been some serious neglect to guard the railroad, which should be immediately remedied.

“H. W. HALLECK,  
“*General-in-Chief.*”

“Major General McCLELLAN, *Alexandria.*”

At 1.40 p. m. General Halleck receives General McClellan's reply, dated 12.5 p. m.

[Time received 1.40 p. m.]

“ALEXANDRIA, August 27, 1862—12.5 p. m.

“My aid has just returned from General Franklin's camp; reports that Generals Franklin, Smith, and Slocum are all in Washington. He gave the order to the next in rank to place the corps in readiness to move at once. I learn that heavy firing has been heard this a. m. at Centreville, and have sent to ascertain the truth. I can find no cavalry to send out on the roads. Are the works finished and ready for defence?”

“GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
“*Major General Commanding.*”

“Major General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*”

[Received 1.50 p. m.]

And at 1.15 p. m. General McClellan again despatched General Halleck:

“ALEXANDRIA, August 27, 1862—1.15 p. m.

“Franklin's artillery has no horses except for four guns without caissons. I can pick up no cavalry. In view of these facts, will it not be well to push Sumner's corps here by water as rapidly as possible, to make immediate arrangements for placing the works in front of Washington in an efficient condition of defence? I have no means of knowing the enemy's force between Pope and ourselves. Can Franklin, without his artillery or cavalry, effect any useful purpose in front? Should not Burnside at once take steps to evacuate Falmouth and Aquia, at the same time covering the retreat of any of Pope's troops who may fall back in that direction? I do not see that we have force enough in hand to form a connection with Pope, whose exact position we do not know. Are we safe in the direction of the valley?”

“GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,  
“*Major General.*”

“General HALLECK,  
“*General-in-Chief.*”

THURSDAY, August 28, 1862.

I ask no better testimony to refute this statement than the despatches and letters which passed between the President, the general-in-chief, and General McClellan, while the latter was in Alexandria charged with the duty of sending forward the army of the Potomac to re-enforce me, from the 27th of August to the 3d of September, 1862.

I append these despatches, only inserting such remarks as are necessary to connect them in their chronological order, and premising that during the whole time this correspondence was going on, the army under my command was engaged in a series of bloody battles, and that the roar of the artillery was plainly heard in the streets of Washington. Scarcely an hour passed that news did not reach General McClellan concerning the army under my command

On this morning General Halleck telegraphs General Franklin directly :

“WAR DEPARTMENT,  
“*Washington, D. C., August 28, 1862.*”

“On parting with General McClellan, about 2 o'clock this morning, it was understood that you were to move with your corps to-day towards Manassas Junction, to drive the enemy from the railroad. I have just learned that the general has not yet returned to Alexandria. If you have not received his order, act on this.

“H. W. HALLECK,  
“*General-in-Chief.*”

“Major General FRANKLIN, *Alexandria.*”

To which at 1.05 p. m. General McClellan (not General Franklin) replied :

[Received 1.05 p. m.]

“ALEXANDRIA, VA., *August 28, 1862—1 p. m.*”

“Your despatch to Franklin received. I have been doing all possible to hurry artillery and cavalry. The moment Franklin can be started with a reasonable amount of artillery he shall go. In the mean time see Whipple's despatch. Something must be done in that direction. Please see Barnard and be sure that the works towards the Chain bridge are perfectly secure. I look upon these works, especially Ethan Allen and Marcy, as of the first importance. I have heard, incidentally, that there is no garrison in Ethan Allen, but presume it is a mistake. I have just conversed with Colonel Holabin, and think the enemy is in so much force near Manassas as to make it necessary for us to move in force.

“GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,  
“*Major General Commanding.*”

“General H. W. HALLECK,  
“*General-in-Chief.*”

General McClellan being thus of opinion that “it is necessary for us to move in force,” it becomes a matter of interest to observe what efforts are made to that end.

At 3.30 p. m. General Halleck, in a tone that manifests his estimate of the position, telegraphs General McClellan :

[Sent 3.30 p. m.]

“WAR DEPARTMENT,  
“*Washington, D. C., August 28, 1862.*”

“Not a moment must be lost in pushing as large a force as possible towards Manassas, so as to communicate with Pope before the enemy is re-enforced. I directed General Barnard to report to you, and do not know where he is. In Barnard's absence Whipple can tell you about the garrisons of the forts. No message from Pope has reached here.

“H. W. HALLECK,  
“*General-in-Chief.*”

“Major General McCLELLAN, *Alexandria.*”

At 4.40 p. m. this despatch is sent :

[Received 7.30 p. m.]

“HEADQUARTERS NEAR ALEXANDRIA,  
“*August 28, 1862—4 40 p. m.*”

“General Franklin is with me here. I will know in a few minutes the condition of artillery and cavalry. We are not yet in condition to move; may be by to-morrow morning. Pope must cut through to-day, or adopt the plan I suggested.

I have ordered troops to garrison the works at Upton's hill. They must be held at any cost. As soon as I can see the way to spare them I will send a good corps of troops there. It is the key to Washington, which cannot be seriously menaced as long as it is held.

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,  
"Major General.

"Major General H. W. HALLECK,  
"General-in-Chief."

And at 4.45 the following argumentative reply to General Halleck's despatch of 3.30 p. m.:

[Received 6.15 p. m.]

"CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA,  
"August 28—4 45 p. m.

"Your despatch received. Neither Franklin's nor Sumner's corps is now in condition to move and fight a battle. It would be sacrifice to send them out now. I have sent aids to ascertain the condition of the commands of Cox and Tyler; but I still think that a premature movement in small force will accomplish nothing but the destruction of the troops sent out. I repeat that I will lose no time in preparing the troops now here for the field, and that whatever orders you may give after hearing what I have to say will be carried out.

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,  
"Major General.

"Major General H. W. HALLECK,  
"General-in-Chief."

Thus appreciated and replied to by General Halleck at 8.40 p. m.:

[Sent 8.40 p. m.]

"WAR DEPARTMENT,  
"Washington, D. C., August 28, 1862.

"There must be no further delay in moving Franklin's corps towards Manassas. They must go to-morrow morning, ready or not ready. If we delay too long to get ready there will be no necessity to go at all, for Pope will either be defeated or victorious without our aid. If there is a want of wagons the men must carry provisions with them till the wagons can come to their relief.

"H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

"Major General McCLELLAN, Alexandria."

To which General McClellan answers, 12.20 a. m.:

"ALEXANDRIA, August 28, 1862—10 a. m.

"Your despatch received. Franklin's corps has been ordered to march at six (6) o'clock to-morrow morning. Sumner has about fourteen thousand (14,000) infantry, without cavalry or artillery, here. Cox's brigade of four regiments is here, with two batteries of artillery. Men of two (2) regiments, much fatigued, came to-day. Tyler's brigade of three new regiments, but little drilled, is also here. All these troops will be ordered to hold themselves ready to march to-morrow morning, and all, except Franklin's, to await further orders. If you wish any of them to move towards Manassas please inform me. Colonel Wager, second New York volunteer artillery, has just come in from the front. He reports strong infantry and cavalry force of rebels near Fairfax Court House. Reports numerous, from various sources, that Lee and Stuart, with large forces, are at Manassas; that the enemy, with one hundred and twenty thousand men, intend advancing on the forts near Arlington and Chain bridge, with a view to attacking Washington and Baltimore.

“General Barnard telegraphs me to-night that the length of line of fortifications on this side of the Potomac requires two thousand additional batterymen, and additional troops to defend intervals, according to circumstances. At all events, he says an old regiment should be added to the force at Chain bridge, and a few regiments distributed along the lines to give confidence to our new troops. I agree with him fully, and think our fortifications along the upper part of our line on this side of the river very unsafe with their present garrisons, and the movements of the enemy seem to indicate an attack upon these works.

“GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,

“*Major General.*”

“Major General HALLECK,

“*General-in-Chief U. S. Army.*”

And thus Franklin's corps, ordered to move on the morning of the 27th, had not stirred a foot on the night of the 28th.

Friday, August 29, 1862, at 10.30 a. m., General McClellan telegraphs General Halleck :

“CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA,

“*August 29—10.30 a. m.*”

“Franklin's corps is in motion ; started about six (6) a. m. I can give him but two squadrons of cavalry. I propose moving General Cox to Upton's hill, to hold that important point with its works, and to push cavalry scouts to Vienna *via* Freeman hill and Hunter's lane. Cox has two squadrons of cavalry. Please answer at once whether this meets your approval. I have directed Woodbury, with the engineer brigade, to hold Fort Lyon, however. Detailed, last night, two regiments to the vicinity of Forts Ethan Allen and Marcy. Meagher's brigade is still at Aquia. If Sumner moves in support of Franklin it leaves us without any reliable troops in and near Washington. Yet Franklin is too much alone. What shall be done? No more cavalry arrived. Have but three squadrons belonging to army of Potomac. Franklin has but forty rounds of ammunition, and no wagons to move more. I do not think Franklin is in a condition to accomplish much if he meets strong resistance. I should not have moved him but for your pressing orders last night. What have you from Vienna and Drainesville?

“GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,

“*Major General.*”

“Major General H. W. HALLECK,

“*General-in-Chief.*”

It is difficult to qualify conduct like this, and, at the same time, guard decorum. Throughout the reiterated despatches of the two previous days General McClellan advises General Halleck that he is pushing Franklin forward, and now, on the morning of the third day, tells him, “I should not have moved him (Franklin) but for your pressing order last night.”

General McClellan telegraphs :

[Received 12.08 p. m.]

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF POTOMAC,

“*August 29, 1862—12 m.*”

“Your telegram is received. Do you wish the movement of Franklin's corps to continue? He is without reserve, ammunition, and without transportation.

“GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,

“*Major General.*”

“Major General H. W. HALLECK,

“*General-in-Chief.*”

And again :

[Received 12.50 p. m.]

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF POTOMAC,  
“*Alexandria, Virginia, August 29, 1862—12 m.*

“Have ordered most of the twelfth Pennsylvania cavalry to report to General Barnard, for scouting duty towards Rockville, Poolsville, &c. If you apprehend a raid on your side of river I had better send a brigade or two of Sumner's to near Tenallytown, where, with two or three old regiments in Forts Allan and Marcy, they can watch both Chain bridge and Tennallytown. Would it meet your views to post rest of Sumner's corps between Arlington and Fort Corcoran, where they can either support Cox, Franklin, or Chain bridge, or even Tennallytown? Franklin has only between 10,000 and 11,000 ready for duty. How far do you wish this force to advance?

“G. B. McCLELLAN,  
“*Major General U. S. Army.*

“Major General HALLECK,  
“*General-in-Chief.*”

To which General Halleck replies at 3 p. m. : “I want Franklin's corps to go far enough to find out something about the enemy.”

[Sent 3 p. m.]

“WAR DEPARTMENT,  
“*Washington, D. C., August 29, 1862.*

“Your proposed disposition of Sumner's corps seems to me judicious. Of course I have no time to examine into detail. The present danger is a raid upon Washington in the night time. Dispose of all troops as you deem best. I want Franklin's corps to go far enough to find out something about the enemy; perhaps he may get such information at Anandale as to prevent his going further. Otherwise he will push on towards Fairfax. Try to get something from direction of Manassas, if by telegram or through Franklin's scouts. Our people must move more actively and find out where the enemy is. I am tired of guesses.

“H. W. HALLECK,  
“*General-in-Chief.*

“Major General McCLELLAN, *Alexandria.*”

At 2.40 p. m. the President despatches :

[Sent 2.40 p. m.]

“WAR DEPARTMENT,  
“*Washington, D. C., August 29, 1862—2.30 p. m.*

“What news from direction of Manassas Junction? What generally?

“A. LINCOLN.

“Major General McCLELLAN, *Alexandria.*”

And at 3.30 p. m. receives General McClellan's reply :

[Time received, 3.30 p. m.]

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF POTOMAC,  
“*Near Alexandria, Virginia, August 29, 1862—2.45 p. m.*

“The last news I received from the direction of Manassas was from stragglers, to the effect that the enemy was evacuating Centreville, and retiring towards Thoroughfare Gap. This is by no means reliable. I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted: first, to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope; second, to leave Pope to get out of

his scrape, and at once to use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe. No middle course will now answer. Tell me what you wish me to do, and I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay longer.

“GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,  
“Major General.

“A. LINCOLN, *President.*”

The President, in his answer at 4.10 p. m., thought the first alternative, viz : “to concentrate all our available force to open communication with Pope,” is the right one.

[Sent 4.10 p. m.]

“WAR DEPARTMENT,  
“Washington, D. C., August 29, 1862.

“Yours of to-day just received. I think your first alternative, to wit : “to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope,” is the right one. But I wish not to control. That I now leave to General Halleck, aided by your counsels.

“A. LINCOLN.

“Major General McCLELLAN,  
“Alexandria, Virginia.”

At 7.50 p. m. General Halleck to General McClellan :

“WAR DEPARTMENT,  
“Washington, D. C., August 29, 1862.

“You will immediately send construction train and guards to repair railroad to Manassas. Let there be no delay in this. I have just been told that Franklin's corps stopped at Anandale, and that he was this evening in Alexandria. This is all contrary to my orders. Investigate and report the fact of this disobedience. That corps must push forward as I directed, to protect the railroad and open our communications with Manassas.

“H. W. HALLECK,  
“General-in-Chief.

“Major General McCLELLAN, *Alexandria.*”

To which General McClellan replies at 8 :

[Time received 8.50 p. m.]

“CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA, August 29, 1862—8 p. m.

“By referring to my telegrams of 10.30 a. m., 12 m., and 1 p. m., together with your reply of 2.48 p. m., you will see why Franklin's corps halted at Anandale. This small cavalry force, all I had to give him, was ordered to push on as far as possible towards Manassas. It was not safe for Franklin to move beyond Anandale, under the circumstances, until we knew what was at Vienna. General Franklin remained here until 1 p. m. endeavoring to arrange for supplies for his command. I am responsible for both these circumstances, and do not see that either was in disobedience to your orders. Please give distinct orders in reference to Franklin's movements of to-morrow. I have sent to Colonel Haupt to push out construction and supply trains as soon as possible, General Tyler to furnish the necessary guards. I have directed General Banks's supply train to start out to-night, at least as far as Anandale, with an escort from General



Tyler. In regard to to-morrow's movements I desire definite instructions, as it is not agreeable to me to be accused of disobeying orders when I have simply exercised the discretion you committed to me.

"GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

*Major General Commanding.*

"Major General HALLECK,  
" *General-in-Chief.*"

At ten that night General Halleck advised General McClellan that he has a despatch from General Franklin stating that "Pope is very short of provisions and the country will not support him."

[Received 10.50 p. m.]

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
" *Camp near Alexandria, August 29, 1862—10 p. m.*

"The following has just been received by an orderly :

'ANANDALE—7.15 p. m.

'GENERAL: The news picked up here from all sources passing along the road is as follows: Jackson left Centreville yesterday afternoon to march through Thoroughfare Gap. He was confronted by Sigel, whom he attacked immediately. Sigel was re-enforced by Heintzelman and Porter to-day. McDowell by noon was four miles from the field, and was merely waiting for his ammunition to come up to join him. The field of battle is near Gainesville. Sigel fought all day yesterday, slept on the enemy's grounds, and this morning at 5 o'clock was attacked, and the cannonading was very heavy when a certain sutler, one of the parties who gives the information, left there. From all the evidence the inference is that we met with no disaster, and that Stonewall is in a tight place unless he leaves to-night by Aldie. Jackson had with him yesterday three divisions—his own, Ewell's, and Hill's—amounting to forty-thousand men. Birney held Centreville this morning, and pursued Jackson, picking up many stragglers. The enemy left Centreville last evening. Many of the rebel dead are lying near Centreville. Birney ceased the pursuit on learning the force of the enemy. All of the best witnesses, and all of the citizens who have passed, consider Jackson in a dangerous position. Pope's train is parked this side of Centreville.

'Truly yours,

'W. B. FRANKLIN,

*Major General, Commanding Sixth Corps.*

'P. S.—Pope is said to be short of provisions, and the country will not support him.

'W. B. F.'

"GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

*Major General.*

"Major General H. W. HALLECK,  
" *General-in-Chief.*"

And thus, on the night of the third day after General Franklin's corps had been peremptorily ordered to join the army under my command, it had advanced as far as Anandale, six miles from Alexandria, Franklin himself being in that city as late as 1 p. m.

SATURDAY, August 30, 1862.

On this morning I sent the following despatch to Major General Halleck :

[Received 3.20 p. m. August 30, 1862.]

“HEADQUARTERS BATTLE,

“Near Groveton, Virginia—5.30 a. m.

“We fought a terrific battle here yesterday with the combined forces of the enemy, which lasted with continuous fury from daylight until dark, by which time the enemy was driven from the field, which we now occupy. Our troops are too much exhausted yet to push matters, though I shall do so in the course of the morning, as soon as General F. J. Porter comes up from Manassas. The enemy is still in our front, but badly used up. We have lost not less than eight thousand men, killed and wounded; but, from the appearance of the field, the enemy lost at least two to one. He stood strictly on the defensive, and every assault was made by ourselves. The battle was fought on the identical battlefield of Bull run, which greatly increased the enthusiasm of the men. The news just reaches me from the front that the enemy is retiring toward the mountains; I go forward at once to see. We have made great captures, but I am not able yet to form an idea of their extent. Our troops behaved splendidly. I think you had best send Franklin’s, Cox’s, and Sturgis’s regiments to Centreville, as also forage and subsistence. I received a note this morning from General Franklin, written by order of General McClellan, saying that wagons and cars would be loaded and sent to Fairfax station as soon as I would send a cavalry escort to Alexandria to bring them out. Such a request, when Alexandria is full of troops and we fighting the enemy, needs no comment. Will you have these supplies sent, without the least delay, to Centreville?

“JNO. POPE, *Major General.*”

“Major General HALLECK,  
“*General-in-Chief.*”

I add copy of the note of General Franklin referred to :

“AUGUST 29, 1862—8 p. m.

“To COMMANDING OFFICER *at Centreville :*

“I have been instructed by General McClellan to inform you that he will have all the available wagons at Alexandria loaded with rations for your troops, and all of the cars also, as soon as you will send in a cavalry escort to Alexandria as a guard to the train.

“Respectfully,

“W. B. FRANKLIN,  
“*Major General Commanding Sixth Corps.*”

General McClellan’s despatch of 10 p. m., 29th August, states that he ordered Franklin “to cover the transit of Pope’s supplies.” General Franklin, who doubtless understood his orders, explained them as above by saying that the supplies would be loaded “as soon as you send a cavalry escort.” It was thus General Franklin was to “cover the transit.”

At 9.40 a. m. General Halleck telegraphs General McClellan :

[Sent 9.40 a. m.]

“WAR DEPARTMENT,  
“*Washington, D. C., August 30, 1862.*

“I am by no means satisfied with General Franklin’s march of yesterday, considering the circumstances of the case. He was very wrong in stopping at Anandale. Moreover, I learned last night that the quartermaster’s department

would have given him plenty of transportation if he had applied for it any time since his arrival at Alexandria. He knew the importance of opening communication with General Pope's army, and should have acted more promptly.

"H. W. HALLECK,  
"General-in-Chief."

"Major General McCLELLAN, *Alexandria.*"

In connection with this despatch it will be recollected that on the morning of the 27th of August General McClellan told General Halleck that he had ordered Franklin to come to Alexandria in order that he (McClellan) might inform him as to his means of transportation. On the 29th he says, "Franklin is without transportation." These two statements need no commentary but the last cited despatch of General Halleck.

At 11 a. m. General McClellan telegraphs General Halleck:

[Received 11.15 a. m.]

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF POTOMAC,  
"Camp near Alexandria, August 30, 1862—11 a. m.

"Have ordered Sumner to leave one brigade in the vicinity of Chain bridge, and to move the rest by Columbia pike on Anandale and Fairfax Court House, if this is the route you wish them to take. He and Franklin are both instructed to join Pope as promptly as possible. Shall Couch move also when he arrives?"

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,  
"Major General."

"Major General H. W. HALLECK,  
"General-in-Chief."

To this inquiry as to proper direction of the troops at the crisis of that day General Halleck's reply is comprehensive and pointed: "Send them where the fighting is."

[Sent 12.26 p. m.]

"WAR DEPARTMENT,  
"Washington, D. C., August 30, 1865.

"I think Couch should land at Alexandria and be immediately pushed out to Pope. Send the troops where the fighting is. Let me know when Couch arrives, as I may have other information by that time. Use the Connecticut officers and regiments as you propose. Send transports to Aquia to bring up Burnside's command. I have telegraphed to him, and am waiting his answer.

"H. W. HALLECK,  
"General-in-Chief."

"Major General McCLELLAN, *Alexandria.*"

And adds two hours later:

[Sent 2.15 p. m.]

"WAR DEPARTMENT,  
"Washington, D. C., August 30, 1862.

"Franklin's and all of Sumner's corps should be pushed forward with all possible despatch. They must use their legs and make forced marches. Time now is everything. Send some sharpshooters on the train to Bull run. The bridges and property are threatened by bands of Prince William cavalry. Give Colonel Haupt all the assistance you can. The sharpshooters on top of the cars can assist in unloading the trains.

"H. W. HALLECK,  
"General-in-Chief."

"Major General McCLELLAN, *Alexandria.*"

General McClellan's next despatch opens with the remarkable statement that he "knows nothing of the calibre of Pope's artillery."

[Received 3 p. m.]

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF POTOMAC,  
"Alexandria, Virginia, August 30, 1862—1.10 p. m.

"I know nothing of the calibre of Pope's artillery. All I can do is to direct ordnance officers to load up all the wagons sent to him. I have already sent all my headquarters wagons. You will see that wagons are sent from Washington. I can do nothing more than give the order that every available wagon in Alexandria shall be loaded at once. The order to the brigade of Sumner that I directed to remain at Chain bridge and Tennallytown should go from your headquarters, to save time. I understand you to instruct it also to move. I have no sharpshooters except the guard around my camp. I have sent off every man but those. I will now send them with the train, as you directed. I will also send my only remaining squadron of cavalry with General Sumner. I can do no more; you have every man of the army of the Potomac who is within my reach.

"GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN,  
"Major General Commanding.

"Major General HALLECK,  
"General-in-Chief."

On the morning after the three days' fighting at Manassas I reported by telegraph as follows:

[Received 3.40 p. m., August 31, 1862.]

"CENTREVILLE—10.45 a. m.,

"Our troops are all here and in position, though much used up and worn out. I think it would, perhaps, have been greatly better if Sumner and Franklin had been here three or four days ago; but you may rely upon our giving them as desperate a fight as I can force our men to stand up to. I should like to know whether you feel secure about Washington should this army be destroyed. I shall fight it as long as a man will stand up to the work. You must judge what is to be done, having in view the safety of the capital. The enemy is already pushing a cavalry reconnoissance in our front at Cub run, whether in advance of an attack to-day I don't yet know. I send you this that you may know our position and my purpose.

"JOHN POPE, Major General.

"Major General HALLECK,  
"General-in-Chief."

And finally, three days later, after drawing back all my troops within the intrenchments under orders from General Halleck, advised him:

"HEADQUARTERS, BALL'S CROSSROADS,  
"September 3, 1862—1.40 p. m.

"Major General HALLECK: We ought not lose a moment in pushing forward the fresh troops to confront the enemy. In three days we should be able to renew the offensive in the direction of Little River pike beyond Fairfax Court House. We must strike again with fresh men while the enemy is wearied and broken down. I am ready to advance again to the front with fresh troops now here. Those I brought in can remain for two days. Somebody ought to have the supreme command here. Let us not sit down quietly, but push forward again. I give you these suggestions because I believe them very important. I would have attacked again yesterday but for the reason I gave you; whether the

causes then stated can be removed I do not know ; but, if possible, they should be. The enemy is in the direction of Leesburg with his left resting on Drainsville road, far as he can be traced by his pickets. I have just received advices from that direction. Lee himself is on the Leesburg turnpike.

“JNO. POPE, *Major General.*”

A true copy :

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.*

If these despatches are not sufficient answer to General McClellan's extraordinary statement, I know not what would be.

In the narrative of my connection with military operations in Virginia, I have reached a point where it is equally difficult to continue or to be silent. While, perhaps, it would not be judicious to recount all that occurred between the 2d and the 7th of September, 1862, yet some account of the extraordinary transactions of those few days seems to be demanded in justice to myself and others. I shall pass as briefly over the matter as I possibly can, and only relate what seems to be entirely indispensable to anything like an understanding of the subject. After withdrawing within the outer intrenchments around Washington, the command of the troops, in compliance with orders from General Halleck, passed into the hands of General McClellan. I made my personal camp at Ball's Crossroads, and on the morning of the — of September repaired to Washington with a few officers of my staff, and reported in person to the General-in-chief, the Secretary of War, and the President. Each one of these high functionaries received me with great cordiality, and expressed in the most decided manner his appreciation of my services, and of the conduct of my military operations throughout.

Great indignation was expressed at the treacherous and unfaithful conduct of officers of high rank who were directly or indirectly connected with these operations, and so decided was this feeling, and so determined the purpose to execute justice upon them, that I was urged to furnish for use to the government, immediately, a brief official report of the campaign. So anxious were the authorities that this report should be in their possession at once, that General Halleck urged me to remain that day in Washington to make it out. I told him that my papers, despatches, &c, were at my camp near Ball's Crossroads, and that I could not well make a report without having them by me. He still urged me to remain, with great persistence, but I finally returned to my camp and proceeded to make out my report. The next day it was delivered to General Halleck, but by that time influences of questionable character, and transactions of most unquestionable impropriety, which were well known at the time, had entirely changed the purposes of the authorities. It is not necessary, and perhaps would scarcely be in place, for me to recount these things here, and I shall therefore only speak of results which followed. The first result was that my report, so urgently demanded the day before, in order that the facts might at once be laid before the country and made the basis of such action as justice demanded, it was resolved to suppress. The reason for this change of purpose was sufficiently apparent. The influences and transactions to which I refer seemed to the authorities to make it essential to the temporary interests of the government that General McClellan should be reassigned to the command, and as a result, that the bad faith and bad conduct which the government was so anxious only the day before to expose should, at least for the present, be overlooked. In what was then considered by the government a serious crisis, I was constrained to submit, for the supposed benefit of the public interests, to reproach, misrepresentation, and calumny concerning a campaign which the government to me personally and to the numerous friends of myself and of justice, constantly and freely, not only then but ever since, proclaimed to have been conducted with

eminent skill and vigor, and to have accomplished greater results than any one believed possible with such a force and under such circumstances, and whose triumphant success was only lost by the bad conduct of those who had been just rewarded for their treachery by the very object they sought to accomplish by it. While I myself did not then and do not now admit that the necessity existed for sacrificing an officer who had done his duty, and rewarding those who had betrayed him and the country, and while I equally disavow the belief that, under any circumstances, a great government is excusable in doing such wrong to a faithful officer and offering such rewards to successful treachery and bad faith, I acceded to the manifest wishes of the government, and cheerfully accepted a position full of trial and bitterness, in the hope that the country might reap the expected benefit which could alone justify (if indeed anything can justify) such silence and such forbearance as was required from me. It was plain to me that the sense of injustice and wrong to be done me by such a course weighed heavily upon the members of the government, and that it was with the extremest reluctance that they decided upon measures which seemed to them necessary. Under such circumstances patriotism and the sense of duty, which I trust have always guided my conduct in this war, left me no alternative consistent with either except to submit in silence. I made no effort whatever to change or modify the course resolved on, except to ask that I might not be retained on service with the army under General McClellan. All other consequences I was ready to accept. I was accordingly relieved from duty with that army, and ordered to the command of the department of the northwest. Of course the amnesty to General McClellan embraced all those who had so grievously sinned in his behalf. I trust I have borne with patience and fidelity the bitter lot imposed upon me, rendered far more bitter by the fact that the sacrifice was made in vain. Within two months it was actually found necessary to depose General McClellan from his command, and bring Fitz-John Porter to trial.


From the beginning I have had an abiding faith in the intelligence and justice of the people, who are sure, sooner or later, to arrive at the truth, and this confidence in the certainty of final, though perhaps tardy, justice has sustained me throughout the long period of misrepresentation and abuse which followed my departure from the east. I think I may say with confidence that in all these proceedings the Secretary of War yielded, as I had done, to the mistaken views of others. From that day until this I have never applied to the government for any command or position, and think I can say with equal truth that I have discharged the duties to which I was assigned with zeal and fidelity.

Of the feelings of an officer thus withheld from active participation in a war which was to decide the existence of his government, it is unnecessary to speak. I am sure my worst enemies will not charge me with absence from the front by any act or inclination of my own. I have made but one intimation to the government in regard to these matters since the day I yielded up the command in Virginia. In the last days of January, 1863, when the trial of Fitz-John Porter had closed, and when his guilt had been established, I intimated to the President that it seemed a proper time then for some public acknowledgment of my services in Virginia from him—such as he had so often made to me and to others in private—as would relieve me from the misconception and misrepresentation which I had so long borne in silence. While the President did not say so in direct words, he indicated very plainly that it was yet necessary for the interests of the country that matters in this respect should remain as they were. Since that day I have never, personally, by letter, or through others, made any sort of reference to the subject to any of the authorities in Washington or to the public.

I considered it a duty I owed to the country to bring Fitz-John Porter to justice, lest at another time and with greater opportunities he might do that which would be still more disastrous. With his conviction and punishment ended all official connection I have since had with anything that related to the operations I conducted in Virginia.


# BATTLEFIELD OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN AUGUST 9<sup>TH</sup> 1862.

No. 2.




# MAP SHOWING THE POSITIONS OF BOTH ARMIES AUGUST 27<sup>TH</sup> 1862 AT NIGHT.

N<sup>o</sup> 3



Report of Maj. Gen. John Pope to the Committee on the Conduct of the War.

Scale: 3 Miles to Inch.



— United States Forces


— Bowen & C<sup>o</sup> Lith. Philad<sup>a</sup>

— Rebels.



# POSITION OF TROOPS AT SUNSET AUGUST 28<sup>TH</sup> 1862.

N<sup>o</sup> 4.







**PART IV.**

**ASSIGNMENT TO COMMAND OF NORTHWEST DEPARTMENT.—INDIAN AFFAIRS.—DRAFT IN WISCONSIN.—ASSIGNMENT TO COMMAND DIVISION OF MISSOURI.—CONDITION OF MISSOURI.—CORRESPONDENCE WITH GOVERNOR FLETCHER, OF MISSOURI.—MEASURES FOR PACIFICATION OF THE STATE.—TREATY WITH INDIANS.**

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On the 16th day of September I reached St. Paul, and assumed command of the department of the northwest. The constantly recurring difficulties arising from close contact between whites and Indians, and the unfortunate, if not dishonest administration of our Indian system by agents, contractors, traders, and other hangers-on more or less interested in plundering the Indians and getting possession of their lands and of the money and goods appropriated to them by Congress, had assumed formidable proportions in Minnesota in the early part of 1862, and during that summer had culminated in the dreadful massacre of hundreds of innocent settlers on the frontiers of that State.

Statements have been made by Indian agents and other white men concerning the causes of this Indian outbreak, and, of course, the whole case has been given against the Indian. The barbarous redress sought and partly accomplished by the Indians fell upon those who were innocent of any wrong to them, and who were completely defenceless. Under cover of the profound horror occasioned by the dreadful massacres of white people which inaugurated this outbreak, the real criminals among the whites escaped the verdict which would and ought to have been passed upon them. The barbarous and indiscriminating outrages committed by the Indians destroyed the sympathy to which, in the beginning, they were fairly entitled, and prevented that calm and judicial examination of the facts which, while it could not have excused or palliated the atrocities they committed, would, at least, have shown that they had been grossly wronged, and had good grounds for deep and abiding dissatisfaction and distrust.

I arrived in Minnesota about the last of September of that year. Colonel (now Brigadier General) Sibley had been sent to the frontier by the governor of the State with all the troops that could be collected. The Indians in force were devastating the entire border settlements, and had destroyed at least one considerable town.

Large numbers of people, estimated by persons of standing in St. Paul at fifty thousand, had abandoned their farms and villages, and were crowding into the large towns on the Mississippi river. Everywhere I found consternation and dismay.

Sibley was successful in beating the Indians, who fought him boldly in large force. An expedition under Sibley was sent against the Indians in 1863, and a co-operating force under Sully sent up the Missouri river in the same summer. Both expeditions met and defeated the Indians. In 1864, Sully again marched against them from the Upper Missouri, and defeated them in several severe fights.

The results are that the Sioux Indians have been entirely driven from Minnesota. There is no large body of these Indians, who are hostile, nearer to the settlements of Minnesota than Devil's lake, in Dakota Territory, a distance of over three hundred miles.

I append, hereto, printed copies of correspondence with the Secretary of War and general-in-chief had for the last three years, which give a sufficiently full history of our Indian policy and its administration. It is to be hoped for the sake of humanity, and for the interest and honor of the government, as well as the good of the Indian, that the present Congress will not adjourn without some

legislation which may correct the abuses in our system of Indian policy and its administration, and lay down such rules as will place our Indian relations on a basis of justice and humanity.

*Communication to Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.—Plan of operations against the Indians of Dakota and Idaho.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE NORTHWEST,  
Milwaukee, Wis., February 6, 1864.

SIR: I have submitted to the general-in-chief, by this mail, a plan of operations against the Indians in the Territories of Dakota and Idaho; and in the same connection I have the honor again to invite your attention to some suggestions as to the policy to be pursued towards the hostile Indians who were directly or indirectly concerned in the Minnesota massacres, as well as towards those tribes of wild Indians with whom treaties have never been made, but with whom the troops as well as emigrants will be brought into contact during the proposed military movements.

Upon the policy adopted will largely depend the successful results of any military operations.

The system of Indian policy hitherto pursued seems to have been the result of temporary expedients, and not of well-considered examination of the subject, and, with its results, is briefly as follows, viz:

As soon as the march of emigration began to press upon lands claimed or roamed over by wild tribes of Indians, a treaty was made with them which provided for the surrender of a large part of the lands, and the location of small reservations for the exclusive occupation of the Indians, or for the purchase of that limited portion of the Indian country bordering on the white settlements, leaving the Indian the larger part of region claimed by him. In consideration of this surrender, considerable money annuities, as well as annuities of goods, arms, ammunition, &c., were granted to the Indians, and an Indian agent appointed as special custodian and disbursing agent of the funds and goods.

By this operation we were placed in contact with two classes of Indians. First, the Indians entirely surrounded by white settlements and living on small reservations; and, second, the Indians who still maintained their roving life and their relation with the wild tribes on the one hand, while on the other they were connected with the whites through the annuities of money and goods paid annually for the surrender of that small portion of their lands bordering on the white settlements. Of course the Indian of the first class was no longer able to maintain himself by hunting in the circumscribed area allotted him, and with his unconquerable dislike to manual labor he grew rapidly to be an idle vagabond, dependent entirely upon the government for support. The money and goods annually furnished him under the treaty, through the Indian agent, necessarily attracted all the gamblers, whiskey sellers, Indian traders, and other unprincipled characters who infest the frontier, while the purchase and transportation of large quantities of goods brought also into the Indian system a horde of contractors. The Indian was thus provided with the worst possible associations, and surrounded by the most corrupt influences, and became a gambler, a drunkard, and a vagabond, plundered and wronged on all sides. His reserved lands rapidly became valuable by the growth of settlements around them, and land speculators besieged Congress with every sort of influence to make another treaty, involving another removal of the Indians and the expenditure of more money and more goods, while the coveted lands fell to the lot of the fortunate or skillful speculator. This process was repeated at no long intervals, the Indian tribe diminishing rapidly with each removal and becoming thoroughly debased, until transferred to a region where they could not derive any support from the soil, and, emas-

culated of their manhood, they soon fell a prey to hostile Indians or perished with disease and want.

The Indians on these reservations, surrounded by such influences and forced into association with so depraved a class of white men, were completely fortified against any efforts to educate or christianize them. Even in their wild state they were not so entirely withdrawn from any hope of civilization.

To the Indians of the second class, viz., those who have sold portions of their lands bordering on the white settlements, though they still retain their roving habits, much the same remarks, though in a more limited degree, are applicable. The yearly or semi-yearly payment of money and goods requires their presence at stated periods on the frontier of the white settlements. Indian traders, whiskey sellers, and gamblers assemble there to meet and plunder them, and these payments become scenes of wild debauch until the Indian has parted both with his money and his goods, when he is forced again to resort to the prairies to support life. Gradually, also, the white settlements encroach more and more upon his lands. He again sells, until, corrupted by gambling and drinking and by contact with depraved whites, he gradually parts with his whole country and is allowed a small reservation upon which, with the assistance of his annuities, he supports himself as he can, becomes one of the class of "Reserve Indians," and goes to his end through the same course.

There do not and have not lacked occasions, time and again, when the Indian, goaded by swindling and wrong and maddened by drink, has broken out against the whites indiscriminately, and committed those horrible outrages at which the country has stood aghast. I think it will be found, almost without exception, that Indian wars of late years have broken out with the second class of annuity Indians, and can be directly traced to the conduct of the white men who have swindled them out of their money and their goods.

By our system of reservations, also, we have gradually transplanted the Indian tribes to the west, and have located them from north to south along our western frontier, building up, by this means, a constantly increasing barrier to travel and emigration westward. Through this barrier all emigrants to the new territories and to the Pacific States are compelled to force their way, and difficulties, leading to robbery and violence, and oftentimes to extensive massacres of both whites and Indians, are of not unfrequent occurrence. If the whites be worsted in these difficulties troops are immediately demanded, and thus begins an Indian war, which the greed of contractors and speculators interested in its continuance, playing upon the natural apprehensions of the people, and influencing the press, makes it very difficult to conduct successfully or bring to an end. Both in an economic and humane view the present Indian policy has been a woful failure. Instead of preventing, it has been, beyond doubt, the source of all the Indian wars which have occurred in late years. So long as our present policy prevails, the money and the goods furnished to the Indians will be a constant and sufficient temptation to unscrupulous white men, and so long may we expect outrages and Indian outbreaks on the frontier. It is not to be denied that the expense of this system to the United States has greatly exceeded what would have been necessary to keep troops enough on the frontier to insure peace with the Indians. It is equally certain that the condition of the Indian, so far from being improved, has been greatly injured. He has lost all the high qualities of his native state, and has simply been reduced to the condition of an idle, drunken, gambling vagabond. The mortality among these annuity Indians, living on reservations, has far exceeded that among the wild tribes, and bids fair to extinguish the whole race in a wonderfully short period. I think it will not be disputed, by those familiar with the subject, that our Indian policy has totally failed of any humanizing influence over the Indian; has worked him a cruel wrong; and has entailed a very great and useless expense upon the government. I have passed ten years of my life in service on the frontier, and the

facts herein stated are the result of observation and experience, and are familiar to every officer in the army who has served in the west. However wise may have been the theory of our Indian system, it can readily be substantiated that, in its practical operation, it has worked injustice and wrong to the Indian; has made his present state worse, morally and physically, than it was in his native wilderness; and has entailed a heavy and useless expense upon the government. Some change, therefore, seems to be demanded by well-established facts resulting from an experience of many years.

It will doubtless be remembered by the War Department, that, shortly after my arrival in Minnesota, in October, 1862, to assume command of this department, I invited the attention of the Secretary of War to this subject, in relation to its application to the reserve and annuity Indians concerned in the outbreak in that State. I proposed then that all the annuity Sioux, as well as the Winnebagoes, be collected together, with or without their consent, and removed to some point far in the rear of the frontier settlements; that their arms be taken away from them; that the payment of money annuities be stopped; that the appropriations for that purpose, and to pay for all lands claimed by such Indians, be devoted to building them villages and supplying them with food and clothing. By this means the annuity Indian would be deprived of any power to indulge his wandering habits, or to injure his white or other neighbors. The temptation which the payment of money to him constantly presents to unscrupulous whites would be taken away, and he would thus be shielded from all the corrupt and debasing influences which have surrounded him in times past. He would be placed under the most favorable circumstances to apply to him the influences of civilization, education, and Christianity, with hope of successful results, and without the surroundings which have hitherto made such instruction impracticable. In the second, if not in the first generation, such humanizing influences would have their full effect, and the Indian, if he could not be made a good citizen, could at least be made a harmless member of any community in which his lot might be cast. So long as annuity Indians retain their tribal organization, and are treated in their corporate and not their individual capacity, the change of habits and of ideas necessary to effect this result cannot be accomplished, nor can these results ever be attained, under any circumstances, until the Indian is no longer an object of cupidity to the white man.

By this means, also, the great barrier to emigration and travel, now constantly accumulating along our western frontier, would be removed, and Indian hostilities, such as have marked our history of late years, would come to an end.

This system would be very much less expensive to the government than the present, attended as the latter is at short intervals with expensive Indian wars. Certainly, in a humane view, such a system as is here sketched has every advantage over that hitherto pursued.

While in October, 1862, I did not consider it my province (as indeed I do not now) to recommend the application of this system to any annuity Indians except such as are within the limits of my own command, I yet believed then, as I do now, that such a system possessed every advantage over that hitherto pursued, and was much more worthy of a humane and wise government.

In proposing it I have not undertaken to discuss the question of the right of a few nomadic Indians to claim possession of the vast districts of country which they roam over to check the advance of civilization, or to retain in wildness and unproductiveness for the scanty subsistence of a few thousand savages, regions which would support many millions of civilized men. However such questions may be decided by abstract reasoning, all history shows that the result will certainly be in some way the dispossession of the savage, and the occupation of his lands by civilized man. The only practical question, therefore, for the government to consider, is the means by which this result may be attained with the

greatest humanity, the least injustice, and the largest benefit to the Indian, morally and physically.

No government except our own has ever recognized Indian title to lands on this continent. It is with just pride that we point to our record on this subject, but such pride cannot but be much abated when we come to contemplate the practical working of the system which is based on this principle. While our Indian system is based upon the principle of remunerating the Indian for lands taken from him, the practical result of its application has been to leave him in contact and intercourse with a class of unscrupulous whites who are attracted to him only in the hope of securing the money which he receives. No measures are omitted to plunder him, and as the most effective method of doing this is first to degrade him by drink and gambling, that process is, of course, the one generally pursued.

No sufficient protection from these influences is afforded to the Indian, and the very principle of recognizing his title to lands and paying him for them, upon which we pride ourselves so much, has been in fact, by the manner of its application, the direct cause of his degradation and of the temptation to wrong and plunder him. To the practical operation of a principle which is in itself wise and humane we owe the constant recurrence of Indian wars and the deep degradation of the Indian.

I propose, therefore, that the annuity Indians who still observe their treaties be removed to points far in the rear of the frontier settlements, in the manner and under the conditions above indicated, and that all other Indians be left to the exclusive management of the War Department and the military commanders in the Indian country.

The application of a system based upon these recommendations would, of necessity, require a radical change in our whole Indian policy; and although I hardly feel justified in recommending so extensive a reorganization of our Indian system, I consider it not improper to present these views for the consideration of those who have jurisdiction of the subject. I have presented the foregoing suggestions for the consideration of the War Department, because I believe the time has arrived when, having had abundant experience of the evil working of our present Indian policy, we can remodel it without confusion, so as best to promote the interests of the government, and to secure humane and just treatment of the Indian tribes. I have sketched the subject thus briefly because I only design to present the outline of suggestions which can properly be made the basis of action by the legislative department of the government, and to invite attention to a subject which merits and should receive careful consideration.

My immediate purpose in giving thus, in detail, the evil working of our present Indian system, is simply that the facts stated may be made the basis of an urgent request to the War Department in view of military operations on the great plains during the coming spring. These operations will bring us in contact with tribes of wild Indians with whom treaties have never been made, and with powerful bands of annuity Indians, belonging to the second class of annuity Indians described in this paper, who have violated their treaties. In view of any permanently successful results of military movements, I have the honor to request respectfully, but with all earnestness, that the present system of treaty-making be not applied to the wild tribes, and treaties already violated be not renewed.

I have proposed to establish large military posts in the midst of the Indian country, which shall cover the border settlements of Iowa, Dakota, and Minnesota at a long distance, and at the same time so locate them that they shall furnish some protection along the emigrant route to Idaho. Strong cavalry forces will visit the various tribes of Indians east, north, and south of the Missouri river, and hold such conferences with them or take such measures as shall assure quiet.



I would ask, therefore, that the military be left to deal with these Indians without the interposition of Indian agents. I ask it because I believe that any permanent peace with the Indians depends upon it, and because I am convinced that the condition of the Indian in his wild state is far better than his status under the present Indian policy. If we could provide by treaty for the removal of the Indians to points far within the frontier States, and could place them in such condition that they would no longer be a temptation to covetous white men, while at the same time they would be prevented from indulging their wandering habits, and subjected, under the most favorable circumstances, to all the influences of education and Christianity, I have no doubt that such treaties would be eminently wise and humane; but between such a condition and the native state of the Indian there is no intermediate arrangement which is not attended with wrong to the Indian, unnecessary expense to the government, and constant danger to the frontier settlements. In his wild condition the Indian possesses, at least, many noble qualities, and has only the vices which are inseparable from the savage state. He is free, and, so far as he can be, happy, contented, and easily managed. If the government make any change in his condition it should be for the better.

It is easier far to preserve the peace and protect emigration where only wild Indians are in question than where these annuity Indians are concerned. Either a radical change in our Indian policy should be made, or, in justice to the government as well as to the Indian and to the cause of humanity, he should be left in his native state, only subject to the condition that he shall not molest the emigrants who pursue their journey through his vast domain.

If we cannot adopt the former of these alternatives, the latter has at least been made more easy by the fact that we have already reached the western limit of the great fertile region between the Mississippi river and the Rocky mountains. The great region now roamed over by the Indians offers no inducements to settlement and cultivation, and the lands are not coveted by the whites except in the circumscribed regions within the mountains where gold has been discovered. Special arrangements can, if necessary, be made with the Indians who claim those intermediate districts; but there is no longer the necessity of interfering with the wild Indians of the great plains, further than to secure immunity of travel for white emigrants. This safety of travel can readily be secured by the kind action of the military authorities.

I believe that the further application by Indian agents of our present system of treaty-making would only jeopard this result, and for this reason, as well as in consideration of the facts heretofore stated, I urge upon the department that no treaties be made nor renewed with Indians in this department.

The system of Indian policy I have herein sketched and recommended I hope earnestly will be adopted, as well for the good of the Indian as for the good of the country. Until that is done, or some such change in our Indian system be made, I trust that, on grounds of humanity, as well as of interest, the government will decide to leave the Indian in his native wildness.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

Hon. E. M. STANTON,

*Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.*

*Communication to Lieutenant General Grant.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,  
St. Louis, Mo., May 23, 1865.

GENERAL: I have the honor to transmit, enclosed, a copy of a letter from General Curtis, in relation to a late Indian raid in Minnesota. That you may fully understand the situation there, it will be proper for me to make the following statement:

Up to the time of the massacres in Minnesota, in 1862, several tribes of Sioux Indians, now hostile, occupied the Upper Minnesota river, and were in immediate contact with the white settlements.

The usual difficulties resulting from this close contact of whites and Indians broke out, and culminated in the dreadful atrocities of the Indian massacres of the summer of 1862. I arrived in Minnesota about the last of September of that year. Colonel (now Brigadier General) Sibley had been sent to the frontier by the governor of the State with all the troops that could be collected. The Indians in force were devastating the entire border settlements, and had destroyed at least one considerable town.

Large numbers of people, estimated by persons of standing in St. Paul at fifty thousand, had abandoned their farms and villages, and were crowding into the large towns on the Mississippi. Everywhere I found consternation and dismay.

Sibley was successful in beating the Indians, who fought him boldly in large force. An expedition under Sibley was sent against the Indians in 1863, and a co-operating force under Sully sent up the Missouri river in the same summer.

Both expeditions met and defeated the Indians. In 1864 Sully again marched against them from the Upper Missouri, and defeated them in several severe fights.

The results are that the Sioux Indians have been entirely driven from Minnesota. There is no large body of these Indians, who are hostile, nearer to the settlements of Minnesota than Devil's lake, in Dakota Territory, a distance of over three hundred miles.

The late excitement in Minnesota was caused by what is said to be a raiding party of sixteen Indians on foot, who came from Devil's lake, passed the outer line of military posts without being discovered, and were first heard of near Mankato, on the Minnesota river. The fact that this party was headed by one Carpenter, a half-breed, who had enlisted in our army, had served in Tennessee, was there tried for robbery, escaped, and came back to Minnesota, renders it doubtful whether the party were really not men like himself, and not Indians. There are in Minnesota eighteen companies of cavalry, four companies of infantry, and one company of artillery. The district of Minnesota, in which these troops are, is commanded by General Sibley, one of the earliest citizens of the State, and a man of character and standing. He has lived twenty-five years or more in that section of the country, and is thoroughly familiar with it, and with the tribes of Sioux Indians concerned.

It would seem, then, that with a force of more than twenty-three hundred men, according to General Sibley's last return, and those mostly cavalry, commanded by an officer who has always lived in the State, and knows the country and the Indians well, Minnesota has been furnished by the general government with every means of protection against Indians. Surely if this large force of cavalry cannot protect the settlements against sixteen Indians on foot, who are obliged to traverse a distance of over three hundred miles, and pass a line of military posts before they can reach any of the frontier settlements, it would be difficult to say how many troops would be necessary. This is all that has occasioned the stampede in Minnesota, and it seems strange that such a raid of

a few Indians on foot should have been made undiscovered over such a great distance, and permitted to reach the frontier. Of course if this party really came all the way from Devil's lake, it was due to carelessness and want of vigilance of the troops. In addition to troops mentioned, however, there is a considerable number of half-breed and Indian scouts, who are occupied in watching the country beyond the posts. Through these scouts, also, this small party of Indians on foot must have passed.

The hostile Sioux, driven from Minnesota and the southern portions of Dakota Territory, have made a temporary rendezvous at Devil's lake, in the northern part of Dakota.

This great lake is near the British line, and whenever the Indians are pressed they take refuge in the British possessions. By British subjects these Indians are supplied with arms, ammunition, and all other articles they need, and are encouraged and incited to keep up hostilities. So long as these Indians are at war with the people of the United States, British settlements monopolize the trade with them. Again and again their unfriendly acts, to call them no worse, have been brought to the notice of British officials without eliciting any satisfactory result.

Permission has been asked to pursue these hostile Indians, who have murdered women and children, into the uninhabited portions of the British possessions, but permission has been refused by the English government, which will neither protect our frontier from hostile savages harboring in British territory, nor permit the United States government to do so in the only manner possible.

I shall send a force to Devil's lake, but the Indians will only retreat a few miles across the British line, where they will be safe.

We are compelled, in fact, to occupy a line of frontier posts in Minnesota, to protect the settlements against small raiding bands of Indians. There is not, and cannot be, anything like an Indian war. There seems to me to be troops enough in Minnesota, with ordinary care, for complete security.

The fact is, in relation to the Indian tribes on the plains, that we are now reaping the harvest of the bad management and bad policy which has characterized our Indian system for so many years. The Indians are every day in the hope that a treaty of peace, such as has hitherto been made, will be offered them; thus securing them immunity for what they have done, and supplies of goods and money, and arrangements for yearly annuities of both. They keep up hostilities in this view, and in the light of their past experience they are doubtless right enough.

It has long been a saying of the Sioux Indians along the Platte river, that, whenever they were poor and needed blankets, and powder and lead, they had only to go down to the overland routes and kill a few white men, and so bring about a "treaty," which would supply their wants for a time. The effects of this system we are now enjoying.

There is, however, another and a wider view of our present relation with the Indians of the plains, and of the Rocky mountains, which should engage serious attention, and enlist an earnest effort to arrive at some definite and permanent policy. The great development of the mining regions in Colorado, Montana, and Idaho has attracted enormous numbers of emigrants, who are crowding over the plains in every direction and on every route. The Indian country is penetrated everywhere; highways are made through it and the game driven off or killed. The Indians are therefore crowded more and more into narrow limits, where they are less able every day to subsist themselves by hunting. Of course they are becoming exasperated and desperate, and avail themselves of every opportunity to rid their country of the whites.

The opportunities are numerous enough, owing to the carelessness and eagerness to reach the mines of the white emigrants. They have been in the habit of travelling without precaution in the smallest parties, and striving with each

other to arrive first in the mining regions. The Indians, always watchful and alert, lose no opportunity of attacking them. We can, by sending troops enough, beat the Indians whenever they appear, but what is to become of them? Every day is reducing them more and more to actual suffering for food, and with this rush of emigrants continued for a few years, their game will become so scarce that they cannot live at all. Of course we fight them to protect our people. They keep up hostilities in the expectation every day of making treaties which will supply their necessities for a time, and as these necessities will grow greater every day, and the supplies will last for a less and less time, we seem likely to have an endless Indian war under the present system. If we now make one of the usual treaties with them, it will only encourage them to another outbreak as soon as the supplies given them under such a treaty are exhausted.

I still think that the plan proposed in my letter to the Secretary of War, referred to in previous letters to you, is the best, both for the sake of the government and of the Indian. Wisdom and humanity alike seem to demand some policy which shall save the Indian from complete and violent extinction.

This question is now directly and barely presented: Either the extermination of the Indian tribes by force, or some policy of supporting them by the general government at places where, deprived of arms and of the power to do injury or indulge their wandering habits, they can be subsisted and protected and subjected, under the most favorable circumstances, to all the influences of education and Christianity. This generation of Indians might not profit by such a system, but the next would, and even this generation could be made harmless members of a community under charge of the general government.

This subject demands and should receive serious attention. Your own experience on the frontier and in Indian service makes you as familiar as I am with this whole matter. You know the means which Indian agents, Indian traders, and other unscrupulous white men, more or less directly engaged in Indian trade, will resort to, in the newspapers or otherwise, to thwart any effort to change the present deplorable condition of affairs.

You know how officers exposing these abuses and seeking to bring about needed reforms will be abused and denounced, and how every sort of effort will be made to depreciate them and secure their removal from command. With all such proceedings your experience has made you familiar, and you know very well that in these Indian affairs no man can make a movement towards reform without paying the penalty in abuse and misrepresentation.

How much influence with the authorities such attacks on an officer, thus seeking honestly to inform his government and reform abuses, has had, or is likely to have, it would be difficult to say; but I trust that the report of the congressional committee lately sent out to examine into the abuses of the present Indian system, and the conduct of Indian officials, will go far to enlighten the public mind, and destroy the effect of malicious abuse.

I care little for such attacks, coming from such people, except as they affect the authorities at Washington, and, through them, the best interests of the public service.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT,  
*General-in-Chief.*

Official:

JOS. McC. BELL,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

*Communication to Lieutenant General Grant.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,

*St. Louis, Mo., June 14, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of copies of the following communications in relation to Indian affairs, with indorsement thereon of June 10th:

1st. Letter dated May 6, 1865, from J. H. Leavenworth, Indian agent, to W. P. Dole, Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

2d. Letter dated May 9, from Hon. Newton Edmonds, governor of Dakota Territory, and *ex officio* superintendent of Indian affairs for that Territory, to W. P. Dole, Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

3d. Letter dated May 10, from same to same.

4th. Letter dated May 26, from W. P. Dole, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to Hon. J. Harlan, Secretary of the Interior.

5th. Letter dated May 29, from Hon. J. Harlan, Secretary of the Interior, to Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

In relation to Colonel Leavenworth's letter and operations, I enclose herewith a despatch from Washington, signed by the Secretaries of War and the Interior, and two despatches from General Dodge, which cover the whole case.

In relation to the two letters of the Hon. Newton Edmonds, I have only to say that the Sioux Indians have been attacking everybody in their region of country; and only lately—long since the date of these letters—attacked, in heavy force, Fort Rice, on the Upper Missouri, well fortified and garrisoned by four companies of infantry with artillery. They have also made several raids into Minnesota and at least one along the Iowa border. If these things show any desire for peace, I confess I am not able to perceive it. There are some of the Sioux bands, of the Dakota Territory, who are peacefully disposed, and we are using every effort to get them into the military posts to effect peace with them, and I hope we shall soon be able to separate them from the hostile bands. The Indians now in hostility need some exhibition of force, and some punishment for the atrocities they have committed, before they will be peaceful.

I transmit copies of my orders and instructions to commanders on the frontier. My views and opinions on this subject are well known to the War Department. They were communicated long since, and at various times, through Major General Halleck, first as general-in-chief, and then as chief of staff, and are doubtless now on file. The exact course I am pursuing I long since notified him that I intended to pursue, and all the information needed will be found in his office.

The treaty of peace which Governor Edmonds proposes to make, and which he thinks the Indians will be very willing to make, is, I presume, such a treaty as it has been the unvarying practice of the Indian Department to make heretofore. A supply of food and presents, to induce the Indians to assemble, and to satisfy them during negotiations, is first bought and transported to the place where the Indians are to meet the negotiators.

A treaty is then made which provides that the United States government shall pay certain annuities of goods and money so long as the Indians remain at peace. In other words, the Indians are bribed not to molest the whites. Past experience shows very conclusively what the Indians think of such a transaction. No country ever yet preserved peace, either with foreign or domestic enemies, by paying them for keeping it. It is a common saying with the Sioux that whenever they are poor and need powder and lead they have only to go down to the overland routes and murder a few white men, and they will have a treaty to supply their wants. If such is the kind of treaty which will be satisfactory to the government, I do not doubt that Governor Edmonds is right in saying he can make one, either with the Sioux or any other Indians whatever. He has only to notify the Indians, hostile or not, that if they will come to a

certain place he will insure their safety, going and coming, and will give them presents and food, and make arrangements for continuing to supply them, provided only they will sign a paper promising to keep the peace toward the whites. But the very Indians with whom he now proposes to treat have signed such a paper and gone through the same absurd performance once before, at least—some of them oftener. Is there any reason to suppose that they are going now to keep their word any better than they did then? Of one thing we may be sure, and that is, that they will now demand a higher price for signing such a promise than they did before, and in six months or less will be ready for another treaty at a still higher price.

It seems idle to pursue the subject. It seems to me that no man can fail to understand, if he wishes to understand the matter at all, that such a practice as this only encourages Indians to commit hostile acts. Every time they do it they are thus paid for it. The treaties I have directed military commanders to make are simply an explicit understanding with the Indians that, so long as they keep the peace, the United States will keep it; but as soon as they commit hostilities the military forces will attack them, march through their country, establish military posts in it, and, as a natural consequence, their game will be driven off or killed; that the Indians can avoid this by keeping the peace, and in no other manner. This is a peace which involves no expenditure of public money for annuities or presents, and is, no doubt, objectionable to Indian officials on that account; but, as it certainly will not involve any more Indian wars than have hitherto occurred, and will be certain again to occur under the present Indian system, it will have the merit at least of greater economy. Indians will keep the peace when they fear the consequences of breaking it, and not because they are paid (and badly paid, too) for keeping it, and when they can, by the present system of treaty-making, really make more by committing hostilities than by keeping the peace.

The Indians with whom Governor Edmonds proposes to treat are Indians who are now violating a former treaty. What have they done to entitle them to presents and annuities, or to greater confidence in their promises—unless, indeed, the violation of former treaties and the murder of whites is to be thus compensated?

I am very willing to unite with Indian officials or anybody else to secure peace with the Indians, but not willing, if I can prevent it, to pay Indians for outrages committed upon innocent women and children, and thus encourage them to a renewal of the same atrocities. I oppose the proposed treaty of Governor Edmonds, because it will only lead to renewed hostilities, and very certainly, in the future as in the past and the present, involve the necessity of exactly the same operation in treaty-making.

At the same time, if the government and the people concerned will hold the military authorities blameless for any hostilities which may result from such a treaty, I will very willingly aid the Indian agents in making one; but, unless the Indian department will hold itself responsible for any murders of white people by the Indians with whom they make a treaty—Indians who have already violated one or more treaties of the same kind, and upon whom we have no greater hold now than hitherto—I am not willing to consent.

Whenever Indian hostilities or massacres occur on the frontier the military are held responsible for them, and by none are they so held more promptly and violently than by officials of the Indian department, who have made treaties with the very Indians concerned, which could not fail to lead to an outbreak.

Either the War or the Interior Department should have the sole management of Indian affairs. This divided jurisdiction leads to nothing but evil. The Indian officials are anxious, in season and out of season, to make treaties, for reasons best known to themselves.

The military commanders, foreseeing the inevitable result of these bribing

treaties, and knowing that they will be held responsible for all the Indian hostilities which surely result from such treaties, oppose treaty-making of this character. Hence, constant differences of opinion and conflicts of jurisdiction, which can only be avoided in one of two ways: 1st, to return to the War Department the whole management of Indian affairs; or, 2d, to provide for making treaties with Indians without the expenditure of money or goods. Having no power to effect the former arrangement, I am endeavoring to effect the latter.

Permanent or even long-continued peace with the Indians, under the present system of treaty-making, even if conducted with strict honesty and good faith with the Indians, I believe to be hopeless.

I again invite attention to my letter on this subject to the Secretary of War, dated February 6, 1864, and published in the Official Army and Navy Gazette, of April 23, 1864.

Wisdom and humanity dictate a change in the present system of Indian management

The development of the mining regions in the Territories of Colorado, Nebraska, Idaho, and Montana, has attracted such a horde of emigrants that the Indian country is penetrated in every direction; highways are made through it, and the game driven off or destroyed. The Indians are more and more confined to circumscribed areas, where they are less able every day to subsist by hunting. A few years more and they will be driven to extremities. No one can say what outrages are committed upon Indians by these irresponsible crowds of white men flocking through their country.

It is only what the Indian does to the white man that is published to the country; never what the white man does to the Indian. I have not a doubt that the Indians could be pacified if they did not hope, from day to day, that, by keeping up hostilities, they would secure a treaty such as has always before been made with them, and which would supply their wants.

By sending troops enough the Indians can, of course, be exterminated; but, surely, such cruelty cannot be contemplated by the government. The question is now squarely before us: Either the extermination of the Indian tribes, or a humane policy, which shall save them from so cruel a fate, and at the same time secure from danger white emigrants. The present system of Indian policy has only to be pursued a few years longer, and, in view of the past results in this direction, it is certain that no Indians will be left to treat with. Where are the great tribes of Indians to whom we applied this system of treaty-making so short a time since? Has there been a people on earth who have been so rapidly destroyed under the pretence of kind treatment? It is a simple process to calculate how long is the term of life of the tribes which still remain. Nothing can save them from the same fate unless the government changes its course—gathers them together and places them in such a position and condition that they will no longer be objects of cupidity to unscrupulous whites. So long as they receive money and goods they will be a constant source of temptation to white men, and will be wronged and plundered.

It is surely unnecessary for me to pursue this subject further. I am only reiterating opinions and views long since officially communicated to the War Department, and which I am convinced the new Secretary of the Interior would gladly examine and consider courteously. To his predecessor in office it has been useless to represent such matters. I beg, therefore, that this communication, with its enclosures, be laid before the honorable Mr. Harlan. I feel confident that he will very willingly adopt the plan suggested, or some other, to save his department from discredit and the government from the shame of inhumanity.

I shall pursue the course I have begun, without change, unless I receive orders to the contrary from my proper superiors.

Since beginning this letter the enclosed despatches have been received. The

Indians thought by Colonel Leavenworth to be so anxious for peace are those mainly concerned in the reported outrages. Opportunity has been, and is being given to him to make peace with these Indians. He has been once robbed of his stock, and driven out of their country. My impression is that this time he will lose his life.

I transmit, also, a copy of a letter just received from General Dodge, commanding department of Missouri, which touches upon some of the points in question.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT,

*General-in-Chief of the Army.*

Official :

JOS. McC. BELL,

*Assistant Adjutant General.*

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*Communication to Colonel R. M. Sawyer, assistant adjutant general, military division of the Mississippi.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,

*St. Louis, Mo., August 1, 1865.*

[Extract.]

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The Indian question is the most difficult, and I confess I do not see how it is to be solved, without an entire change of the Indian policy which has hitherto been, and must, under the laws, now be pursued. The development of the rich mining regions in the territories of itself has attracted great throngs of emigrants, and their number has been tenfold increased by the necessary results of the late civil war. Thousands of families who have been disloyal, or who have been sympathizers with the South, have, since the conclusion of the war, found it difficult, if not impossible, to continue to live at their homes, and have left the States of Missouri, Arkansas, southern Illinois, Kentucky, and no doubt other southern States, to make their permanent homes in the new territories. Many thousands of men who have been discharged from the army are also seeking the mining regions. A surprising emigration has been going forward ever since the opening of spring, and seems still to flow on without cessation. Not alone, or even generally, are the great overland routes pursued by these great throngs of emigrants. Every route supposed to be practicable is explored by them; they make highways in every direction across the great plains, and drive off or destroy the game. No part of that great region, however inaccessible, escapes the prying eye of the gold-seeker, and no route which promises discoveries of value, or in any manner shortens his route of travel, is neglected. Of course neither the movements nor the conduct of these parties can be controlled. No man except themselves can say what wrongs they do to the Indians by robbery, by violence, or by dispossessing them of districts of country which they have occupied unmolested for centuries. Yet the United States government is held responsible if any danger is incurred by them, or any loss of life or property sustained anywhere in the vast and remote regions they are traversing.

What the white man does to the Indian is never known. It is only what the Indian does to the white man (nine times out of ten in the way of retaliation) which reaches the public. The Indian, in truth, has no longer a country. His



lands are everywhere pervaded by white men; his means of subsistence destroyed, and the homes of his tribe violently taken away from him; himself and his family reduced to starvation, or to the necessity of warring to the death upon the white man, whose inevitable and destructive progress threatens the total extermination of his race. Such is to-day the condition of affairs on the great plains and in the ranges of the Rocky mountains. The Indians, driven to desperation and threatened with starvation, have everywhere commenced hostilities against the whites, and are carrying them on with a fury and courage unknown to their history hitherto. There is not a tribe of Indians on the great plains, or in the mountain regions east of Nevada and Idaho, of any consideration, which is not now warring on the whites. Until lately the United States troops, small in numbers and utterly incapable, on that account, of affording security to the whites or protection to the Indians, have been strictly on the defensive. Lately large re-enforcements have been sent to the plains, and several expeditions have been organized which are now moving against the Indians in the hope to restore peace, but, in my judgment, with little prospect of doing so, except by violent extermination of the Indians, unless a totally different policy towards them is adopted. The commanding officers of these expeditions, as also the commanders of military posts on the frontier, have orders to make peace with the Indians, if possible, and at the earliest moment that any peace which even promises to be lasting can be made. The difficulty lies in the fact that we can promise the Indian, under our present system, nothing that he will ask with any hope that we can fulfil our promise. The first demand of the Indian is that the white man shall not come into his country; shall not kill or drive off the game upon which his subsistence depends; and shall not dispossess him of his lands. How can we promise this with any purpose of fulfilling the obligation, unless we prohibit emigration and settlement west or south of the Missouri river? So far from being prepared to make such engagements with the Indian, the government is every day stimulating emigration and its resulting wrong to the Indian; giving escorts to all parties of emigrants or travellers who desire to cross the plains; making appropriations for wagon roads in many directions through the Indian country, and sending out engineers to explore the country, and bands of laborers to construct the roads, guarded by bodies of soldiers. Where, under such circumstances, is the Indian to go, and what is to become of him? What hope of peace have we when, by these proceedings, we constantly are forcing the Indian to war? I do not know of any district of country west of the Mississippi where the Indians can be located and protected by the government, and at the same time support themselves, as is their custom. I explained all these difficulties very fully in the conference which was had between the Secretaries of War and the Interior, General Grant and myself. It is idle to talk of making treaties of peace with the Indians, when not even an unmolested home in the great region which they claim can be promised them, with any sort of certainty that such a promise can be fulfilled. The very soldiers placed to protect the limited district which the government could alone protect against the invasion of white men would render it impossible for the Indian to maintain himself in the only manner known to him. It is useless to think of the government undertaking to subsist large bodies of Indians at remote and inaccessible districts. Whatever may be the abstract wrong or right of the question, all history shows that the result in this country must inevitably be the dispossession of the Indian of all his lands, and their occupation by civilized man. The only practical question to be considered is, how this inevitable process can be accomplished with the least inhumanity and the greatest moral and physical benefit to the Indian. We are surely not now pursuing such a course, nor are the means used becoming to a humane and Christian people.

My duties as a military commander require me to protect the emigration,

the mails and the settlements against hostile acts of Indians. I have no power under the laws of the United States to do this except by force. This necessity demands a large military force on the plains, which will have to be increased, as the Indians are more and more driven to desperation, and less and less able to protect the game, which is their only means of life. The end is sure, and dreadful to contemplate. Meantime there is, so far as my power goes, nothing to be done except what is being done, and, if the condition of affairs demands considerable military force and heavy expenditures, it must either be accepted by the government, or the troops must be withdrawn and the plains again given up to the Indians. It would probably not be difficult to make such a peace now with the Indians as has been the custom in times past, but useless to do so unless we can, at the same time, remove the causes of certain and speedy renewal of war, when by withdrawing our forces we will be far less prepared for it than now. These treaties perhaps answered the purpose (though I think they were always unwise and wrong) so long as the Indians continued to occupy the greater portion of their country, and the trading involved small encroachments by whites on its borders. Hitherto the process of dispossessing the Indian of his lands, although equally certain, was far slower and far less alarming. To-day we are at one grasp, seizing the whole region of country occupied by the Indians, and plunging them without warning into suffering and starvation. Treaties such as we have made with them in times past will no longer answer the purpose.

I have presented my views on this subject, and suggested what seems to me the proper course to be pursued, so fully and so often to the War Department, and have so frequently urged the matter upon the attention of the government, that it seems unnecessary and hardly consistent with official propriety that I should reiterate them in this manner. I only do so now because the telegram from the general-in-chief, which you enclose to me, seems to indicate dissatisfaction that so many troops are employed in the Indian country. Either a large force must for a time be kept there, or we must furnish insufficient protection to our citizens in that region.

It is hoped that during the present season the expeditions now marching against the Indians will be able to inflict such damage upon them that they will prefer to undergo much wrong and suffering, rather than again break out in hostilities. This is a cruel process, but the only one which, under the present system, seems to be in my power.

I will withdraw and muster out of service all the troops I possibly can from day to day, and by the close of this season I will endeavor to reduce to a much less force the troops serving on the plains. It is proper for the government, however, to realize that, owing to the changed condition of affairs on the plains, arising from the rapid development of the mining regions, and the great emigration to, and rapid settlement of, the new territories, a much larger military force will for a long time be required in that region than we have heretofore considered necessary. The remote stations of these troops, and the necessity of hauling in wagons from the Missouri river all supplies needed for them, renders the protection required and demanded by the mail service, the emigration, and the remote settlements an expensive undertaking, the propriety of which must be determined by the government itself. The military commander ordered to furnish such protection has only to carry out his orders in the best and most economical manner. I trust I have no purpose except to perform my duty in this matter and in this manner. I have assigned Major General Dodge, a well known and most efficient and careful officer, to the command of all operations in the Indian country west and south of the Missouri river, with orders to reduce forces and expenditures as rapidly as it is possible to do so. His subordinate commanders are men entirely familiar with Indians and the Indian country. In conclusion, I desire, if it be

consistent with the public interests, to be informed upon two questions, in order that I may act with more full understanding of the purposes of the government.

First. Is it designated that such military pressure be kept upon the Indians that small parties of adventurers, prospecting the plains and mountains in every direction, and in the most remote and uninhabited regions of the country, will be unmolested by Indians, whatever such parties may do or wherever they go? I need not say that protection, if of so general and universal a character, will require a large military force, which will be mainly needed to protect the Indians by watching these white men, and preventing them from committing acts for which the Indians will assuredly retaliate. Is the commander of this department responsible for hostile acts of Indians against such parties?

Second. In case treaties of peace, such as have been usual, are made with the Indians by the proper officers of the Indian department, and the troops withdrawn from the Indian country, in accordance with such treaty, is the army commander to be held responsible if the Indians violate the treaty and renew the war?

In short, is the army to be made responsible for every murder or outrage committed on the great plains by Indians or white men, who are officially at peace, according to the records in the office of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs?

Where there is divided action, as is the case now in the management of Indian affairs, there should be divided responsibility. Army commanders are very willing to be held responsible for military operations under their immediate command, but they are not willing, and ought not, to be held responsible for breaches of treaties made by other departments of the government, which they did not approve, yet to the terms of which they are obliged to conform. If these questions, which are respectfully asked, can be answered without official impropriety, the question of troops needed in the Indian country and attendant expenses can be easily settled.

I am, colonel, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Colonel R. M. SAWYER,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

Official :

JOS. McC. BELL,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

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*Communication to Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.*

The following proposed regulations for trade with the Indians were submitted to the Secretary of War:

GENERAL ORDER } HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE NORTHWEST,  
No.—, - } . *Milwaukee, Wisconsin, ———, 1864.*

The following rules, regulating trade with the Indian tribes, are published for the information of all concerned, and will be strictly enforced by all military commanders in the Indian country within the limits of this military department:

I. All permits to trade with Indians are hereby revoked, and hereafter any person desiring to carry on trade with the Indians must first procure written authority from the War Department.

II. A copy of this authority, properly certified under oath, will be furnished by the party holding it to the commanding officer of the military district in which it is proposed to establish trading posts, accompanied by a bond, giving satisfactory security that the trade regulations herein set forth will be strictly complied with.

III. The district commander will designate the points at which trading posts shall be established under these permits, which shall, in all cases, be located in the immediate vicinity of some military post. While the trader shall have authority to notify, by messenger or otherwise, all Indians with whom he proposes to trade, yet no traffic of any kind with Indians shall be carried on at any point, or in any places except the regularly established trading posts.

IV. Every trader shall furnish to the commander of the military district in which his post is located, as also to the commanding officer of the nearest military post, a copy of the invoices of his goods, with original prices attached, certified under oath, which certified invoices will be turned over to the council of administration of that post.

V. The council of administration will thereupon fix a tariff of prices in the same manner required for sutlers' goods, and will cause a written or printed copy of this tariff of prices to be exhibited publicly in some conspicuous place in the office of the adjutant of the post and in the storehouse of the trader, who will conform himself strictly to it in his dealings with Indians. A copy of this schedule of prices, with any changes which may be made from time to time, will be forwarded to the inspector general of the department and of the district.

VI. The council of administration will also, from the best information they can obtain, fix a fair and reasonable price upon all furs or other articles offered by Indians for barter, and the traders shall be bound in their dealings with the Indians to conform carefully to the prices thus established.

VII. The members of the council of administration shall be sworn to have no interest, direct or indirect, in Indian trade or with Indian traders, and to receive from them no consideration and no present of any description.

VIII. No money will be paid to Indians under any circumstances whatever, but traffic shall be confined exclusively to goods, provisions, and a limited amount of ammunition, and such other articles as may be necessary or useful to Indians. The sale or the possession of wines or other spirituous liquors of any description by Indian traders is positively prohibited.

IX. With the exception of Indian traders furnished with authority of the War Department, and their properly authorized clerks and employes, subjecting themselves to the provisions of these regulations, no white men will be permitted to come into the Indian country, except emigrants on their way to the mines or to the territories or States west of Dakota, and such emigrants are positively prohibited from engaging in any traffic with Indians.

X. The Indians shall at all times have the right to examine the tariff of prices fixed upon their own and the traders' goods, and the post commanders will cause the schedule of prices to be explained to the Indians by an interpreter, whether demanded by them or not. Their rights under these regulations will be carefully explained to them by the post commanders, and the Indians will be advised and requested to make known to the military authorities at once any infraction of these rules.

XI. Any Indian trader who violates these regulations shall be arrested and confined by the military commander of the nearest post, who will close his store and place a guard over his goods, which will be disposed of as thereafter shall be directed. The trader shall be held in confinement until his case be acted on by the War Department. Any other white man or half-breed who is detected trading with Indians shall be arrested and sent out of the Indian country, and his goods confiscated to the use of the Indians.

XII. Sutlers at all military posts shall be permitted to trade with the Indians in accordance with the regulations herein established.

XIII. Should any hostilities with Indians occur, the district commander will immediately cause all trading posts in reach of hostile Indians to be at once closed, and all trade suspended until quiet is restored.

XIV. The necessity of these regulations in securing peace with the Indians,

by making it clear to them that they will be dealt with fairly and kindly, in encouraging them to locate their permanent homes in the immediate vicinity and under the supervision of military posts, and in restraining all irresponsible persons who might wrong or plunder them, or in any other way create difficulties with them, is so manifest, that it is believed that all well-disposed persons will cheerfully comply with them.

XV. The commanders of military districts and posts are directed to furnish every possible aid to missionaries or other religious instructors who desire to have intercourse with Indians for humane purposes. It is expected that all officers and soldiers in this department will at all times treat such persons with respect and kindness, and extend to them all assistance at their command in the discharge of a duty so full of benefit to the Indians and of such advantage to the best interests of the government.

XVI. The commander of each military post in this department is charged with the enforcement of these regulations. He will make or cause to be made such frequent inspection and examination as will prevent any violation of them, or detect such violation at the earliest moment. He will be held responsible in all respects that these regulations are enforced in strict accordance with their terms.

By command of Major General Pope:

J. F. MELINE,  
*Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

The usual questions, concerning the relations between the civil and military authorities in the enforcement of United States laws, especially the conscription law, which obtained in all the military departments which comprised States not in insurrection, arose in the department of the northwest. The subjoined correspondence between the governor of Wisconsin and myself fully sets forth the views and principles upon which my official conduct in these matters was based. I am gratified to say that in the department of the northwest, the laws of the United States, however disagreeable to the people, were fairly and fully executed, and that at no time was there any conflict of jurisdiction or even of opinion between the civil and military authorities in that department. Of course this satisfactory result was due to the good sense and patriotism of the people.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE NORTHWEST,  
*Milwaukee, Wisconsin, June 25, 1863.*

GOVERNOR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23d instant, in relation to the execution of the conscription law in this State and to the question of the use of military force for that purpose. I fully agree with you that military force should not be employed within the loyal States, in the execution of this or any other law, until all the means for its enforcement usual in times past have been exhausted.

Conflicts of authority between the military and civil departments, or between the military forces and the people, are entirely to be deprecated. I am sure that you will bear testimony to the respect which has been exhibited towards the constituted authorities of this State, and to the care with which, in the discharge of duty in this military department, complications and misunderstandings which might arise from such a cause have been avoided.

I have been satisfied from the beginning that in nearly every case the conscription law can be executed by the civil authorities alone, through the people, acting under their direction in the legal and usual forms.

In the discretion intrusted to me by the government as to the employment of military force for the execution of this law within this military department, I have steadily declined to permit the use of any of the troops under my com-

mand unless I could be convinced that all other legitimate means had been tried without success.

Already in one or two cases I have found that applications for military aid had been made without necessity, the enrolment under the law having been completed thoroughly by the willing aid of the civil authorities.

The habit of resorting to military force in every trifling case of opposition or resistance to the laws is becoming so common as to excite in the minds of judicious men very serious alarm. Such a practice entirely supplants the civil authorities, sets aside time-honored means for the enforcement of the laws in this country, destroys in the citizen that feeling of personal interest in their execution through which alone we have maintained popular government, and prepares the public mind for complete abdication of civil rule.

It is impossible to believe that citizens of this country, except under the immediate influence of excitement, can be willing to trust the enforcement of civil law to military force, and thus to surrender the very highest privilege and duty of American citizens. Such a course would inevitably lead, if persisted in, to the complete dominion of the military and the final overthrow of free institutions. This practice tends also materially to weaken in the soldier that reverence for the civil law and that respect for the civil authorities with which he entered the military service, which he still earnestly cherishes, and upon which alone we must rely for the quiet disbanding of our great armies and the return of the soldier to his home an orderly, law-abiding citizen. Every dictate of wisdom and of patriotism should teach us to discourage, both by act and word, anything that might possibly tend to impair in the mind of the soldier his feeling as a citizen.

I therefore confidently hope that all well-disposed citizens of this State will, after short reflection, understand the imperative necessity of exercising their rights through the civil tribunals, to enforce every law of the United States, however much they may have been opposed to its enactment.

While, therefore, my duty to the government requires me to furnish whatever military aid is necessary to enforce the conscription law throughout this department in strict accordance with its terms, I shall only employ military force for that purpose after every resource of the civil authorities has been used without success.

It is my earnest hope that the people of the several States comprised within this military department have already adopted some such views as are here presented, and will so act upon them as to relieve me from the necessity of using measures in the performance of my duty, which are as unpleasant to me as they can possibly be to any loyal citizen.

I am, governor, respectfully, your obedient servant.

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

Hon. E. SALOMON,

*Governor of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin.*

On the 1st of February I was assigned to the command of the military division of the Missouri, and assumed command at St. Louis, Missouri. This division comprised the departments of the northwest, under General Curtis; of Missouri, under General Dodge; and of Arkansas, under General Reynolds.

The condition of affairs which obtained in the State of Missouri was sufficiently deplorable, and the means adopted for restoring quiet and the proper dominion of the civil law will be found fully set forth in the subjoined correspondence between Governor Fletcher and myself. The measures indicated in my letter were promptly put in operation, with entirely satisfactory results.

The people of the State cordially united in efforts to restore and enforce their

civil laws. Martial law was rapidly withdrawn from one section of the State after another, and before the war closed it became manifest that Missouri no longer needed any considerable force of United States troops, and was abundantly able and entirely willing to administer its own laws.

*Letter from Governor Fletcher.*

LINDELL HOTEL, *March 2, 1865.*

GENERAL: In order that I may be able to determine as to the propriety of the use of some of the means I have in contemplation for the future security of the people of Missouri, I have the honor to request that you will give me your views as to the best uses of the military forces of the United States in this department, and their relation to the present and prospective condition of this State.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOS. C. FLETCHER.

Major General POPE,

*Commanding Military Division of the Missouri.*

*Letter from General Pope.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI.

*St. Louis, March 3, 1865.*

GOVERNOR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2d instant, asking my views as to "the best uses of the United States military forces, and their relation to the present and prospective condition of this State," in view of certain measures contemplated by you for the future security of the people of Missouri.

Although in replying to your letter I shall be obliged to notice a condition of things not pleasant to contemplate, I have sufficient confidence in the good sense and practical judgment of the people of Missouri, as exhibited in the late elections and in the measures adopted by your legislature and State convention, to feel confident that they are prepared to meet and settle any questions affecting the welfare and prosperity of the State, however grave or unpleasant.

Until I reached this city I had supposed that the difficulties which had disturbed the State for the past three years had either been practically settled or were in a fair way of settlement, and that Missouri would soon resume the full exercise of her civil functions and dispense entirely with the cumbersome, inefficient, and altogether anomalous machinery of provost marshals, provost guards, and military supervision. I knew that the Union party at the fall elections had carried the State by an overwhelming majority, and that a loyal governor and a loyal legislature were now in power at Jefferson City. It did not seem too much to expect of the opposition party in Missouri that a large portion of it would at least be opposed to the whole guerilla system which has so long afflicted the State, and would, like all reasonable men, regard bushwhackers as the destroyers of all civil organization and the enemies of mankind.

I knew that since Price was driven from the State no organized force of the enemy could be found within the borders of Missouri. I fully believed in the capacity of the American people for self-government, and their determination to retain it; and I presumed, of course, that the people of Missouri had at once and earnestly assumed the performance of their civil duties, and were rapidly placing the State in the position it ought always to have occupied. I hoped to find the military forces in process of being relieved from the anomalous and anti-American functions which had been forced upon them by the extraordinary necessities of

the past three years, and concentrated for service in other fields and against the organized forces of the enemy.

I need not tell you, however, that such is by no means the condition of things which I find in Missouri. On the contrary, there has not been a time since the rebellion began when your civil affairs have been more under the control of a military police than they are to-day. I am glad to be informed, by many of your loyal and most respectable citizens, that order has been, to a great extent, preserved and treason overawed by the action of the military guards and provost marshals in this State; and those who complain of oppression or irregularity on the part of provost marshals in the performance of their duties must remember that the adoption of martial law was essential to the safety of the State; that under martial law provost marshals must necessarily come into existence, and the exercise of great power may, in some instances, be confided to men who subsequently prove unworthy of their trusts. The only wonder is that there have been so few wrongs committed and so few rights invaded during the existence of such a condition of government in Missouri. But it is surely needless to say that the longer such a system is continued the greater will be the liability to abuse; and, as a logical result, what are now rare and exceptional cases of outrage and injustice on the part of the provost marshals and soldiers will gradually but surely become of far more general occurrence, and you may expect finally to see your State under the complete dominion of the military. There will then be scarce a square yard of the State which will not enjoy the felicity of some military functionary. They will come to perform the duties of all the civil magistrates—to be the final judges of all things. Into every province of civil law, and even of domestic life, these military officials will in time most assuredly intrude, and become the final arbiters of both morals and manners.

What will become of the citizen under this extraordinary state of government? The simple mention of a few instances, I trust exceptional, which have been brought to my knowledge by undoubted authority since my arrival in St. Louis, will sufficiently answer.

By the authorities in Washington my attention has been called to the fact that provost marshals in several districts of Missouri are seizing and selling property, themselves being the judges of law and fact, and the custodians and disposers of the property involved. Another instance: An application was made since my arrival here for an order to take a military guard across the river into the State of Illinois and arrest a citizen of that State, living twenty miles distant, and bring him to the military prison in this city, because a colored man, also living in Illinois, complained that the white man owed him for several days' labor, and had abused him when he asked for the money. Another case, mentioned to me by a loyal gentleman of this city, a man of high character and undoubted veracity: A quarrel occurred between a man and his wife in one of the interior towns of the State, in which, on complaint of the wife, the provost marshal arrested the husband, made him divide his property with his wife, and then banished him from the State. These are some of the cases (rare and exceptional, it is to be hoped) which have already occurred. What would be the condition of things after long persistence in a system which logically and surely tends to such abuses?

If it were not sad and humiliating, it would be ludicrous, to see citizens—the most distinguished in position and intelligence appealing for justice and protection to a provost marshal, and invoking his decision of grave questions affecting life, liberty, and property.

As I said before, there are no organized forces of the enemy in the State, and I doubt not that twenty bushwhackers to each county would be considered a liberal estimate of the number of these enemies to mankind. In some counties there are doubtless more, in others fewer; but, even in those counties most infested by them, they bear an absurdly small proportion to the inhabitants. These are



all the enemies of peace and quiet now to be found within the borders of Missouri, and they are equally the enemies of every man in the State who has anything to lose.

Can there be a man in Missouri willing to admit that if every soldier were to-day withdrawn from the State the people would be unable to exterminate these small parties of robbers and thieves; in other words, to say that the people of Missouri are incapable of self-government, unable to execute the laws they themselves have made against these ridiculously small parties of outlaws and vagrants? Who does not know that the State is abundantly able to free herself of these pests if the people will only do their duty, and that duty the very first ever performed by man, and equally recognized by all classes and conditions of men?

This seeming neglect of the duty and the privilege of American citizens—a duty by the strict performance of which alone can we maintain our freedom and our free institutions—is to be attributed mainly, I think, if not wholly, to an alarming and fatal tendency among the people, which I have been astonished and dismayed to notice elsewhere in more favored regions, to surrender to the military the execution of the laws, and thus to abandon all safeguards against tyranny and oppression, and to pass unconsciously into a condition of acquiescence in the complete dominion of military authority. Once let the American people abandon themselves to this practice, which indulgence confirms into habit, and their liberties are gone from them forever.

It is hardly necessary to say that under free institutions the military is subordinate to the civil power, and that the life of a free government depends upon maintaining this relation. There are, no doubt, occasions where, in consequence of the presence of the enemy, or other extraordinary cause, martial law may become necessary in certain limited sections of the country; but such violent and exceptional reversal of the true condition of things should in every case be made to terminate with the immediate necessity which justified it.

There is no doubt that for a long time after the rebellion was inaugurated military authority was necessarily and properly made to supersede the civil power in Missouri, and perhaps that necessity existed until the inauguration of a new State government at Jefferson City. It would seem, however, that such a necessity should not exist much longer. I presume we will agree that not one step should ever have been taken in the direction of military supremacy except what was essentially necessary. Yet I find that although the pressure of that necessity was far stronger in Missouri in 1861 than to-day, and although in those days the enemies of the State and of the Union occupied one-half of the State with organized armies, and the malcontents who remained at home were infinitely more active and more dangerous, because more hopeful, the extent of the military jurisdiction was trifling in comparison with what I now find it. There can be no reason for such a state of things, except that people once accustomed to yield their civil jurisdiction, from the pressure of temporary necessity, soon acquire the habit of acquiescence after discovering how much trouble it spares them, and how much more easy it is, instead of performing their civil duties themselves, to devolve them upon soldiers and provost marshals. If a man is murdered, if a house is robbed, if any breach of civil law is committed, how much easier it is to write a note to the nearest provost marshal informing him of the fact, and then remain quietly at home attending to one's business, than to be summoned on a jury, called out as one of a *posse*, or in any other manner put to inconvenience. According to statements made to me by many of your citizens, this practice prevails to an alarming extent in this State, and unless it can be arrested and the citizens induced to resume the performance of their duties, I can see no redemption for Missouri.

If the war were ended to-day, and the Union restored, I do not see that the condition of your State would be at all bettered. On the contrary, the thou-

sands of your people who are in the rebel armies, being disbanded and returning to Missouri, lawless vagrants, without the means of livelihood or the inclination to work, would simply re-enforce the small bands of bushwhackers and outlaws which now infest the State. The troops, too, now stationed in Missouri, would be disbanded by a return of peace, and the people of the State would at last be brought face to face with this question, and without the advantages which they now possess. This question must some day be met and settled by the people themselves. Is it likely to be a more favorable season than now? On the contrary, does not every day lost increase the difficulty? Is it likely that the people will be more willing or more able in one year or ten years to resume the performance of their civil duties than they are to-day? If they be more willing, will they have the same aid then that they can have now in the undertaking?

To resume the functions of civil government in Missouri, will, undoubtedly, at the outset, be a work full of labor and sacrifice, and will require unusual fortitude and determination on the part of the people; but as it is a work which must be done sooner or later, and as there can never, to human foresight, be a better opportunity for that purpose than the present, surely now is the time to do it.

Some of your people object that they have no organizations, and wish me to issue orders to assist them in organizing; but such orders have again and again been issued without producing the effect. General or special orders from military commanders can never infuse into the people what alone is needed—and without which nothing can be effected—an earnest, resolute determination to act for themselves, to resume their manhood and their civil privileges, and to put down the outlaws who obstruct the execution of the laws and depredate upon the people.

Any organization for such a purpose, to be at all effectual, in fact to possess any vitality whatever, must originate with the people themselves, and be controlled by them. It is useless to talk of the people co-operating with the military in carrying on a war of extermination against guerillas and outlaws, or in efforts to resume control of the civil administration of your State. It is the military who should co-operate with and aid the people, not the people the military. This distinction may not be obvious at first glance, but it is a distinction vital to success.

Since certain orders, issued by me in 1861, for the preservation of peace in north Missouri, have been mentioned in terms of approval by public speakers in this city, and alluded to with favor in personal interviews, by many of your citizens, it may not be improper for me to state that it was the same earnest action of the people that is now proposed for the preservation of peace and the execution of civil law, which I undertook to secure in north Missouri in 1861, by the orders referred to. These orders were suspended and countermanded by higher authority than mine. At the time a majority of the people of Missouri were not prepared for what was then considered an extreme measure. I believed then that the orders issued would force such action as would lead to peace, in the absence of organized armies of the enemy. I have seen no reason since to change that opinion, but find you to-day far better prepared for the extreme measures to secure peace in the State than you were then for orders which, in these days, would be considered anything but radical. If these orders be approved, why not adopt now the popular action which they then recommended? The people of Missouri are able to enforce law and preserve peace in the State if only they use their power cordially and earnestly. Is it not better to use your civil officers to execute your laws than have them executed by provost marshals? The military forces under my command can and will render you the same service in either case. It is only suggested to you that, for the present, you replace the provost marshals by your civil officers, and let the military force

required be applied under their direction, and in conformity to law, and not under direction of a provost marshal, and in conformity with his discretion. May it not be apprehended, too, that your militia, a large and controlling body of your own citizens, are being educated into habits of disrespect for your civil authorities, and irreverence for civil law, by being encouraged or permitted to usurp jurisdiction of civil questions, through provost marshals or military commanders? The lesson of irreverence is soon learned, but of all lessons it is the most difficult to unlearn. What reason have the people of Missouri to believe that their militia, once taught such a lesson, will unlearn it whenever it is found convenient to resume civil jurisdiction? Is it not better, and far more likely to secure respect for your civil authorities, to require the troops to act under your civil officers in accordance with the laws of the country? Certainly the change from provost marshals to civil officers, in regulating the action of the military in civil matters, can be easily made, and without the slightest danger of impairing the efficiency of the military arm for that purpose.

Some have said that Missouri is not entirely regenerated, and that, although a loyal governor and legislature have been elected, yet there remain still in office many men who are neither loyal nor trustworthy. The answer to this is found in resolutions now before your State convention. That convention embodies the sovereign power of Missouri, and can to-day vacate all or any-of the civil offices of the State, and provide for filling them by the governor of the State. Until you have not only loyal men, but energetic and determined men, who will do their duty with vigor and boldness, holding every office in the State, it seems useless for your legislature to enact laws. In fact it is child's play to meet in Jefferson City to make laws which are either not executed at all, or must be executed to the extent and in the manner which suits the judgment or the fancy of provost marshals or military commanders. Until the people of Missouri are ready and willing to put forth their whole power to enforce the laws they themselves have made, it is a farce to legislate.

I do not wish to be understood as advocating any abrupt or sudden change in the present condition of things. I only offer some reasons why Missouri should take the first steps towards a resumption of her civil functions. Surely all portions of the State are not equally unsettled. In some counties it is probable that civil law is enforced, and that neither martial law nor soldiers are necessary. In other counties, not so fortunately situated, why will it not be well to take steps at once to at least begin the resumption of civil administration, aided, if necessary, by the military? A little time only will be required, if civil law is promptly administered, even with the aid of soldiers, to make the people feel strong enough to execute the laws themselves. Of course I am supposing that the civil officers act vigorously and efficiently; that they originate what is to be done, and that the soldiers act only under their call and on their authority. Slowly and gradually, county by county, the State could resume its own administration and dispense with the military.

It is by such gradual and careful process that it seems to me certain results can be obtained.

Once let us make a beginning, and keep steadily and constantly in view, in everything that is done, that the final object is the restoration of civil administration, and it will not be found a long nor a difficult task to accomplish the result.

But this end must never be lost sight of, and all arbitrary or exceptional acts must be carefully avoided or done only under the strongest and plainest necessity. Martial law seems essential now to the protection of life and property and to the preservation of the State from utter lawlessness, because it seems to be the only law which is generally enforced. Until the people provide officers to execute their laws, who will be supported in doing so not only by the soldiers, but by the great body of the citizens, martial law is your only protection against violence

and outrage. It rests with the people to replace it by civil law, and that this can be gradually but surely done there is not a doubt.

It seems idle to dwell upon the absolute necessity of returning to your civil status in the Union. Not only are your lives, liberties, and possessions at stake in this matter, but every moral and material interest of the State is involved. Neither peace nor security at home, nor emigration from abroad, can reasonably be expected under the state of things which now obtains in Missouri. It is hardly to be considered probable that people living in other States, where they have always possessed their civil rights and enjoyed the protection of civil law, will find any temptation sufficient to induce them to emigrate to Missouri, and submit themselves to the risk of the present uncertain and exceptional protection of life and property which is offered.

I trust that no one will believe that the military desire to continue this state of things. I say for them, as their commander, that nothing would be more satisfactory to them than to relinquish all connection with your civil affairs, and to be transferred to some field where they would confront the organized forces of the enemy, and where their presence with our armies might determine the fate of battles. The only duty which should now be required of the general government is to protect your State from an invasion of the organized forces of the enemy. The proper position for United States troops assigned to such duty is some point on the Arkansas river. How can troops be sent there when all the forces which can be spared for the defence of Missouri are, on demand of your people, kept scattered over the State, on the plea that they are needed for protection against a few outlaws and robbers?

If I accept the views expressed to me by many of your citizens, more troops are required for this service than would be sufficient to beat the largest army that ever yet undertook the invasion of the State. It is said that the disloyal men in the State harbor and assist the bushwhackers. Such service is extremely hazardous, and if these statements be true, a boldness and a spirit are exhibited by your disloyal citizens, of which, if a title were exhibited by the loyal men, not a bushwhacker would be found in Missouri at the end of sixty days. Guerillas and bushwhackers were never yet and never will be put down by the operation of a military force alone.

How is it in Missouri? A company of troops is stationed in a village or neighborhood to protect the people against these outlaws. Two or three bushwhackers come into the town, or perhaps live in it, and commit robbery and murder in some house. Before the troops are notified and get to the ground, the criminals have either fled or mingled with the crowd, and although every citizen in the place knows precisely who were the offenders, where they live, or who harbors them, not a word of information on the subject can be had from them, lest the next night some of the party or some of their friends burn the house or take the life of the informers. Is it expected that the troops, thus of necessity groping in the dark, can put down these outlaws, when the very men needing, perhaps, certainly asking, the protection of a military force, will not even give the slightest information necessary to identify the guilty or the dangerous parties? That this is really the condition of facts, I think you know. That it was so in 1861 and 1862, I know by my own experience in Missouri in those years.

What ground is there for believing that a military force, in the face of such inaction and fear on the part of the people, will ever be able to find out who the bushwhackers are, to say nothing of finding out where they are, or of exterminating them? The fact is, that in many parts of the interior of the State the people are living under a reign of terror, dominated over and paralyzed by a ridiculously small number of outlaws and vagabonds. It is useless to comment upon such an exhibition of—I will not say what—on the part of a large body of American people. It is only necessary here to express the conviction that just

as long as this strange paralysis continues, just so long will the people of Missouri be harassed and plundered by bushwhackers, or by any other lawless vagabonds. All the troops in the world could not, under present circumstances, prevent it.

We come back, then, to the same question: Do the people of Missouri intend to rouse themselves and execute, as well as make, their own laws? A single example of the trial of one of these outlaws before your courts, and his execution by your civil authorities, would do more to put an end to bushwhacking in Missouri than a thousand military executions. Strip these rogues of respectability, borrowed from the notion that they are armed enemies and southern soldiers, and reduce them, by actual trial and punishment before your courts, to their true status, as outlaws and ruffians, guilty of theft and arson, and you will deal them and their sympathizers such a blow as will go far to end the business. In this undertaking you shall have all the assistance the military can render you. The military forces employed shall act under the direction of your civil officers, according to law and the practice in times past. They can thus render you as much assistance as in any other manner, and the result of a success achieved under such circumstances will be of infinitely more benefit to you than a thousand successes achieved by the military alone.

I trust I shall be pardoned for so much reiteration; but, plain as are the principles set forth, and familiar as they ought to be, and doubtless are, to all Americans, they seem to me to be regarded in Missouri as mere abstractions, which are true, certainly, but hardly vital enough to control the action of the people.

I stand ready to aid the people of Missouri, by all the means at my command, to resume their status as citizens. I will render them, both by word and deed, every assistance which will tend to restore civil government in Missouri, and most promptly and cheerfully, when they have done this, will I withdraw the troops under my command to their true position under the Constitution and laws of the United States. It is only necessary to put reliable men into every civil office, and to enact such laws as are necessary to restore peace and civil rights in Missouri. The soldiers under my command stand ready at all times to respond to the call of your civil officers, and to act under their direction in helping to enforce the laws of the State. Such is the position they ought now to occupy, and such is the position which, under the action of your State convention and of the State government at Jefferson City, I trust they will be permitted to occupy in the shortest possible period.

Of course I cannot indicate to you what I intend to do, because you may readily understand from the foregoing remarks that any measures which I shall adopt must of necessity depend upon the action of the people of Missouri. If they will only resume their civil rights and privileges, administer civil government and set to work to execute their own laws, I stand ready to put an end to military jurisdiction at a moment's notice. I will give all the aid of the military to assist in reducing us to this subordinate position, but until then I am compelled to retain and administer martial law in the State. Unless you do it, and that promptly, civil liberty and free institutions in this country will have received a discouraging blow.

If Missouri, without an armed enemy within her borders, with a loyal State executive and civil officers, with an enormous majority of loyal citizens, and with all the aid the general government is now giving her, cannot resume her civil functions and execute her laws—in other words, conduct her local administration—what can be hoped for the States further south, which do not possess the same advantages?

The example of Missouri, then, is of the last importance in re-establishing the Union. If she fails even to attempt to administer her State government, with a large force of United States troops to aid her, it would seem almost hopeless

to make the experiment elsewhere. Missouri successful, and the problem of re-establishing civil government in the States further south is far advanced towards solution. Only earnestness and resolution are required. Can these qualities be wanting in your people? Your State convention has emancipated the negroes—a great work, well and bravely done. Cannot the people of Missouri now emancipate themselves? Can they not free themselves from the necessity of martial law? Can they not resume the performance of their duty as citizens, and execute as well as make their own laws?

With great respect, governor, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,

*Major General Commanding.*

Hon. THOMAS C. FLETCHER,

*Governor of Missouri.*

At this date, November 15, 1865, treaties of peace have been made with nearly all the hostile tribes of Indians, and it is hoped that, through proper acts of Congress at this session, such change in our Indian system will be made as will enable the government to complete and perpetuate peace with all of the Indian tribes.

Respectfully submitted:

JNO. POPE,

*Major General.*



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REPORT  
OF  
MAJOR GENERAL J. G. FOSTER,  
TO THE  
COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

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REPORT  
OF  
MAJOR GENERAL-J. G. FOSTER,  
TO THE  
COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,  
*November 2, 1865.*

HONORED SIR: Upon the receipt of your letter of the 22d May, 1865, requesting to be furnished with a reliable account of the military operations under my command since the beginning of the rebellion, and to reply in full to the written interrogatories of the committee, which were enclosed, I had the honor to reply at once that it would require considerable time for me to get together the requisite copies of orders, instructions, and reports from the records of the several department headquarters, where at different times I had commanded, and where, as was my invariable custom in active campaigns, I had left all the official documents of my operations while in command. I have now to report that I wrote to the headquarters of the department of North Carolina, Virginia, and of the Ohio, but have failed to obtain the requisite copies. Brigadier General I. N. Palmer replied from Newbern, North Carolina, that the records of the department of North Carolina had been removed by Major General B. F. Butler to Fort Monroe, Virginia, when he was in command; and upon application to the headquarters at Fort Monroe I was informed that the records could not be found. Application to the headquarters of the department of the Ohio also failed to obtain the papers that I required. The reports in the possession of the Adjutant General United States army were about being placed in the hands of the printer for publication. I am therefore unable to furnish copies of many of my reports, and of the written instructions received. Under ordinary circumstances I should have retained with my personal baggage copies of all official papers, but in the active operations in which I was constantly engaged this could not be done, and I was forced to leave them where I supposed they would be preserved. I will, however, furnish as complete a statement as possible, from my note-books and from memory, as follows:

To the first interrogatory—

“Please state what positions you have held and what commands you have exercised since the commencement of the rebellion, giving the periods during which those respective commands have been exercised by you”—

I have to reply that at the outbreak of the rebellion I was on duty in Charleston harbor, South Carolina, as captain of engineers in charge of the construction and repairs of the forts in that harbor, together with the forts in North Carolina, (Fort Caswell, at the mouth of the Cape Fear river, and Fort Macon, in Beaufort harbor)

From August, 1860, to December of that year, I was actively employed with a large force in strengthening the defences of Fort Moultrie. In November and December of that year I also set at work a large force upon the completion of Fort Sumter, and a smaller force upon the repairs of Castle Pinckney.

On the night of the 26th December, 1860, at the request of Major Robert Anderson, I managed, by means of the engineer employes and boats, to transport, secretly, the entire command from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter.

From December 27, 1860, to April 14, 1861, I was on duty as senior engineer officer in Fort Sumter. Left Fort Sumter with the command of Major Anderson, which evacuated the fort April 14, 1861. Arrived in New York with Major Anderson's command on the 18th April, 1861. Received orders to report to the Chief Engineer in Washington, April 22, 1861. Remained on duty in the engineer office several days, when was ordered to return to New York and relieve Captain H. W. Benham of the charge of the construction of the fort at Sandy Hook, New Jersey. Remained in charge of this work from May 10 to November 22, 1861. For several weeks before being relieved from this duty, performed the additional duty of engineer agent for the purchase of engineer supplies in New York city. Appointed brigadier general of volunteers, to date as such from November 16, 1861, with orders to report to Brigadier General A. E. Burnside, United States volunteers. Upon reporting received orders to proceed to Annapolis and assume command of the troops collecting there to form the Burnside expedition, and to organize and drill them. Remained in command at Annapolis from November 25, 1861, until General Burnside's arrival, December 20, 1861.

Took command of the first brigade of the coast division of General Burnside, December 20, 1861; sailed with the Burnside expedition from Annapolis January 9, 1862; the first brigade in advance, Reno's brigade second, Parke's brigade third.

Expedition attacked Roanoke island February 7, 1862. The gunboats failing to silence the fire of the Pork Point battery, General Burnside ordered me to land with my brigade, in the evening of the same day. Generals Reno and Parke's brigades also landed.

Attacked the enemy's position on the centre of the island, at daylight on 8th February, 1862, being in immediate command on the field. Defeated the enemy and captured the whole island. Remained in continued command of the first brigade until after the battle and capture of Newbern, and the surrender of Fort Macon, April 26, 1862, the crowning achievement of the Burnside expedition.

General Burnside's command was now created the 9th army corps of which I commanded the first division, as acting major general.

Appointed "major general of volunteers," to date from April 26, 1862, the day of the surrender of Fort Macon. First appointment of major general of volunteers withdrawn by the Secretary of War, on account, as stated, of "inadvertence in fixing the date," and a new one substituted, dated July 18, 1862.

General Burnside having moved to join General McClellan, on the Peninsula, with Generals Reno and Parke's divisions, about the 1st of July, 1862, I was left in command of the department of North Carolina, from July 1, 1862, to July 15, 1863.

The force under my command was constituted the 18th army corps.

On the 15th July, 1863, received orders to take command of the department of Virginia, and the 7th army corps, which was united to the department of North Carolina, under the title of the "department of Virginia and North Carolina." Remained in command of the "department of Virginia and North Carolina," from 15th July, 1863, to November 13, 1863, when I was relieved by Major General B. F. Butler, United States volunteers, and, in obedience to orders from the War Department, reported in person at the headquarters of the army in Washington.

On the 13th November, 1863, received orders to proceed to East Tennessee and relieve Major General Burnside of the command of the "army and department of the O.h.o." Arrived in Knoxville, East Tennessee, and relieved Major General A. E. Burnside of the command of the "army and department of the

Ohio" on December 12, 1863. Remained in command of this department until the 9th February, 1864, when, having been seriously injured in my wounded leg by the fall of my horse, I was, upon application, relieved of my command by Major General Schofield, United States volunteers. Remained in Baltimore, Maryland, on sick-leave until May 5, 1864.

About the 5th May, 1864, received orders (Par. 17, Sp. Or. No. 168, War Dept., 1864) to proceed to Hilton Head, South Carolina, and assume command of the "department of the south." Reached Hilton Head, and assumed command on the 26th May, 1864. Remained in command of the "department of the south" from the 26th May, 1864, to the 11th February, 1865, when I was relieved by Major General Q. A. Gillmore, United States volunteers, to enable me to take leave of absence to have a surgical operation performed on my wounded leg. Remained on sick-leave from 11th February, 1865, to July 13, 1865, when General Orders No. 118, of the War Department, (current series,) assigning me to the command of the "department of Florida" was received. Assumed command of the "department of Florida" August 7th, 1865, and have remained in command since that date.

To the 2d interrogatory, viz :

"Please state such particulars as you may deem necessary to a proper understanding of the several campaigns in which you have been engaged; setting forth the orders and instructions under which those campaigns were conducted, and the principal orders and instructions given by you, with such incidents and circumstances as you consider will be of interest to the public; appending to your statement copies of your reports and those of your principal subordinates, keeping the account of each campaign by itself as far as convenient"—

I have to report as follows, commencing with the operations in Charleston harbor, at the opening of the war, which, although of small magnitude, possessed, at the time of their conclusion, interest from having ended in the first collision of arms :

#### COMMENCEMENT OF THE REBELLION, IN CHARLESTON HARBOR, SOUTH CAROLINA.

The threatening aspect of political affairs caused the officers on duty in Charleston harbor to call their attention, at an early day, to the nature and strength of its military defences. As the engineer officer in charge of the forts in Charleston harbor, I received the authority of the Engineer department to strengthen the defences of Fort Moultrie, where the garrison of the harbor, two companies of the first artillery, under command of Colonel Gardner, were stationed, and, notwithstanding the heat of the summer, commenced work with a large force in the month of August, 1860. The work was pushed vigorously under my personal supervision, so that by the end of December this fort was so much strengthened as to be unassailable except by an overpowering force well supplied with scaling ladders. The body of sand that had been drifted by the winds against the scarp wall of the fort was moved to the front and formed into a glacis. A ditch was formed around the fort, in the middle of which a small net ditch was excavated to the quicksand; new bastionettes to sweep with their fire the ditches were built and armed. A strong picket fence was built entirely around the fort, under close pistol-fire. The parapet towards the sand-hills on the west were raised and embrasures formed, and provided with rifle-proof shields, and the guard-house was loopholed and prepared to serve as a citadel.

In the mean time a large engineer force had been set at work on Fort Sumter, under the direction of my assistant, Lieutenant George W. Snyder, United States engineers, to push forward the work, so as to place that fort in a defensible state. A third force was set to work repairing Castle Pinckney, under the direction of my second assistant, Lieutenant R. K. Meade, United States engineers.

I also wrote frequently, almost constantly, to the Engineer department at Washington, of the rapidly increasing hostile feeling in Charleston towards the government, and earnestly requested that the War Department might be begged to send re-enforcements to the forts in Charleston harbor. This was done; but the Secretary of War declined to send re-enforcements. My engineer employes were tampered with, and plots formed by parties in the city to seize Fort Sumter and Castle Pinckney. My assistants in charge of those forts asked for muskets, with which to arm a few of their trustiest men against the attempts of any mob to obtain possession of the forts.

I obtained permission from the Ordnance department at Washington to get forty (40) muskets, for this purpose, from the Charleston arsenal; and having brought them from the city, armed twenty (20) men in Fort Sumter, and twenty (20) in Castle Pinckney. At two o'clock on the morning following the day on which this was done, about the 11th December, 1860, I was aroused from my sleep by an officer of the revenue cutter, who had been sent from the city to my quarters upon Sullivan's island, with the following despatch, which I give from memory:

Captain John G. FOSTER, *United States Engineer, Charleston, S. C.:*

It is reported that you have removed some arms from the Charleston arsenal to the forts under your charge. If you have received any arms, return them immediately.

J. B. FLOYD,  
*Secretary of War.*

Although this would place my officers and Forts Sumter and Pinckney entirely at the mercy of any mob, I considered myself bound as an officer to obey the order, which I did, by the prompt return of the muskets by ten o'clock that morning.

Major Robert Anderson had before this time arrived and taken command of the troops in Fort Moultrie. Late in November, or early in December, Major Buell, assistant adjutant general United States army arrived with confidential instructions from the Secretary of War for Major Anderson.

These were understood to be, to maintain his position at Fort Moultrie as long as possible. But in the event of a pressing military necessity, he was authorized to remove the garrison to Fort Sumter.

After the passage of the ordinance of secession by the Charleston convention, on the 20th of December, 1860, the spirit of the secessionists became so ardent as to threaten some aggressive movement, and the governor of South Carolina was reported to have sworn that by the 26th of December none other than the palmetto flag should float over Fort Moultrie.

On the morning of the 26th December Major Anderson informed me that he intended to transfer his command to Fort Sumter on that night, and desired me to effect the removal by means of engineer employes and the boats and lighters at my disposal. The necessary arrangements were accordingly made, and in the evening the whole command, with the principal stores, were removed to Fort Sumter. This was effected with the greatest success and secrecy, although the rebel steam guard-boats were at the time patrolling up and down the harbor, and one of them actually passed close to a boat-load of troops, which escaped observation by the men bending low and covering their arms. I remained at Fort Moultrie, in obedience to Major Anderson's orders, to fire on any vessel that attempted to interfere with the crossing of the boats loaded with troops. Five (5) guns were loaded for this purpose. I had with me Dr. S. E. Crawford, my clerk, Mr. Edward Moall, two sergeants, and three men, seven in all; with this force we held the fort during the night, and towards morning spiked the guns.

daylight, in accordance with the orders of Major Anderson, the flagstaff was

cut down, the gun-carriages on the side towards Fort Sumter burnt, and the last lighter-load of ammunition and supplies sent to Fort Sumter. I then went to the city in my row-boat and secured the public money in my charge, paid several public accounts, closed the engineer office, and returned to Sullivan's island. Soon after we received orders from Major Anderson to remove the rear-guard to Fort Sumter, at once. As the last boat, with the small rear-guard under Lieutenant Jeff. C. Davis, moved across to Fort Sumter, a steamer-load of the rebels landed on the upper end of Sullivan's island to take Fort Moultrie. Arriving at Fort Sumter a boat from Castle Pinckney soon announced that a steamer-load of rebels from the city had landed and scaled that fort with ladders, capturing its defenders, Lieutenant Meade, United States engineers, and Ordnance Sergeant Skilling. The next morning disclosed the palmetto flag floating from all the forts in the harbor, except Fort Sumter, where the stars and stripes were soon displayed in the form of a good sized garrison flag. Active preparations for defence were immediately commenced. As no guns were mounted, the engineer officers with their employés undertook to mount them, while the soldiers guarded the walls. The provisions brought from Fort Moultrie, in the hurry of removal, were found to be scanty, and, but for the three months' supply that had been laid in for the engineer force, would have been inadequate for the three months' siege that followed. In addition to mounting the guns, the work of strengthening the fort was pushed with all diligence by the engineers. The unfinished embrasures on the second tier were bricked up; shutters fitted to the embrasures of the lower tier; guns arranged to sweep the landing; machicolis galleries constructed on the parapet, from which to fire along the face of the scarp wall, and also to drop loaded shells, with lanyards attached to their friction primers, intended to operate against assaulting parties from boats; mines were also formed outside the fort. No assault, however, was attempted; but, at several times before the final bombardment of the fort, insults were offered to the garrison and to the American flag that ought to have met with a hostile attitude at once.

On the 9th January, 1861, the steamer *Star of the West*, coming in with supplies and re-enforcements for the garrison, with American flags flying at the masthead and peak, was fired on by a battery on Morris island and forced to turn back. Many of the officers and men of the garrison were anxious to avenge this insult to the flag by firing on the rebel battery, and the guns were quickly manned and pointed. Major Anderson, however, hesitated to give the order to fire until the steamer had turned and gone out to sea. A council of the officers was then called by the commanding officer, at which the orders of the War Department, not to do anything to precipitate hostilities, was explained. A vote was then taken on the course to be pursued. Five officers were for opening fire. These contended that the flag of the United States was fired on by hostile batteries, and that their simple duty, as soldiers sworn to defend the American flag and the honor of their country, was to revenge this insult to both. The others, five in number, deprecated precipitate measures as closing the door on any further compromise by which the threatening civil war could be averted, and referred to the orders of the War Department for authority. It was finally decided by Major Anderson to demand of Governor Pickens, of South Carolina, a full and ample apology for the firing on the *Star of the West*, else the fire of Fort Sumter would be opened on all hostile vessels coming within the range of its guns. To the communication expressing this resolve Governor Pickens returned an elaborate and defiant reply. Major Anderson thereupon decided to defer the threatened action and to refer the matter to Washington; and Lieutenant Theodore Talbot, first artillery, was accordingly sent as a bearer of despatches, with the consent of Governor Pickens.

On January 11, 1861, a council of officers was called to listen to the communication of General Jameison, secretary of war, and Judge McGrath, secretary

of state of South Carolina, commissioners sent by Governor Pickens to summon Major Anderson to surrender Fort Sumter. Judge McGrath, at some length, conjured Major Anderson to listen to the "refined dictates of humanity" and avoid the "shedding of blood," for, if not, "thousands will howl around these walls and pull out the bricks with their fingers." Upon hearing that the council had decided to refuse the demand, and that the written reply of Major Anderson expressed such determination, the demand was mitigated to a proposal to send a joint commission to Washington, which was agreed to by Major Anderson. Mr. Hayne, of Charleston, and Lieutenant H. J. Hall, United States army, were accordingly despatched. In the mean time the rebels were active in the erection of batteries on Morris, Sullivan's, and James's islands, and at Mount Pleasant. These were constructed with impunity under our eyes, and within the range of our guns. Almost every day saw new batteries in progress, all intended to destroy the fort that we were placed to defend. In addition, after these works were completed and armed, the garrisons practiced their guns with shot and shell to obtain our range, and frequently burst their shells on different sides of the fort and sometimes over it. Not content with this, the iron-clad battery on Morris island, in its morning's practice on the 8th March, 1861, fired a solid shot at the sally-port of the fort, barely missing it by striking the sea-wall.


On April 3 the schooner Rhoda H. Shannon, from Boston, bound for Savannah, ran into the harbor by mistake and was fired on, when, hoisting the American flag, she was fired at by all the batteries on Morris island. After keeping on her course some time she hauled down her flag, but the batteries continuing to fire at her she turned and ran out of the harbor, with no damage except one shot-hole through the mainsail. To the demand for apology no reply was made, except the expression of intention to fire on every vessel bearing the United States flag that attempted to enter the harbor.

Finally, on the 11th of April the rebel commander, General Beauregard, peremptorily demanded the surrender of the fort. Major Anderson declined to surrender, but remarked to the bearer of the summons that in a few days he should be starved out. Taking note of this, General Beauregard sent to know in what time the fort would be surrendered from this cause. The reply, specifying the 15th instant, not satisfying him, notice was given at 2 a. m. on the night of the 11th of April, that in one hour the fire of the besieging batteries would be opened on Fort Sumter. It was accordingly opened at 4.30 a. m., and at 7 o'clock in the morning after breakfast the fort returned the fire. It soon became evident that the constant mortar fire that was kept up on the fort would prevent the service of the guns on the barbette tier without a great loss of life. The lower casemate tier was therefore alone used. During the first day the fire was well sustained. Several men-of-war appearing off the bar gave the encouragement that succor was at hand, and that some of them, or their boats, would run in during the night. We were at the time nearly out of provisions, and the stock of cartridge bags had been exhausted. Facilities were prepared for rapidly disembarking any supplies that might be brought in, and a sharp lookout kept during the night. The night, however, was very stormy, and no boats or vessels came in. All the needles in the fort, four in number, were kept at work nearly all night, making cartridge bags. In the morning the enemy's fire opened as vigorous as ever, and was replied to as promptly by ours. The vessels of the fleet showed no signs of coming in. Very soon a hot shot from Fort Moultrie entered the officers' quarters under the eaves of the roof and set it on fire. The quarters had been on fire the previous day several times, but had been extinguished by great exertions. Now, however, the fire was too high up to be reached, even were it not for the shot from the enemy's batteries which, as soon as the smoke appeared, rained upon the quarters. The most that could be done was to get out as much powder as possible from the

# SKETCH

showing position of Besieging Batteries.

April 12-13, 1861.



- Note:**
- Battery 1 on Cummings Pt. Iron clad, 4 guns.
  - " 2 do. Mortars and guns.
  - " 3 do. do. do.
  - " 4 Sullivan Island Fort Moultrie.
  - " 5 do. Mortar Battery
  - " 6 do. do.
  - " 7 do. Columbiads
  - " 8 do. Iron clad, 4 guns.
  - " 9 Mount Pleasant. Mortars
  - " 10. Fort Johnson Guns.





magazines that were in casemates at the ends of the burning quarters, and then to bank up earth against the magazine doors before the fire reached them. While the quarters and barracks were burning, the wind, which was from the south, beat the smoke down into the interior of the fort, so that great inconvenience was experienced in seeing or breathing. Only a few shots were fired at this time. When the smoke of the burning quarters cleared away the fire of our guns was resumed, but slowly, owing to the lack of cartridge bags. All the material in the fort, all the old clothes, and even the engineer and hospital blankets and sheets had been cut up to make cartridges, but even this supply was exhausted. The supply of provisions was also reduced to salt pork alone. The flagstaff had been cut down by shot, but the flag was quickly raised again on the parapet. Under these circumstances Major Anderson consented to surrender the fort and march out with the garrison; this was done on the 14th April, when the garrison embarked on the steamer Baltic, and sailed for New York. Strictly speaking, the garrison might have held out one or two days longer, and perhaps a week: for, although the ration was reduced to pork alone, the men would have lived on that, and cheerfully too, if it had been necessary, for some remarked in the hearing of officers, "I would rather live on pork for two weeks than see *that flag* come down."

This terminated the siege of Fort Sumter, of over three months' duration, during all of which time it could have been easily re-enforced by vessels running in at night. As proof of this, witness the ease with which the blockade-runners during the war ran into Charleston, sometimes even through three lines of blockading vessels, and past our batteries at Morris island.

#### THE BURNSIDE EXPEDITION.

The coast division constituting the military force of this expedition, composed of three brigades, General Foster's, the first, General Reno's, the second, and General Parke's, the third, sailed from Annapolis, Maryland, on the 9th of January, 1861. Ren lezyousing at Fort Monroe, the whole fleet sailed again on the 12th for Hatteras inlet, where most of the vessels arrived on or before the 15th. Here the whole fleet of nearly a hundred sail was crowded into a small anchorage, with insufficient room to swing at the turn of the tides.

A storm lasting several days followed our arrival. In consequence, many vessels were dragged from their anchorages, and against each other; some sunk at their anchorage, and others, at every turn of the tide, collided heavily and with much damage against neighboring vessels. There was no immediate remedy for these disasters. The bulkhead or swash, between the inlet and Pamlico sound, over which the vessels must pass to get into the sound, had only eight feet of water on it, whereas the draught of most of the vessels of the fleet was nine feet. The process of lightering the vessels and then dragging them over the swash, at high tide, was both slow and laborious, and was constantly interrupted by storms. But by determined and persistent efforts on the part of the general officers, and patient endurance on the part of the officers and men, the disheartening difficulties surrounding the expedition at this time were overcome, and the fleet, finally, safely anchored in the sound.

This was not accomplished until the evening of the 5th of February, 1861. On the following morning the signal to set sail was given, and we stood for Roanoke island, the gunboats, under Commodore Goldsborough, in the rear. Entering Croatan sound on the morning of the 7th, our gunboats immediately engaged those of the enemy, which retreated beyond a line of obstructions, (see sketch A,) and the gunboats then engaged the Pork Point battery. They bombarded it until 4 p. m. without silencing it, when General Burnside gave the order to land the troops at Ashby's harbor. I immediately ran in with the small steamer Pilot Boy, towing barges filled with men, but when within the short distance

of the landing discovered with my field glass an ambuscading force of artillery and infantry at the landing, and at once changed direction and landed at the point just north of it. Generals Reno and Parke also landed their brigades, forming a force on shore of about ten thousand men, which bivouacked for the night in a pouring rain.

#### BATTLE OF ROANOKE ISLAND.

Before daylight the next morning I gave the order to advance, being in immediate command. At daylight we came upon the enemy's pickets, and soon after upon the enemy's central position, situated in the middle of the island where it narrows almost to a neck. The works consisted of a battery of four guns, with wings of rifle-pits extending on the right and left to swamps deemed impassable, which, in turn, extended to Croatan sound on one side of the island, and to Roanoke sound on the other. The only approach to this position was by a causeway, about four hundred yards in length, over which the road led, which was completely flanked by the guns in the battery. In advance of this causeway the trees were felled. I immediately attacked in front with my brigade, and ordered General Reno to make his way through the swamp and turn the enemy's flank on the left, and General Parke to do the same on the right. This was found to be an almost impossible undertaking, owing to the deep morass and the thick tangled undergrowth. General Reno, however, finally succeeded, with a few men, in getting through the swamp on the left, and opening fire on the right and rear of the enemy's battery. This caused the cannoniers to fall back from their guns. At this moment I ordered a charge in front up the causeway. The enemy being flanked and thus attacked in front, fell back, and we took the work. A vigorous pursuit was at once commenced, General Reno and myself pushing rapidly up the island, while General Parke sent detachments to Shallow-bag bay, and to the rear of the Pork Point battery. We arrived at the upper end of the island before the enemy had time to recover from their panic, whereupon they all surrendered unconditionally. The two strong batteries at that end of the island, Forts Huger and Blanchard, also surrendered. The fruits of the day's fight were the whole island of Roanoke with its five forts, 32 guns, 3,000 stand of arms, and 2,700 prisoners.

#### BATTLE AND CAPTURE OF NEWBERN, N. C.

In accordance with the orders of General McClellan, which directed the capture of Newbern, with the view to an advance on Goldsboro', the expedition, both naval and military, sailed from Roanoke island on March 11, 1862. We effected a landing at Slocum's creek, about fifteen miles below Newbern, on the morning of the 13th, and advanced at once towards Newbern. After marching six miles came upon the first line of the enemy's works, which were deserted. Marching four miles further, and night coming on, we bivouacked in the rain within a short distance of the enemy.

At daylight, on the morning of the 14th, picket firing commenced, when General Burnside ordered me to advance and commence the attack. I did so, and soon came upon the enemy's position, situated about two miles from Newbern. This consisted of a strong and continuous line of earthworks, extending from the south bank of the Neuse river for about one mile in a perpendicular direction across the road upon which we were advancing, and to the railroad, beyond which it continued in a broken line of lunettes and redans for a distance of another mile further over broken ground to another road, where was a two-gun battery, beyond which was a swamp. This line was defended by eight regiments of infantry, about six thousand strong, armed by three batteries of light artillery, in addition to the heavy battery, where the line met the river called Fort Thompson, mounting twelve guns, four of which flanked the line

In front of this line trees were felled for a distance of one hundred and sixty yards. I formed my brigade in line, with the right resting on the river, and, advancing to the edge of the woods, opened fire. General Burnside sent General Reno, with his brigade, to the left to turn the enemy's right, and held General Parke's brigade in reserve, near the railroad. General Reno, however, came upon the line of detached works beyond the railroad, extending through the woods, and was forced to develop his whole brigade to face these works. The weak point of the enemy's line was at the railroad. Here the enemy had two heavy guns on platform cars, but had been unable to mount them for lack of time. At the opening of the battle one of General Reno's regiments had penetrated the enemy's line at this point, but had been driven out again. After this, when my left regiment got into position close to this portion of the line, its well-directed fire overcame that of the enemy at this point. General Parke, taking advantage of the opportunity, advanced his regiments through the opening, and swept the enemy's line towards the river. As soon as I saw this I ordered my brigade to advance, which it did promptly, and the enemy retreating precipitately we entered the works. By sending a regiment to the right the river battery was captured, and then swinging around to the left with other regiments, in obedience to General Burnside's orders, we took in reserve and captured the regiments of the enemy still engaged with General Reno. The remainder of the enemy fled towards the city, and burned the bridge over the Trent river behind them. I crossed my brigade over the river by the aid of the gunboats, as ordered by General Burnside, and occupied the town, where, by the labor of the soldiers and negroes, we finally succeeded in extinguishing the flames which had been kindled by the rebel troops with the intention of burning the city. The fruits of the victory at Newbern were, the richest town in North Carolina, one steamer, two hundred prisoners, forty-six heavy guns, eighteen field-pieces, several hundred stands of arms, the command of the railroad, the cutting off from supplies of the garrison of Fort Macon, with the prospective capture of that work, and the facilities of the railroad for our advance on Goldsboro'.

#### OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA, WHILE IN COMMAND OF THE DEPARTMENT, FROM JULY 1, 1862, TO JULY 15, 1863.

General Burnside having moved with Reno's and Parke's divisions to join General McClellan on the Peninsula, I was left in command of the department. The earthwork defences of Newbern were at once commenced and pushed to completion. Washington, North Carolina, was soon after occupied and fortified. Subsequently Plymouth was taken possession of and effective defences raised at that place also. Here labors occupied nearly one year. In the mean time the enemy was kept constantly harassed by raids and rapid movements by our small force. These brought on engagements at different times during the summer and autumn of 1862, of which those at the following places may be mentioned, viz: Bachelidor's creek, near Newbern; Trater's creek, between Washington and Plymouth; Rainbow Bluff, near Hamilton; Plymouth, and Washington.

#### EXPEDITION TO GOLDSBORO', NORTH CAROLINA, IN DECEMBER, 1862.

General Burnside having moved the army of the Potomac towards the Rappahannock with the intention of crossing, I was ordered by Major General Halleck, general-in-chief of the armies of the United States, to advance with my whole available force and destroy the railroad bridge at Goldsboro', and as much of the track as possible; the movement to be made simultaneous with the crossing at Fredericksburg. Accordingly, having been re-enforced by one brigade from Major General Dix's corps at Fort Monroe, I advanced from Newbern on the 12th of December, 1862, with four brigades and forty pieces of

artillery, in all about twelve thousand (12,000) men. After removing the obstructions placed in the roads of the retreating rebels, I pushed a cavalry force directly towards Kingston, which surprised the main picket guard of the enemy and drove it in. Under cover of this feint, the main body was moved rapidly by the left so as to strike Southwest creek at the most westerly of the four bridges that cross it. As anticipated, this bridge was found weakly guarded. While occupying this guard in front a regiment was thrown across the creek on a mill-dam, which by a vigorous and unexpected charge captured the artillery guarding the bridge, and thus opened it to our advance. This was late at night.

At daylight on the following morning we advanced upon Kingston. The enemy was encountered in a chosen position on the south side of the Neuse river, where the road crossed a swamp closely filled with thick undergrowth. The enemy occupied a ridge just beyond the swamp. For over two hours our attack failed to dislodge the enemy. Finally, after strong demonstrations on both flanks, a decisive effort was made in the centre, in which one of my best regiments, the tenth Connecticut volunteers, gallantly charged through the enemy's line, and seized and held the bridge over the Neuse, in the rear. The enemy then broke. A part retreated rapidly up the south bank of the Neuse; the remainder were captured. We crossed the river at once and occupied Kingston. General Evans rapidly retreated, with the garrison of the defences of the town, up the north bank of the river, closely pursued by our cavalry. We captured during the day seven hundred prisoners, nine pieces of artillery, four heavy guns, and a large quantity of ammunition, which being stored in houses in the town, we could only partially destroy without destroying the town. The information obtained at Kingston went to show that General Burnside had been repulsed at Fredericksburg; that General Lee had telegraphed General G. W. Smith, at Goldsboro', that he could send him thirty thousand men, if necessary, to resist our advance; and that strong defences had been constructed at Mosely Hall, and other points where the road crosses difficult streams. Believing, however, that, by deceiving the enemy, and rapid marching, the object of the expedition could be attained, I determined to go on. As a feint, the army was pushed out a few miles on the Goldsboro' road and encamped. At daylight it retraced its steps, crossed the river, burnt the bridge behind it, and rapidly marched up the south bank. At Whit hail a sharp affair took place. A rebel gunboat was being built at that point, and a considerable force was there to defend it, and prevent our crossing. Every attempt to cross infantry to burn the boat failed. All the artillery was then opened, and soon completely riddled the vessel. It served also to give the impression that an attempt to force a crossing was made. Leaving a few men to keep up that impression, the main body marched rapidly up the river and reached the railroad bridge as the smoke was seen ascending from the Mount Olive station, which the cavalry had been sent to destroy. The enemy were not prepared for us; their force was scattered; large numbers had been detached towards Whitehall and Kingston. The brigade on the south side at the bridge was soon whipped and driven from the field. The bridge was burned despite the efforts of the force collecting on the north bank; and before any considerable concentration could be made to disturb us, we had destroyed several miles of the track. As the column moved off on its return, having accomplished its purpose, a brigade made an attack on our rear guard, which repulsed it with severe loss. After that no attack was made, and the column returned quietly to Newbern. The force in the department of North Carolina was now increased and constituted by the President the 18th army corps, under my command.

I received orders from Major General Halleck to co-operate with the naval forces in an attack on Wilmington, North Carolina. All the preparations were completed, and the troops about being embarked at Beaufort, North Carolina, when the news arrived of the foundering of the Monitor, at sea. The loss of

this iron-clad, which was the only armored vessel in service, of sufficient light draught to enter the new inlet of Cape Fear river and take up position in reverse of the enemy's batteries on Federal Point, caused a change in the destination of the expedition. I was then ordered to take the expedition to South Carolina, and co-operate with Admiral DuPont in the projected attack on Charleston, South Carolina. Accordingly the fleet, having on board about twelve thousand (12,000) men, the best troops in North Carolina, sailed from Beaufort harbor, North Carolina, on the 2d of February, 1863. Arriving at Hilton Head, I paid my respects to Major General Hunter. I then called on Admiral DuPont to arrange the plan of the joint attack. The admiral explained that he could not be ready in less than two weeks, in consequence of having to increase the thickness of the decks of the monitors. I then decided to profit by the delay in obtaining some 100-pounder Parrotts for siege guns, and, after informing General Hunter of my intention, left for Fort Monroe for that purpose. After I left General Hunter issued an order breaking up my organization, and merging my whole force into the small corps commanded by him. He also ordered my personal staff to leave his department forthwith. Under these circumstances, I requested and obtained authority from General Halleck to return to North Carolina. The twelve thousand (12,000) picked men that were thus lost to my command were not used with any effect, in conjunction with Admiral DuPont's attack on Charleston; and the expedition thus failed.

#### REPULSE OF THE ATTACK ON NEWBERN, MARCH 14, 1863.

The enemy learning of the large force that had sailed for South Carolina, determined to make an effort to recover his lost ground in eastern North Carolina.

On the 14th of March, 1863, the anniversary of its capture, the rebel General D. H. Hill made an attack on Newbern with his whole corps. The main body advanced on the Trent road. A side column advanced by the way of Trenton and Pollocksville. Both waited for the success of a second side column, which at break of day made a furious attack, with twenty pieces of artillery, on an unfinished field-work on the north bank of the Neuse, nearly opposite the city, hoping to take it, and thence to drive the gunboats from the river. The garrison (the ninety-second New York volunteers) held the work coolly until re-enforced, and the attack failed. The whole force of the enemy then withdrew.

#### SIEGE OF WASHINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA.

After the failure at Newbern, Hill moved on Washington, North Carolina. Apprised of his intentions, I reached the place with my staff before he could surround it. The re-enforcements that were ordered to accompany me did not arrive in Pamlico river until Hill's batteries on Rodman's Point and Hill's Point completely blockaded the river. I found the garrison (forty-fourth Massachusetts volunteers, twenty-seventh Massachusetts volunteers, one company third New York artillery, one company third New York cavalry, one company first North Carolina volunteers, and one company negroes armed) to number about twelve hundred (1,200) men. Two naval gunboats and one armed transport, all under the command of Commander R. Renshaw, were in the river in front of the town. The defences of the town were well adapted to give efficiency to a small garrison, consisting of a small and strong field-work on the key-point, with a line of intrenchments surrounding the town, well flanked by blockhouses and redoubts. The supply of rations on hand was ample. The enemy's force was a whole corps, estimated to number twenty thousand (20,000) men, with fifty (50) pieces of artillery. Dispositions to resist an assault were immediately made, the forty-fourth Massachusetts manning the line from 2 to 4, (see sketch,) the twenty-seventh Massachusetts from 4 to 8, the artillery in Fort Washington, the cavalry company in the town. The men worked willingly and hard at strengthening the

lines, using shingles taken from dismantled houses for lack of shovels. Abatis were made, traverses erected, platforms for guns laid, and a portion of the ditches flooded by damming the surface drains. All intercourse with the enemy, even by flags of truce, was peremptorily interdicted, leaving the enemy in uncertainty as to our force. The three first days of hesitancy by Hill in ordering the assault were so improved by us, that when ordered, it is reported that the men refused to obey, seeing that we were ready for them, and that an assault, even if successful, would cost very dear. Hill then decided on a bombardment and siege. Batteries were commenced on all the ridges surrounding the town, and on Rodman's Point across the river. This last was our vulnerable point, as it commanded the gunboats in the river, and that side of the town. Seeing its importance on my arrival, I placed a company (first North Carolina volunteers) on the point, with orders to intrench, and under cover of the gunboats hold the position. Before they could accomplish this, they were at daybreak on the following morning driven off by the enemy and escaped in a scow. Guns were quickly mounted, and the Commodore Hull, aground near the point, received one hundred shots the following day. Determined to reposses this point, we assaulted with a picked party of men the battery at *d* (see sketch,) at the end of the causeway through the swamp, hoping to take it and thus turn and capture the battery on the point. The assault failed. I then determined to make the trial across the river in boats. The gunboat *Ceres*, Lieutenant McDiamid, which had run the blockade of the enemy's batteries to our assistance, was volunteered to assist. She was loaded with picked men and officers, and at daybreak, under cover of a mist, made the attempt. The plan was, to run the *Ceres* ashore at the battery, drive the rebels from their guns with grape and canister, the storming party to jump ashore and carry the battery with the bayonet. Unfortunately the *Ceres* got aground in the middle of the river, abreast the battery, and stuck. The battery opened upon her. She replied gun for gun until her ammunition was exhausted. Fortunately the supply of the enemy in the battery gave out at the same time, and at the next tide the *Ceres* floated off. In the mean time the storming party had been safely landed in boats on our side of the river. The enemy immediately added to and strengthened this battery and commanded the river. Anticipating the destruction of the gunboats, I erected the parapet of a battery on Castle island (a small island in the middle of the river,) into which, in that emergency, their guns could be removed, and thus retain command of the river. While this was transpiring, the siege batteries on the land side were completed and armed, and at the end of about a week opened with fourteen guns, most of them rifled. Fort Washington replied; and the cannonading thus commenced continued with varying intensity for twelve days. The town was traversed in different directions by the shot, and the lines of defence enfiladed, but by means of the protection of traverses, splinter-proof shelters, and bomb-proofs, sufficient shelter was afforded, and very little loss ensued. The old barbette carriages of the 32-pounders soon gave out, and were repaired piece by piece until, at the end of the siege, they had been almost entirely rebuilt. The consumption of ammunition exhausted the supply at the end of the third day's firing, and its replenishment soon became a difficult and serious matter. The fleet of gunboats below the Hill's Point battery were deterred from coming up by the obstructions, (the buoy to the narrow passage through them being removed by the rebels,) and by the fire of that battery. The relieving force, three thousand strong, under Brigadier General Henry Prince, which by my order had arrived in the river in transports, were not made effective. To my written order to land and take the Hill's Point battery by assault, General Prince returned the reply that "it was impracticable," and did not even make the attempt. Our only way, therefore, to get ammunition was by row-boats and small sail-boats, running the blockade of the enemy's batteries at night. These, finally, had to be armed to enable them to force a passage through the enemy's guard-boats placed to intercept

them. In this way we obtained at night the ammunition for the next day's firing, and thus were enabled to maintain the fire from day to day.

Finally, about the 12th of April, the steamer *Escort*, Captain Wall, with the fifth Rhode Island volunteers on board, ran the blockade at night without loss, and landed the regiment and her cargo of ammunition, so much needed, at the wharves of the town. This timely succor and re-enforcement rendered Washington secure. I immediately determined to go to Newbern and take command of the troops there and raise the siege. The number of troops there, including those under General Prince, was about ten thousand (10,000.) The written orders sent to Brigadier General Prince in the Pamlico river, were to return to Newbern, collect all the available troops there, march across the country, attack the force supporting Hill's Point battery and capture it. Concordant orders were sent to Brigadier General Palmer at Newbern. General Palmer, however, remained in Newbern. General Prince reported himself sick, and also remained. The force, eight thousand strong, marched under command of Brigadier General Spinola, who, after a fruitless front attack on the enemy at the crossing of Blount's creek, returned to Newbern. I started on board the *Escort* on the morning of the 14th, at daybreak. The enemy was prepared, and as we passed the batteries fired rapidly. Forty-seven shots struck the vessel, but, owing to the protection of the machinery by hay bales, did not disable her. The pilot killed and seven others killed or wounded were the only loss. Arrived in Newbern, orders were immediately issued for the whole force to prepare for march and action. We crossed the river on the 16th, and marched at daylight on the 17th.

On the following morning occupied Hill's Point battery, which the enemy had evacuated. In a few hours after our cavalry came upon and cut up the enemy's rear guard, near the intrenchments at *e*, (see sketch.) It was then known that the whole force of Hill was in full retreat. The defence of Washington, North Carolina, (sometimes called "Little Washington,") is of interest, simply from illustrating the fact that a small force, if active, brave, and determined, may often, in judiciously intrenched positions, defeat the efforts of very superior numbers.

On the 3d July, 1863, a cavalry raid, supported by infantry, was made on the Wilmington and Weldon railroad at Warsaw, where the track was destroyed for a mile or two, rebel stores burnt, and other damage done. Another and more successful raid was made soon after on the railroad at Rocky Mount station, where the bridges, factory, locomotives, cars, and stores were destroyed. On its return it captured Tarboro', North Carolina, and destroyed the rebel steamers at that place.

On the 13th July, 1863, I received orders to take command of the united departments of Virginia and North Carolina, with headquarters at Fort Monroe, Virginia. While in this command frequent and successful expeditions into the enemy's country were made. The fortifications of Norfolk, Portsmouth, York town, Gloucester, and Williamsburg were much improved and strengthened.

After being relieved by Major General B. F. Butler on the 13th November, 1863, and being ordered to East Tennessee to relieve General Burnside, I started at once to execute the order, proceeding by the way of Cumberland gap, took command of the five thousand (5,000) men at that point, and advanced towards Knoxville, constantly skirmishing with Wheeler's cavalry and Ransom's division of infantry until the siege was raised. General Longstreet having retreated from before Knoxville, in consequence of the advance of General Sherman, I reached that place on the 12th December, 1863, and relieved General Burnside. As soon as General Sherman returned towards Chattanooga, Longstreet turned on our pursuing column at Bean's station and repulsed it. Our column fell back to a good position at Blain's Crossroads, where it was re-enforced by my whole effective force. The two hostile armies remained in face of each other for several days, neither being able to attack on account of the severity of the weather and the nearly impassable roads, and, on our part, for want, also, of supplies of food,



clothing, and ammunition. Both armies suffered much from the severe weather and lack of supplies. Longstreet retired to winter quarters at Morristown. Our infantry and artillery were placed in cantonments, while the cavalry was thrown to the front to cover the foraging parties. The principal fighting during the winter was done by this arm, which had several brilliant engagements with the enemy's cavalry at the following places, viz: Dandridge, Mossy creek, Kimber's Crossroads, and Fair Gardens. An avenue of supplies from Chattanooga was opened by the way of Tennessee river about the 1st of January, 1864, and the condition of the army improved from that date. The railroad from Chattanooga to Loudon was reopened on the 12th of January, 1864, thus opening another avenue of supplies, and completely solving the problem of subsisting the army of the Ohio in East Tennessee. A depot of salted meat had already been formed at Knoxville by salting the hogs and cattle driven from Kentucky. The defences of the city had been made much stronger and armed and manned, to render the depot safe during offensive operations with the main force.

Having been severely injured by the fall of my horse in going to the front at Blain's Crossroads on the 23d December, 1863, I applied for a sick-leave to enable me to be cured of the injuries. General Schofield was ordered to relieve me. He arrived at Knoxville and received from me the command on the 9th February, 1864.

#### OPERATIONS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH TO AID GENERAL SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA-SHORE.

In November, 1864, I received, at Hilton Head, South Carolina, instructions from General Halleck to concentrate all my available force, and make a demonstration towards Pocotaligo, to favor the march of General Sherman, who was expected to reach that vicinity about the 30th November. I accordingly gathered every effective man. The force was small, only five thousand men, as I had previously, in obedience to General Grant's orders, sent to the armies in front of Richmond, every man that could be spared, keeping only enough to guard the garrisoned posts, while standing strictly on the defensive.

I landed this force on Boyd's neck on the 30th November, under General J. P. Hatch, and ordered him to push forward to the railroad in the vicinity of Grahamsville and to hold it. Mistaking the roads, the column did not reach the point on that night, as expected, and in consequence, on the following day found a strong force of the enemy in an intrenched position at Honey Hill, in advance of Grahamsville. An obstinate engagement, lasting nearly the whole day, followed; but the position was not taken, and at night General Hatch retired, having suffered severe loss. A few days after, I moved the force quickly across the river to Devaux's neck, between the Tulifinny and Coosawhatchie rivers, where it seized a position within good cannon range of the railroad, and held it. Guns were placed in position and the road commanded so as to disable any passing trains.

The command of the railroad had the good effect to prevent the passage of troops or supplies to Savannah, and to make the garrison of that city apprehensive for its safety in retreat, which it probably hastened.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. G. FOSTER,


*Major General Commanding.*

Hon. BENJAMIN F. WADE,


*Chairman of Committee on Conduct of the War,*

*U. S. Senate, Washington, D. C.*










**SKETCH**  
 showing the route to Newbern,  
 pursued by the Burnside Expedition, March 11, & 14, 1862.


**Note.**  
 ⚓ Anchorage on night of March 12, 1862.    ⚔ Battlefield March 14, 1862.  
 A Landing place of the troops, March 13, 1862.    C Line of obstructions.  
 B Deserted entrenchments.    D Line of Yankee catchers.


Scale: 350000 of miles.



**B.**  
**SKETCH**

showing route of the Burnside Expedition.





**Notes:**

- Fort Huger 12 guns and hot shot furnace.
- Fort Blanchard 4 guns
- Fort Bartow 8 guns
- Ballast Pt. Batt<sup>y</sup> 2 guns
- A Landing Place
- ⊗ Battle was fought.
- B Rebels surrendered.

**A.**  
**SKETCH**  
 OF  
**ROANOKE ISLAND, N. C.**





## APPENDIX.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL J. G. FOSTER TO MAJOR GENERAL BURNSIDE, OF THE OPERATIONS OF FIRST BRIGADE COAST DIVISION AT THE BATTLE OF NEWBERN, N. C., MARCH 14, 1862.

HEADQUARTERS GENERAL FOSTER'S BRIGADE,  
DEPARTMENT OF NORTH CAROLINA,  
*Newbern, N. C., March 20, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in pursuance of the orders of General Burnside, and in accordance with the plan of operations agreed upon, I proceeded to land my brigade on the 13th instant at Slocum's creek. I took on board the Pilot Boy about five hundred men of the twenty-fourth Massachusetts volunteers, and towing the boats of my brigade, carrying about six hundred more, reached the mouth of the creek and landed without molestation. I landed with the first detachment, and instructed Captain Messinger to remain on the Pilot Boy and land the balance of the brigade. I had sent orders to form the twenty-fourth and advance a short distance on the main road, and on landing took command and moved on, giving the advance to the twenty-first regiment Massachusetts volunteers, of General Reno's brigade, by order of General Burnside, assigning the advance to General Reno. I left an aid to form the regiments as they landed, and to order them to follow. I advanced on the main road, throwing out skirmishers and an advance-guard of the twenty-first Massachusetts; and at a distance of six miles I heard from Captain Williamson, of the topographical engineers, the result of a daring reconnoissance made by him, accompanied by Lieutenants Pell and Fearing, of General Burnside's staff, and by Lieutenants Strong, Pendleton, and Strong, of mine, discovering an abandoned breastwork. I then pushed on and entered the work, accompanied by General Reno, who had shortly before come up and assumed command of the twenty-first Massachusetts. The work was found to be a breastwork, well constructed and running in a straight line from the railroad to the river, a distance of about one mile, having a flank facing the railroad and a fort on the river flank; there were four flanking bastions for guns, and the fort was prepared for four guns; none were mounted, however. The troops were halted inside the fort to rest and eat. General Burnside then coming up, I, agreeably to his orders, advanced my brigade about 3 o'clock on the country road, General Reno being ordered to take the railroad track, which ran off to the left of the country road. We marched about four miles, halted and bivouacked for the night near the enemy's position. At daylight of the next morning (the 14th) I advanced my brigade, by order of General Burnside, until I came to the enemy's position, (General Parke was ordered to the left by General Burnside,) and made the following dispositions: The twenty-fifth was thrown to the extreme right, followed in order by the twenty-fourth in line of battle, their left resting on the country road, just on the left of which I placed the howitzer from the Highlander, under command of Captain Dayton, supported in line of battle on the left by the twenty-seventh Massachusetts, and opened fire. On the arrival of the navy boat howitzers, under command of Lieutenant McCook, they were placed in the line on the left of Captain Dayton's guns, and the twenty-third was ordered to the left of the twenty-seventh. The firing was incessant and very severe from the breastwork and within a very short range. General Burnside arriving, I communicated to him the dispositions I had made, which he approved; sending over to General Parke to push on the enemy's right, and leaving me to hold the front, he rode off to reach General Reno's position. The tenth regiment Connecticut volunteers having arrived, were ordered to the left of the twenty-third, and to support them if rendered necessary by want of

ammunition; this being the case, they formed on to the left of the position of the twenty-third and opened fire. Hearing from the twenty-seventh that they were very short of ammunition, I ordered the eleventh Connecticut, of General Parke's brigade, which had just come up by order of General Burnside to their support, and sent one of my aids to conduct them to their position. The twenty-seventh Massachusetts then retired in good order, with orders to lie in a hollow, out of the fire, with fixed bayonets, and wait further orders. The ammunition of the naval howitzers being nearly exhausted, and one piece disabled, the twenty-fifth Massachusetts were ordered to march by the flank and form so as to support the guns, leaving the twenty-fourth on the extreme right. About twenty-five minutes from this time the head of General Parke's column, the fourth Rhode Island, had reached the breastwork at the railroad crossing, and, after a brisk fire, pushed on and entered the breastwork in an opening left for the railroad track, and where the enemy's fire had much slackened in consequence of the steady and constant fire of the twenty-third Massachusetts and tenth Connecticut. This position of affairs being discovered, I ordered an advance along the line, which was promptly obeyed, the enemy retreating with great precipitation. On entering the breastwork sharp firing was still heard to the right of the enemy's position, and hearing from General Parke that he was engaged with the enemy's forces in their works on the right of the railroad, I led the twenty-fifth Massachusetts to their support and received the surrender of Colonel Avery and one hundred and fifty men. The breastwork we had entered was similar in construction to the abandoned one, running from Fort Thompson at the river to the railroad track, a distance of a mile and a quarter, and from the railroad track rifle pits and detached intrenchments, in the form of lunettes and redans, following each other for the distance of a mile and a quarter, terminating by a two-gun battery. Fort Thompson, a flanking bastion, mounted thirteen guns, all thirty-two pounders, (two rifled,) four of which were turned so as to bear on our lines. The breastwork was mounted with two complete field batteries, besides several small pieces of heavy artillery, and manned by about six thousand men. The force in men and artillery of the other defences I am unable to give, they not coming under my observation. Pressing forward with my brigade I reached the railroad bridge at Newbern, which being burnt to prevent our following up the flying enemy, I rested the men on a field on the east bank of the Trent. By order of General Burnside, who had continued up with me, I shortly after crossed with my brigade over the river and encamped the regiments, with the exception of the twenty-fifth Massachusetts, in the camp of the enemy at the fair grounds, the enemy having left all his camp equipage, and from appearances must have fled very precipitately, the twenty-fifth being quartered in town for police duty. The fatigue and hardships of the march from Slocum's creek I need not mention; the horrible state of the road, the wearing labor it cost to drag for twelve miles the howitzers, the severity of the storm, and the wet ground of the soldiers' bivouac for the night, you well know. I must mention in my brigade, where all behaved bravely, with particular praise the twenty-fourth Massachusetts and the tenth Connecticut. The former, under a severe fire of musketry in the front, and exposed to a flanking fire of grape and canister from Fort Thompson, unprotected by the trees, behaved with marked coolness and steadiness; the latter advanced close under the enemy's fire, in line of battle, fired with the most remarkable steadiness, and stood steadily up, giving and taking the most severe fire. The howitzers, under the command of Lieutenant McCook, Acting Masters Daniels and Hammond, captain's clerk Meeker, Captain Rowan's clerk Gaberdan, Lieutenants Tillotson and Hughes, of the Union Coast Guard, were most admirably served during the day, and when their ammunition was exhausted they laid down by their pieces rather than withdraw from their position. Captain Dayton volunteered again to land and command

the gun from the Highlander. His gun was first in position, and he served it, as before, with steadiness and efficiency. Lieutenant Tillotson, whose gun was disabled, rushed ahead after the action, in pursuit, with such speed as to be captured by the enemy. From the joy of victory I must turn to the price it cost, in the soldier's death of Lieutenant Colonel Merritt, of the twenty-third Massachusetts, who fell early in the action while urging and cheering the men on, and of Lieutenant J. W. Lawton, of the twenty-seventh Massachusetts, shot dead on the field. Major Robert H. Stevenson, of the twenty-fourth Massachusetts, was wounded in the leg, but stood up encouraging his men till forced to leave the field. Adjutant W. L. Horton, of the same regiment, was severely wounded by a grape shot in the shoulder, while in the active performance of his duties, and Lieutenants Daniel Sargent and James B. Nichols were each slightly wounded. Captain V. V. Parkhurst, of the twenty-fifth Massachusetts, had his leg fractured; Lieutenants J. S. Atchison and J. W. Trafton, of the twenty-seventh, were slightly wounded. Captain R. R. Swift also severely wounded, and Lieutenant George Warner had a foot shot off. Captains Wesley C. Sawyer and William B. Alexander, of the twenty-third Massachusetts, were wounded, the former severely in the leg, rendering amputation necessary, and the latter in the hand. Lieutenant T. W. B. Hughes, of the Union Coast Guard, was also wounded.

Enclosed I hand you the returns of killed and wounded, showing a total of thirty-nine killed and one hundred and fifty-three wounded. It is with much pleasure that I can report all my staff as uninjured. They consisted, during the day, of Brigade Surgeon J. H. Thompson, who volunteered in the early part of the fight to carry any order for me, and he did so, until called elsewhere by his duties, under the hottest fire; Captain Southard Hoffman, assistant adjutant general; Captain Edward E. Potter, acting commissary of subsistence; Lieutenant John F. Anderson, aide-de-camp; Lieutenant J. M. Pendleton, aide-de-camp; Lieutenant James H. Strong, aide-de-camp; Lieutenant Edward N. Strong, aide-de-camp, and Lieutenants J. L. Van Buren and R. T. Gordon, of the signal corps, who were used as aides; and I most cordially bear my testimony to the conduct of the above-mentioned officers as most worthy a gallant set of gentlemen. They were indefatigable in carrying orders, urging on men, and in placing the regiments, coolly and correctly obeying every order, and always under the heaviest fire. Without drawing any distinctions in the staff I would take advantage of this opportunity to mention the names of Lieutenants James N. Pendleton, and James H. and Edward N. Strong, as being volunteers, who, without commission or emolument, have acted, during the entire campaign, as aides, and performed every duty zealously and satisfactorily, and whose conduct during the day I have already spoken of, and to suggest that, under these circumstances, their services deserve a recognition, if not award, from the government. I also desire to return my thanks to the colonels for the able assistance they rendered in promptly and correctly obeying, with the regiments under their command, my orders during the day. They were: Colonel Edwin Upton, of the twenty-fifth Massachusetts; Colonel Thomas G. Stevenson, twenty-fourth Massachusetts; Colonel Horace C. Lee, twenty-seventh, Massachusetts; Colonel John Kurtz, twenty-third Massachusetts; Lieutenant Colonel Albert W. Drake, tenth Connecticut; Lieutenant Colonel Charles Mathewson, eleventh Connecticut.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. G. FOSTER,

*Brigadier General U. S. Army.*

Captain DAVIS RICHMOND,

*Assistant Adjutant General.*

## REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL J. G. FOSTER OF OPERATIONS IN EAST TENNESSEE.

BALTIMORE, MD., *February 21, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have the honor, in obedience to your direction, to make the following report of the operations of the army of the Ohio while I was in command, and of the general condition of affairs in East Tennessee:

I relieved General Burnside at Knoxville, East Tennessee, on the 12th of December, 1863. At that time the forces of the enemy under General Longstreet, comprising his own force that had been engaged in the siege of Knoxville, Ransom's division of infantry, and Jones's division of cavalry, with which he had formed a junction, were supposed to be in full retreat towards Virginia. There were at that time near Rogersville General Parke with the 9th and 23d corps (10,000) infantry, and the cavalry (4,000 men) was in pursuit, having his advance at Bean's station. General Sherman was returning towards Chattanooga, leaving General Granger with the 4th corps near Knoxville. As soon as General Longstreet learned this latter fact, and that the force pursuing him was small, he turned on General Parke's advance and repulsed it at Bean's station. Advancing at once in his turn he forced General Parke to fall back first to Rutledge, and afterwards to Blain's Crossroads. This being a good position, I determined to make it the stand-point, and accordingly hurried up the 4th corps and every available fighting man. General Longstreet, however, did not attack, in consequence, probably, of the very inclement weather which then set in with such severity as to paralyze for a time the efforts of both armies. Their numbers were equal, being 26,000 effective men each. At this time (the 23d of December, 1863) my horse fell with me upon a ledge of rocks and contused my wounded leg, already very much inflamed by constant riding, to such an extent as to confine me to my quarters. General Parke retained the active command of the forces in the field. The condition of the army was bad. The troops were suffering for want of tents, clothing, food, and medicines. One-half the men were unfit for a march for want of shoes or clothing. The issues of bread or meal rarely came up to one-quarter of the ration, while the continual feeding upon fresh meat caused sickness among the soldiers, which we had no medicines to check. This state of things arose from the impossibility of getting supplies over the impassable roads from Kentucky, and the necessity for living on the country. The forage had become nearly exhausted and had to be sought at distances varying from ten to forty miles. The stock of ammunition was also too limited. The enemy undoubtedly suffered privations similar to our own, for he soon retired to winter quarters at Morristown and Russellville. Being anxious to follow and bring on a decisive engagement as soon as possible, I hurried the cavalry over the Holston as soon as it could be forded, and pushed it forward to Mossy creek, and beyond, and also to Danbridge. At the same time every effort was made to complete the bridge at Strawberry Plains, so as to cross infantry and artillery, as well as railroad cars. Earnest requisitions were, at the same time, made on Chattanooga for supplies of clothing, bread, and ammunition, to be sent up the Tennessee river in light-draught steamers.

These supplies commenced to arrive slowly about the 28th of December. General Grant visited Knoxville on the 30th December, 1863. Seeing the suffering among the troops, he decided to have me await the arrival of supplies, and the completion of the Strawberry Plains bridge, before advancing. He left on the 7th January, to return by the way of Cumberland gap. The cavalry, under General Sturgis, was almost constantly engaged with the enemy's cavalry in the direction of Danbridge and Mossy creek, after crossing the Holston. These fights culminated in a general cavalry engagement near

Mossy creek on the 29th, in which the enemy were driven from the field towards Morristown. General Elliott's division of cavalry from the army of the Cumberland particularly distinguished itself for gallantry.

On the 13th January, the main body of our cavalry having entirely exhausted the supplies in the country around Mossy creek, were forced to move to Dandridge, where some little forage was to be found. The draught animals of the infantry and artillery being by this time almost entirely without forage of any kind, were dying by the hundreds daily. It became a matter of the first importance to move to a position where forage, if not corn for the men, could be obtained at once. I therefore ordered the 4th and 23d corps to move across the Strawberry Plains bridge, (which was passable on the 15th January,) to march to Dandridge, cross the French Broad river near that place on a bridge to be built of wagons and any boats that could be obtained, and then to occupy the country south of that river as far towards the Nolchucky as possible. It was represented that a considerable quantity of corn was to be found in this section. Besides this, the movement would tend to disturb Longstreet concerning his left flank and communications to the rear, especially towards North Carolina. The 9th corps was ordered to hold Strawberry Plains, to be ready to support the movement while in progress, and afterwards cover Knoxville.

The troops started on the 15th and reached Dandridge on the 17th, when the bridge was immediately commenced. It was completed to what was supposed to be the opposite bank of the river, and a brigade crossed over. It was soon found, however, to be upon an island, and that another channel of the river remained to be bridged. In the mean time the cavalry which had skirmished heavily with the enemy on the previous day, the 16th, near Kimber's Crossroads, five miles from Dandridge towards Morristown, had been forced back by the determined advance of the enemy almost to the town. General Parke satisfied himself that General Longstreet was in his front with his whole force, having advanced from his cantonments to meet our supposed advance in force. This fact added to the delay in completing the bridge, the difficulty in crossing in presence of an active enemy, the want of rations, and the commencing rain, which would soon make it impossible to get up supplies from the rear over the then almost impassable roads, induced General Parke to decide to retire at once on Strawberry Plains, which he did without loss. I immediately ordered the whole force to move to Knoxville, cross the Holston on the pontoon bridge at that place, just completed, and ascend the south side of the French Broad to reach the foraging ground that it had failed to reach through Dandridge. As the cavalry passed through the town most of their horses had not been fed for forty-eight hours, and some of the artillery horses were without food for four days and nights. The cavalry reached and occupied the country south of the French Broad as far up as Fair Gardens, ten miles beyond Sevierville, and scouted through the entire country as far up as the Nolchucky. The 4th corps in following was four miles out from Knoxville when I received General Sturgis's report, that the reports of the supplies in that section of the country were very much exaggerated, inasmuch as they would only suffice his cavalry for three weeks, and that the roads were impassable for wagons and artillery. Disappointed in this, no other course remained but that of distributing the bulk of the force to obtain forage and supplies wherever it could be found. I accordingly sent the 4th corps to Morrisville, Lenoir station, and Loudon, with orders to gather their supplies from the surrounding counties. The 9th corps occupied the railroad, within supporting distance of Knoxville. The 23d corps encamped around the town. All the draught animals were sent to the rear, on the Tennessee river, to forage. Those that were entirely broken down were sent back to Kentucky. The cavalry occupied the country south of the French Broad until the supplies were nearly exhausted, when the enemy, feeling the necessity of driving it away, made the effort with his cavalry on the

27th January. General Sturgis met the enemy's cavalry at Fair Gardens, and completely defeated it, with the loss of one hundred and fifty killed and wounded, seventy-five prisoners, two rifled field-pieces, and some wagons and horses. The enemy's cavalry was then re-enforced by several brigades of infantry, which had succeeded in fording the river, and General Sturgis was in his turn forced to fall back towards Morristown. Previous to this Colonel Palmer with his regiment, the eleventh Pennsylvania cavalry, had captured General Vance with his staff and one hundred and fifty prisoners. Subsequently he sent an expedition against Colonel Thomas and his gang of whites and Indians at Quallitown, which succeeded in entirely breaking up the gang. All were killed or wounded except fifty that escaped into the mountains, and twenty-two that were brought in as prisoners. The governor of Kentucky having become anxious for the safety of that State from raids by the enemy, and having called on the legislature to raise regiments for the defence of the State, I sent a division of dismounted cavalry to Mount Sterling, Kentucky, to be reorganized, remounted and re-equipped for service, either against raids or in making them upon the flanks of the enemy's communication with Virginia. The remainder of the cavalry was ordered to the Little Tennessee river, to forage.

Such was the military situation at the time I was relieved by General Schofield, on the 9th February, 1864. In Kentucky, the detachments guarding railroads and posts had been reduced to the minimum. Cumberland gap and the adjacent districts of the Clinch were under the command of Brigadier General Garrard, who had an infantry and cavalry brigade under his command. In my opinion no offensive movement can be undertaken before the 1st of April, in East Tennessee, without running great risks of a disaster, which may cause the loss of that section of the country. The reasons are, that the men and animals are worn down and need rest and recuperation; the country between the two armies is entirely exhausted of forage and all kinds of supplies, which it is impossible to haul from the rear in consequence of the bad roads of the winter and spring, and also of the lack of forage even at the rear. For lack of horses, caused by the want of forage, very little artillery can be taken on a march at this time. The green grass, with the green corn, wheat, &c., will by the 1st of April subsist the animals of an army on the march. The men will be recruited in strength, and the veteran regiments returned to their brigades, with, probably, filled ranks. The same reasons will keep General Longstreet inactive, unless forced to move. If, however, he should advance with his present force to attack Knoxville, the chances amount to almost certainty that he will meet with a great disaster. Knoxville, if properly defended, cannot be taken. It is naturally very strong, and I increased the strength of the defences raised by General Burnside, and armed them with seventy pieces of artillery. As for supplies for a siege, they are ample, I had salted down over half a million rations of pork, and collected five hundred barrels of flour. If Longstreet attempts to march past Knoxville, for the purpose of destroying the communications with Chattanooga, resistance can be successfully made at the Little Tennessee, or the Holston, as a line of defence, while re-enforcements are marching from Chattanooga. At the same time his communications will be open to flank attacks from Knoxville. If he should attempt to make a raid into Kentucky through Pound gap, Pendleton's gap, or Crank's gap, (Cumberland gap being held by us,) a column formed of the disposable force at Knoxville, marching rapidly on his heels, can easily close the gaps in his rear, and perhaps capture his trains; while a force may be thrown around by rail from Chattanooga, sufficient, with that in Kentucky, to destroy him. No large force will be thrown into East Tennessee by the rebels, unless we force them to do so by increasing our force and taking the offensive. It is in their power to increase Longstreet's force between this and the 1st of April, by detaching from General Lee's army; but after that time, they will not dare to diminish General Lee's force. If by great sacrifices Gen-

eral Longstreet be now driven from East Tennessee, he will re-enforce other rebel armies where his presence may be productive of more harm than in East Tennessee. While he is in his present position, he can neither do damage in Virginia, North Carolina, nor assist General Johnston to resist our armies in Alabama and Georgia. The best policy seems to be to let him remain until the objects of the movements further south are attained, and until the offensive can be taken with advantage; even then it is questionable whether the engagements with him should not have for object to retain him where he is until Atlanta, Mobile, Montgomery, and perhaps Augusta and Savannah, fall. Knoxville is only the left wing of the united armies under General Grant. It is one hundred and ten miles from the centre at Chattanooga, a secondary base, which is still distant from the right wing and the primary base in Tennessee. It is very questionable whether the left wing should be pushed beyond Knoxville. By keeping the army there on the defensive, a considerable force may be spared from it to re-enforce the large army of the centre to penetrate into Georgia, where every mile gained in advance tends to dis sever the confederacy. General Longstreet's force has been increased by a force from North Carolina, said to be Pickett's division, numbering 2,800 men. General Pickett did not come with it, but remained in North Carolina. Added to the above about 1,000 convalescents arrived from Richmond.

On the other side, he had suffered from desertions at the rate of twenty a day, and had allowed five per cent. of his force to go home on furloughs, ranging from twenty-five to thirty-five days each. His present strength is 21,000 infantry and artillery, and 6,000 cavalry. The army of the Ohio numbered (23d corps 7,000, 9th corps 4,000, 4th corps 8,000,) 19,000 infantry and artillery, and 6,000 cavalry, of which, however, only about 3,500 were mounted. The question of supplies is satisfactorily settled. The railroad from Chattanooga to Loudon was opened. The work on the bridge at Loudon was being rapidly carried on. It should be finished in seventy days. A wagon bridge having been completed across the Holston at Knoxville, I ordered the pontoon bridge removed to Loudon, to enable the supplies brought up by rail, to be wagoned across the river, and thence conveyed by rail to Knoxville. The number of light-draught steamers on the river is to be increased. In general the condition of affairs in East Tennessee was so much improved as to produce a decided feeling of confidence.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. G. FOSTER,

*Major General of Volunteers.*

Major General H. W. HALLECK,

*General-in-Chief U. S. A., Washington, D. C.*






# D. SKETCH

showing route pursued in the advance to  
GOLDSBORO, N. C. in Dec. 1862.



Note.  
⚡ Engagement fought.



# E. SKETCH

showing the position of the attacking and de-  
fending forces at the  
**SIEGE OF WASHINGTON, N. C.,**  
March 29 to April 16, 1863.

Scale of Miles:



### NOTES:

#### Federal batteries.

- N<sup>o</sup> 1 Manned by Seamen 1 30 pdr. Parrott, 2 how<sup>ers</sup>
- " 2 Blockhouse 1 6 pdr
- " 3 do do
- " 4 Fort Washington 1 32 pdrs 2 6 pdr-Wards & 2 12 pdr-Napoleons
- " 5 Blockhouse and battery 1 32 pdr 1 6 pdr
- " 6 Redoubt for Infantry.
- " 7 Battery 1 12 pdr
- " 8 Battery 1 32 pdr 2 12 pdr-Napoleons.
- " 9 Battery on Castle Island, for naval guns, if the gun-boats be-  
came disabled.
- " 10 Str Louisiana Capt. Renshaw, U.S.N.
- " 11 " Ceres Lieut. M. Diamond U.S.N.
- " 12 " Eagle Army Transport 1 32 pdr
- " 13 " Com<sup>mander</sup> Hull Capt. Saltonstall, Vol<sup>unteer</sup>
- 14 U.S. Gunboats and Transports.

#### Garrison.

Line from N<sup>o</sup> 2 to N<sup>o</sup> 1, the 41 Mass Vols. Col. Lee.  
do. " 4 to " 6 the 27 Mass Vols. Lt. Col. Lyman  
Fort Washington 1 Co. 3<sup>rd</sup> N.Y. Art<sup>illery</sup>  
Entrenchment adjacent 1 Co. armed Negroes  
Gladel in town 1 Co 3<sup>rd</sup> N.Y. Cavalry

#### Rebel Batteries:

- d 2 guns commanding Causeway
- a & b 1 32 pdr and 8 field guns and a 20 lb. Whitworth.
- c 1 12 pdr (silenced by Gunboats).
- e Work for field guns and Infantry, to resist attempts to raise  
the siege.
- f Hills Pt. Batteries 2 guns 2 Whitworths
- g Siege batteries 8 in N<sup>o</sup>. 10 rifled guns, 1 smooth.



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REPORT  
OF  
MAJOR GENERAL A. PLEASANTON,  
TO THE  
COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

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MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN,  
*October 15, 1865.*

MY DEAR SIR : Agreeably to your request I submit, for the consideration of your honorable Committee on the Conduct of the War, some of the prominent facts that came under my observation during the campaigns in which I was engaged in the late war of rebellion, and which had any bearing on their success or failure.

The first most important and prominent step in the prosecution of the war, and one whose consequences were felt to the end, was the defective and injurious organization given to the army of the Potomac in the winter of 1861-'62. It was most unfortunate, that, with the finest men and material ever furnished to any army of the world, that army should have been organized with so little reference to the rules of war governing the organization of armies. The highest military authorities have laid down, that, in the proper organization of an army, the cavalry should form from one-fourth to one-sixth of the infantry which composes it. This relation of the cavalry to the infantry is so important, in consequence of the necessary duties assigned to each in time of war, that it may fairly be said no army is fit to take the field unless these two arms are properly organized and bear the proper proportion to each other in respect to numbers; and it is also a strong fact, which the war has demonstrated, that the more closely these proportions are observed throughout the campaign the greater will be the success, and the greater will be the confidence reposed by the troops of the different arms in each other; which greatly tends to lighten their most arduous duties. It is a vicious organization that requires the infantry to supply the deficiencies of service for want of sufficient cavalry, or the reverse; or, that imposes upon a small body of cavalry the arduous and ruinous service that should only be borne by thrice their number.

With eighty thousand cavalry on the pay-rolls of the country in the winter of 1862, the army of the Potomac was kept so deplorably deficient in cavalry as to be unable to ascertain what the enemy were doing at Fairfax and Manassas; were unable to raise the blockade of the Potomac; and the rebels had finally moved away from those places in the spring before our army had started in pursuit. Does any one now assert that those obstacles could not have been removed by twenty thousand cavalry, properly supported by that army? So little interest was taken in the organization, support, and efficiency of the cavalry that it became more of a farce than the earnest effort to create an important arm to advance against the enemy.

I served with the army of the Potomac from October, 1861, until March, 1864, in the various capacities of regimental, brigade, division, and corps commander

of cavalry. My constant theme was the proper increase and organization of the cavalry, and, from what has since been done, I am confirmed in the opinion formed at that time, that if the proper steps had been taken that winter of 1862, a superb cavalry corps could have been organized by the spring, in which event the Peninsula campaign, one of the bad consequences resulting from the neglect of the cavalry, would not have been forced upon us. McClellan dreaded the rebel cavalry, and supposed that, by placing his army on a peninsula with a deep river on each side, he was safe from that arm of the enemy; but the humiliation on the Chickahominy of having a few thousand of the enemy's cavalry ride completely around his army, and the ignominious retreat to Harrison's landing, are additional instances in support of the maxim, "that a general who disregards the rules of war finds himself overwhelmed by the consequences of such neglect when the crisis of battle follows."

While the cavalry arm was thus neglected in the organization of the army, the infantry force, which was upwards of one hundred and thirty thousand men, was kept in divisions until the army entered the field in the spring, when the corps formation was adopted; but so indifferently, however, that the command of the corps fell upon officers of no higher grade than that of brigadier general. This carelessness of assignment, by rendering every high officer uncertain of the position he held, was a fruitful source of the jealousies and dissensions that afterwards occurred among the commanders in this army, and which did so much to retard and frustrate the best devised plans that were attempted to be executed, and taken in connection with the useless superabundance of artillery with which at that time the army was supplied, and which was without higher organization than that of the battery, added to the other causes mentioned, prevented that unity of action, compactness, confidence, mobility, courage, energy, and enterprise in the army, which are so essential in the prosecution of successful warfare.

General Hooker was the first commander of the army of the Potomac to exhibit a correct appreciation of organization in an army. He consolidated and increased his cavalry, organized them into a corps, supplied them with artillery, and was rewarded by some distinguished service that made the march of his army a triumph from Falmouth to Frederick city.

The campaign of Gettysburg, which he commenced so brilliantly, was afterwards conducted by his successor with such results as to produce the deepest mortification throughout the country. The doubt, hesitation, and fear of consequences displayed by General Meade, were in striking contrast to the heroic valor so constantly and stubbornly exhibited by the army. Never did the cavalry, though few in numbers for the labors assigned them, perform more brilliant and successful deeds of arms than those which, after the battle of Gettysburg, brought to bay a shattered, baffled, and beaten army at Falling Waters, on the banks of the Potomac, in July, 1863. The army was eager for the attack; they knew the end of the rebellion was within their grasp, but their commander, General Meade, receiving no inspiration from their genius, only held them back until the enemy had escaped. The same fear of consequences which animated General Meade, caused the army to fall back from Culpeper to Centreville, in the fall of 1863, when the rebels advanced and took from the campaign of Gettysburg whatever might have been claimed for it on the score of generalship, and the Mine Run campaign showed so plainly that General Meade was deficient in the qualities required for a commander, that it was not surprising to see Lieutenant General Grant, a short time after, assume the personal direction of the army of the Potomac.

It is a very important fact that the numbers of the cavalry in that army were then more nearly in the proper proportion to those of the infantry than at any other time in its history, and the noble record of the cavalry and of the army while under General Grant can consequently be accepted as one of the

results of observing that important principle of war—the proper organization of an army.

In reviewing this subject it is well to observe that the success of the rebel army in Virginia, for the first two years of the war, was mainly due to its superior organization, and to the splendid corps of cavalry it was able to maintain. That army was not hampered with a surplus of artillery, and its numerous and efficient cavalry kept its commander well informed of our movements. But when the casualties of war reduced this cavalry faster than they could replace them, which was the case in the campaigns of 1863, the army was soon thrown upon the defensive, from which it was never after able to recover. We then deduce the following facts: that the army of the Potomac was better organized in the later periods of the war than at the beginning, while the reverse was the case with the rebel army. The successes of either army bore a marked correspondence to its superior organization to that of its opponent, at the time of achievement. The question then recurs, could not the war have been much sooner closed by giving to the army of the Potomac a proper organization at the beginning? The government should now decide this question, and if responded to in the affirmative, make the necessary corrections to prevent similar evils in our military system hereafter.

#### CAMPAIGN OF THE PENINSULA.

In the campaign of the Peninsula I commanded the second regiment of United States cavalry until the army arrived at Harrison's landing, when I was made a brigadier general of volunteers, and commanded a brigade of cavalry in the second action at Malvern Hill on the 5th of August, 1862, and also covered the withdrawal of the army from the Peninsula. Throughout this campaign there was a decided want of vigor in the conduct of the army, and the first great mistake was made in permitting the rebels to occupy and re-enforce Yorktown before taking possession of it. Some thirty days' delay occurred in laying siege to Yorktown, when it might have been taken by assault the first few days after the army arrived before it; at all events, the importance of time at that period was such as to make an attempt worthy of a trial. The time lost at Yorktown and on the Chickahominy gave the rebels an opportunity to gather their forces to defend Richmond; and the error committed in placing the army on both sides of the Chickahominy enabled the enemy to cripple first our left wing at Fair Oaks and Seven Pines, and afterwards our right wing at Mechanicsville and Gaines's mill, and by the moral effect of these partial actions caused the army to retreat to James river. There appeared no disposition throughout this campaign to bring the entire army into action as an army; there was no controlling spirit so decidedly strong as to effect the necessary concert of action in the different portions of the army, and, as a consequence, the battles that took place resulted from the enemy's successively massing heavier forces on our detached corps, which were outnumbered, beaten in detail, and compelled to retreat. It has been claimed that more troops should have been furnished the army for the purpose of taking Richmond; but the facts of the case do not support this assertion, as the troops that were in the army were never all used and fought in connection with and in support of each other, as should have been done. To have increased these large masses, without material change in the manner of fighting them from that which had been adopted, would not have changed the ultimate result from what it was, and would have only added to the embarrassments which already existed. Besides the causes already mentioned, there were numerous oversights and neglects bearing upon discipline, and which also had a serious influence upon the success of the campaign. Very little was done to excite the energy, emulation, and enthusiasm of the troops, while some measures were adopted that had a decided tendency to diminish these necessary qualities.



in a marked degree. At Yorktown an order from headquarters prohibited all music by bands and all calls by either drums or bugles, and they were not resumed until after the army had arrived at Harrison's landing. When the large masses of men which composed the army of the Potomac were moving among the swamps of the Chickahominy, without any of the enlivening sounds of martial music, or the various well-known calls of an army life, the effect was very depressing, and caused the soldiers to exaggerate the issue that required of them to lose the most agreeable part of their profession. The army, however, had gone to the Peninsula very enthusiastic, the soldiers always earnest and faithful in the discharge of their duties; and although the field for the campaign had been badly selected, and there were numerous drawbacks to disappoint their hopes, there were also several occasions won by their valor when a bold, determined, resolute commander could have forced the result to a successful issue.

#### CAMPAIGN OF ANTIETAM.

In this campaign I commanded the cavalry division of the army, and took the advance from Washington city through Maryland and until the field of Antietam was reached, when I fought my command in front of the bridge leading from Keedysville to Sharpsburg, and held the centre of our army throughout the battle. The same mistakes were made in this campaign that characterized that of the Peninsula. The army was not moved with sufficient rapidity or vigor from the Peninsula or through Maryland, and the enemy was again given time to prepare and concentrate. When the battle was delivered it was fought by detached commands in such positions as to be unable to give or receive assistance from each other. Hooker's, Franklin's, and Sumner's corps were on the right, too distant to receive support from the rest of the forces, while Burnside's forces were on the left, at least three miles from where my command was, without any troops being between us, and with Antietam creek, which was not fordable, behind us. Fitz John Porter's corps was behind my position a mile and a half on the opposite side of the creek as a reserve, but it was never brought into action. Notwithstanding the disadvantages our army labored under from these arrangements, a decisive victory could have been won at 4 o'clock on the afternoon of the 17th of September, if a strong attack had been made on Sharpsburg from the centre. My command had cleared the enemy from my front and were in high spirits, while the stubborn fighting of the army generally had told fearfully upon the rebels. I therefore recommended this attack, and requested to be permitted to take the initiative in it. The proposition was not approved, and I was directed to hold the position I then had. The enemy were then so far off, falling back, my guns could not reach them, and the battle ended so far as my command was concerned. On the next day the army was not permitted to advance, and on the 19th the enemy had crossed the Potomac and escaped. The rebel army had suffered so much more than ours in this campaign, and their ammunition was so much exhausted, that I was convinced a rapid and energetic pursuit would have routed them, if it had not caused Lee himself to surrender. Colonel Davis, of the eighth New York cavalry, had, before the battle, destroyed all the ammunition belonging to Longstreet's corps, and the heavy demands of the fight had nearly exhausted the supply for the rest of their army. This, with the disappointment of the rebel soldiers at the failure of their enterprise to invade Pennsylvania, were advantages which should not have been thrown away.

Another opportunity for success was offered when the army was at Warrenton, in the fall of 1862. The rebel force was then divided; Longstreet and A. P. Hill, with their corps, being at Culpeper, while Stonewall Jackson and D. H. Hill were in the Shenandoah valley, at Front Royal. By crushing Longstreet

at Culpeper the army would cripple that of the rebels and would cut it off from Richmond. Culpeper should have been occupied. It was at this time that General Burnside assumed command of the army, and unfortunately decided to march on Fredericksburg. The details of that campaign have already been so thoroughly examined by your honorable committee as to leave nothing to be said in reference to it, except, perhaps, that the cavalry bore no prominent part in it.

#### CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

In this campaign my command was the first cavalry division of the army of the Potomac, the first brigade of which during the battle was with General Stoneman on his raid towards Richmond, in rear of Lee's army. With one brigade I preceded the 11th and 12th corps as far as Chancellorsville. The movements of the 5th, 11th, and 12th corps across the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers were very fine and masterly, and were executed with such secrecy that the enemy were not aware of them; for, on the 30th of April, 1863, I captured a courier from General Lee, commanding the rebel army, bearing a despatch from General Lee to General Anderson, and written only one hour before, stating to General Anderson he had just been informed we had crossed in force, when, in fact, our three corps had been south of the Rapidan the night previous, and were then only five miles from Chancellorsville. The brilliant success of these preparatory movements, I was under the impression, gave General Hooker an undue confidence as to his being master of the situation, and all the necessary steps were not taken on his arrival at Chancellorsville to insure complete success. The country around Chancellorsville was too cramped to admit of our whole army being properly developed there; and two corps, the 11th and 12th, should have been thrown on the night of the 30th of April to Spottsylvania Court House, with orders to intrench, while the remainder of the army should have been disposed so as to support them. This would have compelled General Lee to attack our whole force or retire with his flank exposed, a dangerous operation in war, or else remain in position and receive the attack of Sedgwick in rear and Hooker in front, a still worse dilemma.

In the third day's fight at Chancellorsville General Hooker was badly stunned by the concussion of a shell against a post near which he was standing, and from which he did not recover sufficiently during the battle to resume the proper command of the army. The plan of this campaign was a bold one, and was more judicious than was generally supposed from the large force General Hooker had at his command. There is always one disadvantage, however, attending the sending off of large detachments near the day of battle. War is such an uncertain game it can scarcely be expected that all the details in the best devised plans will meet with success, and unless a general is prepared and expects to replace at once, by new combinations, such parts of his plans as fail, he will be defeated in his campaign, and as these changes are often rapid, he cannot include his distant detachments in his new plans with any certainty, and the doubt their absence creates, reduces the army he can depend on to the actual number of men he has in hand. If General Hooker had not been injured at the commencement of the final battle, I am not certain his splendid fighting qualities would not have won for him the victory. It was in this battle that with three regiments of cavalry and twenty-two pieces of artillery I checked the attack of the rebel General Stonewall Jackson after he had routed the 11th corps. Jackson had been moving his corps of twenty-five or thirty thousand men through the woods throughout the day of the 2d of May, 1863, from the left to the right of our army, and about six o'clock in the evening he struck the right and rear of the 11th corps with one of those characteristic attacks that made the rebel army so terrible when he was

with it, and which was lost to them in his death. In a very short time he doubled up the 11th corps into a disordered mass, that soon sought safety in flight. My command of three cavalry regiments and one battery of six guns happened to be near this scene; and perceiving at a glance that if this rout was not checked the ruin of the whole army would be involved, I immediately ordered one of my regiments to charge the woods from which the rebels were issuing and hold them until I could bring some guns into position; then charging several squadrons into our flying masses to clear ground for my battery, it was brought up at a run, while staff officers and troops were despatched to seize from the rout all the guns possible. The brilliant charge of the regiment into the woods detained the rebels some ten minutes, but in that short time such was the energy displayed by my command, I placed in line twenty-two pieces of artillery, double-shotted with canister, and aimed low, with the remainder of the cavalry supporting them. Dusk was now rapidly approaching, with an apparent lull in the fight, when heavy masses of men could be seen in the edge of the woods, having a single flag—and that the flag of the United States—while at the same time they cried out, "Don't shoot; we are friends!" In an instant an aide-de-camp galloped out to ascertain the truth, when a withering fire of musketry was opened on us by this very gallant foe, who now dropped our ensign, displayed ten or twelve rebel-battle flags, and with loud yells charged the guns. I then gave the command "fire," and the terrible volley delivered at less than two hundred yards' distance caused the thick moving masses of the rebels to stagger, cease from yelling, and for a moment discontinue their musket fire; but they were in such numbers, had such an indomitable leader, and they had so great a prize within their reach, that they soon rallied and came on again with increased energy and force, to be met by the artillery, served well and rapidly, and with such advantage that the rebels were never able to make a permanent lodgement at the guns, which many of their adventurous spirits succeeded in reaching. This fight lasted about an hour, when a final charge was made and repulsed; they then sullenly retired to the woods. It was at this time that General Jackson was mortally wounded; and as the rebel authorities have published he had been killed by his own men, I shall mention some facts of so strong a character as to refute this statement. Soon after the last attack I captured some of the rebel soldiers in the woods, and they told me it was Jackson's corps that had made this fight; that Jackson himself had directed it, and had been mortally wounded, and that their loss was very heavy. I have since met rebel officers who were then engaged, and they corroborated the above statement, and they added, that it was known and believed among Jackson's men that he had been mortally wounded by our own fire. Again, one of my own officers who had been taken prisoner in that engagement told me, after he was exchanged, that he had been taken up to Jackson soon after his capture; that Jackson questioned him about our force, and that he then was not far from our lines. This clearly proves that Jackson was on the field, in command, and had not been wounded up to and until after the fight had commenced. Now, when it is remembered the entire front of my line did not occupy six hundred yards; that the opposing forces were in open ground, not three hundred yards from each other, and so close that no reconnoissance in front was necessary by an officer of Jackson's rank, and taken in connection with the fact that the fierce characteristic of the attacks of the man did not cease until he was wounded, and were not renewed after he was, the conclusion is simple, natural, and forcible that Jackson commanded and fell in his attack on our guns. In justice to the high character, as a general, of Jackson, I am free to admit that had he not been wounded, and had made another attack, as he undoubtedly would have done, he would have carried my position, for my losses had already disabled more than half my guns, and the few that were left could have easily been overpowered. There seemed a providential interference

in Jackson's removal at the critical time in which it occurred, for the position fought for by him commanded and enfiladed our whole army; and had he won it on the rout of the 11th corps, the disaster to us would have been irreparable.

#### CAMPAIGN OF GETTYSBURG.

I was placed in command of the cavalry corps of the army of the Potomac and made a major general of volunteers after the battle of Chancellorsville; and the campaign of Gettysburg began by my attacking the rebel cavalry at Beverly ford, on the Rappahannock river, on the 9th of June, 1863. The rebels were defeated, and very important information was obtained relative to their proposed invasion of Pennsylvania, upon which General Hooker acted immediately, and moved his army towards Maryland. On the 17th, the 19th, and the 21st of June, 1863, I again attacked the rebels at Aldie, at Middleburg, and Upper-ville, with such success that General Lee abandoned his design of crossing the Potomac at Poolesville, and moved the bulk of his army to Hagerstown, by the way of Williamsport, and from thence to Chambersburg. When our army had arrived at Frederick city, General Hooker was relieved from the command, and General Meade was assigned in his place. General Hooker left the army in fine condition and discipline, and well in hand, and he had the confidence of the troops in his ability to command them.

General Meade sent for me soon after his assignment, and in discussing the subject of the campaign, I mentioned that from my knowledge of the country obtained the year before, in the Antietam campaign, I considered the result of the present one depended entirely upon which of the two armies first obtained possession of Gettysburg, as that was so strong a position that either army, by holding it, could defeat the other; that General Lee knew this, and would undoubtedly make for it. But in the disposition of the army for the march I saw that General Meade did not attach that importance to the subject that it deserved, and that he was more impressed with the idea that Lee intended crossing the Susquehanna river, and accordingly threw the bulk of his army too far to the east of Gettysburg. Seeing this, I directed General Buford, who commanded the first cavalry division, and who was ordered to Gettysburg, to hold that place at all hazards until our infantry could come up.

Buford arrived at Gettysburg on the night of the 30th of June, 1863, in advance of the enemy, and moved out the next day very early, about four miles on the Cashtown road, when he met A. P. Hill's corps of the enemy, thirty thousand strong, moving down to occupy Gettysburg; Lee thus doing exactly what I informed General Meade he would do. Buford with his four thousand cavalry attacked Hill, and for four hours splendidly resisted his advance until Reynolds and Howard were able to hurry to the field and give their assistance. To the intrepidity, courage, and fidelity of General Buford and his brave division the country and the army owe the battle-field of Gettysburg. His unequal fight of four thousand men against eight times their numbers, and his saving the field, made Buford the true hero of that battle. While this terrible fight of the first day was raging, having been commenced by Buford in the morning and continued by Reynolds and Howard in the evening, General Meade was seventeen miles off, at Taneytown, leisurely planning a line of battle on some obscure creek between that and Gettysburg, when he was aroused by a despatch from Buford, through me, stating Reynolds was killed, the field was becoming disordered, and if he expected to save it, the army must be moved up at once. The different corps were then directed to march on Gettysburg; but some were so distant, Sedgwick in particular, that it did not arrive on the field until sundown of the 2d of July, after having marched thirty-five miles. General Meade did not himself reach the field until 1 o'clock on the morning of the 2d, long after the first day's fight had been brought to a close.

On the second of July, 1863, that portion of the army that was on the field was placed in a defensive position, but General Meade had so little assurance in his own ability to maintain himself, or in the strength of his position, that when the rebels partially broke our line in the afternoon of the 2d, he directed me to collect what cavalry I could, and prepare to cover the retreat of the army; and I was thus engaged until 12 o'clock that night. I mention this fact now, because when I was before your honorable committee and was asked the question whether General Meade ever had any idea of retreating from Gettysburg, I answered that I did not remember, the above circumstances at that time being out of my mind, and it was only afterwards recalled by my staff officers on my return to camp.

On the 3d of July, 1863, the last day of the battle of Gettysburg, and immediately after the final repulse of the rebels, I urged General Meade to advance his whole army and attack them; but he refused to do so quite angrily, and his remarks showed that he did not or would not understand the events that were occurring around him. He directed me to send the cavalry and ascertain if the enemy were retreating, which was done at once; but as the cavalry was at some distance from the army, it was not until 8 o'clock the next morning that the first report of the cavalry on the Cashtown road was received, showing the enemy were twenty-two miles off, and getting away as fast as they could. The cavalry was continued in pursuit, but the remainder of the army did not leave Gettysburg for several days after the rebels had left, and were then moved in such a leisurely manner as to show no great anxiety by the commander to overtake the rebels. Very unexpectedly to the army and to the rebels, the heavy rains caused the Potomac to rise so rapidly that Lee could not cross, and he was again brought face to face with the army of the Potomac at Falling Waters. Every military reason demanded that the rebels should be immediately attacked, for after three days' heavy fighting at Gettysburg it was a moderate conclusion to arrive at that the rebels were short of ammunition, and could not sustain a protracted fight. General Lee admitted this afterwards in his official report, and expected to be attacked, when he says: "Our artillery having nearly expended its ammunition," and again, "the enemy in force reached our front on the 12th. A position had been previously selected to cover the Potomac from Williamsport to Falling Waters, and an attack was awaited during that and the succeeding day. This did not take place, though the two armies were in close proximity; the enemy being occupied in fortifying his own lines." The army of the Potomac having had all its wants supplied since the battle of Gettysburg, and with the prestige of that battle, was eager for the fight, and was in good condition for it.

Here General Meade again refused to fight, and waited a whole day until the rebels had succeeded in crossing the river and had again escaped.

The army thus lost the fruits of all its arduous toils, struggles, and triumphs, and the country had entailed upon it a prolonged war for two years more, with its innumerable sacrifices of blood and treasure.

In reviewing the battle and campaign of Gettysburg, when we notice that General Meade was absent from the first day's fight; that he was occupied with the idea of retreating on the second day, and after his indomitable army had repulsed and badly beaten the rebel army on the third day, he refused to allow them to complete their victory; and still later, when fortune again unexpectedly thrust the rebels in our power at Falling Waters, he doggedly refused to fight, but waited until they could escape, we are forced to the conclusion that General Meade was unable to fight the army of the Potomac as it should have been fought, nor could he avail himself of the advantages which the valor of his troops at times gave him; and that the honors of that campaign are not due to any generalship that he displayed, but to the heroic bravery, patriotism, and perseverance of the army.

## THE RETREAT FROM CULPEPER.

General Meade had occupied Culpeper with his army about the middle of September, 1863, General Lee's army being south of the Rapidan.

The army had been at Culpeper about a month, when General Meade decided to make an offensive demonstration against Lee; for which purpose, Buford's division of cavalry were ordered to cross the Rapidan at Germania ford and then uncover Raccoon ford, where Newton's corps was to assist him.

After Buford had started and was too far off to be recalled, General Lee put his army in motion towards our right, which so alarmed General Meade that he made his preparations to retreat from Culpeper; and so precipitate were his movements that Buford's division was very near being cut off, while the army was hastily marched to the rear. General Lee finding he could move General Meade so easily, urged him back as far as Centreville, and when the latter took up a position near that place, Lee contented himself with destroying the railroad we had left behind, and retired on Culpeper.

## CAMPAIGN OF MINE RUN.

The President having ordered General Meade to advance and attack General Lee, Culpeper was again occupied early in November, 1863, when shortly after General Meade projected the campaign of Mine Run, the plan of which was based on the supposition that there was a good road from a mill several miles above Germania ford on the Orange Court House road or turnpike, when the fact was, there was no road at all, and the country was extremely difficult to pass through. I knew the country well, and I told General Meade there was no road at that place, and to attempt to march troops through it would jeopard the campaign, but my report did not appear to make any impression on him. On the evening before the army moved, a gentleman by the name of Smith, who had resided in that neighborhood, who was a loyal man, was in our employ, and who knew the country thoroughly, came to me and said he had heard General Meade intended passing a portion of his army by that mill above the Germania ford, and that if he did so he would get his army into trouble, as there was no road at that point. I persuaded Mr. Smith to go and see General Meade and tell him what he knew of the country, and Mr. Smith afterwards told me that he had done so, but that the general had not paid much attention to him. Two corps, French's and Sedgwick's, were put in where General Meade imagined there was a road, and they floundered about in the woods and ravines for a day and a half, the rest of the army waiting for them, and when they did join us and we came up to the rebels, General Meade changed his mind, again refused to attack, and marched the army back to Culpeper.

Shortly after this campaign, I was ordered to the department of the Missouri, and my connection with the army of the Potomac ceased.

## CAMPAIGN OF PRICE IN MISSOURI.

The rebel General Price, with twenty-five thousand men and eighteen pieces of artillery, invaded the State of Missouri from Arkansas in October, 1864. He attacked the field-work near Pilot Knob, in the southeastern part of the State, and although he was repulsed, the garrison abandoned the work and fled to Rolla, some sixty miles to the southwest, where two brigades of cavalry were stationed. Price then moved up towards Franklin and threatened St. Louis. General A. J. Smith's command was thrown out to Franklin to cover that place, when Price turned off to Jefferson City, destroying the railroads as he went along, and on arriving at Jefferson City he besieged it for several days, the garrison having some six thousand troops, with ten or twelve guns, under four volunteer brigadier generals.

On the 6th of October, 1864, General Rosecrans, commanding the department of Missouri, fearing Jefferson City would be lost, ordered me to proceed to that place and take command of all the forces in that vicinity. I arrived in time to see Price move off, and immediately organized a cavalry force of about four thousand men with a battery, which was sent in pursuit, and which did good service in compelling Price to keep his command together, and so save the country from being badly pillaged. All other troops that could possibly take the field were prepared to do so, and by the 18th of October a cavalry force of seven thousand men and eight pieces of artillery, including the force that was sent in pursuit of Price, was organized and on the march. I assumed the command of this force, and by forced marches came to Lexington on the 21st, out of which place Price had driven General Curtis's troops, under General Blunt, that morning.

I pushed on the next day to the Little Blue, engaged Price's troops, captured two pieces of cannon, and drove them back to the Big Blue, through Independence.

While this was going on General Price with part his force attacked Major General Curtis, who had a force of twenty thousand mounted men and thirty-two pieces of artillery, and drove him to Westport, in Kansas, Curtis losing one of his guns.

On the 23d of October I attacked Price in position on the Big Blue, drove him from his position towards the south, and took a number of prisoners. Price then moved rapidly in retreat.

At this time Major General S. R. Curtis, commanding department of Kansas, joined me, and proposed, as my command had done so much hard fighting, that he should take the advance; to this I assented, when Curtis, after marching for a day in front, on finding that Price had halted on the Osage river in position to give battle, requested me to take the advance and attack Price. I therefore moved immediately with my command to the front, and continued my march all night of the 24th of October, and at daylight on the morning of the 25th I surprised Price in his camp, and drove him from it, and by a series of heavy engagements throughout the day captured eight pieces of artillery, several standards, one major general, one brigadier general, four colonels, and many subordinate officers, and fifteen hundred men, besides a large number of wagons, beef cattle, sheep, &c., Price's forces becoming demoralized and retreating rapidly, throwing away their arms and other property that encumbered them.

I regret to add that Major General Curtis gave me no support whatever this day, but, to the benefit of the rebels, his troops were kept back and did not participate in any of the engagements; otherwise, I should have captured Price's whole force.

After the fighting was over General Curtis moved his forces up, and with the most exemplary modesty laid claims to the prisoners, guns, &c., that had been captured; but which I could not recognize, since he had waived his right to command at the time it was necessary to take them from the enemy.

On arriving at Fort Scott, Kansas, such of my troops whose horses were able pursued Price to the borders of the State, and in an engagement near Newtonia, under General Sauborn, Price was again routed and a number of prisoners were taken, which ended the campaign in Missouri.

The object of General Price in his invasion of Missouri, as shown by intercepted despatches and his speeches at Booneville and elsewhere, was, in concert with disloyal parties in the north, to hold the States of Missouri and Kansas during the time of the presidential election, to prevent an election, and by other action embarrass the government of the United States.

It was this design that demanded such hard marching and extraordinary energy on the part of the small force at my command, to defeat intentions so sinister and disastrous to the country; and the efforts put forth were so success-

ful, that the State of Missouri recognized their glorious consequences by giving at the presidential election a vote of forty thousand majority in favor of the government. This was not the only important result of the campaign to the national cause, for the defeat and discomfiture of Price also released from service in Missouri a large force of our troops, that were sent immediately to General Thomas, at Nashville, and they arrived in time to assist in the battles before that place against General Hood; and it is not too much to assert, that this addition General Thomas received to his forces in General A. J. Smith's corps rendered him victorious in one of the crowning achievements of the war.

The mistake of this campaign consisted in not attacking Price on his entry into the State, or as soon after as possible, as the same troops were then able to defeat Price in the east that afterwards did so on the borders of Kansas.

A. PLEASONTON,

*Major General.*

Hon. B. F. WADE,

*Chairman of Committee on the Conduct of the War.*





REPORT  
OF  
MAJOR GENERAL E. A. HITCHCOCK,  
TO THE  
COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.



REPORT  
OF  
GENERAL E. A. HITCHCOCK  
ON THE  
SUBJECT OF EXCHANGE.

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WASHINGTON CITY, D. C., *November 22, 1865.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following statement, as my general report for the current year, on the subject of the exchange of prisoners of war; in doing which I find it necessary to revert to some facts of a precedent date in order that the subject may be the better understood.

At an early period of the rebellion, a cartel for the exchange of prisoners was agreed upon in conformity with the authority of the President, as communicated to General Dix by the Secretary of War in the following despatch, which contains on its face an important limitation, carefully guarding against any recognition of the rebel government, the object having expressly in view the humane purpose of extending relief to prisoners of war:

"WAR DEPARTMENT,  
" *Washington City, July 12, 1862.*

"The President directs me to say that he authorizes you to negotiate a general exchange of prisoners with the enemy.

"You will take immediate measures for that purpose, observing proper caution against any recognition of the rebel government, and confining the negotiations to the subject of exchange. The cartel between the United States and Great Britain has been considered a proper regulation as to the relative exchange value of prisoners:

"EDWIN M. STANTON,  
" *Secretary of War.*

"Major General JOHN A. DIX, *Fortress Monroe.*"

The agreement, signed by General Dix on the part of the government, and General Hill on the part of the rebels, was duly announced in public orders by authority dated War Department, Adjutant General's Office, Washington, September 25, 1862, a copy of which is hereunto annexed.

So long as the cartel for the exchange of prisoners was respected in the south, it was faithfully observed by the government, and there is no doubt that its faithful execution would have been continued by the government until the end of the war, unless properly revoked by competent authority, if the rebel authorities had not most distinctly violated its terms, under circumstances, indeed, of great aggravation.

The first indication on the part of the rebels of a disposition to disregard the cartel became public through a message by Jefferson Davis to the rebel congress, in which, after alluding to the proclamation of the President announcing emancipation, he makes use of the following language:

"I shall, unless in your wisdom you deem some other course more expedient, deliver to the several State authorities all commissioned officers of the United States that may hereafter be captured by our forces in any of the States embraced in the proclamation, that they may be dealt with in accordance with the laws of those States providing for the punishment of criminals engaged in exciting servile insurrection."

This announcement of Mr. Davis was made January 12, 1863, and received the modified approval of the rebel congress, as shown in the following sections of an act approved May 1, 1863, to wit:

"SEC. 4. That every white person, being a commissioned officer, or acting as such, who, during the present war, shall command negroes or mulattoes in arms against the Confederate States, or who shall arm, train, organize or prepare negroes or mulattoes for military service against the Confederate States, or who shall voluntarily aid negroes or mulattoes in any military enterprise, attack or conflict in such service, shall be deemed as inciting servile insurrection, and shall, if captured, be put to death, or be otherwise punished at the discretion of the court.

"SEC. 5. Every person, being a commissioned officer or acting as such in the service of the enemy, who shall during the present war excite, attempt to excite, or cause to be excited, a servile insurrection, or who shall incite, or cause to be incited, a slave to rebel, shall, if captured, be put to death, or be otherwise punished at the discretion of the court."

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"SEC. 7. All negroes and mulattoes who shall be engaged in war or be taken in arms against the Confederate States, or shall give aid or comfort to the enemies of the Confederate States, shall, when captured in the Confederate States, be delivered to the authorities of the State or States in which they shall be captured, to be dealt with according to the present or future laws of such State or States."

When the message just referred to became known to the President, he saw at once the necessity of meeting it, and gave instructions to retain such rebel officers as might be captured, in order to be in a position to check the rebel government and restrain the execution of its avowed purpose, in violation of the cartel.

This proceeding, initiated by the rebel government in violation of the cartel, ultimated in the cessation of exchanges, which, as the history of the matter shows, became unavoidable, and was entirely due to the rebel government.

Coincident with the proceedings with regard to the exchange of prisoners of war, the rebels inaugurated a system of seizing unoffending citizens of the United States and subjecting them to maltreatment, in various ways, in order to effect a particular object, which became apparent when a demand was made for their release. For this purpose quite a number of citizens of Pennsylvania were carried into captivity by General Lee, when he penetrated into that State in 1863.

When a demand was made for the release of this class of prisoners, it was met by a most positive declaration that no citizen prisoner in rebel hands should be released unless the government would enter into an agreement with the rebel authorities not to arrest any one on account of his opinions or on account of his sympathy with the rebel cause; and this declaration was repeated again and again by the rebel authorities whenever the government demanded the release or exchange of said citizen prisoners.

It will require but the slightest glance at this subject to convince any one of the utter impossibility of acquiescing in the demand of the rebel authorities, as a pre-requisite to the release of the citizens thus held in bondage. Such an agreement on the part of the United States would have been a virtual acknowledgment of the independence of the rebel government, and would have fore-

closed all proceedings of the United States against all persons whomsoever engaged in the crime of treason and rebellion. It was absolutely impossible to acquiesce in the demand of the South on that point, and this is the reason why this class of prisoners was beyond the reach of the government, except through the power of its armies, which finally settled the entire question by putting an end to the rebellion itself.

At the commencement of the cessation of exchanges the rebels held a few prisoners of war over and above the number of rebels held by the government, but the capture of Vicksburg and Port Hudson threw the balance largely the other way; and, as the prisoners captured by General Grant and General Banks were left in the south on parole, the rebel authorities determined to make use of them, not merely in violation of the cartel, but in open contempt of the laws of war. They first ordered that body of men to be assembled at a place called Enterprise, in Mississippi, on pretence of facilitating measures for their supplies, but in reality with the distinct purpose, as we are now compelled to believe, of throwing them into the rebel ranks to meet the anticipated conflict which, it was seen, was near at hand in East Tennessee, and which accordingly took place at the memorable battles of Chickamauga and Chattanooga; in which battles many of the captured prisoners paroled in the south by Generals Grant and Banks took part, without having been duly exchanged, although the rebel authorities made an *ex parte* declaration of exchange in their favor without proper authority, which was protested against by the United States.

It must be understood that the rebels might at any time have resumed the system of exchange agreed upon in the cartel by receding from the assumed right of disposing of captured Union officers as required in the act passed by the rebel Congress, before alluded to, and agreeing to the exchange of colored troops; but they would never agree to acknowledge the right of colored troops to treatment due to prisoners of war; and, as the government of the United States had exercised the right of employing colored troops as a part of the force against the rebels, their claim to such protection as the government could give was one which did not admit of discussion.

When the rebels discovered that the suspension of exchanges was operating against them, they resorted to the horrible expedient of subjecting the prisoners they held to starvation and exposure to the elements, without the protection of quarters or tents, after first robbing them of their money and most of their clothing, and without regard to seasons or their inclemencies, in the hope of forcing the government into a system of exchanges which should have the effect, not only of leaving in their hands all of the colored prisoners they had taken, but of throwing into their ranks the entire body of prisoners held by the federal power, then greatly in excess over the prisoners held by the rebels. This fact is proved by the declarations of the Richmond papers, at the time when a few exchanges were made, that the rebel agent, Colonel Ould, had not sent over the lines the number of prisoners equivalent to those received, but only a proportionate number, the ratio being determined by Colonel Ould, in view of the number of prisoners held in the south against those held in the north—the claim to hold in reserve the colored prisoners in the south having never been abandoned. This fact was further established by the official records of the commissary general of prisoners, by which it appeared that, after sending several boat-loads of exchanged prisoners each way, the rebels were constantly falling in debt. Upon observing this fact, and noticing the publications in Richmond, I called upon the commissary general of prisoners for a tabular statement of the result, and the statement showed an indebtedness in our favor of over five hundred men; which statement was handed to the Secretary of War, who thereupon directed an order to General Grant to assume the entire control of the matter of exchanges, with authority to give such orders as he might think proper on the subject. General Grant at once reverted to first

principles, and directed that Colonel Ould, or the rebel authorities, should be notified that colored troops should be treated as prisoners of war when captured; and, as the rebels were not willing to accede to this requirement, no further exchanges were made.

Upon the receipt at the War Department of the first intelligence of the inhuman treatment to which our prisoners were subjected at Richmond, the Secretary of War, without a moment's hesitation, gave instructions to our agent of exchange, at Fortress Monroe, to send forward supplies from the public stores for their relief, and large quantities of provisions and clothing were accordingly sent for distribution among the prisoners, and every possible effort was made to afford that sort of relief, even at the hazard of large portions of the supplies being wasted, or, what was worse, misappropriated to the benefit of our enemies, who, it soon appeared, made use of these supplies for their own advantage, leaving our prisoners still to suffer. But even this did not destroy the hope of the Secretary that some portion of the supplies would, at least, be permitted to reach its destination, and the orders to send that relief were left in force until the rebels themselves, shamed, perhaps, by the scandalous state of things, then likely to become historical, refused to receive any further supplies through the agents of the government.

In the mean time the sympathies of friends in the north were naturally awakened, and large quantities of supplies of all kinds were sent to Fortress Monroe, whence they were forwarded for the relief of the prisoners at Richmond; but the moment they passed beyond the control of our agents they fell into the hands of the most unprincipled and shameless scoundrels that ever disgraced humanity. It is in proof that large quantities of supplies furnished by the benevolence of the North for the relief of suffering humanity in southern prisons, were piled up in sight of the objects for whose relief those supplies were sent, but beyond the line of the prison guards; and while the prisoners were thus in sight of their own boxes, they were not only forbidden to touch them, but compelled to witness depredations upon them by the guards themselves, who feasted upon their contents, leaving the victims of war a prey to that merciless barbarism which will make one of the darkest pages in the history of a rebellion which will itself remain an astonishment to all posterity for its almost causeless existence.

Many have supposed that it was in the power of the government to afford relief to the prisoners in the south by a resort to retaliatory treatment of rebel prisoners in the north. It is difficult to meet a suggestion of this kind by an appeal to the instincts of civilized humanity, because the mere suggestion supposes the absence of those instincts, and implies a willingness to see the public sentiment degraded into barbarism, which would have put the nation itself on the footing of savages, whose only excuse for their barbarity is their ignorance and their exclusion from the civilized world. The day must come when every true American will be proud of the reflection that the government was strong enough to crush the rebellion without losing the smallest element of its humanity or its dignity, and stand before the world unimpeached in its true honor and glory.

It may be observed that no one imagined, prospectively, the horrors which came to light at Andersonville, the full enormity of which only became known at the close of the military events which ended the war. Had they been known when at their worst, the government would have had the choice of but three measures: first, the rebel prisoners might have been sent south, we to receive in return such white prisoners as they might have held, leaving the colored troops to their fate; second, a resort to retaliatory measures; or, lastly, for the country to wage the war with increased zeal to bring it to a legitimate end. No man can doubt which of these plans the northern people would have approved, if submitted to them, and the government only assumed to represent the people in the question.

It ought to be mentioned here, as a beautiful illustration of the moral sublime, that among the many memorials, some of them very numerous signed, which reached the War Department, praying for relief to federal prisoners suffering in the south, in nearly all of them there was an express protest against a resort to retaliation. And what was the real effect of the barbarity upon the prisoners in the south? Certainly, it was most deplorable and shocking upon individuals for the time being; but no one whose moral eyes are open can fail to see that it became in many ways a signal step, under the guidance of Providence, for bringing the rebel cause to destruction. It strengthened the feeling in the north in favor of warlike and determined measures against rebellion; it sent thousands into the army who took the field resolutely determined to punish the authors of a great crime against humanity. The enemy might almost literally have felt that it is "a terrible thing to fall into the hands of the living God."

An erroneous opinion appears to have been circulated, more or less widely, with regard to the number of colored federal troops who fell into the hands of the enemy, which makes it important to state that the actual number thus exposed to injurious treatment was very much greater than has been commonly supposed. This will sufficiently appear from the fact that, on the 21st of January, 1865, Lieutenant O. O. Poppleton, adjutant of the 111th United States colored infantry, addressed a letter, dated at Nashville, Tennessee, to Major General Butler, in the following words, to wit:

"I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a Mobile paper (rebel) containing, over the signature of D. H. Maury, major general Confederate States army, the names of five hundred and sixty-nine (569) soldiers belonging to the 106th, 110th, and 111th regiments of United States colored infantry, who were taken prisoners by a force of the enemy, under Major General N. B. Forrest, at Athens and Sulphur Branch Trestle, Alabama, on the 24th and 25th of September, 1864, and placed at work on the defences of Mobile, Alabama, by order of the rebel authorities. Lieutenant William T. Lewis, adjutant 110th United States colored infantry, has a paper of later date than this, containing the names of nearly three hundred (300) more soldiers of the same command, also at work on the defences of Mobile."

This is an official report from the adjutant of the 111th regiment colored infantry, showing that there were then, in January, 1865, at work on the fortifications about Mobile five hundred and sixty-nine (569) colored soldiers belonging to three regiments only; and a reference is made to another paper as being at that time in the hands of another officer, an adjutant also of one of those regiments, embracing the names of "nearly three hundred (300) more soldiers of the same command," making in all over eight hundred (800) colored soldiers of the United States army at work, under rebel officers, on the fortifications around Mobile alone.

When the government determined to employ colored troops in its armies, the principle was recognized that they were entitled to protection; and, accordingly, it was claimed that the class of troops referred to should receive such treatment from the enemy as was due to other troops employed in the defence of the government. The assertion of this principle did not depend upon the number of colored troops who might at any one time be in the hands of the enemy. Every consideration of honor and humanity required the assertion of this principle as due to the troops employed in the service of the government; and, accordingly, in various communications, when the subject required it, the government agents connected with the duties of the exchange of prisoners invariably set forward the principle. But this did not prevent the exchange of prisoners, man for man and officer for officer. The difficulty on this subject was due, first, to the message of Mr. Davis to the rebel congress, already referred to, declaring his purpose to deliver to southern State authorities such white Union officers as might be captured, for trial under State laws unknown alike to the laws of Congress



and to the laws of war; and, secondly, to the open contempt of the laws of war as also stated above, in the fact that the rebel authorities released from the obligations of their parole a number of rebel prisoners, and placed them in their ranks without exchange.

During a brief period prior to the capture of Vicksburg, the rebels held more prisoners of war than the government; but after the date of that event the case was reversed, and from that time forward the government made every effort to obtain exchanges—man for man and officer for officer—but without avail, the rebel authorities persistently resisting applications for exchange unless the government would release all rebel prisoners, after they had openly violated the cartel themselves, claiming that the government should deliver to them all rebel prisoners, while they, on their part, declared their purpose of withholding from exchange such colored prisoners as they might have in their possession.

It is important to observe here, that while this controversy was pending we actually held, in prison depots in the north, about seventy thousand (70,000) prisoners of war, over and above which we had a just and valid claim for more than thirty thousand (30,000) men who had been captured and paroled in the south, chiefly at Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and who had never been properly exchanged; making in all at least one hundred thousand (100,000) men whom the rebel authorities wished to draw from us in exchange for about forty thousand (40,000) of the white troops of the United States; the effect of which would have been to throw into the army of General Lee an effective force of about sixty or seventy thousand men, in fine health and able in all respects to be put immediately into the field against General Grant's army, or with which General Lee might have obtained a disposable force of some fifty or more thousand men for the purpose of entering the States of the north, and thereby possibly compelling General Grant to raise the siege of Richmond, or expose the northern States to devastation by the enemy.

It was the desire of the rebel agent of exchange to avoid making special exchanges, in the hope of drawing from us the whole of the rebel prisoners of war we held in return for inferior numbers held by the enemy. To accomplish that object, the rebel commissioner or agent of exchange not only declined to make exchanges on equal terms, in any considerable number, but refused to make special exchanges except under extraordinary influences brought to bear by the friends of interested parties; and, in repeated instances, the rebel agent took care to indorse upon special applications the express declaration that he neither made nor countenanced such applications.

In consequence of this state of things, and while there was a hope of effecting general exchanges, only a few applications of a special character were forwarded over the lines; but when it became apparent that a general exchange could not be effected, I received your instructions to forward all special applications for exchange, in order, as you explained the purpose at the time, to afford every possible opportunity to extend relief to as many individuals as might have the good fortune to secure southern influences for that object; and great numbers of such applications were sent over the lines, most of which, however, were never heard from afterwards.

Another fact I beg to state in connection with this subject, as a further illustration of the efforts of the department to extend relief to federal officers and soldiers imprisoned south, to wit: The rebel authorities resorted to the system of placing individuals in close confinement, in alleged retaliation for what on our side was but the legitimate operation of the laws of war in the punishment of spies and other offenders against those laws. In the endeavor to afford relief in a particular case of this kind, the rebel agent seized the opportunity of proposing the mutual release and exchange of all prisoners in close confinement, although at that time we had no rebel prisoners thus confined except by due course of law. This proposition was manifestly unfair, and a recovered letter

from the rebel agent has shown that he knew it was so. Nevertheless, the proposition was accepted by your orders; and although it effected the release of some criminals belonging to the rebel army, it carried relief to a number of federal officers and soldiers in the south who thus obtained liberation; the concession on your part having had in view the relief it promised, and to some extent effected, in favor of a few of our officers and soldiers.

The recovered letter alluded to was dated at City Point, March 17, 1863, and addressed to Brigadier General Winder, in the following words:

“SIR: A flag-of-truce boat has arrived with 350 political prisoners, General Barrow and several other prominent men among them. I wish you to send me, at four o'clock Wednesday morning, all the military prisoners (except officers) and all the political prisoners you have. If any of the political prisoners have *on hand proof enough to convict them* of being spies or of having committed other offenses which should subject them to punishment, so state opposite their names. Also, state whether you think, under all circumstances, they should be released. *The arrangement I have made works largely in our favor.* We get rid of a set of miserable wretches, and receive some of the best material I ever saw. Tell Captain Turner to put down on the list of political prisoners the names of Edward G. Egging and Eugenia Hammernister. The President is anxious they should get off. They are here now. This, of course, is between ourselves. If you have any female political prisoner whom you can send off safely to keep her company, I would like you to send her. Two hundred and odd more political prisoners are on their way. I would be more full in my communication if I had time.

“Yours truly,

“ROBERT OULD, *Agent of Exchange.*”

It should be noticed in this report that when the subject of exchange became embarrassing, because of the unwillingness of the enemy to exchange man for man, he demanding all of the rebel prisoners we held in exchange for the white prisoners held by him, Major General Halleck, by the direction of the Secretary of War, made an effort to obtain exchanges on equal terms. For this purpose he sent a flag of truce to General Lee, then in force on the Rapidan, and proposed that species of exchange. But General Lee declined to act upon the proposition, and answered, evidently in accordance with instructions from Richmond, that the subject of exchange was in the hands of a commissioner, and he preferred to have nothing to do with it.

As a further effort to obtain this class of exchanges, the Secretary authorized various commanders, distant from Washington, to open communications with the enemy, and to effect exchanges whenever they could be made on equal terms. In the midst of these difficulties I was painfully impressed with the impossibility of effecting exchanges on equal terms with Judge Ould; and having understood that General Butler was of the opinion that, if empowered to do so, he could make exchanges, I addressed a note to the Secretary of War and proposed to withdraw from the position of commissioner of exchange in favor of any officer who could accomplish so desirable a result; upon which, however, the Secretary did not see fit to make an order. A few days after this I was sent for from the War Office, where I found the Secretary in conversation with General Halleck on the subject of exchanges. The Secretary then informed me that General Butler had expressed the opinion above stated, and that several members of Congress had expressed a similar opinion with regard to General Butler's ability to effect exchanges, if empowered to do so. I at once said to the Secretary, “If General Butler is of opinion that he can make exchanges, I think, sir, you had better let him try.” He then said that it was his wish that I should go to Fortress Monroe and confer upon General Butler the

requisite power by his authority; and he thereupon wrote, in the presence of General Halleck and myself, the following order:

“WAR DEPARTMENT.

“Washington, December 16, 1863.

“Major General HITCHCOCK, *Commissioner of Exchange of Prisoners:*

“GENERAL: You will proceed immediately to Fortress Monroe, and take any measures that may be practicable for the release, exchange, or relief of United States officers and soldiers held as prisoners by the rebels.

“You are authorized and directed to confer with Major General Butler on the subject, and may authorize him, as special agent, commissioner, or otherwise, to procure their release or exchange upon any just terms not conflicting with principles on which the department has heretofore acted in reference to the exchange of colored troops and their officers, and not surrendering to the rebels any prisoners without just equivalents. You may, if you deem it proper, relieve General Meredith and direct him to report to the Adjutant General for orders.

“Yours truly,

“EDWIN M. STANTON,

“*Secretary of War.*”

Within half an hour after the writing of the above order I was on my way to Fortress Monroe, and on the morning of the 17th of December I reported to General Butler. After stating the limitations under which he would be authorized to make exchanges, I requested him to prepare instructions for himself, giving him the authority he desired, in accordance with the orders of the Secretary, stating that, when ready, I would sign them in the name of or with the authority of the Secretary. In two or three hours thereafter I called again upon General Butler, and made the instructions he had prepared official. They contained the following paragraphs:

“You are hereby instructed not to make any exchange which shall not return to you man for man, officer for officer, of equal rank with those paroled and sent forward by yourself, regarding, of course, for motives of humanity, in the earlier exchanges, those officers and men on either side who have been the longest confined.

“Colored troops and their officers will be put upon an equality in making exchanges, as of right, with other troops.

“You are permitted, in conducting the exchange, to waive for the present the consideration of the questions of parole and excess now pending between the confederate belligerent authorities and this government, leaving them untouched as they stand until further interchange of views between those authorities and yourself.”

The above instructions to General Butler will show precisely the *animus* of the Secretary of War on the subject of exchanges. He was perfectly willing and anxious to make exchanges, man for man, officer for officer, and gave, as must be seen, the fullest power to General Butler to effect those exchanges. General Butler, in his conversation with me, expressed no desire to have any other instructions or powers committed to him, and appeared to be very confident of his ability to accomplish the desired result, giving me, in detail, many reasons for that confidence. I returned to the city of Washington; and within a few days the public prints announced General Butler's first attempt to make exchanges and the result. General Butler sent a boat-load of prisoners under a flag of truce to City Point, where they were offered for a like number of federal troops. It appears that, when this was reported to the rebel government, violent indignation was expressed by the rebel authorities, on the alleged ground that General Butler was an outlaw by the proclamation of Mr. Davis, and that

it was an insult to employ him to accomplish any result requiring any sort of intercourse between him and the rebel authorities; but it was concluded that, inasmuch as a certain number of their troops were actually within their lines as returned prisoners of war, they should be received, and a like number of federal prisoners should be exchanged for them; but notice was given to our agent that no more prisoners would be received in that manner, and it was reported at the time that General Butler was informed that a flag of truce even should not protect him within the rebel lines.

When this was reported in Washington, the President himself, in the presence of the Secretary of War, declined to give any order on the subject, unwilling to concede to the rebels the right to dictate what agents this government should employ in its public business; but it was plain to be seen that the real object of the rebel authorities was to avoid making equal exchanges of man for man and officer for officer, their purpose being to deliver to us, as before stated, only a proportionate number of prisoners held by them as against those held by us; and because General Butler's instructions required the exchange of man for man, made the employment of General Butler in the business of exchange a pretext for refusing those equal exchanges. This was evident, because, in point of fact, General Butler did not personally appear in the business—that is, he did not accompany the flag of truce—and, if there had been any disposition on the part of the rebels to make equal exchanges, they knew those exchanges would be made through the agency of another officer, and not personally by General Butler; and thus the real purpose of the rebels becomes manifest, their object being to draw from us all of their own troops in our hands, giving us in exchange only such white troops of the federal forces as they might hold.

After this experiment by General Butler, matters remained in suspense for some time, no exchanges being made.

At length two federal officers, who had escaped from rebel prisons, gave me their opinion, in this city, that if we would send to City Point, for exchange, a body of three, four, or five hundred rebel officers, demanding a like number in return, the feeling in the south, they believed, would be such that the rebel authorities would not dare to refuse the exchange; and if that succeeded, they would not dare thereafter to refuse to exchange private soldiers. I thought very well of this suggestion, and addressed a note to the Secretary of War, communicating it, and recommending its trial. The Secretary at once accepted the suggestion, and directed General Canby, then on duty in the War Office, to require General Butler to make that trial. But General Butler thought proper to send a mixed boat-load of officers and men.

Here, then, was another effort to make exchanges on equal terms. The enemy accepted the prisoners sent over the lines, but did not return a like number. This fact was publicly stated by the newspapers at Richmond, and was confirmed by official reports received at the office of General Hoffman, the commissary general of prisoners, after several boat-loads had passed. When the purpose of the rebel commissioner became apparent, not to make exchanges man for man, but only in proportionate numbers, the fact, with the evidence for it, was submitted to the Secretary of War, and then it was, as stated above, that General Grant was instructed to take the subject under his own supervision, with the result already alluded to.

After General Butler took charge of the duties in connection with the exchange of prisoners, I was not officially advised of his proceedings, because he, being of senior rank to myself, made no reports to me; but in August, 1864, there was published in the journals of the day a letter, over the signature of General Butler, of the highest importance in connection with this subject. No official copy was furnished to me, and I have never seen the letter of Judge Ould to which it refers; the authenticity of which, however, is sufficiently vouched in the letter of General Butler, which commences, addressed to Judge Ould, in these words:

"SIR: Your note to Major Mulford, assistant agent of exchange, under date of the 10th of August, has been referred to me. You therein state that Major Mulford *has several times proposed to exchange prisoners respectively held by the two belligerents, officer for officer and man for man; and that the offer has also been made by other officials having charge of matters connected with the exchange of prisoners, and that this proposal has been heretofore declined by the confederate authorities.* That you now consent to the above proposition, and agree to deliver to you (Major Mulford) the prisoners held in captivity by the confederate authorities, provided you agree to deliver an equal number of officers and men."

This letter, cited by General Butler from Colonel Ould, shows, conclusively, by whom the proposition for an equal exchange was originally made. It shows, also, that it had been *repeatedly* made by the government, and had been as repeatedly refused by the rebel authorities.

The matter had been placed in General Butler's hands, and he answered Judge Ould's letter, asking some preliminary explanations, which I believe were never made, and the opportunity of a final action upon Judge Ould's letter was thus cut off by himself.

The reasons which induced General Butler's action may no doubt be seen, in part at least, in the letter he addressed to Judge Ould, which was published in the journals of the day. I have never heard that the matter was referred to the Secretary of War, and have never understood that he gave any order in the premises.

We learn from General Butler's letter that Judge Ould did not reach his conclusion in reference to Major Mulford's proposition until a period of eight months had elapsed.

It is impossible to approach the subject of this report without being solemnly impressed by a sense of the horrors inflicted upon the prisoners of war in the south; but, in making the report, I have felt imperatively called upon to confine myself to facts connected immediately with the subject of exchanges, leaving inferences to be drawn by others. I attach hereto such official letters and telegraphic despatches as have either originated in my office or have reached me, as may throw light upon the subject of this report.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. A. HITCHCOCK,

*Major General Vols., Commissioner for Exchange of Prisoners.*

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

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REPORT

OF

MAJOR GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN,

TO THE

HON. COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

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REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF THE ELEVENTH DIVISION, ARMY OF THE  
OHIO, IN THE BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE.

HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH DIVISION, ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
*Camp on Rolling Fork, six miles south of  
Lebanon, Ky., October 23, 1862.*

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of my division, in the action of the 8th instant, near Perryville, Kentucky:

In accordance with the instructions of the general commanding, I directed Colonel Dan. McCook, with his brigade and Barrett's battery, to occupy the heights in front of Doctor's creek, so as to secure water for our men. This was done very handsomely, after a short skirmish at daylight in the morning, giving us full possession of the heights. In about two hours afterwards the enemy advanced in considerable force, through a line of heavy timber on the eastern slope, to drive us from this position. I had, however, in the mean time ordered forward Colonel Laiboldt's brigade and Hancock's battery, so that I felt myself well prepared, and strong enough to receive him. I then directed Colonel Laiboldt to advance two of his old regiments and drive the enemy from the timber, and at the same time put the batteries into position. Colonel Laiboldt succeeded in driving the enemy back down the hill and across Chaplin creek, after an obstinate contest, in which the loss was severe on both sides, and Captain Barrett with one section of his battery, and Lieutenant Taliaferro with one section of Hescoek's battery, drove the enemy from every position he took.

About this time General McCook with his corps, under artillery fire from the enemy, made his appearance on my left, when I advanced Captain Hescoek's battery to a very good position in front of the belt of timber above mentioned, where he had an enfilading fire on the enemy's batteries on the opposite side of the valley of Chaplin creek, and advanced, at the same time, six regiments to support him. The fire of Captain Hescoek was here very severely felt by the enemy, who attempted to dislodge him by establishing a battery at short range; but Hescoek's firing was still so severe, and his shots so well directed and effective, as to force the enemy's battery from its new position in ten minutes.

The enemy then placed two batteries on my right flank, and commenced massing troops behind them with the apparent intention of making an attack on that front, when, by direction of Major General Gilbert, I reoccupied the crest of the hill.

I had no sooner gotten into position than the enemy attacked me fiercely, advancing with great determination almost to my very line, notwithstanding a large portion of the ground over which he was advancing was exposed to a



heavy fire of canister from both of my batteries. I then directed a general advance of my whole line, bringing up the reserve regiments to occupy the crest of the hill.

On our advance the enemy commenced retiring, but in good order. I could not follow up this advantage to any great extent, as the enemy were advancing on our left, General McCook's right having been driven back some distance, but directed the fire of my artillery across the valley on this advance of the enemy, forcing it to retire, thus very much relieving General McCook. This ended the operations of the day, it being dark, and the enemy having retired from the field.

I cannot speak with too much praise of the good conduct of the officers and men of my whole division, all of whom were engaged. The new troops vied with the old troops of the division in their coolness and steadiness.

My brigade commanders, Colonels Greusel, Dan. McCook, and Lieutenant Colonel Laiboldt, behaved with great gallantry, leading their troops at all times.

Neither can I speak too highly of Captains Heseock and Barrett, and the officers and men of their batteries.

I respectfully bring to the notice of the general commanding the excellent conduct of Surgeon Griffiths, medical director of the division, who was untiring in his care for the wounded on all parts of the field; also the following officers of my staff: Captain Beck, aide-de-camp, Lieutenant George Lee, acting assistant adjutant general, Lieutenant Van Pelt, division commissary, and Lieutenants Denning and Burton, for their activity in bearing orders, and other valuable assistance rendered me during the day.

The total casualties in my division were as follows:

Killed, 44; wounded, 274; missing, 12. Total, 330.

I enclose herewith a list of same, giving names, rank, company and regiment.

This report is also accompanied by the reports of brigade and battery commanders.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. H. SHERIDAN,

*Brigadier General Commanding.*

Captain J. EDWARD STACEY,

*Assistant Adjutant General, Third Corps.*

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REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF THE THIRD DIVISION, RIGHT WING, 14TH ARMY CORPS, FROM DECEMBER 26, 1862, TO JANUARY 6, 1863, INCLUDING THE BATTLE OF STONE RIVER.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, RIGHT WING, 14TH ARMY CORPS,  
*Camp on Stone River, Tenn., January 9, 1863.*

MAJOR: In obedience to instructions from the headquarters right wing, I have the honor to report the following as the operations of my division from the 26th day of December, 1862, to 6th day of January, 1863:

On the 26th day of December I moved from camp near Nashville, on the Nolinsville pike, in the direction of Nolinsville. At the crossing of Mill creek the enemy's cavalry made some resistance, but was soon routed, one of his lieutenants and one private being captured.

On approaching Nolinsville I received a message from General Davis—who had arrived at Nolinsville, the Edmison pike—that the enemy were in considerable force in his front, and requesting me to support him. On the arri-

val of the head of my division at Nolinsville, General Davis advanced upon the enemy's position, which was about two miles south of that place, supported by my division. The enemy had here made a stand in a gap of the mountains, but, after a short conflict with General Davis's command, was routed, and one piece of his artillery captured.

On the next day (27th) I supported General Johnson's division in its advance on Triune, where the enemy was supposed to be in considerable force. The town was taken possession of after a slight resistance—the main portion of the forces having evacuated the place.

On the 28th of December I encamped at Triune.

On the 29th I supported General Davis's division—which had the advance from Triune on Murfreesboro—and encamped that night at Wilkinson's Cross-roads, from which point there is a good turnpike to Murfreesboro.

On the next day (the 30th) I took the advance of the right wing on this turnpike towards Murfreesboro—General Stanley, with a regiment of cavalry, having been thrown in advance.

Upon arriving at a point about three miles from Murfreesboro, the enemy's infantry pickets were encountered and driven back, their numbers constantly increasing, until I had arrived within about two miles and a quarter of Murfreesboro, where the resistance was so strong as to require two regiments to drive them. I was here directed by Major General McCook to form my line of battle, and place my artillery in position.

My line was formed on the right of the pike and obliquely to it, four regiments to the front, with a second line of four regiments within short supporting distance in the rear, and a reserve of one brigade, in column of regiments, to the rear and opposite the centre. General Davis was then ordered to close in and form on my right. The enemy all this time kept up a heavy artillery and musketry fire upon my skirmishers, and continued to occupy, with his skirmishers, a heavy belt of timber to the right and front of my line and across some open fields, and near where the left of General Davis's division was intended to rest. General Davis was then directed by Major General McCook to swing his division, and I was directed to swing my right brigade with it, until our continuous line would front nearly due east. This would give us possession of the timber above alluded to, and which was occupied by the enemy's skirmishers in considerable force. The movement was successfully executed after a stubborn resistance on the part of the enemy, in which he used one battery of artillery. This battery, however, was silenced in a very short time by Bush's and Hescoc's batteries of my division, and two of its pieces disabled.

At sundown I had taken up my position; my right resting on the timber; my left on the Wilkinson pike; my reserve brigade of four regiments to the rear and opposite the centre.

General Davis's left was closed in on my right, and his line thrown to the rear, so that it formed nearly a right angle with mine, and General Negley's division of Thomas's corps was immediately on my left, his right resting on the left-hand side of the Wilkinson pike.

The enemy appeared to be in strong force in a heavy cedar woods across an open valley in my front and parallel to it—the cedar extending the whole length of the valley—varying from 200 to 400 yards.

Our killed and wounded during the day numbered 75 men.

At 2 o'clock on the morning of the 31st General Sill, who commanded my right brigade, reported great activity on the part of the enemy immediately in his front. This being the narrowest point in the valley, I was fearful that an attack might there be made, and therefore directed two regiments from the reserve to report to General Sill, who placed them in position in very short supporting distance of his lines. At 4 o'clock the division was assembled under arms, and the cannoners at their pieces. About fifteen minutes after seven

o'clock, the enemy advanced to the attack across the cotton field on Sill's front. This column was opened upon by Bush's battery of Sill's brigade, which had a direct fire on its front, and by Hescoek's and Houghtaling's batteries, which had an oblique fire on its front from a commanding position near the centre of my line; the effect of this fire upon the advancing column was terrible. The enemy, however, continued to move forward until he had reached nearly the edge of the timber, when he was opened upon by Sill's infantry at a range of not over fifty yards; as this attacking force was massed several regiments deep, the destruction to it was great. For a short time it withstood the fire, then wavered, broke and ran. Sill directed his troops to charge, which was gallantly responded to, and the enemy was driven back across the valley and behind his intrenchments. The brigade then fell back in good order and resumed its original lines. In this charge I had the misfortune to lose General Sill, who was killed.

The enemy soon rallied and advanced to the attack on my extreme right, and in front of Colonel Woodruff of Davis's division. There, unfortunately, the brigade of Colonel Woodruff, and one regiment of Sill's brigade which was in the second line, gave way. This regiment fell back some distance into the open field, and there rallied, its place being occupied by a third regiment of the reserve. At this time the enemy, who had made an attack on the extreme right of our wing against Johnson, and also on Davis's front, had been successful, and the two divisions on the right were retiring in great confusion, closely followed by the enemy, thereby completely turning my position and exposing my line to a fire from the rear. I hastily withdrew the whole of Sill's brigade and the three regiments supporting it, and at the same time directed Colonel Roberts of the left brigade—who had changed front and formed in column of regiments—to charge the enemy in the timber from which I had withdrawn these regiments. This was very gallantly done by Colonel Roberts, who captured one piece of artillery, which, however, had to be subsequently abandoned.

In the meantime I formed Sill's and Schaeffer's brigades on a line at right angles to my original line and behind three batteries of artillery, which were placed in a fine position, and directed Colonel Roberts to return and form on this new line. I then made an unavailing attempt to form the troops on my right on this line, in front of which there were open fields, and through which the enemy was approaching under heavy fire from Hescoek's, Houghtaling's, and Bush's batteries.

After the attempt had proved to be entirely unsuccessful, and my right was again turned, General McCook directed me to advance to the front and form on the right of Negley. This movement was successfully accomplished under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, every regiment of mine remaining unbroken.

I took position on Negley's right, placing Roberts's brigade at right angles to Negley's line, facing the south, the other two brigades to the rear at right angles with Roberts, facing the west and covering the rear of Negley's lines. I then directed Houghtaling's battery to take position at the angle of these two lines, and Captain Hescoek at the same time sent one section of his battery, under Lieutenant Taliaferro, and one section of Bush's battery, to the same point; the remaining pieces of Hescoek's and Bush's batteries were placed on the right of Negley's line, facing towards Murfreesboro.

In this position I was immediately attacked, when one of the bitterest and most sanguinary contests of the whole day occurred. General Cheatham's division advanced on Roberts's brigade, while heavy masses of the enemy, with three batteries of artillery, advanced over the open ground which I had occupied in the previous part of the engagement, and at the same time opened fire from the intrenchments in the direction of Murfreesboro. The contest then became terrible; the enemy made three attacks and was three times repulsed—

the artillery range of the respective batteries being not over 200 yards. In these attacks Roberts's brigade lost their gallant commander, who was killed. There was no sign of faltering with my men, the only cry being for more ammunition, which unfortunately could not be supplied on account of the discomfiture of the troops on the right of our wing, which allowed the enemy to come in and capture the ammunition train.

Schaeffer's brigade being out of ammunition, I directed it to fix bayonets and await the enemy; Roberts's brigade, which was nearly out of ammunition, I directed to fall back, resisting the enemy. Captain Houghtaling, having exhausted all his ammunition, and nearly all the horses of his battery having been killed, attempted, with the assistance of the men, to withdraw his pieces by hand. Lieutenant Taliaferro, commanding the section of Hescoc's battery, having been killed, and several of his horses shot, his two pieces were brought off by his sergeant with the assistance of the men. The difficulty of withdrawing the artillery here became very great, as the ground was very rocky and covered with a large growth of cedar. Houghtaling's battery had to be abandoned; also two pieces of Bush's battery. The remaining pieces of artillery of my division were with great difficulty, and under a heavy fire from the enemy, drawn through the cedars to an open space on the Murfreesboro pike, near the right of General Palmer's division.

In coming through the cedars, two regiments of Schaeffer's brigade succeeded in obtaining ammunition, and were immediately put in front to resist the enemy, who appeared to be driving in our entire lines. On arriving at the open space above alluded to, I was directed by Major General Rosecrans to take these two regiments and put them in action on the right of Palmer's division, where the enemy were pressing heavily. They went in very gallantly, driving the enemy from the cedar timber, and for some distance to the front. At the same time I put four pieces of Hescoc's battery into action, near by and on the same front. The other two regiments of Schaeffer's brigade, and the thirty-sixth Illinois of Sill's brigade, were directed to cross the railroad, where they could obtain ammunition. I then, by direction of Major General McCook, withdrew the two regiments that had been placed on the right of Palmer's division, also Captain Hescoc's pieces, that point having been given up to the enemy in the rearrangement of our lines. The regiments of Schaeffer's brigade having supplied themselves with ammunition, I put them into action by direction of Major General Rosecrans, directly to the front and right of General Wood's division, on the left-hand side of the railroad. They advanced through a clump of timber, and took position on the edge of a cotton field, close upon the enemy's lines, relieving the division of General Wood, which was falling back under heavy pressure from the enemy.

At this point I lost my third and last brigade commander, Colonel Fred. Schaeffer, who was killed.

The brigade, after remaining in position until it had expended its ammunition, was withdrawn to the rear of this timber, where it was again supplied, and joined by the thirty-sixth Illinois.

I was here directed by General Rosecrans to form a close column of attack, and charge the enemy should he again come down on the open ground. During the remaining portion of the evening this gallant brigade remained in close column of regiments, and under the fire of the enemy's batteries, which killed about 20 of the men by round shot.

In the mean time Colonel Roberts's brigade, which had come out of the cedars unbroken, was put into action by General McCook at a point a short distance to the rear, where the enemy threatened our communication on the Murfreesboro pike, and although it had but three or four rounds of ammunition, it cheerfully went into action, gallantly charged the enemy, routed him, recaptured two pieces of artillery, and took 40 prisoners. The rout of the enemy at this point

deserves special consideration, as he had nearly reached the Murfreesboro pike. On the night of the 31st I was placed in position on the Murfreesboro pike, facing the south, and on the ground where Roberts's brigade had charged the enemy, General Davis being on my right.

On the 1st of January heavy skirmish fighting, with occasional artillery shots on both sides, was kept up till about 3 o'clock p. m., when a charge was made by a brigade of the enemy on my position. This was handsomely repulsed, and one officer and 85 men of the enemy captured. Colonel Walker's brigade of Thomas's corps was also placed under my command temporarily, having a position on my left, where the same character of fighting was kept up.

On the 2d of January Colonel Walker sustained two heavy attacks, which he gallantly repulsed.

On the 3d skirmishing took place throughout the day.

On the 4th all was quiet in front, the enemy having disappeared.

On the 5th nothing of importance occurred, and on the 6th of January I moved my command to its present camp on Stone river, three miles south of Murfreesboro, on the Shelbyville pike.

I trust that the general commanding is satisfied with my division. It fought bravely and well. The loss of Houghtaling's battery, and one section of Bush's battery, was unavoidable, as all the horses were shot down or disabled. Captain Houghtaling was wounded, and Lieutenant Taliaferro killed. My division, alone and unbroken, made a gallant stand to protect the right flank of our army, being all that remained of the right wing. Had my ammunition held out, I would not have fallen back, although such were my orders if hard pressed. As it was, this determined stand of my troops gave time for a rearrangement of our lines. The division mourns the loss of Sill, Schaefer, and Roberts; they were each instantly killed, and at the moment when their gallant brigades were charging the enemy. They were true soldiers, prompt and brave.

On the death of these officers, respectively, Colonel Greusel, thirty-sixth Illinois, took command of Sill's brigade; Lieutenant Colonel Laiboldt, second Missouri, of Schaeffer's brigade; and Colonel Bradley, fifty-first Illinois, of Roberts's brigade. These officers behaved gallantly throughout the day.

It is also my sad duty to record the death of Colonel F. A. Harrington, of the twenty-seventh Illinois, who fell while heroically leading his regiment to the charge.

I refer with pride to the splendid conduct, bravery, and efficiency of the following regimental commanders, and the officers and men of their respective commands:

Colonel F. T. Sherman, eighty-eighth Illinois; Major F. Ehrler, second Missouri; Lieutenant Colonel John Weber, fifteenth Missouri; Captain W. W. Barrett, forty-fourth Illinois, (wounded;) Major W. A. Presson, seventy-third Illinois, (wounded;) Major Silas Miller, thirty-sixth Illinois, (wounded and a prisoner;) Captain P. C. Oleson, thirty-sixth Illinois; Major E. C. Hibbard, twenty-fourth Wisconsin; Lieutenant Colonel — McCreary, twenty-first Michigan; Lieutenant Colonel N. H. Walworth, forty-second Illinois; Lieutenant Colonel F. Swanwick, twenty-second Illinois, (wounded and prisoner;) Captain Samuel Johnson, twenty-second Illinois; Major W. A. Schmidt, twenty-seventh Illinois; Captain — Wescott, fifty-first Illinois.

I respectfully bring to the notice of the general commanding the good conduct of Captain Hescoek, my chief of artillery, whose services were almost invaluable; also Captains Houghtaling and Bush, and the officers and men of their batteries. Surgeon D. J. Griffiths, medical director of my division, and Dr. McArthur, of the board of medical examiners of Illinois, were most assiduous in their care of the wounded. Major H. F. Deitz, provost marshal, Captain Morhardt, topographical engineer, Lieutenant George Lee, acting assistant adjutant general, Lieutenants R. M. Denning, Frank H. Allen, E. H. DeBruin, J.

L. Forman, and Soward, aides-de-camp, officers of my staff, were of the greatest service to me, delivering my orders faithfully, and promptly discharging the duties of their respective positions.

The ammunition train above alluded to as captured was retaken from the enemy through the good conduct of Captain Thruston, ordnance officer of the corps, and Lieutenant Douglas, ordnance officer of my division, who, with Sergeant Cooper of my escort, rallied the stragglers and drove the enemy's cavalry.

The following is a list of casualties in the division :

Officers killed . . . . .	15	
wounded . . . . .	38	
missing . . . . .	11	
		64
Total officers . . . . .		64
Enlisted men killed . . . . .	223	
wounded . . . . .	943	
missing . . . . .	400	
		1,566
Total enlisted men . . . . .		1,566
Aggregate . . . . .		1,630

Of the eleven officers and four hundred enlisted men missing many are known to be wounded and in the hands of the enemy.

Prisoners were captured from the enemy by my division as follows : Majors, 1 ; captains, 1 ; lieutenants, 3 ; enlisted men, 216. Total, 221.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. H. SHERIDAN,  
*Brigadier General Commanding.*

Major J. A. CAMPBELL,  
*Assistant Adjutant General, right wing 14th Army Corps.*

REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF THE THIRD DIVISION, 20TH ARMY CORPS,  
ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND, FROM SEPTEMBER 2 TO SEPTEMBER 23,  
1863, INCLUDING THE BATTLE OF CHICAMAUGA.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, 20TH ARMY CORPS,  
*Chattanooga, Tenn., September 30, 1863.*

COLONEL : I have the honor to report the following as the operations of my command from September 2 to September 23, 1863 :

On the 2d and 3d of September this division crossed the Tennessee river, at Bridgeport, and encamped at Moore's spring, in the little valley at the base of Sand mountain, some delay having occurred in consequence of the giving way of the bridge. On the 4th I ascended the mountain and encamped at Warren's mill, about half way across. On the 5th I descended the mountain and encamped near Trenton, Georgia, in Lookout valley. On the 6th I moved south and encamped at Colonel Easley's, five miles from Trenton. On the 7th I moved to Stevens's mill, a distance of five miles, where I remained during the 8th and 9th. On the 10th I moved to Valley Head, ascended Lookout mountain, and encamped at Indian falls. On the 11th I crossed and descended the mountain, and encamped at Alpine, in Broomtown valley. On the 12th I remained at Alpine. On the 13th and 14th I recrossed Lookout mountain and encamped again at Stevens's mill. On the 15th and 16th I recrossed Lookout mountain at Stevens's gap and encamped at the base of the mountain, in Mc-Lamore's cove. On the 17th the division remained in line of battle during the

day and night, the enemy having made demonstrations on my front, and the rest of the army having moved to the left. On the 18th I marched to the left and encamped at Lee's mill, on the extreme right of the army, and during the night of the 18th I followed the army to the left, camping at Pond spring. On the 19th I was again ordered to resume the march, and went into line of battle at Crawfish springs.

Immediately after forming my line I was ordered to hold the ford at Lee & Gordon's mill with my whole division, the troops on my left having moved to the left, thereby again isolating me.

In a short time after occupying the position at Lee & Gordon's mill, and after having driven the enemy's skirmishers from my immediate front, I was directed to support General Crittenden with two brigades of my division.

Moving rapidly to the left, I came in to the support of Generals Wood and Davis, who were being hard pressed, and their troops nearly exhausted. The brigade of Colonel Bradley, consisting of the 22d, 27th, 42d, and 51st Illinois, was hastily formed, and gallantly drove the enemy from the open ground in its front and across the Chattanooga and Lafayette road, after a sanguinary engagement, in which it recaptured the 8th Indiana battery, which had previously been captured by the enemy, and captured a large number of prisoners belonging to Hood's division of Longstreet's corps. While Colonel Bradley was thus driving the enemy Colonel Laiboldt, with his brigade, formed upon his right. Darkness coming on, the opposing lines lay down upon their arms, ready to renew the contest in the morning.

In this engagement Colonel Bradley received two severe wounds, while gallantly leading his brigade, and Lieutenant Moody, his acting assistant adjutant general, was mortally wounded at the same time.

About 11 o'clock that night I was again directed to move to the left, and occupy a position at Glenn's house. This was successfully accomplished by strengthening the picket lines and moving the brigades from right to left until the point designated was arrived at, after which the picket lines were withdrawn.

On the morning of the 20th I rearranged my lines, and formed myself in a strong position on the extreme right, to which I had been assigned, but which was disconnected from the troops on my left.

At about 9 o'clock the engagement again opened by a heavy assault upon the left of the army, while everything was quiet in my front. To resist the assault that was being made on the left the interior divisions were again moved.

About 11 o'clock the brigade of Colonel Laiboldt, composed of the 2d and 15th Missouri, 44th and 73d Illinois, was directed to move to the left and occupy a portion of the front which had been covered by General Negley. Before getting into this position, however, the ground was occupied by Carlin's brigade, of Davis's division, and Laiboldt was directed to take position on a very strong ridge in Carlin's rear, to deploy on this ridge, and hold it, so as to prevent Davis's flank from being turned. Word was then sent to General McCook of the disposition which had been made, which he approved of.

Immediately afterwards I received orders to support General Thomas with two brigades, and had just abandoned my position, and was moving at a double-quick to carry out the order, when the enemy made a furious assault with overwhelming numbers on Davis's front, and, coming up through the unoccupied space between Davis and myself—even covering the front of the position I had just abandoned—Davis was driven from his lines, and Laiboldt, whose brigade was in column of regiments, was ordered by Major General McCook to charge, deploying to the front. The impetuosity of the enemy's charge, together with the inability of Laiboldt's command to fire in consequence of the ground in his front being covered with the men of Davis's division, who were rushing through his ranks, caused this brigade also to break and fall to the rear. In the mean time I had received the most urgent orders to throw in my other two brigades.

This I did at a double-quick, forming the brigade of General Lytle—composed of the 36th and 88th Illinois, 24th Wisconsin and 21st Michigan—and Colonel Bradley's brigade, now commanded by Colonel W. H. Walworth, to the front under a terrible fire of musketry from the enemy. Many of the men were shot down before facing to the front. After a stubborn resistance, the enemy drove me back nearly to the Lafayette road, a distance of about 300 yards. At this point the men again rallied, drove the enemy back with terrible slaughter, and regained the line of the ridge on which Colonel Laiboldt had originally been posted. In this charge we took a number of prisoners, and the 51st Illinois captured the colors of the 24th Alabama.

Here, unfortunately, the enemy had strong supports, while I had none to relieve my exhausted men, and my troops were again driven back to the Lafayette road, after a gallant resistance.

In this engagement I had the misfortune to lose General Lytle, commanding my first brigade, and many of the best and bravest officers of my command.

After crossing the road, my division was again formed on the ridge which overlooked the ground on which the sanguinary contest had taken place, the enemy manifesting no disposition to continue the engagement further. I here learned positively that which I had before partially seen, that the divisions still further on my left had been driven, and that I was completely cut off. I then determined to connect myself with the troops of General Thomas, by moving on the arc of a circle until I struck the Dry Creek Valley road, by which I hoped to form the junction. In the mean time I was joined by a portion of the division of General Davis, under command of General Carlin, and a number of stragglers from other divisions. On reaching the Dry Creek Valley road, I found that the enemy had moved parallel to me and had also arrived at the road, thus preventing my joining General Thomas by that route. I then determined to move quickly on Rossville, and form a junction with him on his left flank, via the Lafayette road. This was successfully accomplished about five o'clock p. m. Before undertaking this latter movement, I disencumbered myself of sixteen pieces of artillery, forty-six caissons, one entire battery, and a portion of another battery, all belonging to other divisions, and which I found in wild confusion and collected where I first formed my lines.

After forming the junction with General Thomas on his left, his command was ordered to fall back to Rossville, and I was directed to fall back to the same place, where the command rested during the night.

On the 21st I formed my command in line of battle at Rossville, and remained in that position until during the night of that day, when I fell back to Chattanooga, forming the rear guard of the 20th corps.

The above is a brief narrative of the operations of my division, which, before going into action on the 19th, numbered about 4,000 bayonets.

The battle of the 20th was fought under the most disadvantageous circumstances, without time being given to form line of battle, without supports, and contending against four or five divisions. The division gave up its ground after a sanguinary contest, and after losing 96 of its gallant officers and 1,421 of its brave men.

Among the killed early in the engagement of the 20th was Brigadier General W. H. Lytle, who was three times wounded, but refused to leave the field. In him the country has lost an able general, and the service a gallant soldier.

Colonel Bradley, commanding my third brigade, who had greatly distinguished himself, was twice severely wounded in the action of the 19th; Colonel Laiboldt, commanding my second brigade, behaved with conspicuous gallantry in the action of the 20th. I respectfully recommend both of these officers for promotion.

Colonel W. H. Walworth, 42d Illinois, succeeded Colonel Bradley in the command of the third brigade, and Colonel Silas Miller, 36th Illinois, succeeded



General Lytle in the command of the first brigade. They both behaved with great skill and bravery.

The following regimental officers were especially distinguished : Colonel J. F. Jacques, 73d Illinois, for skill exhibited and great personal courage ; he is almost the only officer left with his regiment, seventeen of them having been either killed or wounded ; Colonel W. W. Barrett, 44th Illinois, Lieutenant Colonel John Weber, 15th Missouri, Lieutenant Colonel John Russell, 44th Illinois, and Lieutenant Colonel J. J. Davidson, 73d Illinois, were wounded ; Major J. Leighton, 42d Illinois, was killed on the 19th, and Colonel W. B. McCreary, 21st Michigan, killed on the 20th ; Major Smith, 73d Illinois, killed, Major S. Johnson, 22d Illinois, mortally wounded ; Lieutenant Colonel T. S. West, 24th Wisconsin, wounded and captured, Lieutenant Colonel Wells, 21st Michigan, killed ; Colonel J. R. Miles, 27th Illinois, Colonel Joseph Conrad, 15th Missouri, Lieutenant Colonel S. B. Raymond, 51st Illinois, Major H. A. Rust, 27th Illinois, Lieutenant Colonel J. Hottenstein, commanding 42d Illinois, Lieutenant Colonel F. Swanwick, commanding 22d Illinois, Lieutenant Colonel W. A. Schmidt, 27th Illinois, Major Arnold Beck, commanding 2d Missouri, Lieutenant Colonel A. S. Chadbourne, commanding 38th Illinois, Major Chandler, 88th Illinois, Lieutenant Colonel P. C. Oleson, commanding 36th Illinois, Major George L. Sherman, 36th Illinois, and many other officers of lesser grades whose names cannot be given without undue length to this report.

I respectfully bring to the notice of the general commanding the following officers of my staff : Surgeon D. J. Griffiths, medical director, Major F. Morhardt, topographical engineer, Captain H. Hescocock, chief of artillery—who was probably wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy.—Captain George Lee, assistant adjutant general, Captain A. F. Stevenson, inspector, Captain W. L. Mallory, commissary of subsistence, Captain P. U. Smith, acting assistant quartermaster, Captain J. S. Ransom, provost marshal, Lieutenant A. J. Douglas, ordnance officer, Lieutenants F. H. Allen, M. V. Sheridan, and T. W. C. Moore, aides-de-camp, and Lieutenant J. Van Pelt, acting aide-de-camp, all of whom rendered me valuable service, both on the march and in action. After the death of General Lytle, Colonel J. F. Harrison, volunteer aide-de-camp, and Lieutenant Alfred Pirtle, aide-de-camp, of his staff, reported to me for duty, and behaved very handsomely.

The total casualties—officers and men—in this division, are as follows :

Killed, 152 ; wounded, 1,037 ; captured, 328 ; total, 1,517. Of the 1,037 wounded, 325 were left in the hospital at Crawfish Springs, and fell into the hands of the enemy.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. H. SHERIDAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Lieutenant Colonel G. P. THRUSTON,  
*Assistant Adjutant General and Chief of Staff, 20th Army Corps.*

REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF THE SECOND DIVISION, 4TH CORPS, ARMY  
OF THE CUMBERLAND, FROM NOVEMBER 23 TO NOVEMBER 26, 1863,  
INCLUDING THE BATTLE OF MISSION RIDGE.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, 4TH ARMY CORPS,  
*Loudon, Tennessee, February 20, 1864.*

COLONEL : I have the honor to submit to the general commanding the following report of the operations of my division in the valley of Chattanooga, embracing the storming of Mission Ridge, and the pursuit of the enemy to the crossing of Chickamauga creek, at Bird's mills :

On the morning of November 23 my division lay inside of the fortifications at Chattanooga, its right resting on Fort Negley, its left well over towards Fort Wood, the front parallel to Mission Ridge.

This ground I had occupied for a long time. The right of my picket line commenced on the direct road from Chattanooga to Rossville, swept around on the arc of a circle, crossing Moore's road, and in front of an elevation on my front known as Bushy Knob, now designated the National Cemetery, and joining on the picket line of General Wood nearly in front of Fort Wood. The division of General Baird was on my right; that of General Wood on my left.

My division consisted of three brigades, in all twenty-five regiments, with an effective force of about six thousand officers and men. The first, commanded by Colonel Frank T. Sherman, composed of the following regiments: Second Missouri, fifteenth Missouri, twenty-second Indiana, seventy-fourth Illinois, thirty-sixth Illinois, forty-fourth Illinois, twenty-fourth Wisconsin, seventy-third Illinois, eighty-eighth Illinois. The second, commanded by Brigadier General G. D. Wagner, embracing the following regiments: Fifteenth Indiana, fortieth Indiana, fifty-seventh Indiana, fifty-eighth Indiana, one hundredth Illinois, twenty-sixth Ohio, ninety-seventh Ohio. The third, commanded by Colonel G. D. Harker, sixty-fifth Ohio infantry, consisting of the following regiments: Twenty-second Illinois, twenty-seventh Illinois, forty-second Illinois, fifty-first Illinois, seventy-ninth Illinois, third Kentucky, sixty-fourth Ohio, sixty-fifth Ohio, one hundred and twenty-fifth Ohio.

The command had been prepared for an offensive movement for some days.

About 12 o'clock, m., of the 23d I was notified by Major General Granger that General Wood would make a reconnoissance to an elevated point on his (Wood's) front, known as Orchard Knob, and I was directed to support him with my division, and prevent his right flank from being turned by an advance of the enemy on Moore's road, or from the direction of Rossville.

In obedience to these instructions, I marched my division from its camp about 2 o'clock p. m., and placed Wagner's brigade on the northern slope of Bushy Knob, Harker's brigade on the southern slope, Sherman's in reserve. Immediately upon taking this position I was joined by two batteries of the fourth regular artillery, from the 11th army corps, under command of Major Osborne. These were placed in position; one on Bushy Knob, the other in a small lunette which I had previously constructed.

Shortly after this disposition had been made, the division of General Wood passed my left flank on its reconnoissance, attacked the enemy's pickets, drove in their lines, and took possession of Orchard Knob. Wagner's brigade followed up the movement in echelon with Wood's right, Harker moved forward in echelon with Wagner's right, and Sherman followed in reserve.

In this forward move, the skirmishers of Wagner and Harker encountered those of the enemy and drove them in. After the two brigades had reached a slight ridge on their front, three hundred yards in advance, they were halted, and, by direction of Major General Thomas, a line of rifle-pits was constructed, covering the front, making the position a very strong one.

Shortly after dark, General Wood feeling uneasy about his right flank, by direction of Granger I moved closer to him, and at the same time ordered battery G, fourth United States artillery, to a position on the left of Wagner, so as to give entire security to General Wood's right. Strong lines of pickets had already been thrown out on my front, and I advanced scouts to watch any movement of the enemy during the night.

Next morning and next day found me in the above described line, without any inconvenience except being at several times subjected to a very heavy artillery fire from rebel batteries on Mission Ridge.

During the day I was joined by Captain Gunther's battery, fourth artillery, which I placed on Bushy Knob.

On the morning of the 25th, I directed Colonel Harker to drive in the rebel pickets on my front, so as to enable me to prolong my line of battle on that of General Wood, the necessity of refusing my right having been obviated by the capture of Lookout mountain. The enemy's pickets retired without resistance; then Wagner's, Harker's, and Sherman's brigades were advanced on the prolongation of Wood's line, and laid down upon their arms in front of Mission Ridge. Battery G, fourth artillery, was moved to a position in front of Wagner's left, and Gunther's battery to a position in front of Harker's centre.

I would here state that the division of General Baird had been moved from my right during the morning.

Shortly after this disposition had been completed, about 2 o'clock p. m., orders were received from General Granger to prepare to carry the enemy's rifle-pits at the base of Mission Ridge, to report when ready, and that the signal for the attack would be six guns fired from Orchard Knob in quick succession. I had few changes to make; Wagner was in two lines, connecting with Wood's right; Harker also in two lines, and closed on Wagner; Sherman I had directed to form with his brigade a column of attack, with a front of three regiments, and to throw out a heavy line of skirmishers on his front, covering the right flank of his column, as the troops on my right did not close on to me, or were in echelon. Wagner and Harker were also directed to cover their flanks with heavy lines.

After this disposition for attack had been made, my right rested some distance to the right of Moore's road; my left joined Wood well over toward Orchard Knob. A small stream of water ran parallel to my front. The centre of my division was opposite to Thrumman's house, on Mission Ridge, the headquarters of General Bragg.

The ground in my front was first open timber; then an open smooth plain, the distance across which varied from 400 to 900 yards to the first line of the enemy's rifle-pits; next a steep ascent of about 500 yards to the top of the ridge, the face of which was ragged and covered with fallen timber; lastly, the rifle-pits on the crest of the ridge, about 250 yards from the first line of rifle-pits. At a point about midway up the ridge was a partial line of pits, commencing opposite my right centre, and extending to my right.

While making my dispositions for attack, the enemy, in plain view of the whole division, was making his dispositions for resistance. He marched regiments from opposite our right, waving their blue battle-flags, and filled up the spaces in his rifle-pits not already occupied.

I had Wagner, Harker, and Sherman. Their men were veterans; they had been at Pea Ridge, Shiloh, Perryville, Stone River, and Chickamauga.

While riding from right to left, and closely examining the first line of pits occupied by the enemy, which seemed as though they would prove untenable after being carried, the doubt arose in my mind as to whether I had properly understood the original order, and I despatched Captain Ransom, of my staff, to ascertain from General Granger whether it was the first line that was to be carried, or the ridge.

He had scarcely left me when the signal was given, and the division marched to the front under a most terrible tornado of shot and shell. It moved steadily on, and, emerging from the timber, took up the double-quick, and dashed over the open plain and at the enemy's first line with a mass of glistening bayonets which was irresistible. Many of the enemy fled; the balance were either killed or captured. The first line of the three brigades reached the first line of pits simultaneously, passed over them, and laid down on the face of the mountain.

The enemy had now changed from shot and shell to grape, canister, and musketry; the fire was terrific. About this time Captain Ransom, who had been despatched to General Granger, as heretofore mentioned, reached the left of my division, and informed General Wagner that it was the first line that was

to be carried. Wagner withdrew his men to that line with severe loss. One of Harker's demi-brigades was also retired to the rifle-pits.

Captain Ransom then joined me about the centre of the line, and confirmed the original order; but believing that the attack had assumed a new phase, and that I could carry the ridge, I could not order those officers and men who were so gallantly ascending the hill step by step to return.

I rode from the centre to the left, and saw disappointment in the faces of the men; told them to rest for a few moments, and that they should go at it again.

In the mean time the right and right centre were approaching the partial line of pits above alluded to, led by twelve sets of regimental colors; one would be advanced a few feet, then another would come up to it, each vying with the other to be foremost, until the entire twelve were planted on the crest of the partial line of pits by their gallant bearers.

Captain Avery, of General Granger's staff, here came up and informed me that the original order was to carry the first line of pits, but that if in my judgment the ridge could be taken, to do so. My judgment was that it could, and orders were given accordingly, obeyed with a cheer, and the ridge was carried.

The right and right centre reached the summit first, being nearest to the crest, and crossed it to the right of General Bragg's headquarters. The contest was still maintained for a few minutes, when the enemy was driven from his guns, and the battery captured.

Two of the pieces taken were designated, respectively, "Lady Buckner" and "Lady Breckinridge." The adjutants general of Generals Breckinridge and Bates, and many other staff officers were taken prisoners, the generals themselves barely escaping, General Bragg having left but a few moments before. The whole division had now reached the crest, and the enemy was retiring, but had a well organized line covering his retreat.

His disorganized troops, a large wagon train, and several pieces of artillery, could be distinctly seen flying through the valley below, within a distance of half a mile.

I at once directed Wagner and Harker to press their rear-guard, and capture their wagon train and artillery, if possible. The right of Wagner's and the left of Harker's brigade moved along the road leading to Chickamauga Station, (Moore's road), their brigades being deployed to the left and right of the road.

Both brigades skirmished with the enemy in this advance. Wagner's brigade drove the enemy from and captured nine pieces of artillery.

On reaching a point about one mile beyond Mission Ridge, the road ran over a high formidable ridge, on which the enemy had posted eight pieces of artillery, supported by a heavy force, notwithstanding which, these gallant brigades, without artillery, did not hesitate to attack him. I immediately rode toward the front and met a staff officer of Colonel Wood, (commanding demi-brigade,) who informed me that the command was hard pressed, and that two regiments were on the left of the road with captured artillery. I repaired at once to the regiments, 26th Ohio and 15th Indiana, and ordered them to advance, at the same time hastening forward myself to the front, where I found Colonel Wood contending bravely against overwhelming numbers of the enemy, his men clinging to the face of the hill, as they had done a few hours before on Mission Ridge.

It was dusk, and the two regiments above referred to were about flanking the enemy, but in order to accomplish this a high bluff, where the ridge on the left terminated, had to be carried. General Wagner here joined me, and I designated to him the point to be carried, and directed him to accompany the regiments in person.

Colonel Harker, who had also joined me, was directed to push forward the demi-brigade of Colonel Opdyke on the right. But a few moments elapsed

ere the 26th Ohio and the 15th Indiana carried the crest. When the head of the column reached the summit of the hill, the moon rose from behind, and a medallion view of the column was disclosed as it crossed the moon's disk and attacked the enemy, who, outflanked on the left and right, fled, leaving two pieces of artillery and many wagons. This was a gallant little fight.

While we were thus pushing the enemy, and forcing him to abandon his artillery, wagons, and stores, the division of General Wood remained on Mission Ridge, constructing rifle pits, and General Hazen and his brigade employed themselves in collecting the artillery from which my men had driven the enemy, and have claimed it their capture.

General Wood, in his report to General Thomas of artillery taken, claims many pieces which were the prizes of my division, and when told by me that the report was untruthful, replied "That it was based upon the report of General Hazen," who, perhaps, will in turn base his on those of the regiments, but whether Wood, Hazen, regimental or company commanders are responsible, the report is untrue.

Eleven of these guns were gleaned from the battle-field, and appropriated while I was pushing the enemy on to Chickamauga Station.

I beg pardon for this unpleasant digression.

After the ridge was captured Wagner's and Harker's brigades went into bivouac.

About 12 o'clock at night, being ordered with my division to press the enemy, I drove him over Chickamauga creek and captured caissons, limbers, wagons, a large quantity of artillery ammunition and small-arms, and very many prisoners.

I reached the creek at about two o'clock of the morning of the 26th of November, and, in the afternoon of the same day, returned to camp at Chattanooga, where I was at once ordered to prepare to march on Knoxville to raise the siege.

To recur again to the assault on Mission Ridge and the position taken for the attack, I would make mention of the most terrible cross-fire of artillery and musketry to which my troops were subjected for a distance of at least one and one-eighth miles, while in, and emerging from, the timber, and during the time occupied in crossing the open plain to the first line of rifle-pits.

In justice to my gallant officers and men, I must say that their conduct was more than heroic; it was the prompting of a brave heart in a just cause, and an inspiration caused by the sight of the old flag which had been borne by them through many battles.

The gallant color-bearers, officers and men, who planted their flags upon Mission Ridge, are the true heroes of the battle.

In giving praise, I cannot nor will the country forget that 123 officers and 1,179 men of this division bathed the face of Mission Ridge with their loyal blood.

I am pleased to recommend to the attention of the general commanding and to my country, General G. D. Wagner and Colonels Harker and Sherman, commanding respectively the 2d, 3d and 1st brigades. Colonels Harker and Sherman accompanied the colors of their regiments, and inspired their men by their coolness and gallant bearing. I take great pleasure in recommending these officers for promotion to brigadier generals, a position which they have fairly won on this and other fields, and which they are fully qualified by ability and long experience to fill.

Of Colonels Laiboldt, 2d Missouri, Miller, 36th Illinois, Wood, 15th Indiana, Walworth, 42d Illinois, Opdyke, 125th Ohio, each of whom commanded *demi-brigades*, I would say much in approbation; they are well worthy of any compliment that their country can confer.

Of the regimental commanders, Colonels Jacques, 73d Illinois, Barrett, 44th Illinois, Marsh, 74th Illinois, Conrad, 15th Missouri, Lieutenant Colonels Chandler, 88th Illinois, Oleson, 36th Illinois, Beck, 2d Missouri, Colonels Dunlap, 3d

Kentucky, Buckner, 79th Illinois, McIlvaine, 64th Ohio, Miles, 27th Illinois, Lieutenant Colonels Bullet, 65th Ohio, Swanwick, 22d Illinois, Major Davis and Captain Tilton, 51st Illinois, Captain Swaine, 42d Illinois, Major Davidson, 73d Illinois, Lieutenant Colonels Neff, 40th Indiana, Moore, 58th Indiana, Burns, 97th Ohio, Young, 26th Ohio, Majors Hammond, 100th Illinois, and White, 15th Indiana, many of whom were wounded, I would speak in the highest praise; by their brilliant example at the head of their respective regiments, men were inspired to the perfection of deeds of valor and heroism.

To the skirmish line, composed of the 88th Illinois, 57th Indiana, and 42d Illinois, great credit is due for the gallant manner in which it charged the enemy's lines. Lieutenant Colonel Leonard, 57th Indiana, Major Sherman, 36th Illinois, and Captain Swaine, 42d Illinois, in charge of the skirmishers of their respective brigades, are brave and efficient officers, and well deserving of promotion; with such officers to lead, success is inevitable.

In my special mentions must be included Captain Gunther, commanding a battery temporarily assigned to me; also the officers of battery G, 4th United States artillery, to whom I am indebted for valuable services rendered, and regret that I am unable to particularize by name.

I wish also to bring to the notice of the general commanding, the officers of my staff; my aids, Captain J. S. Ransom, Lieutenants Frank H. Allen, M. V. Sheridan, and T. W. U. Moore, my faithful assistants, assiduous in the discharge of their duties, always ready and prompt to carry orders; Surgeon D. J. Griffiths, medical director, Captain George Lee, assistant adjutant general, Captain Warren P. Edgerton, chief of artillery, Captain W. L. Mallory, chief of subsistence, Captain P. U. Smith, assistant quartermaster, Major Francis Mohrhardt, topographical engineer, Captain Snyder, commissary of musters, all of whom discharged their duties with fidelity.

The following captures were made by my division: seventeen pieces of artillery; six of these, with caissons complete, were turned over and receipts obtained therefor. The eleven were hauled off the field and appropriated as heretofore mentioned while the division was pushing the enemy back on Chickamauga creek.

The number of prisoners taken is as follows: First brigade, 470; second brigade, 762; third brigade, 530. In all, 1,762.

In summing up I would make the following statement of casualties: Officers killed, 12; men killed, 119; aggregate, 131. Officers wounded, 111; men wounded, 1,060; aggregate, 1,171. Men missing, 2. Total officers killed, wounded, and missing, 123. Total men killed, wounded, and missing, 1,131; grand aggregate, 1,304.

I have the honor to be, colonel, your obedient servant,

P. H. SHERIDAN, *Major General Commanding.*

Lieutenant Colonel J. S. FULLERTON,

*Ass't Adj. Gen. 4th Army Corps, Dep't of the Cumberland.*

#### REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF THE CAVALRY CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, FROM APRIL 6, TO AUGUST 4, 1864.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE GULF,  
*New Orleans, La., May 13, 1866.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the cavalry corps, army of the Potomac, from April 6, 1864, to August 4, 1864:

On March 27, 1864, I was relieved from the command of the second division, 4th corps, army of the Cumberland, to take command of the cavalry corps, army of the Potomac, and on the 4th of April, in General Order No. 144, current

series, War Department, I was assigned to that corps, then lying in the vicinity of Brandy Station, Virginia.

The corps consisted of three divisions, and twelve (12) batteries horse artillery, and in a few days after I joined was adjusted as follows: Brigadier General A. T. A. Torbert to command the first division; Brigadier General D. M. Gregg, the second division; and Brigadier General J. H. Wilson, the third division; the artillery being under the command of Captain Robinson, United States army. The officers and men were in pretty good condition, so far as health and equipment were concerned, but their horses were thin and very much worn out by excessive, and, it seemed to me, unnecessary picket duty; the picket line almost completely encircling the infantry and artillery camps of the army, covering a distance, if stretched out on a continuous line, of nearly sixty miles. The enemy, more wise, had been husbanding the strength and efficiency of his horses by sending them to the rear, in order to bring them out in the spring in good condition for the impending campaign; however, shortly after my taking command, much of the picketing was done away with, and we had about two weeks of leisure time to nurse the horses, on which so much depended; consequently, on the 4th of May, when the campaign opened, I found myself with about ten thousand (10,000) effective men, and the same number of horses in passable trim.

After carefully studying the topography of the country from the Rapidan to Richmond, which is of a thickly wooded character, its numerous and almost parallel streams nearly all uniting, forming the York river, I took up the idea that our cavalry ought to fight the enemy's cavalry, and our infantry the enemy's infantry. I was strengthened in this impression still more by the consciousness of a want of appreciation on the part of infantry commanders as to the power of a large and well managed body of horse, but as it was difficult to overcome the established custom of wasting cavalry for the protection of trains, and for the establishment of cordons around a sleeping infantry force, we had to bide our time.

On May 4 the army moved; Gregg's division taking the advance to Ely's ford on the Rapidan; Wilson's the advance to Germania ford on the same stream; Torbert's covering the trains of the army in rear, holding from Mitchell's Station to Culpeper, and around Stevensburg, and strongly picketing the fords from Germania ford to Rapidan Station.

As soon as the 2d corps reached Ely's ford, Gregg moved to Chancellorsville; and, upon the 5th corps reaching Germania ford, Wilson made the crossing of the Rapidan, moved through Old Wilderness, and advanced to Parker's Store.

On the 5th, Torbert joined me at Chancellorsville, and General Meade ordered Wilson in the direction of Craig's meeting-house, where he was attacked, and, after a sharp engagement, driven back, via Shady Grove church, to Todd's tavern. It was necessary for him to take this route, as the enemy's infantry had advanced from the direction of Orange Court House, and had occupied Parker's Store and the direct road back to our army.

When General Meade discovered that Wilson was cut off, he sent word to me, near Chancellorsville, to go to his relief, and I immediately despatched General Gregg's division in the direction of Todd's tavern, where he met Wilson, who was still being followed up.

The enemy's pursuing force was attacked by Gregg at this place, defeated, and driven to Shady Grove church, a distance of three or four miles.

It was now well understood that the enemy's cavalry at Hamilton's Crossing had joined General Lee's forces, and the necessity for my moving to that point, as ordered, was obviated.

As I was held responsible for the left flank of our army and the trains, I made such disposition of the troops under my command as to hold the line of the Brock road beyond the Furnaces, and thence around to Todd's tavern and Piney

Branch church, but General Meade, on false report, became alarmed about his left, and notified me in the following note that Hancock's left had been turned, and directed me to draw in my forces to protect the trains :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

May 6, 1864—1 o'clock p. m.

Major General SHERIDAN,

*Commanding Cavalry Corps:*

Your despatch of 11.45 a. m. received. General Hancock has been heavily pressed, and his left turned. The major general commanding thinks that you had better draw in your cavalry so as to secure the protection of the trains.

The order requiring an escort for the wagons to-night has been rescinded.

A. A. HUMPHREYS,

*Major General, Chief of Staff.*

I obeyed this order, and the enemy took possession of the Furnaces, Todd's tavern, and Piney Branch church, the regaining which cost much fighting on the 6th and 7th, and very many gallant officers and men.

On the 6th Custer fought at the Furnaces, and defeated the enemy, who left his dead and wounded in our hands.

On the 7th the trains of the army, under directions from headquarters army of the Potomac, were put in motion to go into park at Piney Branch church. As this point was held by the enemy I was confident that the order must have been given without fully understanding the condition of affairs, and therefore thought the best way to remedy the trouble was to halt the trains in the vicinity of Aldrich's, attack the enemy and regain the ground. This led to the battle of Todd's tavern, in which the enemy was defeated. Gregg attacked with one of his brigades on the Catharpen road, and drove the enemy over Corbin's bridge; Merritt, who was in command of the first division during the temporary absence of Torbert, attacked with his division, on the Spottsylvania road, driving him towards Spottsylvania, and Davies's brigade of Gregg's division made a handsome attack on the Piney Branch church road, uniting with Merritt on the Spottsylvania road. The pursuit was kept up until dark. Gregg's and Merritt's divisions encamped in open fields in the vicinity of Todd's tavern, with orders to move in the morning, at daylight, for the purpose of gaining possession of Snell's bridge, over the Po river. To accomplish this, Wilson, who was at Alsop's house, was directed to take possession of Spottsylvania early on the morning of the 8th, and thence move into position at Snell's bridge. Gregg and Merritt were ordered to proceed to the same point; the former via the crossing at Corbin's bridge, the latter by the block-house.

Had these movements been carried out successfully, it would probably have sufficiently delayed the march of the enemy to Spottsylvania Court House as to enable our infantry to reach that point first, and the battles fought there would have probably occurred elsewhere, but upon the arrival of General Meade at Todd's tavern the orders were changed, and Gregg was simply directed by him to hold Corbin's bridge, and Merritt's division ordered in front of the infantry column, marching on the road to Spottsylvania in the darkness of the night, the cavalry and infantry becoming entangled in the advance, causing much confusion and delay.

I was not duly advised of these changes, and for a time had fears for the safety of General Wilson's command, which had proceeded, in accordance with my instructions, to Spottsylvania Court House, capturing and holding it until driven out by the advance of Longstreet's corps.

The time had now come to leave the Wilderness, where we had successfully held the left of the army, and defeated the enemy's cavalry on the 5th at Todd's tavern, and at the Furnaces; again on the 6th at the Furnaces, and on the 7th



at Todd's tavern. During the 8th I received orders to go out and engage the rebel cavalry, and when out of forage, *of which we had half rations for one day*, I was to proceed to the James river, and replenish from the stores which General Butler had at Bermuda Hundred.

Pursuant to this order the three divisions of cavalry, on the evening of this day, were concentrated in the vicinity of Aldrich's, on the plank road to Fredericksburg, and on the morning of the 9th commenced the march. It will be seen, upon examination of the map of Virginia, that there was but very little space for a large cavalry force to operate on the left of our army, from Spottsylvania to the Rappahannock, and that we were liable to be shut in; I therefore concluded to march around the right of Lee's army, and put my command, before fighting, south of the North Anna, where I expected to procure grain; where I was confident that while engaging the enemy's cavalry no timely assistance from his infantry could be procured, and whence, if not successful, I could proceed west and rejoin our army, swinging around towards Gordonsville and Orange Court House.

With this view we started, marching out on the plank road to Tabernacle church, thence to the Telegraph road, thence down through Childsburg to Anderson's crossing of the North Anna. This movement was made at a walk, with three divisions on the same road—making a column of about thirteen miles in length—marching by the flank of the enemy; I preferred this, however, to the combinations arising from separate roads, combinations rarely working as expected, and generally failing, unless subordinate commanders are prompt and fully understand the situation; besides, an engagement was imminent, and it was necessary that the force be well together.

As soon as the Nye, Po, and Ta rivers, each giving an excellent defensive line to the enemy, were passed, all cause for anxiety was removed, and our ability to cross the North Anna unquestionable.

After passing the Ta river the enemy's cavalry came against the rear of my column, and General Davies, who had the rear brigade, was directed to fight as rear-guard, following up the main column; it is with pleasure I say that he and his command performed this responsible and trying duty with courage and good judgment. About dark Merritt crossed the North Anna at Anderson's ford; Gregg and Wilson encamped on the north side, engaging the enemy up to a late hour at night. After Merritt's division crossed Custer's brigade was ordered to Beaver Dam Station, on the Virginia Central railroad, where he captured 375 Union prisoners, taken by the enemy in the Wilderness; destroyed the station, two locomotives, three trains (100) cars, ninety (90) wagons, from eight to ten miles telegraph wire and railroad, 200,000 pounds bacon, and other supplies, amounting in all to about one and a half million of rations, and nearly all the medical stores of General Lee's army. These stores had been moved from Orange Court House to this point, either because General Lee wished to have them directly in his rear—the road used for hauling from Orange Court House to Spottsylvania being on a parallel line to his line of battle—or because he contemplated falling back, or being driven back, to the North Anna.

On the morning of the 10th, Gregg and Wilson were again attacked, but their crossing was covered by the division on the south side of the North Anna, and was effected without much loss.

An important point of the expedition had now been gained, and we had also obtained forage for our almost finished animals; our next object was to husband their strength and prepare to fight.

It now became apparent that the enemy, in following up our rear, had made a great mistake, and he began to see it; for, when we leisurely took the Negro-foot road to Richmond, a doubt arose in his mind as to whether his tactics were good, whereat he immediately hauled off from the rear, and urged his horses to the death so as to get in between Richmond and our column. This he effected,

concentrating at Yellow tavern, six miles from the city on the Brook turnpike; consequently the march on the 10th was without much incident, and we quietly encamped on the south bank of the South Anna, where we procured all necessary forage, marching from fifteen to eighteen miles.

On the night of the 10th and 11th of May, Davies's brigade of Gregg's division was ordered to Ashland, and arriving before the head of the enemy's column, which had to make a wide detour to reach Yellow tavern, drove out a force occupying the town; burnt a locomotive with train of cars attached; destroyed the railroad for some distance, and rejoined the main column at Allen's station, on the Fredericksburg railroad.

From Allen's the entire command moved on Yellow tavern, Merritt in advance, Wilson next, and Gregg in rear. The enemy here again made an error in tactics by sending a large force to attack my rear, thus weakening his force in front, enabling me to throw all my strength on that which opposed my front, and fight this force with a small rear guard.

Merritt gallantly attacked the enemy at Yellow tavern, and got possession of the Brook turnpike. The enemy, still confident, formed his line a few hundred yards to the east of this pike, enfilading it with his artillery fire, and making Yellow tavern a hot place; but Gibbs and Devin held fast with their brigades, supported by artillery, and Custer charged the enemy's battery and line, supported by Chapman's brigade of Wilson's division—in fact, by the whole of Wilson's division, Gregg having one brigade available to support.

Custer's charge, with Chapman on his flank, was brilliantly executed; first at a walk; then at a trot; then dashing at the enemy's line and battery, capturing the guns and gunners and breaking the line, which was simple enough to receive the charge in a stationary position.

In this assault General J. E. B. Stuart, commanding the enemy's cavalry, was mortally wounded.

Gregg about the same time charged the force in rear with equal success, and ended the engagement. We captured a number of prisoners, and the casualties on both sides were quite severe. After Custer's charge and the enemy's line was broken—one portion of which was driven towards Ashland, the other towards Richmond—a reconnoissance was sent up the Brook turnpike, towards the city, dashed across the south fork of the Chickahominy, drove a small force from the exterior line of the works, and went inside of them.

I followed up this party, and found between the two lines of works a road leading to that from Mechanicsville to Richmond. I thought we could go around on this across the Mechanicsville pike, south of the Chickahominy, and encamp next night (12th) at Fair Oaks, and determined to make the movement, being influenced to some extent in doing so by the reports from colored people, during the afternoon, that General Butler's force had reached a small stream about four miles south of Richmond, on the south side, and that I possibly could help him by a demonstration. Therefore, after making the wounded as comfortable as possible, we commenced the march about 11 o'clock on the night of the 11th, and massed the command on the plateau south of Meadow bridge at about daylight; torpedoes planted in the road—many of which exploded, killing several horses—being the only difficulty encountered.

At daylight on the morning of the 12th Wilson encountered the enemy's batteries on, or near, the Mechanicsville pike, and could not pass them. As soon as I was notified of this condition, Custer's brigade was ordered to make the crossing to the north side of the Chickahominy at Meadow bridge, but as the bridge was found to have been destroyed, and the enemy's cavalry posted on the north side, I ordered Merritt's entire division to repair it, and to make the crossing at all hazards.

During the time thus occupied, the enemy gave the working party great annoyance by sweeping the bridge with a section of artillery; and Merritt, to drive

away this section and the force supporting it, crossed a small force of two or three regiments, attacked dismounted, and was repulsed; still the work on the bridge continued, and when it was finished, Merritt crossed nearly all his division, dismounted, attacked the enemy, carried his line of temporary breastworks, and continued the pursuit to Gaines's mill. Meantime the enemy advanced from behind his works at Richmond, and attacked Wilson and Gregg. Wilson was driven back in some confusion, but Gregg was ready, having concealed a heavy line of skirmishers in a bushy ravine in his front, and when the enemy marched to attack, with more display than grit, this unexpected and concealed line opened a destructive fire with repeating carbines, and some of Wilson's men at the same time turning in on their flank, the line broke in disorder, and went into security behind the breastworks defending the city. The six batteries of regular artillery were used by Captain Robinson, chief of artillery, with great effect, and contributed much to our success.

The enemy considered us completely cornered, but such was not the case, for while we were engaged, scouting parties were sent along the Chickahominy, and several fords found by them.

This attack and repulse ended the battle; for the balance of the day we collected our wounded, buried our dead, grazed our horses, and read the Richmond papers, two small newsboys having, with commendable enterprise, entered our lines and sold to the officers and men.

Between three and four o'clock in the afternoon the remaining portion of the command crossed the Chickahominy, at and between Walnut grove and Gaines's mills.

On the 13th the march was resumed, encamping at Bottom's bridge; on the 14th we marched through White Oak swamp, and went into camp between Haxall's landing and Shirley, on the James river.

Our casualties on the march were 425.

All transportable wounded and a large number of prisoners were brought along to this point, and the former, through the kindness of General Butler's medical officers, quickly cared for on arrival.

From the 14th until the 17th we rested in this camp, sending out scouting parties as far as New Market, in the direction of Richmond.

On the night of the 17th we commenced the return march, crossing the Chickahominy at Jones's bridge, and went into camp, on the 18th, at Baltimore crossroads and vicinity.

The uncertainty of what had happened to the army of the Potomac during our absence made the problem of how to get back and where to find it somewhat difficult, particularly so as I knew that re-enforcements had come up from the south to Richmond; I therefore determined to cross the Pamunkey river at the White House, and sent to Fortress Monroe for a pontoon bridge to be used for that purpose.

While waiting, I ordered Custer with his brigade to proceed to Hanover Court House, and, if possible, destroy the railroad bridges over the South Anna; Gregg and Wilson were sent at the same time to Cold Harbor, to demonstrate in the direction of Richmond as far as Mechanicsville, so as to cover Custer's movement; Merritt, with the remaining brigades of his division, held fast at Baltimore crossroads.

After Gregg and Custer started it was found on examination that the railroad bridge at the White House had been but partially burned, and could be repaired, and General Merritt was at once put on this duty. By sending mounted parties through the surrounding country, each man bringing back a board, it was made passable in one day, and on the 22d, when Custer and Gregg returned, we crossed, encamping that night at Aylett's, on the Mattapony river.

Custer encountered a large force of the enemy apparently moving from the direction of Richmond to Lee's army, and was unable to accomplish his mission.

Gregg occupied Cold Harbor and sent scouting parties, which encountered small squads of mounted men, to the vicinity of Mechanicsville, but nothing of great importance occurred.

At Aylett's we learned from citizens, and captives belonging to Lee's army, that the army of the Potomac was at North Anna river, in the vicinity of Chesterfield station.

On the 23d the march was resumed, encamping at Reedy swamp.

On the 24th we rejoined the army of the Potomac in the vicinity of Chesterfield.

This ended the first raid, which occupied sixteen days.

We lost but few horses, considering their condition when we started. The average distance travelled per day did not exceed eighteen miles; the longest march being thirty miles.

The horses which failed were shot by the rear-guard, as they could have been easily recuperated and made serviceable to the enemy. I think the actual number lost would not exceed 300, perhaps not more than 250.

On the 25th General Wilson with his division was transferred to the right of the army, and made a reconnoissance south of the North Anna as far as Little river; the other two divisions remained encamped from the 24th until the 26th in the vicinity of Polecat Station.

On the 26th a movement of the army commenced in order to make the crossing of the Pamunkey river at or near Hanover town. Torbert's and Gregg's divisions, with Russell's division of the 6th corps, took the advance to secure the crossings, with directions to demonstrate so as to deceive the enemy as much as possible in the movement.

To accomplish this end, Torbert was ordered to move to Taylor's ford on the Pamunkey, and demonstrate until after dark as if the crossing was to be made at that point, then to leave a small guard, quietly withdraw, and march to Hanover town ford, where the real crossing was to be made. General Gregg was ordered to Littlepage's crossing of the Pamunkey to demonstrate in the same manner, to retire quietly after dark, leaving a guard to keep up the demonstration, and march quickly to Hanover town crossing, taking with him the pontoon bridge.

Russell took up the march and followed the cavalry,

On the morning of the 27th Custer's brigade of Torbert's division made the crossing, driving from it about one hundred of the enemy's cavalry, and capturing thirty or forty; the balance of the division followed this brigade, and advanced to Hanover town, where General Gordon's brigade of rebel cavalry was encountered, routed, and driven in great confusion in the direction of Hanover Court House, the pursuit being continued to a little stream called Crump's creek.

Gregg was moved up to this line, and Russell encamped near the crossing of the river.

We had been successful in our mission, and, upon the arrival of the army, on the 28th, it crossed the Pamunkey behind our line, unimpeded.

I was immediately after ordered to demonstrate in the direction of Mechanicsville in order to find out the enemy's whereabouts, and therefore directed Gregg's division to move out, via Hawe's shop, on the Mechanicsville road, but when about three-fourths of a mile in advance of Hawe's shop it encountered the enemy's cavalry, which was dismounted and behind a temporary breastwork of rails, &c. Gregg vigorously attacked this force, which appeared to be the rebel cavalry corps, and a brigade of South Carolina troops, reported 4,000 strong, armed with long-range rifles, and commanded by a Colonel Butler; these Carolinians fought very gallantly in this their first fight, judging from the number of their dead and wounded, and prisoners captured. The most determined efforts were made on both sides in this unequal contest, and neither would give way until late in the evening, when Custer's Michigan brigade was dismounted, formed in

close column of attack, and charged, with Gregg's division, when the enemy was driven back, leaving all his dead, and his line of temporary works in our possession.

This was a hard-contested engagement, with heavy loss, for the number of troops engaged, to both sides, and was fought almost immediately in front of the infantry line of our army, which was busily occupied throwing up breastworks. After dark, our own and the enemy's dead being buried, we moved to the rear of the infantry, and went into camp on the morning of the next day—the 29th—in the vicinity of Old Church.

In the battle at Howe's shop but one brigade (Custer's) of Torbert's division was engaged; the other two, being posted on the Crump creek line, could not be gotten up until relieved by the 6th corps. They arrived in the afternoon, however, but did not become seriously engaged, only demonstrating on the right of Gregg.

After we had taken position at Old Church, Wilson's division was ordered to the right of the army, and Gregg's and Torbert's pickets pushed out in the direction of Cold Harbor, which was occupied by the enemy in some force. As our occupation of this point was essential to secure our lines to the White House, which was to be our base, its possession became a matter of deep interest. The enemy appeared to realize this also, for he, at a very early period, took possession of it, and pushed a force up to Matadequin creek on the Old Church road, putting his front parallel with the Pamunkey—which was then our line to the White House—in order to make it dangerous for our trains.

This force encountered the pickets of the first division at Matadequin creek, but they held fast and fought gallantly until re-enforced by their division on the north side of the creek, which took up the contest. The fight then became general and was stubbornly contested, but the enemy finally gave way, and was pursued within one and a half mile of Cold Harbor. In this fight Butler's South Carolinians were again put in to receive the brunt, and many of them were killed and captured.

On the morning of the 31st I visited Torbert and Custer, at Custer's headquarters—Torbert's division having the advance—and found that they had already talked over a plan to attack and capture Cold Harbor, which I indorsed, and on the afternoon of the 31st the attack was made, and after a hard-fought battle the town taken. Gregg was immediately moved to the support of Torbert, but the place was captured before any of his troops became engaged.

Cold Harbor was defended by cavalry and infantry, and on the Old Church side the enemy had thrown up temporary breastworks of logs and rails. The fight on the part of our officers and men was very gallant; they were now beginning to accept nothing less than victory. After gaining the town I notified army headquarters to that effect, but that the enemy in additional numbers were arriving there; that I could not hold it with safety to my command, and that I would move out, and did so; just after we had left, however, a despatch was received directing that Cold Harbor be held at all hazards, and I therefore immediately ordered its re-occupation, changed the temporary breastworks thrown up by the enemy, so as to make them available for our troops, dismounted the cavalry, placing them behind these works, and distributing the ammunition in boxes along the line, determined to hold the place as directed.

While this was being done the enemy could be heard giving commands and making preparations to attack in the morning.

Just after daylight, June 1, he marched to the attack, and was permitted to come close in to our little works, when he received the fire of our batteries and repeating carbines, which were used with terrible effect, and was driven back in confusion; still determined to get the place, after reorganizing, he attacked again, but with the same result.

About 10 o'clock the 6th corps arrived, and relieved the cavalry, which moved

towards the Chickahominy, and covered the left of the line until relieved by Hancock's corps during the afternoon.

While the balance of the cavalry were engaged at Cold Harbor, Wilson's division was posted on the right of the army, near the headwaters of the Tolopotomy creek.

On being relieved by the infantry from the Cold Harbor line the two divisions moved down the Chickahominy, encamping for the night of the 1st of June at Prospect church and vicinity, and on the 2d we moved down the Chickahominy still further, taking a position on the north side, at Bottom's bridge; the enemy's cavalry occupying the south side, with artillery in position at the fords.

No movements took place on the 3d; the enemy shelled our position at very long range but did no damage.

On the 4th the first division marched back to Old Church, and on the 6th the second division was relieved at Bottom's bridge by one brigade of Wilson's division, and marched back to the same vicinity; thence both divisions moved to New Castle ferry, where the trains which had been sent to the White House reached us, with supplies for a march, since called the Trevillian raid.

While Gregg's and Torbert's divisions were operating on the left of the army, Wilson, who was on the right, engaged the enemy at Mechump's creek on the 31st of May; at Ashland on the 1st of June; and on the 2d of June at Hawe's Shop—the scene of the battle of May 28th—and at Tolopotomy creek. The battle at Ashland was brought about by McIntosh's brigade, which had been ordered to that vicinity for the purpose of covering a movement made to the South Anna to destroy the railroad bridges over that stream, and which was successful.

On the 6th of June I received instructions from General Meade and the Lieutenant General to proceed with two divisions of my corps to Charlottesville, for the purpose of cutting the Virginia Central railroad, to unite if possible with Major General D. Hunter, whom I expected to meet at or near Charlottesville, and bring his command over to the army of the Potomac.

There also appeared to be another object, viz: to remove the enemy's cavalry from the south side of the Chickahominy, as, in case we attempted to cross to the James river, this large cavalry force could make such resistance at the difficult crossings as to give the enemy time to transfer his force to oppose the movement. Two divisions being ordered to proceed on this raid, Wilson was detached by the following order, and took the advance of the army of the Potomac, on its march to the James river:

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, ARMY OF POTOMAC,  
*Newcastle Ferry, June 6, 1864.*

GENERAL: I am directed by the major general commanding to notify you that he will march from Newcastle ferry at 5 a. m. to-morrow, taking with him the first and second cavalry divisions. During his absence you will report and receive your orders direct from headquarters army of the Potomac.

Your division quartermaster and commissary will have to attend to the supplying of your command.

Orders have been issued directing the officers in charge at the White House to send all detachments of cavalry (mounted) belonging to the different cavalry divisions to report temporarily for duty with your command.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAS. W. FORSYTH,

*Lieutenant Colonel, Chief of Staff.*

Brigadier General J. H. WILSON,

*Commanding Third Cavalry Division.*

On June 7th the command being prepared with three (3) days' rations in haversacks, to last for five days, two days' forage on the pommel of the saddles, one

hundred rounds of ammunition, forty on the person and sixty in wagons, one medical wagon, eight ambulances, and one wagon each for division and brigade headquarters, we crossed the Pamunkey at New Castle, and encamped that night between Aylett's and Dunkirk, on the Mattapony river.

On the 8th we encamped two miles west of Polecat Station.

It was my intention to march along the north bank of the North Anna, cross it at Carpenter's ford, strike the railroad at Trevillian Station, and destroy it to Louisa Court House, march past Gordonsville, strike the railroad again at Cobham's Station, and destroy it thence to Charlottesville as we proceeded.

We, therefore, on the 9th of June resumed the march along the Anna—our advance guard skirmishing, as it almost always did, with mounted men of the enemy and encamped on East-northeast creek, near Young's Mills.

During this day I learned that Breckinridge's division of infantry was passing slowly up the railroad to Gordonsville parallel to me, and that the enemy's cavalry had left their position on the south side of the Chickahominy, and were marching on the old Richmond and Gordonsville road on Gordonsville. This information was confirmed by a party sent to cut the telegraph wires along the railroad during the night. On the 10th the march was resumed; we passed through Twyman's Store, crossed the North Anna at Carpenter's ford, and encamped on the road leading to Trevillian Station and along the banks of the North Anna.

During the night of the 10th the boldness of the enemy's scouting parties, which we had encountered more or less every day, indicated the presence of a large force.

On the morning of the 11th we resumed the march on Trevillian, meeting at once and driving the enemy's advance parties in our front. Torbert had the leading division, and, at a point about three or three and a half miles from Trevillian Station, encountered the enemy in full force behind a line of breastworks constructed in dense timber. Custer with his brigade was ordered to take a wood road found on our left and get to Trevillian Station, or at least in rear of the enemy, and attack his led horses. In following this road he passed between Fitz Lee's and Hampton's divisions—the former being on the road leading from Louisa Court House to where the battle commenced, the latter on the direct road from Trevillian to the same point—and on, without opposition, to Trevillian Station, which he took possession of.

As soon as I found that Custer had gotten to the rear of the enemy, the remaining two brigades of Torbert's division were dismounted and formed line of battle, assailed the enemy's works and carried them, driving Hampton's division pell-mell and at a run back on Custer, at Trevillian, who commenced fighting in all directions. So panic-stricken was this division (Hampton's) and so rapidly was it pushed that some of it was driven through Custer's lines, and many captured.

While the first division was thus engaged Gregg attacked Fitz Lee on the Louisa Court House road and drove him in the direction of Louisa Court House; the pursuit was continued until about dark.

Hampton's division made its way in the direction of Gordonsville, and was joined during the night by Fitz Lee, who made a detour westward for that purpose.

At night my command encamped at Trevillian Station, and from prisoners, of which we had captured about 500, I learned that Hunter, instead of coming towards Charlottesville, as I had reason to suppose, was at or near Lexington, moving apparently on Lynchburg; that Ewell's corps was on its way to Lynchburg, on the south side of James river; and that Breckinridge was at Gordonsville or Charlottesville, having passed up the railroad as heretofore alluded to. I therefore made up my mind that it was best to give up the attempt to join Hunter, as he was going from me instead of coming towards me, and concluded to return.

Directions were at once given to collect our own wounded and those of the enemy in hospitals, and to make provisions for their transportation back in ammunition wagons and in vehicles collected from the country. I was still further influenced in my decision to return by the burden which these wounded threw upon me, there being over 500 cases of our own, and the additional burden of about 500 prisoners, all of whom must have been abandoned by me in case I proceeded further; besides, one more engagement would have reduced the supply of ammunition to a very small compass.

On the morning of June 12th we commenced destroying the railroad to Louisa Court House, and in the afternoon I directed Torbert to make a reconnoissance up the Gordonsville road to secure a by-road leading over Mallory's ford, on the North Anna, to the Catharpen road, as I proposed taking the route in returning, and proceeding to Spottsylvania Court House, thence, via Bowling Green and Dunkirk, to the White House.

In the reconnoissance Torbert became heavily engaged, first one brigade, then another, then the last, the battle continuing until after dark. Gregg, during this time, was breaking up the railroad to Louisa Court House.

The result of Torbert's fighting made it impossible to cross at Mallory's ford without venturing a battle next day, in which case the remainder of our ammunition would have been consumed, leaving none to get back with; therefore, during the night of the 12th, we moved back on our track, recrossed the North Anna at Carpenter's ford on the following morning, unsaddled our horses and turned them out to graze, as they were nearly famished, having had no food for two days, and in the afternoon proceeded to the vicinity of Twyman's Store, where we encamped.

The enemy, excepting a small party which General Davies dispersed with one of his regiments, did not follow us.

I left near Trevillian three hospitals containing many rebel wounded, and ninety of ours that were non-transportable, with medicines, liquors, some hard bread, coffee, and sugar; I regret to say that the surgeons left in charge were not well treated by the enemy, and that the hospitals were robbed of liquors and stores.

On the 14th the march was continued, and we reached the Catharpen road—upon which it was originally intended to move after crossing Mallory's ford, and which would have saved much time and distance—and encamped at Shady Grove church.

On the 15th we encamped at Edge Hill, on the Ta river, having passed over the battle-field of Spottsylvania; and on the 16th at Dr. Butler's farm on the Mattapony, having marched through Bowling Green.

Being as yet unable to ascertain the position of the army of the Potomac, and uncertain whether or not the base at the White House had been discontinued, I did not like to venture between the Mattapony and Pamunkey rivers, embarrassed as I was with wounded, prisoners, and about 2,000 negroes that had joined us, and therefore determined to push down the south bank of the Mattapony far enough to enable me to send them with safety to West Point, where I expected to find gunboats and transports.

Following this plan we proceeded on the 17th to Walkerton and encamped; and on the 18th resumed the march through King and Queen Court House, encamping in its vicinity.

I here learned that the base at the White House was not entirely broken up, and that supplies there awaited me; therefore, on the morning of the 19th, I sent the wounded, prisoners, and negroes to West Point, escorted by two regiments of cavalry, and turning, marched to Dunkirk on the Mattapony, a point at which the river was narrow enough for my pontoons to reach across.

On my march from Trevillian to this point, we halted at intervals during each day to dress the wounded, and refresh them as much as possible. Nothing



could exceed the cheerfulness exhibited by them; hauled as they were in old buggies, carts, ammunition wagons, &c., no word of complaint was heard.

I saw on the line of march men with wounded legs driving, while those with one disabled arm were using the other to whip up the animals.

On the 20th we resumed the march at an early hour, to the sound of artillery, in the direction of the White House, and had proceeded but a short distance when despatches from General Abercrombie notified me that the place was attacked. I had previously sent an advance party with directions to move swiftly, and to report to me by couriers the condition of affairs; from these I soon learned that there was no occasion to push our jaded animals, as the crisis, if there had been one, was over, and therefore moved leisurely to the banks of the Pamunkey opposite White House, and encamped, the enemy holding the bluffs surrounding the White House farm.

On the morning of the 21st, Gregg's division was crossed over dismounted, and Torbert's division mounted, and the enemy driven from the bluffs, and also from Tunstall's Station in the evening, after a sharp engagement.

I found here orders to break up the White House depot, and to move the trains over to Petersburg, via Jones's bridge.

I immediately commenced breaking up as directed and making my arrangements to carry over and protect a train of over nine hundred wagons, knowing full well that I would be attacked if the enemy had any spirit left in him.

On the morning of the 22d I sent Torbert in advance to secure Jones's bridge over the Chickahominy, so that we could make the crossing at that point, and Gregg marched on a road parallel to the one on which the train was moving, and on its right flank, as it was the only flank requiring protection.

The train was not attacked, but was safely parked on the south side of the Chickahominy for the night.

On the morning after Torbert had secured the crossing, the 23d, the enemy attacked his picket post on the Long Bridge road, with Chambliss's brigade, and drove it in, but on its being re-enforced by six companies of colored troops belonging to Getty's command, the enemy was repulsed, and the picket post re-established. This brigade, I was told by the prisoners taken, was the advance of the rebel cavalry corps, and through it Hampton had been advised of our having already secured the crossing of the Chickahominy.

General Getty had relieved General Abercrombie, and was in command of a small infantry force, composed mostly of the odds and ends of regiments and batteries.

On the 24th the march was resumed, with directions to cross the trains at Bermuda Hundred, where there was a pontoon bridge; to reach this point I was obliged to march through Charles City Court House, thence by Harrison's landing and Malvern Hill, the latter of which was occupied by the enemy; in fact, he held everything north of the James, except the *tête de pont* at the crossing.

Torbert's division marched out on the Charles City Court House road as an escort to the trains, and when in the vicinity of the court-house, the advance guard encountered the enemy and drove him across Herring creek, on the road to Westover church. As soon as this attack was reported to me, orders were immediately given to park the train—the head of which was far beyond Charles City Court House—at convenient points on the road, and Torbert was directed to push his whole division to the front to meet the enemy, while Gregg, who had marched on the road leading to St. Mary's church for the purpose of protecting the right flank of the train, and who had also been attacked, was instructed to hold fast until all the transportation could pass Charles City Court House. The train was immediately after put in motion, and safely parked in the vicinity of Wilcox's landing.

At St. Mary's church Gregg was attacked by the entire cavalry corps of the enemy, and, after a stubborn fight, which lasted until after dark, was forced to retire in some confusion, but without any loss in material.

This very creditable engagement saved the train, which should never have been left for the cavalry to escort.

During the night and next morning the train was moved back through Charles City Court House, to Douthard's landing on the James river, where it was ferried over, after which the troops were transported in the same manner.

Before the crossing was completed, General Meade notified me to move rapidly to the support of General Wilson, who had been ordered on a raid to break the communication south of Petersburg by destroying the Southside and Danville railroads.

General Wilson's expedition had been successful until it reached the left of the army on its return, when it encountered, at Ream's Station, a large force of infantry sent down the Weldon railroad from Petersburg, and being at the same time attacked on the flank by cavalry, the command was routed, and obliged to fall back across Nottoway river at Poplar Hill, whence a wide detour was necessary to reach the main army, in consequence of which, as the heat was intense, the loss in animals was great.

As soon as the orders from General Meade were received, I hastened with Torbert and Gregg, via Prince George Court House and Lee's Mills, to Ream's Station—where I found the 6th corps—but was too late to render material assistance; I immediately, however, sent out parties to procure information concerning the expedition, and learned from them that it had crossed the Nottoway and was safe.

The results obtained in the destruction of the Southside and Danville railroads were considered equivalent to the losses sustained by General Wilson's division. Had an infantry force been sent sooner to Ream's Station, the raid would have been eminently successful.

General Wilson states in his report as follows :

"Foreseeing the probability of having to return northward, I wrote to General Meade the evening before starting that I anticipated no serious difficulty in executing his orders; but unless General Sheridan was required to keep Hampton's cavalry engaged, and our infantry to prevent Lee from making detachments, we should probably experience great difficulty in rejoining the army. In reply to this note, General Humphreys' chief of staff, informed me it was intended the army of the Potomac should cover the Weldon road the next day, the Southside road the day after, and that Hampton having followed Sheridan towards Gordonsville, I need not fear any trouble from him." Still no timely relief was sent.

As soon as Wilson was found to be safe, I was ordered back to Light-house Point and vicinity to rest my command, which had marched and fought for fifty-six consecutive days, and remained there from the 2d till the 26th of July, refitting and picketing the left of the army.

While at this camp I received about 1,500 horses. These, together with about 400 obtained at Old Church by dismounting recruits, were all that were issued to me while personally in command of the cavalry corps, from April 6 to August 1, 1864.

On the afternoon of July 26 I moved with the first and second divisions of cavalry, Torbert's and Gregg's, for the north side of the James river, in connection with the 2d corps, and was directed, if an opportunity offered, to make a raid on the Virginia Central railroad and destroy the bridges over the North and South Anna rivers, and those over Little river.

We crossed the Appomattox at Broadway landing, and on arriving at Deep Bottom, where we were joined by General Kautz's small cavalry division of the army of the James, the command was massed, to allow the 2d corps to pass and take the advance across the James.

Soon after the corps had crossed a small portion of it carried the enemy's works in front of the *tête de pont*, and captured four pieces of artillery.

The cavalry moved to the right of the second corps, and found the enemy occupying a strong line of works extending across the New Market and Central roads leading to Richmond, the right resting on Four-mile creek.

His cavalry videttes posted in front of Ruffin's house on the New Market road were discovered by the second United States cavalry, and driven back on their infantry line of battle, composed of two divisions. The high ground in advance of Ruffin's house thus gained was immediately occupied by the first division as a line of battle, and the second division placed on its right, covering the road from Malvern Hill to Richmond.

Immediately upon the formation of our line, the enemy advanced to the attack and drove the cavalry back over the ridge, on the face of which it quickly lay down in line of battle at a distance of about fifteen yards from the crest. When the enemy's line reached this crest, a fire from our repeating carbines was opened upon it, whereupon it gave way in disorder, and was followed over the plain beyond by the cavalry, which captured about 250 prisoners, and two battle flags, besides killing and wounding very many.

This counter attack against infantry was made by the first and second cavalry divisions simultaneously, and our line re-established. During the engagement, which is called the battle of Darbytown, General Kautz was in support of Gregg on the right of the line.

The enemy, deceived by the long front presented by the second corps and cavalry, was undoubtedly impressed with the idea that nearly all of our forces had been moved to the north side of the James, and at once transferred a large body of his troops from the lines at Petersburg to our front at New Market; as I understood, this transfer by the enemy was the object which the Lieutenant General wished to attain, in order that the mine explosion of Petersburg might, to a greater certainty, result in the capture of the city.

On the afternoon of the 28th the second corps withdrew to a line near the head of the bridge, and the cavalry was drawn back to a position on its right. In order to deceive the enemy still more, I sent during the night one of my divisions to the opposite side of the James, first covering the bridge with moss and grass to prevent the tramp of the horses being heard, and at daylight marched it back again on foot in full view of the enemy, creating the impression that a large and continuous movement to the north side was still going on.

On the 29th nothing occurred during the day on either side, except a skirmish by some of General Kautz's command, in the vicinity of Malvern Hill; but, after dark, the 2d corps was hastily and quietly withdrawn to the south side, to take part in the engagement which was expected to follow the mine explosion. I was directed to follow, and withdrew by brigades from my right, successively passing them over the bridge. This movement was one involving great anxiety, as, when the 2d corps moved, the space at the mouth of the bridge occupied by me was so circumscribed that an offensive movement in force by the enemy must have resulted in the annihilation of my whole command.

Shortly after daylight on the 30th the recrossing had been effected, and by 10 o'clock my advance division was well over to the left of our army in front of Petersburg; but as the mine attack had failed, it was not necessary to carry out the part assigned to the cavalry.

The movement to the north side of the James for the accomplishment of our part of the plan connected with the mine explosion was well executed, and every point made; but it was attended with such anxiety and sleeplessness as to prostrate almost every officer and man in the command.

On the 1st of August I was relieved from the personal command of the cavalry corps, and ordered to the valley of the Shenandoah. Torbert's and Wilson's divisions were directed to join me there.

It will be seen by the foregoing narrative that the idea advanced by me at the commencement of the campaign, viz, "that our cavalry ought to fight the enemy's cavalry, and our infantry the enemy's infantry," was carried into effect immediately after the battle of the Wilderness.

The result was constant success and the almost total annihilation of the rebel cavalry. We marched when and where we pleased; were always the attacking party, and always successful.

During the period herein embraced, I am led to believe, on information derived from the most reliable sources, that the enemy's cavalry was superior to ours in numbers; but the *esprit* of our men increased every day, while that of the enemy diminished.

In these marches, and in others afterwards performed in connection with the valley and Appomattox campaigns, we were obliged to live to a great extent on the country. Forage had to be thus obtained for our horses, and provisions for our men, consequently many hardships were necessarily brought on the people, but no outrages were tolerated.

I do not believe war to be simply that lines should engage each other in battle, as that is but the duello part—a part which would be kept up so long as those who live at home in peace and plenty could find the *best* youth of the country to enlist in their cause, (I say the *best*, for the bravest are always the best,) and therefore do not regret the system of living on the enemy's country. These men and women did not care how many were killed or maimed, so long as war did not come to their doors, but as soon as it did come in the shape of loss of property, they earnestly prayed for its termination.

As war is a punishment, and death the maximum punishment, if we can, by reducing its advocates to poverty, end it quicker, we are on the side of humanity.

In the foregoing brief sketch I have been unable to give in detail the operations of the cavalry, and will have to trust to the subordinate reports to make up the deficiency. In consequence of our constant activity, we were obliged to turn over our wounded and prisoners whenever and wherever opportunity offered, and oftentimes without receipts; I am also, therefore, unable to furnish an accurate list of either my casualties, or prisoners captured from the enemy. I think my casualities, from May 5th to August 1st, will number between 5,000 and 6,000 men; and the captures in prisoners will exceed 2,000.

We sent to the War Department from the 5th of May, 1864, to the 9th of April, 1865, the day on which the army of northern Virginia surrendered, 205 battle flags, captured in open field fighting; it is nearly as many as all the armies of the United States, combined, sent there during the rebellion. The number of field pieces captured in the same period was between 160 and 170; all in open field fighting.

These captures of flags, colors, and artillery were made during the campaign, the operations of which I have just related; the Shenandoah campaign, the march from Winchester to Petersburg, and the Appomattox campaign.

To the 6th and 19th corps, General Crook's command, which, with Merritt's and Custer's divisions of cavalry, composed the army of the Shenandoah, and to the 5th and 6th corps, which operated with me on the Appomattox campaign, a proportionate share of these captures belong.

It will be seen by this report that we led the advance of the army to the Wilderness; that on the Richmond raid we marked out its line of march to the North Anna, where we found it on our return; that we again led its advance to Hanover town, and thence to Cold Harbor; that we removed the enemy's cavalry from the south side of the Chickahominy by the Trevillian raid, and thereby materially assisted the army in its successful march to the James river and Petersburg, where it remained until we made the campaign in the valley; marched back to Petersburg, and again took its advance and led it to victory.

In all the operations the percentage of cavalry casualties was as great as that

of the infantry, and the question which had existed "Who ever saw a dead cavalry-man?" was set at rest.

To Generals D. McM. Gregg, Torbert, Wilson, Merritt, Custer, Diven, J. Irwin Gregg, McIntosh, Chapman, Davies, and Gibbs, to the gallant officers and men of their commands, and to the officers of my staff, I return my sincere thanks.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. H. SHERIDAN,

*Major General United States Army.*

Brevet Major General JOHN A. RAWLINS,

*Chief of Staff, Headquarters Armies of the U. S., Washington, D. C.*

REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF THE SHENANDOAH, FROM  
AUGUST 4, 1864, TO FEBRUARY 27, 1865.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE GULF,

*New Orleans, La., February 3, 1866.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to make the following report of the campaign in the valley of the Shenandoah, commencing August 4, 1864:

On the evening of the 1st of August I was relieved from the command of the cavalry corps of the army of the Potomac, to take command of the army of the Shenandoah, and, on arriving at Washington on the 4th instant, I received directions from Major General H. W. Halleck, chief of the staff, to proceed without delay to Monocacy Junction, on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and report in person to the Lieutenant General. At Monocacy the Lieutenant General turned over to me the instructions which he had previously given to Major General Hunter, commanding the department of West Virginia, a copy of which is herewith attached.

The army of the Shenandoah at this time consisted of the 6th corps, very much reduced in numbers, one division of the 19th corps, two small infantry divisions under command of General Crook, afterwards designated as the army of West Virginia, a small division of cavalry under General Averill, which was at that time in pursuit of General McCausland, near Moorefield—McCausland having made a raid into Pennsylvania and burned the town of Chambersburg. There was also one small division of cavalry, then arriving at Washington, from my old corps.

The infantry portion of these troops had been lying in bivouac in the vicinity of Monocacy Junction and Frederick city, but had been ordered to march the day I reported, with directions to concentrate at Halltown, four miles in front of Harper's Ferry. After my interview with the Lieutenant General I hastened to Harper's Ferry to make preparations for an immediate advance against the enemy, who then occupied Martinsburg, Williamsport, and Shepherdstown, sending occasional raiding parties as far as Hagerstown, Maryland. The concentration of my command at Halltown alarmed the enemy, and caused him to concentrate at or near Martinsburg, drawing in all his parties from the north side of the Potomac. The indications were that he had intended another raid into Maryland, prompted perhaps by the slight success he had gained over General Crook's command at Kearnsstown a short time before.

The city of Martinsburg, at which the enemy concentrated, is on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, at the northern terminus of the Valley pike—a broad macadamized road running up the valley through Winchester, and terminating at Staunton. The Shenandoah valley is a continuation of the Cumberland valley, south of the Potomac, and is bounded on the east by the Blue Ridge, and on the west by the eastern slope of the Alleghany mountains; the general direction of these chains being southwest.

The valley at Martinsburg is about sixty miles broad; at Winchester forty to forty-five; and at Strasburg twenty-five to thirty miles, where an isolated chain called Massanutten mountains rises up, running parallel to the Blue Ridge, and terminates at Harrisonburg; here the valley again opens out fifty or sixty miles broad. This isolated chain divides the valley, for its continuance, into two valleys; the one next the Blue Ridge being called the Luray valley, the one west of it the Strasburg or main valley. The Blue Ridge has many passes through it called gaps. The principal ones, and those which have good wagon roads, are Snicker's, Ashby's, Manassas, Chester, Thoroughfare, Swift Run, Brown's, Rock-fish, and two or three others from the latter one up to Lynchburg. Many have macadamized roads through them, and, indeed, are not gaps, but small valleys through the main chain. The general bearing of all these roads is towards Gordonsville, and are excellent for troops to move upon from that point into the valley; in fact, the Blue Ridge can be crossed almost anywhere by infantry or cavalry.

The valley itself was rich in grain, cattle, sheep, hogs, and fruit, and was in such a prosperous condition that the rebel army could march down and up it, billeting on the inhabitants. Such in brief is the outline, and was the condition of the Shenandoah valley when I entered it August 4, 1864.

Great exertions were made to get the troops in readiness for an advance, and on the morning of August 10, General Torbert's division of cavalry having joined me from Washington, a forward movement was commenced. The enemy, while we were making our preparations, took position at Bunker Hill and vicinity, twelve miles south of Martinsburg, frequently pushing his scouting parties through Smithfield, and up to Charlestown. Torbert was ordered to move on the Berryville pike, through Berryville, and go into position near White Post; the 6th corps moved via the Charlestown and Summit Point road to Clifton; the 19th corps moved on the Berryville pike, to the left of the position of the 6th corps at Clifton; General Crook's command, via Kabletown, to the vicinity of Berryville, coming into position on the left of the 19th corps; and Colonel Lowell, with two small regiments of cavalry, was ordered to Summit Point; so that, on the night of August 10, the army occupied a position stretching from Clifton to Berryville, with cavalry at White Post and Summit Point. The enemy moved from vicinity of Bunker Hill, stretching his line from where the Winchester and Potomac railroad crosses Opequan creek, to where the Berryville and Winchester pike crosses the same stream, occupying the west bank. On the morning of August 11, the 6th corps was ordered to move from Clifton across the country to where the Berryville pike crosses Opequan creek, carry the crossing and hold it; the 19th corps was directed to move through Berryville, on the White Post road, for one mile, file to the right, by heads of regiments, at deploying distances, and carry and hold the crossing of Opequan creek at a ford about three-fourths of a mile from the left of the 6th corps; Crook's command was ordered to move out on the White Post road, one mile and a half beyond Berryville, file to the right, and secure the crossing of Opequan creek at a ford about one mile to the left of the 19th corps; Torbert was directed to move with Merritt's division of cavalry up the Millwood pike towards Winchester, attack any force he might find, and, if possible, ascertain the movements of the rebel army. Lowell was ordered to close in from Summit Point on the right of the 6th corps.

My intention in securing these fords was to march on Winchester, at which point, from all my information on the 10th, I thought the enemy would make a stand. In this I was mistaken, as the results of Torbert's reconnoissance proved. Merritt found the enemy's cavalry covering the Millwood pike west of the Opequan, and, attacking it, drove it in the direction of Kearns town, and discovered the enemy retreating up the valley pike.

As soon as this information was obtained, Torbert was ordered to move quickly,

via the toll-gate on the Front Royal pike, to Newtown, to strike the enemy's flank and harass him in his retreat, and Lowell to follow up through Winchester. Crook was turned to the left, and ordered to Stony Point, or Nineveh, while Emory and Wright were marching to the left, and went into camp between the Milwood and Front Royal pikes, Crook encamping at Stony Point. Torbert met some of the enemy's cavalry at the toll-gate on the Front Royal pike, drove it in the direction of Newtown, and behind Gordon's division of infantry which had been thrown out from Newtown to cover the flank of the main column in its retreat, and which had put itself behind rail barricades. A portion of Merritt's cavalry attacked this infantry and drove in its skirmish line, and although unable to dislodge the division, held all the ground gained. The rebel division during the night moved off. Next day Crook moved from Stony Point to Cedar creek, Emory followed, the cavalry moved to the same point, via Newtown and the valley pike, and the 6th corps followed the cavalry. On the night of the 12th Crook was in position at Cedar creek, on the left of the valley pike, Emory on the right of the pike, the 6th corps on the right of Emory, and the cavalry on the right and left flanks. A heavy skirmish line was thrown to the heights on the south side of Cedar creek, which had brisk skirmishing during the evening with the enemy's pickets, his (the enemy's) main force occupying the heights above and north of Strasburg. On the morning of the 13th the cavalry was ordered on a reconnoissance towards Strasburg, on the middle road, which road is two and a half miles to the west of the main pike.

Reports of a column of the enemy moving up from Culpeper Court House, and approaching Front Royal through Chester gap, having been received, caused me much anxiety, as any considerable force advanced through Front Royal, and down the Front Royal and Winchester pike towards Winchester, could be thrown in my rear; or, in case of my driving the enemy to Fisher's Hill, and taking position in his front, this same force could be moved along the base of Massanutten mountain on the road to Strasburg, with the same result.

As my effective line-of-battle strength at this time was about (18,000) eighteen thousand infantry, and (3,500) thirty-five hundred cavalry, I remained quiet during the day, except the activity on the skirmish line, to await further developments. In the evening the enemy retired with his main force to Fisher's Hill.

As the rumors of an advancing force from the direction of Culpeper kept increasing, on the morning of the 14th I sent a brigade of cavalry to Front Royal, to ascertain definitely, if possible, the truth of such reports, and at the same time crossed the 6th corps to the south side of Cedar creek, and occupied the heights above Strasburg. Considerable picket firing ensued. During the day I received from Colonel Chipman, of the Adjutant General's office, the following despatch, he having ridden in great haste from Washington, through Snicker's gap, escorted by a regiment of cavalry, to deliver the same. It at once explained the movement from Culpeper, and on the morning of the 15th the remaining two brigades of Merritt's division of cavalry were ordered to the crossing of the Shenandoah river near Front Royal, and the 6th corps withdrawn to the north side of Cedar creek, holding at Strasburg a strong skirmish line:

[By telegraph—received in cipher.]

CITY POINT, *August 12, 1864—9 a. m.*

Major General HALLECK:

Inform General Sheridan that it is now certain (2) two divisions of infantry have gone to Early, and some cavalry, and (20) twenty pieces of artillery. This movement commenced last Saturday night. He must be cautious, and act now on the defensive, until movements here force them to this—to send this way.

Early's force, with this increase, cannot exceed forty thousand men, but this is too much for General Sheridan to attack. Send General Sheridan the remaining brigade of the 19th corps.

I have ordered to Washington all the one-hundred-day men. Their time will soon be out, but, for the present, they will do to serve in the defences.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Lieutenant General.*

The receipt of this despatch was very important to me, as I possibly would have remained in uncertainty as to the character of the force coming in on my flank and rear, until it attacked the cavalry, as it did on the 16th.

I at once looked over the map of the valley for a defensive line—that is, where a smaller number of troops could hold a greater number, and could see but one such, I refer to that at Halltown, in front of Harper's Ferry. Subsequent experience has convinced me that no other defensive line exists in the Shenandoah valley. I therefore determined to move back to Halltown, carry out my instructions to destroy forage and subsistence, and increase my strength by Grover's division of the 19th corps, and Wilson's division of cavalry, both of which were marching to join me via Snicker's gap. Emory was ordered to move to Winchester on the night of the 15th, and on the night of the 16th the 6th corps and Crook's command were ordered to Clifton, via Winchester.

In the movement to the rear, to Halltown, the following orders were given to the cavalry, and were executed :

HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION,  
*Cedar Creek, Virginia, August 16, 1864.*

GENERAL: In compliance with instructions of the Lieutenant General commanding, you will make the necessary arrangements and give the necessary orders for the destruction of the wheat and hay south of a line from Millwood to Winchester and Petticoat gap. You will seize all mules, horses, and cattle that may be useful to our army. Loyal citizens can bring in their claims against the government for this necessary destruction.

No houses will be burned, and officers in charge of this delicate but necessary duty must inform the people that the object is to make this valley untenable for the raiding parties of the rebel army.

Very respectfully,

P. H. SHERIDAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Brigadier General A. T. A. TORBERT,  
*Chief of Cavalry, Middle Military Division.*

On the afternoon of the 16th I moved my headquarters back to Winchester. While moving back, at Newtown, I heard cannonading at or near Front Royal, and on reaching Winchester Merritt's couriers brought despatches from him, stating that he had been attacked at the crossing of the Shenandoah by Kershaw's division of Longstreet's corps and two brigades of rebel cavalry, and that he had handsomely repulsed the attack, capturing two (2) battle flags and three hundred (300) prisoners.

During the night of the 16th, and early on the morning of the 17th, Emory moved from Winchester to Berryville, and on the morning of the 17th Crook and Wright reached Winchester, and resumed the march towards Clifton; Wright, who had the rear-guard, getting only as far as the Berryville crossing of the Opequan, where he was ordered to remain; Crook getting to the vicinity of Berryville. Lowell reached Winchester with his two regiments of cavalry on the afternoon of the 17th, where he was joined by General Wilson's division of



cavalry. Merritt, after his handsome engagement near Front Royal, was ordered back to the vicinity of White Post, and General Grover's division joined Emory at Berryville. The enemy having a signal station on Three Top mountain, almost overhanging Strasburg, and from which every movement made by our troops could be seen, was notified early in the morning of the 17th as to this condition of affairs, and without delay followed after us, getting into Winchester about sundown, and driving out General Torbert, who was left there with Wilson and Lowell, and the Jersey brigade of the 6th corps. Wilson and Lowell fell back to Summit Point, and the Jersey brigade joined its corps at the crossing of the Opequan. Kershaw's division and two brigades of Fitz Lee's cavalry division, which was the force at Front Royal, joined Early at Winchester, I think, on the evening of the 17th.

On the 18th the 6th corps moved, via Clifton, to Flowing Spring, two miles and a half west of Charlestown, on the Smithfield pike; Emory about two miles and a half south of Charlestown, on the Berryville pike; Merritt came back to Berryville; Wilson remained at Summit Point, covering the crossing of Opequan creek as far north as the bridge at Smithfield, Merritt covering the crossing of the Berryville pike; Crook remained near Clifton, and the next day moved to the left of Emory. This position was maintained until the 21st, when the enemy moved a heavy force across the Opequan at the bridge at Smithfield, driving in the cavalry pickets, which fell back to Summit Point, and advanced rapidly on the position of the 6th corps near Flowing Spring, and a very sharp and obstinate skirmish took place with the heavy picket line of that corps, resulting very much in its favor. The enemy appeared to have thought that I had taken position near Summit Point, and that by moving around rapidly through Smithfield he would get into my rear. In this, however, he was mistaken. During the day Merritt, who had been attacked and held his ground, was recalled from Berryville. Wilson had also been attacked by infantry, and had also held his ground until ordered in. During the night of the 21st the army moved back to Halltown without inconvenience or loss; the cavalry, excepting Lowell's command which formed on the left, moving early on the morning of the 22d, and going into position on the right of the line.

On the morning of the 22d the enemy moved up to Charleston, and pushed well up to my position at Halltown, skirmishing with the cavalry videttes.

The despatches received from the lieutenant general commanding, from Captain G. K. Leet, assistant adjutant general, at Washington, and information derived from my scouts and from prisoners captured, was of so conflicting and contradictory a nature, that I determined to ascertain, if possible, while on this defensive line, what re-enforcements had actually been received by the enemy. This could only be done by frequent reconnoissances, and their results convinced me that but one division of infantry, Kershaw's, and one division of cavalry, Fitz Lee's, had joined him.

On the 23d I ordered a reconnoissance by Crook, who was on the left, resulting in a small capture and a number of casualties to the enemy.

On the 24th another reconnoissance was made, capturing a number of prisoners, our own loss being about thirty (30) men.

On the 25th there was sharp picket firing during the day on part of the infantry line. The cavalry was ordered to attack the enemy's cavalry at Kearneysville. This attack was handsomely made, but, instead of finding the cavalry, his infantry was encountered, and for a time doubled up and thrown into the utmost confusion. It was marching towards Shepherdstown. This engagement was somewhat a mutual surprise; our cavalry expecting to meet the enemy's cavalry, and his infantry expecting no opposition whatever. General Torbert, who was in command, finding a large force of the rebel infantry in his front, came back to our left, and the enemy believing his (the enemy's) movement had been discovered, and that the force left by him in my front at Hall-

town would be attacked, returned in great haste, but, before doing so, isolated Custer's brigade, which had to cross to the north side of the Potomac, at Shepherdstown, and join me via Harper's Ferry.

For my own part I believed Early meditated a crossing of his cavalry into Maryland, at Williamsport, and I sent Wilson's division around by Harper's Ferry to watch its movements. Averill in the mean time had taken post at Williamsport, on the north side of the Potomac, and held the crossing against a force of rebel cavalry which made the attempt to cross. On the night of the 26th the enemy silently left my front, moving over Opequan creek at the Smithfield and Summit Point crossings, and concentrated his force at Brucetown and Bunker Hill, leaving his cavalry at Leetown and Smithfield.

On the 28th I moved in front of Charlestown with the infantry, and directed Merritt to attack the enemy's cavalry at Leetown, which he did, defeating it and pursuing it through Smithfield.

Wilson re-crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown, and joined the infantry in front of Charlestown.

On the 29th Averill crossed at Williamsport, and advanced to Martinsburg. On the same day two divisions of the enemy's infantry and a small force of cavalry attacked Merritt and the Smithfield bridge, and, after a hard fight, drove him through Smithfield and back towards Charlestown, the cavalry fighting with great obstinacy until I could re-enforce it with Ricketts's division of the 6th corps, when in turn the enemy was driven back through Smithfield, and over the Opequan, the cavalry again taking post at the Smithfield bridge.

On the 30th Torbert was directed to move Merritt and Wilson to Berryville, leaving Lowell to guard the Smithfield bridge and occupy the town.

On the 31st, Averill was driven back from Martinsburg to Falling Waters.

From the first to the 3d of September nothing of importance occurred.

On the 3d, Averill, who had returned to Martinsburg, advanced on Bunker Hill, attacked McCausland's cavalry, defeated it, capturing wagons and prisoners, and destroying a good deal of property. The infantry moved into position, stretching from Clifton to Berryville, Wright moving by Summit Point, Crook and Emory by the Berryville pike. Torbert had been ordered to White Post early in the day, and the enemy, supposing he could cut him off, pushed across the Opequan towards Berryville with Kershaw's division in advance, but this division, not expecting infantry, blundered on to Crook's lines about dark, and was vigorously attacked and driven with heavy loss back towards the Opequan. This engagement, which was after night-fall, was very spirited and our own and the enemy's casualties severe.

From this time until the 19th of September I occupied the line from Clifton to Berryville, transferring Crook to Summit Point on the 8th, to use him as a movable column to protect my right flank and line to Harper's Ferry, while the cavalry threatened the enemy's right flank and his line of communications up the valley. The difference of strength between the two opposing forces at this time was but little.

As I had learned beyond doubt, from my scouts, that Kershaw's division, which consisted of four brigades, was to be ordered back to Richmond, I had for two weeks patiently awaited its withdrawal before attacking, believing the condition of affairs throughout the country required great prudence on my part; that a defeat of the forces of my command could be ill afforded, and knowing that no interests in the valley, save those of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, were suffering by the delay. In this view I was coinciding with the Lieutenant-General commanding.

Although the main force remained without change of position from September 3 to 19, still the cavalry was employed every day in harassing the enemy, its opponents being principally infantry. In these skirmishes the cavalry was becoming educated to attack infantry lines.

On the 13th one of these handsome dashes was made by General McIntosh, of Wilson's division, capturing the eighth South Carolina regiment at Abram's creek; on the same day Getty's division of the 6th corps made a reconnoissance to the Opequan, developing a heavy force of the enemy at Edwards's crossing.

The position which I had taken at Clifton was (6) six miles from Opequan creek, on the west bank of which the enemy was in position. This distance of six miles I determined to hold as my territory by scouting parties, and in holding it in this way, without pushing up the main force, I expected to be able to move on the enemy at the proper time without his obtaining the information, which he would immediately get from his pickets, if I was in close proximity.

On the night of the 15th I received reliable information that Kershaw's division was moving through Winchester and in the direction of Front Royal. Then our time had come, and I almost made up my mind that I would fight at Newtown, on the valley pike, give up my line to the rear, and take that of the enemy. From my position at Clifton I could throw my force into Newtown before Early could get information and move to that point. I was a little timid about this movement until the arrival of General Grant at Charlestown, who indorsed it, and the order for the movement was made out; but, in consequence of a report from General Averill, on the afternoon of the 18th of September, that Early had moved two divisions to Martinsburg, I changed this programme, and determined to first catch the two divisions remaining in the vicinity of Stevenson's depot, and then the two sent to Martinsburg, in detail. This information was the cause of the battle of Opequan instead of the battle of Newtown.

At 3 o'clock on the morning of the 19th September the army moved to the attack. Torbert was directed to advance with Merritt's division of cavalry, from Summit Point, carry the crossings of Opequan creek, and form a junction at some point near Stevenson's depot with Averill, who moved from Darksville. Wilson was ordered to move rapidly up the Berryville pike, from Berryville, carry its crossing of the Opequan, and charge through the gorge or cañon; the attack to be supported by the 6th and 19th corps, both of which moved across country to the same crossing of the Opequan. Crook moved across the country to be in reserve at the same point.

Wilson, with McIntosh's brigade leading, made a gallant charge through the long cañon, and, meeting the advance of Ramseur's rebel infantry division, drove it back and captured the earthwork at the mouth of the cañon; this movement was immediately followed up by the 6th corps. The 19th corps was directed, for convenience of movement, to report to General Wright on its arrival at Opequan creek. I followed up the cavalry attack, and selected the ground for the formation of the 6th and 19th corps, which went into line under a heavy artillery fire.

A good deal of time was lost in this movement through the cañon, and it was not till, perhaps, 9 o'clock a. m., that the order for the advance in line was given. I had from early in the morning become apprised that I would have to engage Early's entire army, instead of two divisions, and determined to attack with the 6th and 19th corps, holding Crook's command as a turning column to use only when the crisis of the battle occurred, and that I would put him in on my left, and still get the valley pike. The attack was therefore made by the 6th and 10th corps, in very handsome style, and under a heavy fire from the enemy, who held a line which gave him the cover of slight brushwood and cornfields.

The resistance during this attack was obstinate and, as there were no earthworks to protect, deadly to both sides.

The enemy, after the contest had been going on for some time, made a counter charge, striking the right of the 6th corps and left of the 19th, driving back the centre of my line.

It was at this juncture that I ordered a brigade of Russell's division of the 6th corps to wait till the enemy's attacking column presented its flank, then to strike it with vigor. This was handsomely done, the brigade being led by General Russell and its commander, Upton, in person; the enemy in turn was driven back, our line re-established, and most of the two or three thousand men who had gone to the rear brought back.

I still would not order Crook in, but placed him directly in rear of the line of battle; as the reports, however, that the enemy were attempting to turn my right kept continually increasing, I was obliged to put him in on that flank instead of on the left, as was originally intended. He was directed to act as a turning column to find the left of the enemy's line, strike it in flank or rear, break it up, and that I would order a left half wheel of the line of battle to support him. In this attack the enemy was driven in confusion from his position, and simultaneously with it Merritt and Averill, under Torbert, could be distinctly seen sweeping up the Martinsburg pike, driving the enemy's cavalry before them in a confused mass through the broken infantry. I then rode along the line of the 19th and 6th corps, ordered their advance, and directed Wilson, who was on the left flank, to push on and gain the valley pike, south of Winchester; after which I returned to the right, where the enemy was still fighting with obstinacy in the open ground in front of Winchester, and ordered Torbert to collect his cavalry and charge, which was done simultaneously with the infantry advance, and the enemy routed.

At daylight on the morning of the 20th of September the army moved rapidly up the valley pike in pursuit of the enemy, who had continued his retreat during the night to Fisher's Hill, south of Strasburg.

Fisher's Hill is the bluff immediately south of and over a little stream called Tumbling river, and is a position which was almost impregnable to a direct assault, and, as the valley is but about three and a half miles wide at this point, the enemy considered himself secure on reaching it, and commenced erecting breastworks across the valley from Fisher's Hill to North mountain; so secure, in fact, did he consider himself that the ammunition boxes were taken from the caissons and placed for convenience behind the breastwork.

On the evening of September 20 Wright and Emory went into position on the heights of Strasburg; Crook, north of Cedar creek; the cavalry to the right and rear of Wright and Emory, extending to the back road. This night I resolved to use a turning column again, and that I would move Crook, unperceived, if possible, over on to the face of Little North mountain, and let him strike the left and rear of the enemy's line, and then, if successful, make a left half wheel of the whole line of battle to his support. To do this required much secrecy, as the enemy had a signal station on Threetop mountain, from which he could see every movement made by our troops; therefore, during the night of the 20th, I concealed Crook in the timber north of Cedar creek, where he remained during the 21st. On the same day I moved Wright and Emory up in the front of the rebel line, getting into proper position after a severe engagement between a portion of Ricketts's and Getty's divisions of the 6th corps and a strong force of the enemy.

Torbert, with Wilson's and Merritt's cavalry, was ordered down the Luray valley in pursuit of the enemy's cavalry, and, after defeating or driving it, to cross over Luray pike to New Market and intercept the enemy's infantry should I drive it from the position at Fisher's Hill.

On the night of the 21st Crook was moved to and concentrated in the timber near Strasburg, and, at daylight on the 22d, marched to and massed in the timber near Little North mountain. I did not attempt to cover the long front presented by the enemy, but massed the 6th and 19th corps opposite the right centre of his line. After Crook had gotten into the position last named I took out Ricketts's division of the 6th corps and placed it opposite the enemy's

left centre, and directed Averill, with his cavalry, to go up on Ricketts's front and right and drive in the enemy's skirmish line, if possible. This was done, and the enemy's signal officer on Threecop mountain, mistaking Ricketts's division for my turning column, so notified the enemy, and he made his arrangements accordingly, while Crook, without being observed, moved on the side of Little North mountain, and struck the enemy's left and rear so suddenly and unexpectedly that he, (the enemy,) supposing he must have come across the mountains, broke, Crook swinging down behind the line, Ricketts swinging in and joining Crook, and so on the balance of the 6th and 19th corps, the rout of the enemy being complete.

Unfortunately the cavalry which I had sent down the Luray valley to cross over to New Market was unsuccessful, and only reached so far as Milford, a point at which the Luray valley contracts to a gorge, and which was taken possession of by the enemy's cavalry in some force. Had General Torbert driven this cavalry, or turned the defile and reached New Market, I have no doubt but that we would have captured the entire rebel army. I feel certain that its rout from Fisher's Hill was such that there was scarcely a company organization held together. New Market being at a converging point in the valley they came together again, and to some extent reorganized. I did not wait to see the results of this victory, but pushed on during the night of the 22d to Woodstock, although the darkness and consequent confusion made the pursuit slow.

On the morning of September 23 General Devin, with his small brigade of cavalry, moved to a point directly north of Mount Jackson, driving the enemy in his front, and there awaited the arrival of General Averill's division, which, for some unaccountable reason, went into camp immediately after the battle. General Averill reached Devin's command at about three o'clock p. m., and, in the evening, returned with all the advance cavalry, of which he was in command, to a creek one-half mile north of Hawkinsburg, and there remained until the arrival of the head of the infantry column, which had halted between Edinburg and Woodstock for wagons, in order to issue the necessary rations.

Early on the morning of the 24th the entire army reached Mount Jackson, a small town on the north bank of the north fork of the Shenandoah. The enemy had, in the mean time, reorganized and taken position on the bluff south of the river, but had commenced this same morning its retreat towards Harrisonburg; still, he held a long and strong line with the troops that were to cover his rear in a temporary line of rifle-pits on the bluff commanding the plateau.

To dislodge him from his strong position Devin's brigade of cavalry was directed to cross the Shenandoah, work around the base of the Massanutten range, and drive in the cavalry which covered his (the enemy's) right flank, and Powell, who had succeeded Averill, was ordered to move around his left flank, via Timberville, while the infantry was pushed across the river by the bridge.

The enemy did not wait the full execution of these movements, but withdrew in haste, the cavalry under Devin coming up with him at New Market, and made a bold attempt to hold him until I could push up our infantry, but was unable to do so, as the open smooth country allowed him (the enemy) to retreat with great rapidity in line of battle, and the three or four hundred cavalry under Devin was unable to break this line. Our infantry was pushed, by heads of columns, very hard to overtake and bring on an engagement, but could not succeed, and encamped about six (6) miles south of New Market for the night.

Powell, meantime, had pushed on through Timberville and gained the valley pike, near Lacy's Springs, capturing some prisoners and wagons.

This movement of Powell's probably forced the enemy to abandon the road, via Harrisonburg, and move over the Keezeltown road to Port Republic, to which point the retreat was continued through the night of the 24th, and thence to Brown's gap in the Blue Ridge.

On the 25th the 6th and 19th corps reached Harrisonburg. Crook was ordered to remain at the junction of the Keezeltown road with the valley pike until the movements of the enemy were definitely ascertained.

On this day Torbert reached Harrisonburg, having encountered the enemy's cavalry at Luray, defeating it, and joining me via New Market, and Powell had proceeded to Mount Crawford.

On the 26th Merritt's division of cavalry was ordered to Port Republic, and Torbert to Staunton and Waynesboro' to destroy the bridge at the latter place, and, in retiring, to burn all forage, drive off all cattle, destroy all mills, &c., which would cripple the rebel army or confederacy.

Torbert had with him Wilson's division of cavalry and Lowell's brigade of regulars.

On the 27th, while Torbert was making his advance on Waynesboro', I ordered Merritt to make a demonstration on Brown's gap to cover the movement. This brought out the enemy, who had been re-enforced by Kershaw's division which came through Swift Run gap, against the small force of cavalry employed in this demonstration, which he followed up to Port Republic, and I believe crossed in some force. Merritt's instructions from me were to resist an attack, but if pressed to fall back to Cross Keys, in which event I intended to attack with the main force, which was at Harrisonburg, and could be rapidly moved to Cross Keys. The enemy, however, advanced with his main force only to Port Republic, after which he fell back. Torbert this day took possession of Waynesboro', and partially destroyed the railroad bridge; but about dark on the 28th was attacked by infantry and cavalry, returned to Staunton, and thence to Bridgewater, via Spring Hill, executing the order for the destruction of subsistence, forage, &c.

On the morning of the 28th Merritt was ordered to Port Republic, and to open communication with General Torbert, but on the same night was directed to leave small forces at Port Republic and Swift Run gap and proceed with the balance of his command (his own and Custer's divisions) to Piedmont, swing around from that point to near Staunton, burning forage, mills, and such other property as might be serviceable to the rebel army or confederacy, and on his return to go into camp on the left of the 6th and 19th corps, which were ordered to proceed, on the 26th, to Mount Crawford in support of this and Torbert's movements.

September 29th Torbert reached Bridgewater, and Merritt Mount Crawford.

On the 1st of October Merritt reoccupied Port Republic, and the 6th and 19th corps were moved back to Harrisonburg.

The question that now presented itself was, whether or not I should follow the enemy to Brown's gap, where he still held fast, drive him out and advance on Charlottesville and Gordonsville. This movement on Gordonsville I was opposed to for many reasons, the most important of which was, that it would necessitate the opening of the Orange and Alexandria railroad from Alexandria, and to protect this road against the numerous guerilla bands would have required a corps of infantry; besides, I would have been obliged to leave a small force in the valley to give security to the line of the Potomac. This would probably occupy the whole of Crook's command, leaving me but a small number of fighting men. Then there was the additional reason of the uncertainty as to whether the army in front of Petersburg could hold the entire force of General Lee there, and, in case it could not, a sufficient number might be detached and moved rapidly by rail and overwhelm me, quickly returning; I was also confident that my transportation could not supply me further than Harrisonburg, and therefore advised that the valley campaign should terminate at Harrisonburg, and that I return, carry out my original instructions for the destruction of forage, grain, &c., give up the majority of the army I commanded, and order it

to the Petersburg line, a line which I thought the Lieutenant General believed, if a successful movement could be made on, would involve the capture of the army of northern Virginia.

I therefore, on the morning of the 6th of October, commenced moving back, stretching the cavalry across the valley from the Blue Ridge to the eastern slope of the Alleghanies, with directions to burn all forage and drive off all stock, &c., as they moved to the rear, fully coinciding in the views and instructions of the Lieutenant General that the valley should be made a barren waste. The most positive orders were given, however, not to burn dwellings.

In this movement the enemy's cavalry followed at a respectful distance, until in the vicinity of Woodstock, when they attacked Custer's division and harassed it as far as Tom's brook, a short distance south of Fisher's Hill.

On the night of the 8th I ordered General Torbert to engage the enemy's cavalry at daylight, and notified him that I would halt the army until he had defeated it.

In compliance with these instructions, Torbert advanced at daylight on the 9th of October, with Custer's division on the back road, and Merritt's division on the valley pike.

At Tom's brook, the heads of the opposing columns came in contact and deployed, and after a short but decisive engagement the enemy was defeated, with the loss of all his artillery excepting one piece, and everything else that was carried on wheels. The rout was complete, and was followed up to Mount Jackson, a distance of some twenty-six miles.

On October 10th the army crossed to the north side of Cedar creek, the 6th corps continuing its march to Front Royal; this was the first day's march of this corps to rejoin Lieutenant General Grant at Petersburg. It was the intention that it should proceed through Manassas gap to Piedmont, east of the Blue Ridge, to which point the Manassas gap railroad had been completed, and from thence to Alexandria by rail; but on my recommendation that it would be much better to march it, as it was in fine condition, through Ashby's gap, and thence to Washington, the former route was abandoned, and on the 12th the corps moved to the Ashby gap crossing of the Shenandoah river; but, on the same day, in consequence of the advance of the enemy to Fisher's Hill, it was recalled to await the development of the enemy's new intentions.

The question now again arose in reference to the advance on Gordonsville, as suggested in the following despatch:

[Cipher.]

WASHINGTON, *October 12, 1864—12 m.*

Major General SHERIDAN:

Lieutenant General Grant wishes a position taken far enough south to serve as a base for further operations upon Gordonsville and Charlottesville. It must be strongly fortified and provisioned.

Some point in the vicinity of Manassas gap would seem best suited for all purposes.

Colonel Alexander, of the engineers, will be sent to consult with you as soon as you connect with General Augur.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major General.*

This plan I would not indorse, but, in order to settle it definitely, I was called to Washington by the following telegram:

WASHINGTON, *October 13, 1864.*

Major General SHERIDAN, (through General AUGUR:)

If you can come here a consultation on several points is extremely desirable. I propose to visit General Grant, and would like to see you first.

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

On the evening of the 15th I determined to go, believing that the enemy at Fisher's Hill could not accomplish much; and as I had concluded not to attack him at present, I ordered the whole of the cavalry force under General Torbert to accompany me to Front Royal, from whence I intended to push it through Chester gap to the Virginia Central railroad at Charlottesville, while I passed through Manassas gap to Piedmont, thence by rail to Washington. Upon my arrival with the cavalry at Front Royal, on the night of the 16th, I received the following despatch from General Wright, who was left at Cedar creek in command of the army:

HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION,  
*October 16, 1864.*

GENERAL: I enclose you despatch which explains itself. [See copy following.]

If the enemy should be strongly re-enforced in cavalry, he might, by turning our right, give us a great deal of trouble. I shall hold on here until the enemy's movements are developed, and shall only fear an attack on my right, which I shall make every preparation for guarding against and resisting.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. G. WRIGHT,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General P. H. SHERIDAN,  
*Commanding Middle Military Division.*

To Lieutenant General EARLY:

Be ready to move as soon as my forces join you, and we will crush Sheridan.  
LONGSTREET,  
*Lieutenant General.*

This message was taken off the rebel signal flag, on Threestop mountain.

My first thought was that it was a ruse, but, on reflection, deemed it best to abandon the cavalry raid, and give to General Wright the entire strength of the army. I therefore ordered the cavalry to return and report to him, and addressed the following note on the subject:

HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION,  
*Front Royal, October 16, 1864.*

GENERAL: The cavalry is all ordered back to you; make your position strong. If Longstreet's despatch is true, he is under the impression that we have largely detached. I will go over to Augur, and may get additional news.

Close in Colonel Powell, who will be at this point. If the enemy should make an advance, I know you will defeat him. Look well to your ground and be well prepared. Get up everything that can be spared. I will bring up all I can, and will be up on Tuesday, if not sooner.

P. H. SHERIDAN,  
*Major General.*

Major General H. G. WRIGHT,  
*Commanding 6th Army Corps.*



After sending this note I continued through Manassas gap and on to Piedmont, and from thence by rail to Washington, arriving on the morning of the 17th. At 12 o'clock m., I returned by special train to Martinsburg, arriving on the evening of the 18th at Winchester, in company with Colonels Thom and Alexander, of the engineer corps, sent with me by General Halleck. During my absence the enemy had gathered all his strength, and in the night of the 18th, and early on the 19th, moved silently from Fisher's Hill, through Strasburg, pushed a heavy turning column across the Shenandoah, on the road from Strasburg to Front Royal, and again recrossed the river at Bowman's ford, striking Crook, who held the left of our line, in flank and rear, so unexpectedly and forcibly as to drive in his outposts, invade his camp, and turn his position. This surprise was owing, probably, to not closing in Powell, or that the cavalry division of Merritt and Custer were placed on the right of our line, where it had always occurred to me there was but little danger of attack.

This was followed by a direct attack upon our front, and the result was, that the whole army was driven back in confusion, to a point about one and a half mile north of Middletown, a very large portion of the infantry not even preserving a company organization.

At about 7 o'clock on the morning of the 19th October, an officer on picket at Winchester reported artillery firing, but, supposing it resulted from a reconnoissance which had been ordered for this morning, I paid no attention to it, and was unconscious of the true condition of affairs until about 9 o'clock, when, having ridden through the town of Winchester, the sound of the artillery made a battle unmistakable, and on reaching Mill creek, one-half a mile south of Winchester, the head of the fugitives appeared in sight, trains and men coming to the rear with appalling rapidity.

I immediately gave directions to halt and park the trains at Mill creek, and ordered the brigade at Winchester to stretch across the country and stop all stragglers. Taking twenty men from my escort, I pushed on to the front, leaving the balance, under General Forsyth and Colonels Thom and Alexander, to do what they could in stemming the torrent of fugitives.

I am happy to say that hundreds of the men, who on reflection found they had not done themselves justice, came back with cheers.

On arriving at the front, I found Merritt's and Custer's divisions of cavalry, under Torbert, and General Getty's division of the 6th corps, opposing the enemy. I suggested to General Wright that we would fight on Getty's line, and to transfer Custer to the right at once, as he (Custer) and Merritt, from being on the right in the morning, had been transferred to the left; that the remaining two divisions of the 6th corps, which were to the right and rear of Getty about two miles, should be ordered up, and also that the 19th corps, which was on the right and rear of these two divisions, should be hastened up before the enemy attacked Getty.

I then started out all my staff officers to bring up these troops, and was so convinced that we would soon be attacked, that I went back myself to urge them on. Immediately after, I returned and assumed command, General Wright returning to his corps, Getty to his division, and the line of battle was formed on the prolongation of General Getty's line, and a temporary breastwork of rails, logs, &c., thrown up hastily. Shortly after this was done, the enemy advanced, and from a point on the left of our line of battle I could see his columns moving to the attack, and at once notified corps commanders to be prepared. This assault fell principally on the 19th corps, and was repulsed.

I am pleased to be able to state that the strength of the 6th and 19th corps, and Crook's command, was now being rapidly augmented by the return of those who had gone to the rear early in the day.

Reports coming in from the Front Royal pike, on which Powell's division of cavalry was posted—to the effect that a heavy column of infantry was moving

on that pike in the direction of Winchester, and that he (Powell) was retiring and would come in at Newtown—caused me great anxiety for the time; and although I could not fully believe that such a movement would be undertaken, still it delayed my general attack. At 4 o'clock p. m. I ordered the advance.

This attack was brilliantly made, and as the enemy was protected by rail breastworks, and at some portions of his line by stone fences, his resistance was very determined. His line of battle overlapped the right of mine, and by turning with this portion of it on the flank of the 19th corps, caused a slight momentary confusion. This movement was checked, however, by a counter-charge of General McMillan's brigade upon the re-entering angle thus formed by the enemy, and his flanking party cut off.

It was at this stage of the battle that Custer was ordered to charge with his entire division, but, although the order was promptly obeyed, it was not in time to capture the whole of the force thus cut off, and many escaped across Cedar creek. Simultaneous with this charge, a combined movement of the whole line drove the enemy in confusion to the creek, where, owing to the difficulties of crossing, his army became routed.

Custer finding a ford on Cedar creek west of the pike, and Devin, of Merritt's division, one to the east of it, they each made the crossing just after dark, and pursued the routed mass of the enemy to Fisher's Hill, where this strong position gave him some protection against our cavalry; but the most of his transportation had been captured, the road from Cedar creek to Fisher's Hill, a distance of over three miles, being literally blocked by wagons, ambulances, artillery, caissons, &c.

The enemy did not halt his main force at Fisher's Hill, but continued the retreat during the night to New Market, where his army had, on a similar previous occasion, come together by means of the numerous roads that converge to this point.

This battle practically ended the campaign in the Shenandoah valley. When it opened we found our enemy boastful and confident, unwilling to acknowledge that the soldiers of the Union were their equal in courage and manliness; when it closed with Cedar creek, this impression had been removed from his mind, and gave place to good sense and a strong desire to quit fighting. The very best troops of the confederacy had not only been defeated, but had been routed in successive engagements, until their spirit and *esprit* were destroyed. In obtaining these results, however, our loss in officers and men was severe. Practically all territory north of the James river now belonged to me, and the holding of the lines about Petersburg and Richmond by the enemy must have been embarrassing, and invited the question of good military judgment.

On entering the valley it was not my object by flank movements to make the enemy change his base, nor to move as far up as the James river, and thus give him the opportunity of making me change my base, thereby converting it into a race-course as heretofore, but to destroy, to the best of my ability, that which was truly the confederacy—its armies. In doing this, so far as the opposing army was concerned, our success was such that there was no one connected with the army of the Shenandoah who did not so fully realize it as to render the issuing of congratulatory orders unnecessary; every officer and man was made to understand that when a victory was gained it was not more than their duty nor less than their country expected from her gallant sons.

At Winchester, for a moment, the contest was uncertain, but the gallant attack of General Upton's brigade of the 6th corps restored the line of battle until the turning column of Crook, and Merritt's and Averill's divisions of cavalry, under Torbert, "sent the enemy whirling through Winchester."

In thus particularizing commands and commanders, I only speak in the sense that they were so fortunate as to be available at these important moments.

In the above-mentioned attack by Upton's brigade the lamented Russell fell. He had been previously wounded, but refused to leave the field. His death brought sadness to every heart in the army.

It was during a reconnoissance to Fisher's Hill, made on the 13th of October, 1864, that Colonel George D. Wells, commanding a brigade in Crook's corps, was killed while gallantly leading his men.

At Fisher's Hill it was again the good fortune of General Crook's command to start the enemy, and of General Ricketts's division of the 6th corps to first gallantly swing in and more fully initiate the rout.

At Cedar creek Getty's division of the 6th corps, and Merritt's and Custer's divisions of cavalry, under Torbert, confronted the enemy from the first attack in the morning until the battle was decided; still none behaved more gallantly, or exhibited greater courage, than those who returned from the rear determined to reoccupy their lost camp.

In this engagement, early in the morning, the gallant Colonel Lowell, of the regular brigade, was wounded while in the advance *en echelon* of Getty's division, but would not leave his command, remaining until the final attack on the enemy was made, in which he was killed.

Generals Bidwell, of the 6th corps, and Thoburn, of Crook's command, were also killed in the morning, while behaving with conspicuous gallantry.

I submit the following list of the corps, division, and brigade commanders who were wounded in the campaign—the killed having already been especially noticed—regretting that the scope of this report will not admit of my specifying by name all the many gallant men who were killed and wounded in the numerous engagements in the Shenandoah valley, and most respectfully call attention to the accompanying sub-reports for such particulars as will, I trust, do full justice to all:

Generals H. G. Wright, J. B. Ricketts, Grover, Duval, E. Upton, R. S. McKenzie, Kitchen, (since died of wounds,) J. B. McIntosh, G. H. Chapman, Thomas C. Devin; Penrose; Colonels D. D. Johnson, Daniel McAuley, Jacob Sharpe.

From the 7th of August the Middle department, department of Washington, department of the Susquehanna, and department of West Virginia, were under my command, and I desire to express my gratitude to their respective commanders, Major Generals Lew Wallace, C. Augur, Couch, and Cadwallader, and to Major Generals Hunter and Crook—who at separate times commanded the latter department—for the assistance given me.

General Augur operated very effectively with a small force under his command, the reports of which were forwarded direct to the War Department.

After the battle of Cedar creek nothing of importance occurred in the valley up to February 27, 1865, the day on which the cavalry moved from Winchester to Petersburg.

On the night of November 11, 1864, General Early moved some of his shattered forces to the north of Cedar creek, for the purpose of bluster, I suppose, as on the night of the following day he hastily retired. In consequence of contradictory information received from scouts and captured cavalry prisoners, I was unconvinced of any rebel infantry being in my vicinity until it was too late to overtake it in its galloping retreat—a retreat which was continued until in the vicinity of Lacy's Springs, near Harrisonburg. Powell engaged the rebel cavalry co-operating on the Front Royal pike with this force, and drove it through Front Royal to Milford, capturing two pieces of artillery.

During this campaign I was at times annoyed by guerilla bands, the most formidable of which was under a partisan chief named Mosby, who made his headquarters east of the Blue Ridge, in the section of country about Upper-ville. I had constantly refused to operate against these bands, believing them to be, substantially, a benefit to me, as they prevented straggling and kept my

trains well closed up, and discharged such other duties as would have required a provost guard of at least two regiments of cavalry. In retaliation for the assistance and sympathy given them, however, by the inhabitants of Loudon valley, General Merritt, with two brigades of cavalry, was directed to proceed on the 28th of November, 1864, to that valley, under the following instructions :

HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION,  
*November 27, 1864.*

**GENERAL:** You are hereby directed to proceed, to-morrow morning at 7 o'clock, with the two (2) brigades of your division now in camp, to the east side of the Blue Ridge, via Ashby's gap, and operate against the guerillas in the district of country bounded on the south by the line of the Manassas Gap railroad, as far east as White Plains ; on the east by the Bull Run range ; on the west by the Shenandoah river, and on the north by the Potomac.

This section has been the hot-bed of lawless bands, who have from time to time depredated upon small parties on the line of army communications, on safeguards left at houses, and on troops. Their real object is plunder and highway robbery.

To clear the country of these parties, that are bringing destruction upon the innocent, as well as their guilty supporters by their cowardly acts, you will consume and destroy all forage and subsistence, burn all barns and mills and their contents, and drive off all stock in the region the boundaries of which are above described. This order must be literally executed, bearing in mind, however, that no dwellings are to be burned, and that no personal violence be offered the citizens.

The ultimate result of the guerilla system of warfare is the total destruction of all private rights in the country occupied by such parties. This destruction may as well commence at once, and the responsibility of it must rest upon the authorities at Richmond, who have acknowledged the legitimacy of guerilla bands.

The injury done this army by them is very slight. The injury they have inflicted upon the people, and upon the rebel army, may be counted by millions.

The reserve brigade of your division will move to Snickersville on the 29th. Snickersville should be your point of concentration, and the point from which you should operate in destroying towards the Potomac.

Four (4) days' subsistence will be taken by the command. Forage can be gathered from the country through which you pass.

You will return to your present camp at Snickersville, on the fifth (5th) day.

By command of Major General P. H. Sheridan :

JAMES W. FORSYTH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

Brevet Major General WESLEY MERRITT,  
*Commanding First Cavalry Division.*

On December 19, General Torbert, with Merritt's and Powell's divisions, was pushed through Chester gap to strike the Virginia Central railroad, at Charlottesville or Gordonsville. An engagement took place, in which two (2) pieces of artillery were captured, but failing to gain Gordonsville, or strike the railroad, he returned to Winchester via Warrenton.

Custer, with his division, was at the same time pushed up the valley to make a diversion in favor of Torbert, but encountering the enemy near Harrisonburg—who attacked his camp at daylight on the ensuing day—he was obliged, in consequence of superior force, to retire.

The weather was so intensely cold during these raids that horses and men suffered most severely, and many of the latter were badly frost-bitten.

On the 5th of February, Harry Gilmore, who appeared to be the last link between Maryland and the confederacy, and whose person I desired in order that this link might be severed, was made prisoner near Moorefield, his capture being very skilfully made by Colonel Young, my chief of scouts, and a party under Lieutenant Colonel Whitaker, first Connecticut cavalry, sent to support him.

Gilmore and Mosby carried on the same style of warfare, running trains off railways, robbing the passengers, &c.

In closing this report, it gives me great pleasure to speak of the skill, energy, and gallantry displayed by my corps and division commanders, and I take this opportunity of acknowledging the assistance given me by them at all times.

To the members of my staff, who so cheerfully on all occasions gave me their valuable assistance, who so industriously labored to execute every duty promptly, and who always behaved with gallantry, I return my sincere thanks. They all joined with me in the deep grief felt at the loss sustained by the army, and the friendly ties broken by the death of their fellow staff officers, Colonel Tolles, chief quartermaster, and Assistant Surgeon Ohlenschlaeger, medical inspector, who were killed while on their way from Martinsburg to Cedar creek, in October, 1864, and in that of the death of the gallant Lieutenant Meigs, my chief engineer, who was killed while examining and mapping the country near Bridgewater, just above Harrisonburg. This young officer was endeared to me on account of his invaluable knowledge of the country, his rapid sketching, his great intelligence, and his manly and soldierly qualities.

I would also here especially mention the loss of two of my most efficient staff officers, Lieutenant Colonels Kellogg and O'Keefe, both of whom died after having passed through the dangers and privations of years of warfare; the former of fever consequent upon excessive labor during the campaign from Petersburg to Appomattox; the latter from wounds received at the battle of Five Forks.

The report of the march from Winchester to Petersburg, to engage in the final campaign, has heretofore been furnished, but I consider it, in fact, a sequel to this.

I attach hereto an abstract of ordnance and ordnance stores captured from the enemy during the campaign, (the 101 pieces of artillery being exclusive of the 24 pieces recaptured in the afternoon at Cedar creek,) also a detailed report of my casualties, which are in aggregate as follows: killed, 1,938; wounded, 11,893; missing, 3,121; total, 16,952.

The records of the provost marshal, middle military division, show about (13,000) thirteen thousand prisoners (as per annexed certificate) to have been received by him, and receipts are among the records of the assistant adjutant general, middle military division, for forty-nine (49) battle flags, forwarded to the honorable the Secretary of War.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. H. SHERIDAN,  
*Major General U. S. Army.*

Brevet Major General J. A. RAWLINS,  
*Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.*

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HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,  
*Monocacy Bridge, Md., August 5, 1864.*

**GENERAL:** Concentrate all your available forces without delay in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and garrisons for public property as may be necessary.

Use in this concentration the railroad, if by so doing time can be saved. From Harper's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved north of the Potomac

in large force, push north, following and attacking him wherever found; following him, if driven south of the Potomac, as long as it is safe to do so. If it is ascertained the enemy has but a small force north of the Potomac, then push south with the main force, detailing, under a competent commander, a sufficient force to look after the raiders and drive them to their homes. In detailing such a force the brigade of cavalry now *en route* from Washington, via Rockville, may be taken into account.

There are now on the way to join you three other brigades of the best of cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses. These will be instructed, in the absence of further orders, to join you by the south side of the Potomac. One brigade will probably start to-morrow.

In pushing up the Shenandoah valley, as it is expected you will have to go, first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command. Such as cannot be consumed, destroy. It is not desirable that buildings should be destroyed—they should rather be protected; but the people should be informed that so long as an army can subsist among them recurrences of these raids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at all hazards.

Bear in mind the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do this you want to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your course by the course he takes.

Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regular vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens.

Very respectfully,

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant General.*

Major General D. HUNTER,

*Commanding Department of West Virginia.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE GULF,  
*New Orleans, La., November 18, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that the number of confederate prisoners received by the forces under your command from August 1, 1864, to March 1, 1865, was about thirteen thousand, (13,000.) The names of nearly that number are recorded on the books recently used in the office of the provost marshal general, middle military division.

Respectfully submitted:

E. B. PARSONS,  
*Late Provost Marshal General Middle Military Division.*

Major General P. H. SHERIDAN,

*United States Army.*



*List of casualties in the United States forces commanded by Major General P. H. Sheridan, campaign in the Shenandoah valley, Virginia, 1864.*

Command.	Battle.	Date.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Aggregate.
Sixth army corps.....	Opequan .....	September 19, 1864.	213	1,424	48	1,685
	Fisher's Hill.....	September 22, 1864.	24	210	3	237
	Cedar Creek.....	October 19, 1864....	255	1,666	294	2,215
	Reconnoissances and minor engagements .....		86	665	11	762
Total.....			578	3,965	356	4,899
Nineteenth army corps..	Opequan .....	September 19, 1864.	275	1,228	453	1,956
	Fisher's Hill.....	September 22, 1864.	11	47	2	60
	Cedar Creek.....	October 19, 1864....	243	1,352	893	2,488
	Reconnoissances and minor engagements .....		57	446	13	516
Total.....			586	3,073	1,361	5,020
Army of West Virginia..	Opequan and Fisher's Hill..	Sept. 19 and 22, 1864.	105	840	8	953
	Cedar Creek.....	October 19, 1864....	46	268	533	847
	Reconnoissances and minor engagements .....		150	839	96	1,085
Total.....			301	1,947	637	2,885
Provisional division ...	Cedar Creek.....	October 19, 1864....	19	91	121	231
Cavalry.....	Opequan .....	September 19, 1864.	65	267	109	441
	Tom's Creek .....	October 9, 1864.....	9	48	.....	57
	Cedar Creek.....	October 19, 1864....	25	139	50	214
	Twenty-six (26) other engagements.....		355	2,363	487	3,205
Total.....			454	2,817	646	3,917
Grand total.....			1,938	11,893	3,121	16,952

REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF FIRST AND THIRD DIVISIONS OF CAVALRY,  
ARMY OF THE SHENANDOAH, FROM FEBRUARY 27 TO MARCH 28, 1865.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE SOUTHWEST,  
*New Orleans, La., July 16, 1865.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of my command in the campaign from Winchester, in the Shenandoah valley, to the armies in front of Petersburg, Virginia, beginning February 27, and ending March 28, 1865.

The command consisted of the first and third divisions of cavalry of the army of the Shenandoah, under the immediate command of Brevet Major General Wesley Merritt—Brevet Major General George A. Custer commanding the third division, and Brigadier General T. C. Devin the first division. The following was the effective force :



*Effective force first and third cavalry divisions, army of the Shenandoah, February 28, 1865.—Major General Wesley Merritt, Chief of Cavalry.*

	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.
First division, Brigadier General T. C. Devin commanding.....	260	4, 787	5, 047
One section (companies C and E) 4th United States artillery.....	2	52	54
Third cavalry division, Brevet Major General G. A. Custer commanding.....	240	4, 600	4, 840
One section (company M) 2d United States artillery.....	1	45	46
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	503	9, 484	9, 987
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>

On the morning of February 27, 1865, we marched from Winchester up the valley pike, with five days' rations in haversacks, and fifteen days' rations of coffee, sugar, and salt in wagons, thirty pounds of forage on each horse, one wagon for each division headquarters, eight ambulances, and our ammunition train; no other wagons except a pontoon train of eight boats were permitted to accompany the command.

My orders were to destroy the Virginia Central railroad and the James River canal, capture Lynchburg if practicable, and then join Major General Sherman wherever he might be found in North Carolina, or return to Winchester; but in joining General Sherman I must be governed by the position of affairs after the capture of Lynchburg.

The command was in fine condition, but the weather was very bad, as the spring thaw, with heavy rains, had already come on. The valley and surrounding mountains were covered with snow which was fast disappearing, putting all the streams nearly past fording.

On our first days' march we crossed Cedar creek, Tumbling river, and Tom's brook, and went into camp at Woodstock, having marched thirty miles.

At 6 o'clock on the morning of the 28th instant the march was resumed through Edinburg, across the north fork of the Shenandoah river, and through New Market, going into camp at Lacy's Springs, nine miles north of Harrisonburg; the crossing of the north fork of the Shenandoah was by a pontoon bridge.

Small bands of guerillas hovered on our flanks during the day, but no effort was made to drive them off, and no damage was done by them; distance marched twenty-nine miles.

The march was resumed at 6 o'clock on the morning of the 29th, through Harrisonburg and Mount Crawford, and camp pitched on Middle river at Kline's mills. Guerillas hovered around us during the march, and at Mount Crawford General Rosser, with two or three hundred cavalry, attempted to burn the bridge over the middle fork of the Shenandoah, but did not succeed; two of Capehart's regiments swam the river above the bridge, charged Rosser and routed him, driving him rapidly to Kline's mills, the advance pushing almost to Staunton; but few of the enemy were killed, thirty taken prisoners, and twenty ambulances and wagons, with their contents, were captured and destroyed; our loss was five men wounded.

Kline's mills are seven miles from Staunton, where the headquarters of General Early were said to be. Not knowing but that he would fight at Staunton, Colonel Staggs's brigade of General Devin's division was ordered to destroy the railroad bridge over Christian's creek, between Staunton and Waynesboro', to prevent his getting re-enforcements by rail, or in case he would not stand, to prevent him carrying off supplies and ordnance stores; the bridge was burned,

but General Early, learning of our approach, made a hasty retreat to Waynesboro', leaving word in Staunton that he intended to fight at that place.

The next morning we entered Staunton, and the question then arose in my mind whether I should pursue my course on to Lynchburg, leaving General Early in my rear, or go out and fight him with my cavalry against his infantry and what cavalry he could collect, defeat him, and open a way through Rock Fish gap, and have everything in my own hands for the accomplishment of that portion of my instructions which directed the destruction of the Central railroad and James River canal.

I decided upon the latter course, and General Custer's division, (3d.) composed of Colonels Wells's, Pennington's, and Caphart's brigades, was directed to take up the pursuit, followed closely by General Devins's division, composed of General Gibbs's and Colonels Fitzhugh's and Staggs's brigades. The rain had been pouring in torrents for two days, and the roads were bad beyond description; nevertheless the men pushed boldly on, although horses and men could scarcely be recognized for the mud which covered them.

General Custer found General Early as he had promised, at Waynesboro', in a well chosen position, with two brigades of infantry and some cavalry under General Rosser, the infantry occupying breastworks. Custer, without waiting for the enemy to get up his courage by the delay of a careful reconnoissance, made his dispositions for attack at once, sending three regiments around the left flank of the enemy, which was somewhat exposed by being advanced from, instead of resting upon, the bank of the river in his immediate rear; and in person, with the other two brigades, partly mounted and partly dismounted, at a given signal boldly attacked and impetuously carried the enemy's works, while the eighth New York and first Connecticut cavalry, which were formed in column of fours, charged over the breastworks, and continued the charge through the little town of Waynesboro', sabring a few men as they went along, and did not stop until they had crossed the south fork of the Shenandoah river, which was immediately in General Early's rear, where they formed as foragers, and with drawn sabres held the east bank of the stream. The enemy threw down their arms and surrendered, with cheers at the suddenness with which they were captured.

The general officers present at this engagement were Generals Early, Long, Wharton, Lilley, and Rosser, and it has been a wonder to me how they escaped, unless they hid in obscure places in the houses of the town.

Colonel Caphart with his brigade continued the pursuit of the enemy's train, which was stretched for miles away over the mountains, and the other two brigades pushed rapidly after him, with orders to encamp on the east side of the Blue Ridge.

The substantial results of this brilliant fight were eleven pieces of artillery, with horses and caissons complete; about 200 wagons and teams, all loaded with subsistence, camp and garrison equipage, ammunition, officers' baggage; seventeen battle flags, and sixteen hundred officers and enlisted men. The results in a military point of view were very great, as the crossing of the Blue Ridge, covered with snow as it was, at any other point would have been difficult.

Before leaving Staunton for Waynesboro', I obtained information of a large amount of rebel property at Swoop's depot, on the Lexington railroad, and sent a party to destroy it, which was done, a list of which will be attached to this report.

General Custer's division encamped at Brookfield, on the east side of the Blue Ridge, General Devin's division remaining at Waynesboro'.

The next morning the prisoners were sent back to Winchester, under guard of about 1,500 men commanded by Colonel J. H. Thompson, first New Hampshire cavalry, who safely reached that point, notwithstanding he was harassed by General Rosser's command as far as the crossing of the north fork of the

Shenandoah, near Mount Jackson, at which point General Rosser made a fierce attack upon him and tried to rescue the prisoners, but was handsomely repulsed by Colonel Thompson, who captured some of his men, and finally arrived at his destination with all his own prisoners, and some of Rosser's men besides.

General Devin resumed his march at 6 a. m., leaving General Gibbs's brigade to destroy the iron bridge over the south fork of the Shenandoah, and to burn and destroy the captured wagons and their contents.

General Custer moved on towards Charlottesville, destroying much government property and subsistence at Greenwood depot and Ivy Station, also the railroad and the large bridge over Meham's river, arriving at Charlottesville at 4 p. m., the mayor and several of the most prominent citizens meeting him in the suburbs of the city, and delivering up the keys of the public buildings.

The roads from Waynesboro' to Charlottesville had, from the incessant rain and spring thaws, become so terribly cut up, and the mud was of such a depth, that it was impossible for our trains to reach Charlottesville under two days. I therefore notified the command that we would remain for that period at this point for the purpose of resting and refitting, and destroying the railroad. Parties were sent well out towards Gordonsville, and also about fifteen miles towards Lynchburg, to break the railroad so as to prevent troops massing on me from either Richmond or Lynchburg. A thorough and systematic destruction of the railroads was then commenced, including large iron bridges over the north and south forks of the Rivanna river, and the work was continued until the evening of the 5th instant, when General Gibbs reported with our trains. Forage and subsistence were found in great abundance in the vicinity of Charlottesville.

Commodore Hollins, of the confederate navy, was killed near here while trying to escape from a scouting party from General Custer's division.

The necessary delay at Charlottesville forced me to abandon the idea of capturing Lynchburg, but trusty scouts had been sent there to find out the state of affairs in that vicinity.

When the time to start came, I decided to separate into two columns, and sent General Devin's division, under command of General Merritt, to Scottsville, with directions to march along the James River canal and destroy every lock as far as New Market, while with Custer's division I pushed on up the Lynchburg railroad, through North and South Gardens, destroying it as far as Amherst Court House, 16 miles from Lynchburg, and then moved across the country and united with General Merritt's column at New Market.

General Merritt started on the morning of the 6th, first sending the first Michigan cavalry, Colonel Maxwell commanding, down the Rivanna river to Palmyra and towards Columbia, with directions to rejoin him at Scottsville. General Merritt thoroughly accomplished his orders, destroying all large flour mills, woollen factories, and manufacturing establishments, tearing up and demolishing all the locks on the James River canal from Scottsville to New Market. I had directed him to try and obtain possession of the bridge across the James river, at Duguidsville, as it was my intention to hold it and strike the South Side railroad at Appomattox depot, and destroy the same as far as Farmville, where the High bridge crosses the Appomattox. A bold dash was made to secure it, but without avail, as the enemy had covered it with inflammable material and set it on fire the instant their scouts signalled the approach of our forces. All the canal locks and bridges between New Market and Duguidsville were destroyed on the following day. The bridge across the James river at Hardwicksville was also burned by the enemy, and none now remaining between Richmond and Lynchburg, I was left more completely master of all the country north of James river.

As my eight pontoons would not reach half-way across the river, and as my scouts from Lynchburg reported the enemy concentrating at that point from the

west, together with a portion of General Pickett's division of infantry, and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry from Richmond, it was here I fully determined to join the armies of the Lieutenant General in front of Petersburg, instead of going back to Winchester, and also determined to make a more complete destruction of the James River canal, and the Virginia Central and Fredericksburg railroads, connecting Richmond with Lynchburg and Gordonsville.

I now had all the advantage, and by hurrying quickly down the canal, and destroying it as near Richmond as Goochland, or beyond, and then moving up to the railroad and destroying it as close up to the city as possible, in the same manner I had done towards Lynchburg, I felt convinced I would strike a hard blow at the means of supply to the rebel capital, and, to a certain extent, the army of northern Virginia, besides leaving the troops now concentrating at Lynchburg without anything to oppose them, and forcing them to return to Richmond.

This conception was at once decided upon, and Colonel Fitzhugh's brigade was ordered to proceed to Goochland and beyond, with instructions to destroy every lock upon the canal, and to cut the banks wherever practicable.

The next morning the entire command moved from New Market down the canal leisurely, completely destroyed the locks and the banks about the aqueducts, and in some places cut the banks which separated the river from the canal.

The rain and mud still impeded us, and the command, particularly the transportation, was much worn and fatigued; however, by replacing our worn-out mules with those captured from General Early's trains, and with the assistance of nearly two thousand negroes who attached themselves to the command, we managed to get along in very good shape, reaching Columbia on the evening of the 10th instant, at which place we were rejoined by Colonel Fitzhugh's brigade, which had destroyed the canal for a distance of about eight miles east of Goochland.

At Columbia we took one day's rest, and I here sent a communication to the Lieutenant General commanding the armies, notifying him of our success, position, and condition, and requesting supplies to be sent to White House.

My anxiety now was regarding my ability to cross the Pamunkey; I felt confident that the enemy would oppose me with a heavy force, and endeavor to prevent my crossing the river at the White House or vicinity. To go south of the Pamunkey river, and between it and Richmond, I regarded as too hazardous, as the railroad from Richmond to Gordonsville was still intact, and I was fearful that the enemy might use it to get on my flank and rear; General Custer was therefore directed to strike the railroad at Frederickshall; and General Merritt at Louisa Court House. General Custer was ordered to thoroughly destroy the track towards Richmond as far as Beaver Dam, while General Merritt did the same thing from Louisa Court House to Frederickshall.

While at this latter place Major Young's scouts from Richmond notified me of preparations being made there by General Longstreet to prevent me from getting to the James river, and that Pickett's division of infantry was coming back from Lynchburg, via the Southside railroad, as was also Fitz. Lee's cavalry, but that no advance from Richmond had yet taken place. I at once determined that there was no way to stop me unless General Longstreet marched his troops to the White House, or in that direction, but that I could prevent his doing so by pushing boldly on towards Richmond, as he would then be forced to come out and meet me near Ashland, when I could withdraw, cross the South and North Annas, and march to White House on the north side of the Pamunkey.

When General Custer struck Frederickshall Station, he entered so suddenly that he captured the telegraph office with all the despatches; among them was one from Lieutenant General Early to General Lee, stating that he had been

informed that Sheridan's forces were approaching Goochland, and that he intended to move up with 200 cavalry which he had collected together, and harass my flank. General Custer immediately ordered a regiment of cavalry in pursuit of this *bold* party, which in about two hours it overtook, attacked, and captured or dispersed in every direction, Lieutenant General Early escaping on a side road with five or six orderlies and two staff officers; he was, however, closely followed by a small detachment, and his staff officers captured, he barely escaping over the South Anna with a single orderly. The next day he made his way to Richmond, after a campaign in the Shenandoah valley in which he had lost nearly the whole of his army, together with his battle flags, nearly every piece of artillery which his troops fired upon us, and also a large part of his transportation.

General Custer, on the morning of the 14th instant, was directed to push down the Negrofoot road and cross the South Anna. He sent his scouting parties up to within eleven miles of Richmond, where they burned a hospital train. The object of this movement was to divert the attention of the enemy from the North and South Anna bridges, and bridges over Little river, which Merritt was ordered to destroy with Devin's division, Custer's main column meanwhile being held at the Negrofoot crossing of the South Anna. General Merritt was ordered to follow the railroad to Hanover Junction, cross the Little river, and go into camp on the north bank of the South Anna.

In the attack upon the railroad bridge over the South Anna, the fifth United States cavalry charged up to the bridge, dismounted, dashed across it, and drove away the company of artillery which tried to defend it, and turned their own guns—four 20-pounder Parrotts—upon them.

I here received a despatch from the Lieutenant General that supplies and one brigade of infantry awaited me at the White House; and captured the following despatch, which led me to doubt whether General Longstreet had yet determined in his own mind where I was going:

[By telegraph from Richmond.]

HANOVER JUNCTION, *March* 14, 11.25.

COLONEL HASKELL: General Longstreet desires you to follow the enemy if he goes east, until he crosses the Rapidan or Blue Ridge. If he goes towards the peninsula, follow as far as you can.

By order of Lieutenant General Ewell:

T. O. CHESTNEY, *A. A. G.*

The next morning General Custer was ordered to move by the Negrofoot crossing of the South Anna to Ashland, and General Devin was ordered to proceed to the same point; this developed the situation. The prisoners captured in front of Ashland reported Longstreet, with Pickett's and Johnson's divisions, and Fitz Lee's cavalry, on the Ashland road in the direction of Richmond, and four miles from Ashland. My course was now clear, and the feint successful; General Devin was quickly ordered to the north side of the South Anna, and General Custer was ordered to follow, leaving Colonel Pennington's brigade to amuse the enemy, cover his front, and gradually fall back.

The whole command was meanwhile ordered to cross the North Anna, and go into camp at Carmel Church, and at daylight take up the line of march for White House, via Mangohick Church.

I then knew I could get to White House before the enemy, and that he could not operate on the Chickahominy, as it would be too close to the lines of the Army of the James.

The enemy finding that he had made a mistake, moved rapidly during the night towards the Pamunkey, through Hanover Court House, but forgot his pontoon trains, and could not cross the river. It would have made no difference, however, as I then could have gotten to the White House without question.

At daylight on the morning of the 16th we leisurely resumed the march to White House, encamping at Mangohick church; on the 17th we marched to, and encamped at, King William Court House; on the 18th we reached Indiantown; and on the 19th, crossed the Pamunkey, at White House, on the railroad bridge which had been repaired by Lieutenant Colonel Babcock, of Lieutenant General Grant's staff. We here found supplies in abundance.

The amount of private and public property, collected for the use of the enemy, destroyed, and the destruction of lines of communication and supplies, was very great, and beyond estimation.

Every bridge on the Central railroad between Richmond and Lynchburg—except the one over the Chickahominy, and that over the James river at Lynchburg—and many of the culverts, were destroyed. The James River canal was disabled beyond any immediate repair.

There perhaps never was a march where nature offered such impediments, and shrouded herself in such gloom, as upon this; incessant rain, deep and almost impassable streams, swamps, and mud, were overcome with constant cheerfulness on the part of the troops that was truly admirable. Both officers and men appeared buoyed up by the thought that we had completed our work in the valley of the Shenandoah, and that we were on our way to help our brothers in arms in front of Petersburg in the final struggle.

Our loss in horses was considerable—almost entirely from hoof-rot. After re-fitting at White House, which occupied until the 24th, we resumed our march, crossed the Chickahominy at Jones's bridge, and arrived at and crossed the James river on the evening of the 25th of March, and, on the following day, by direction of the Lieutenant General, went into camp at Hancock's Station, on the railroad in front of Petersburg.

The whole number of prisoners captured on the march was about sixteen hundred, but some of them we were obliged to parole, as they were unable to keep up with the column, though after the first three days our marches did not average over eighteen miles per day.

To General Merritt, chief of cavalry; Generals Custer and T. C. Devin, division commanders; Generals Gibbs and Wells, and Colonels Fitzhugh, Capehart, Stagg, and Pennington, brigade commanders; my staff; and every officer and man of the first and third cavalry divisions, I return my sincere thanks for patriotic, unmurmuring, and soldierly conduct.

To Major H. H. Young, of my staff—chief of scouts—and the thirty or forty men of his command, who took their lives in their hands, cheerfully going wherever ordered, to obtain that great essential to success, *information*, I tender my gratitude; ten of these men were lost.

Our entire loss during the march did not exceed one hundred men, and some of these we left by the way-side unable to bear the fatigues of the march.

This report should be regarded as the preface of my report of operations in front of Petersburg and Richmond, as my command only rested one day before the commencement of that campaign.

I forward herewith list of prisoners captured and property destroyed.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. H. SHERIDAN,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Brevet Major General JOHN A. RAWLINS,  
*Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.*

*Consolidated report of property captured, and destroyed or issued, also battle flags and prisoners captured, by the 1st and 3d cavalry divisions of the army of the Shenandoah, from February 27, 1865, to March 28, 1865, in the raid from Winchester to White House, and thence to Petersburg, Virginia.*

3 large and deep breaches made in James River and Kanawha canal.	7 flour and grist mills.
46 canal locks.	1 cloth-mill filled with machinery in full operation, containing an immense amount of confederate gray cloth.
5 aqueducts.	3 cotton mills with machinery.
40 canal and road bridges.	1,500 pounds of wool.
2 naval repair shops with machinery.	35 bales of cotton.
2 steam canal dredges.	1 candle manufactory.
1 machine shop.	1,000 pounds of candles.
1 forge.	3 tanneries filled with hides and leather.
9 portable forges.	1,500 bushels of wheat.
1 lumber yard.	1,000 grain sacks.
1 foundry.	600 barrels of flour.
21 warehouses.	18 wagon loads of grain and commissary stores.
6 government warehouses.	1 jail at Goochland, used for imprisonment of federal soldiers.
606 hogsheads of tobacco.	225 ambulances and wagons.
500 kegs of tobacco.	98 wagons loaded with ammunition and stores.
58 boxes of tobacco.	75 beef cattle.
3,000 pounds of tobacco.	100,000 feet of bridge timber.
1 tobacco factory, valued at \$200,000.	1,500 cotton quilts.
336 sacks of salt.	1,000 pounds of bacon.
500 bushels of salt.	7 water tanks.
12 barrels of potash.	3,000 pounds of fixed ammunition.
29 canal-boats loaded with hospital, quartermaster and commissary stores, and ammunition.	A quantity of shell.
6 flat-boats loaded with commissary and quartermaster stores.	500 wall tents.
41 miles of railroad.	500 saddle trees.
10 railroad depots, with tanks, buildings, &c.	500 cavalry saddles.
400 feet railroad trestle work.	110 sides of harness leather.
4 railroad cars.	904 sets of harness.
23 railroad bridges, averaging 400 feet each.	1,000 shelter tents.
6 railroad culverts.	1,600 prisoners of war.
400 cords of wood.	3 pieces of rifled artillery.
27 miles of telegraph.	5 pieces of rifled artillery with limbers.
3,000 pairs pants.	9 pieces of rifled artillery.
2,000 shirts and drawers.	6 caissons.
50 kegs of powder.	1,900 small-arms.
500,000 rounds of rifle ammunition.	A quantity of small-arms.
1 barrel of oil.	60 carbines.
400 gross of buckles and rings.	16 battle flags.
3 saw-mills.	2 United States guidons.
	2,143 horses and mules.

REPORT OF OPERATIONS FROM MARCH 29, 1865, TO APRIL 9, 1865, INCLUDING THE APPOMATTOX CAMPAIGN, AND THE SUBSEQUENT MARCH FROM PETERSBURG TO THE DAN RIVER, AND THE RETURN.

CAVALRY HEADQUARTERS, May 16, 1865.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following narrative of the operations of my command during the recent campaign in front of Petersburg and Richmond, terminating with the surrender of the rebel army of northern Virginia at Appomattox Court House, Va., on April 9, 1865.

On March 26, my command, consisting of the first and third cavalry divisions, under the immediate command of Brevet Major General Wesley Merritt, crossed the James river by the bridge at Jones's landing, having marched from Winchester, in the Shenandoah valley, via White House, on the Pamunkey river.

On March 27 this command went into camp near Hancock Station, on the military railroad in front of Petersburg; and on the same day the second cavalry division, which had been serving with the army of the Potomac, reported to me, under the command of Major General George Crook.

The effective force of these three divisions of cavalry was as follows:

General Merritt's command, first and third divisions .....	5,700
General Crook's command, second division.....	3,300
	9,000
Total effective force.....	9,000

With this force I moved out, on the 29th of March, in conjunction with the armies operating against Richmond, and was, in the subsequent operations, under the immediate orders of the Lieutenant General commanding.

I marched by the way of Ream's station, on the Weldon railroad, and Malon's crossing, on the Rowanty creek, where we were obliged to construct a bridge. At this point our advance encountered a small picket of the rebel cavalry, and drove it to the left across Stony creek, capturing a few prisoners, from whom, and from my scouts, I learned that the enemy's cavalry was at or near Stony creek depot, on the Weldon railroad, on our left flank and rear. Believing that it would not attack me, and that by pushing on to Dinwiddie Court House I could force it to make a wide detour, we continued the march, and reached the Court House at about 5 o'clock p. m., encountering only a small picket force, which was driven away by our advance.

It was found necessary to order General Custer's division, which was marching in the rear, to remain near Malon's crossing, on Rowanty creek, to assist and protect our trains, which were greatly retarded by the almost impassable roads of that miry section.

The first and second divisions went into camp, covering the Vaughan, Flatfoot, Boydton plank, and Five Forks roads, all of which intersected at Dinwiddie Court House, rendering this an important point, and from which I was expected to make a cavalry raid on the South Side railroad, and thence join General Sherman, or return to Petersburg, as circumstances might dictate. However, during the night the Lieutenant General sent me instructions to abandon the contemplated raid, to act in concert with the infantry, under his immediate command, and to turn the right flank of Lee's army, if possible.

Early on the morning of the 30th of March I directed General Merritt to send the first division, Brigadier General Devin commanding, to gain possession of the Five Forks on the White Oak road, and directed General Crook to send General Davies's brigade of his division to the support of General Devin. Gregg's brigade of Crook's division was held on the Boydton plank road, and guarded the crossing of Stony creek, thereby, as I had anticipated, forcing the enemy's cavalry, which was moving from Stony creek depot to form a connection with the right of their army, to make a wide detour on the roads south of Stony creek, and west of Chamberlain's bed—a very fatiguing march in the bad condition of the roads.

A very heavy rain fell during this day, which aggravated the swampy nature of the ground, and rendered the movements of troops almost impossible.

General Merritt's reconnoissance developed the enemy in strong force on the White Oak road, in the vicinity of the Five Forks, and there was some heavy skirmishing throughout the day.

Next morning, March 31, General Merritt advanced towards the Five Forks with the first division, and, meeting with considerable opposition, General Davies's brigade of Crook's division was ordered to join him, while General Crook, advancing on the left with the two other brigades of his division, encountered the enemy's cavalry at a point a little north and west of Dinwiddie,



on Chamberlain's creek, making demonstrations to cross. Smith's brigade was ordered to hold it in check, and Gregg's brigade took position on Smith's right.

The advance of the first division got possession of the Five Forks, but in the mean time the 5th army corps, which had advanced toward the White Oak road from the Vaughan road, was attacked and driven back, and withdrawing from that point, this force of the enemy marched rapidly from the front of the 5th corps to the Five Forks, drove in our cavalry advance, and moving down on the roads west of Chamberlain's creek, attacked General Smith's brigade, but was unable to force his position. Abandoning the attempt to cross in Smith's front, this force of the enemy's infantry succeeded in effecting a crossing higher up the creek, striking General Davies's brigade of the second division, which, after a gallant fight, was forced back upon the left flank of the first division, thus partially isolating all this force from my main line covering Dinwiddie Court House.

Orders were at once given to General Merritt to cross this detached force over to the Boydton plank road, march it down to Dinwiddie Court House, and come into the line of battle. The enemy, deceived by this movement, followed it up rapidly, making a left wheel, and presenting his rear to my line of battle. When his line was nearly parallel to mine, General Gibbs's brigade of the first division, and General Irvin Gregg's brigade of the second division were ordered to attack at once, and General Custer was directed to bring up two of his brigades rapidly, leaving one brigade of his division with the trains that had not yet reached Dinwiddie Court House.

In the gallant attack made by Gibbs and Gregg, the enemy's wounded fell into our hands, and he was forced to face by the rear rank and give up his movement, which, if continued, would have taken in flank and rear the infantry line of the army of the Potomac.

When the enemy had faced to meet this attack, a very obstinate and handsomely contested battle ensued, in which he, with all his cavalry and two divisions of infantry, was unable to drive five brigades of our cavalry, dismounted, from an open plain in front of Dinwiddie Court House.

The brunt of the enemy's cavalry attack was borne by General Smith's brigade, which had so gallantly held the crossing of Chamberlain's creek in the morning. His command again held the enemy in check, with determined bravery, but the heavy force brought against his right flank, finally compelled him to abandon his position on the creek, and fall back to the main line immediately in front of Dinwiddie Court House.

As the enemy's infantry advanced to the attack, our cavalry threw up slight breastworks of rails at some points along our lines, and when the enemy attempted to force this position, he was handsomely repulsed and gave up the attempt to gain possession of the court-house. It was after dark when the firing ceased, and the enemy lay on their arms that night not more than one hundred yards in front of our lines.

The commands of Generals Devin and Davies reached Dinwiddie Court House without opposition, by way of the Boydton plank road, but did not participate in the final action of the day.

In this well contested battle the most obstinate gallantry was displayed by my entire command. The brigades commanded by General Gibbs and Colonels Stagg and Fitzhugh in the first division, Generals Davies, Gregg, and Smith, in the second division, Colonels Pennington and Caphart, in the third division, vied with each other in their determined efforts to hold in check the superior force of the enemy, and the skilful management of their troops in this peculiarly difficult country, entitles the brigade commanders to the highest commendation.

Generals Crook, Merritt, Custer, and Devin, by their courage and ability, sustained their commands, and executed the rapid movements of the day with promptness and without confusion.

During the night of the 31st of March my headquarters were at Dinwiddie Court House, and the Lieutenant General notified me that the 5th corps would report to me, and should reach me by midnight. This corps had been offered to me on the 30th instant, but very much desiring the 6th corps, which had been with me in the Shenandoah valley, I asked for it, but on account of the delay which would occur in moving that corps from its position in the lines in front of Petersburg, it could not be sent to me. I respectfully submit herewith my brief account of the operations of the day, the response to which was the ordering of the 5th corps to my support and my command, as also the despatch of the Lieutenant General notifying me of his action. [See communications Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, in the appendix.]

I understand that the 5th corps, when ordered to report to me, was in position near S. Dabney's house, in the angle between the Boydton road and the Five Forks road, and had General Warren moved according to the expectations of the Lieutenant General, there would appear to have been but little chance for the escape of the enemy's infantry in front of Dinwiddie Court House. Ayre's division moved down the Boydton plank road during the night, and in the morning moved west via R. Boisseau's house, striking the Five Forks road about two and a half miles north of Dinwiddie Court House. General Warren, with Griffin's and Crawford's divisions, moved down the road by Crump's house, coming into the Five Forks road near J. Boisseau's house, between 7 and 8 o'clock of the morning of the 1st of April. Meantime I moved my cavalry force at daylight against the enemy's lines in my front, which gave way rapidly, moving off by the right flank, and crossing Chamberlain's creek. This hasty movement of the enemy was accelerated by the discovery that two divisions of the 5th corps were in their rear, and that one division was moving toward their left and rear.

The following were the instructions sent to General Warren:

CAVALRY HEADQUARTERS,

*Dinwiddie Court House, April 1, 1865—3 a. m.*

Major General WARREN, *commanding 5th army corps.*

I am holding in front of Dinwiddie Court House, on the road leading to Five Forks, for three-quarters of a mile, with General Custer's division. The enemy are in his immediate front, lying so as to cover the road just this side of A. Adams's house, which leads across Chamberlain's bed or run. I understand you have a division at J. Boisseau's; if so, you are in rear of the enemy's line, and almost on his flanks. I will hold on here. Possibly they may attack Custer at daylight; if so, attack instantly and in full force. Attack at daylight anyhow, and I will make an effort to get the road this side of Adams's house, and if I do, you can capture the whole of them. Any force moving down the road I am holding, or on the White Oak road, will be in the enemy's rear, and in all probability get any force that may escape you by a flank movement. Do not fear my leaving here. If the enemy remains I shall fight at daylight.

P. H. SHERIDAN, *Major General.*

As they fell back the enemy was rapidly followed by General Merritt's two divisions; General Devin on the right, and General Custer on the left. During the day General Crook's division held an important position on the extreme left and rear, but was not seriously engaged.

I here determined that I would drive the enemy, with the cavalry, to the Five Forks, press them inside their works, and make a feint to turn their right flank, and meanwhile quietly move up the 5th corps with a view to attacking their left flank, crush the whole force, if possible, and drive westward those who might escape, thus isolating them from their army at Petersburg. Happily, this conception was successfully executed.

About this time General McKenzie's division of cavalry, from the army of the James, which consisted of about 1,000 effective men, reported to me.

I directed General Warren to hold fast at J. Boisseau's house, refresh his men, and be ready to move to the front when required; and General McKenzie was ordered to rest in front of Dinwiddie Court House until further orders.

Meantime General Merritt's command continued to press the enemy, and by impetuous charges drove them from two lines of temporary works, General Custer guiding his advance on the widow Gilliam's house, and General Devin on the main Five Forks road.

The courage displayed by the cavalry officers and men was superb, and about two o'clock the enemy was behind his works on the White Oak road, and his skirmish line driven in.

I then ordered up the 5th corps on the main road, and sent Brevet Major Gillespie, of the engineers, to turn the head of the column off on the Gravelly Church road, and put the corps in position on this road obliquely to, and at a point but a short distance from, the White Oak road, and about one mile from the Five Forks. Two divisions of the corps were to form the front line, and one division was to be held in reserve, in column of regiments, opposite the centre.

I directed General Merritt to demonstrate as though he was attempting to turn the enemy's right flank, and notified him that the 5th corps would strike the enemy's left flank, and ordered that the cavalry should assault the enemy's works as soon as the 5th corps became engaged, and that that would be determined by the volleys of musketry. I then rode over to where the 5th corps was going into position, and found them coming up very slowly.

I was exceedingly anxious to attack at once, for the sun was getting low, and we had to fight or go back. It was no place to intrench, and it would have been shameful to have gone back with no results to compensate for the loss of the brave men who had fallen during the day.

In this connection I will say that General Warren did not exert himself to get up his corps as rapidly as he might have done, and his manner gave me the impression that he wished the sun to go down before dispositions for the attack could be completed. As soon as the corps was in position I ordered an advance in the following formation, and the White Oak road was reached without opposition: Ayer's division on the left, in double lines; Crawford's division on the right, in double lines; and Griffin's division in reserve, behind Crawford.

While General Warren was getting into position I learned that the left of the 2d corps of the army of the Potomac, which was on my right, had been swung around from the direction of its line of battle until it fronted on the Boydton road, and parallel to it, which offered an opportunity to the enemy to march down the White Oak road and attack me in right and rear. General McKenzie was therefore sent up the Crump road with directions to gain the White Oak road if possible, but to attack, at all hazards, any enemy found, and, if successful, then march down the road and join me. General McKenzie executed this with courage and skill, attacking a force of the enemy on the White Oak road and driving it toward Petersburg. He then countermarched and joined me on the White Oak road just as the 5th corps advanced to the attack, and I directed him to swing round with the right of the infantry and gain possession of the Ford road at the crossing of Hatcher's run.

The 5th corps on reaching the White Oak road made a left wheel and burst in on the enemy's left flank and rear like a tornado, and pushed rapidly on, orders having been given that if the enemy was routed there should be no halt to reform broken lines. As stated before, the firing of the 5th corps was the signal to General Merritt to assault; it was promptly responded to, and the works of the enemy were soon carried at several points by our brave cavalymen, and his forces were driven from their strong line of works and completely routed, the 5th corps doubling up their left flank in confusion, while

the cavalry of General Merritt dashing on to the White Oak road captured the artillery, and turning it upon them and riding into their broken ranks so demoralized them that they made no serious stand after their line was carried, but took flight in disorder. Between 5,000 and 6,000 prisoners fell into our hands; the fugitives were driven westward and were pursued until long after dark by Merritt's and McKenzie's cavalry for a distance of six miles.

During this attack I again became dissatisfied with General Warren. In the engagement portions of his line gave way when not exposed to a heavy fire, and simply for want of confidence on the part of the troops, which General Warren did not exert himself to inspire. I therefore relieved him from command of the 5th corps, authority for this action having been sent to me before the battle, unsolicited.

When the pursuit was given up I directed General Griffin, who had been ordered to assume command of the 5th corps, to collect his troops at once, march two divisions back to Gravelly Church, and put them into position at right angles to the White Oak road, facing towards Petersburg, while Bartlett's division (Griffin's old) covered the Ford road to Hatcher's run. General Merritt's cavalry went into camp on the widow Gilliam's plantation; General McKenzie took position on the Ford road at the crossing of Hatcher's run.

I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of the troops in this battle, and of the gallantry of their commanding officers, who appeared to realize that the success of the campaign and fate of Lee's army depended upon it. They merit the thanks of the country and reward of the government.

To Generals Griffin, Ayres, Bartlett, and Crawford, of the 5th corps, and to Generals Merritt, Custer, Devin, and McKenzie, of the cavalry, great credit is due; to their subordinate commanders they will undoubtedly award the praise which is due to them for the hearty co-operation, bravery, and ability which were everywhere displayed.

[For a brief relation of the battle of Five Forks see communication No. 6, appendix.]

At daylight on the morning of April 2 General Miles's division of the 2d corps reported to me, coming over from the Boydton plank road. I ordered it to move up the White Oak road toward Petersburg, and attack the enemy at the intersection of that with the Claiborn road, where they were in position in heavy force, and I followed General Miles immediately with two divisions of the 5th corps. Miles forced the enemy from this position, and pursued with great zeal, pushing him across Hatcher's run and following him upon the road to Southerland's depot. On the north side of the run I overtook Miles, who had a very fine and spirited division and was anxious to attack. I gave him permission, but about this time General Humphreys came up, and, receiving notice from General Meade that General Humphreys would take command of Miles's division, (see communication No. 7, appendix,) I relinquished it once, and facing the 5th corps by the rear returned to Five Forks and marched out the Ford road toward Hatcher's run. I afterwards regretted giving up this division, as I believe the enemy could at that time have been crushed at Southerland's ford.

The cavalry had in the mean time been sent westward to cross Hatcher's run and break up the enemy's cavalry which had collected in considerable force north of that stream, but they would not stand to fight, and our cavalry pursued them in a direction due north to the Namozine road.

Crossing Hatcher's run with the 5th corps the South Side railroad was struck at Ford's depot without opposition, and the 5th corps marched rapidly toward Southerland's depot, in flank and rear of the enemy opposing Miles. As it approached that point the force of the enemy fled before it could reach them, and retreated along the main road running parallel to the Appomattox river, the cavalry and Crawford's division of the 5th corps engaging them slightly about dusk.

On the morning of the 3d our cavalry took up the pursuit, routing the enemy's cavalry and capturing many prisoners. The enemy's infantry was encountered at Deep creek, where a severe fight took place. The 5th corps followed up our cavalry rapidly, picking up many prisoners, five pieces of abandoned artillery, and a number of wagons, and, with Crook's division of cavalry, encamped that night at Deep creek, on the Namozine road; neither of these commands was engaged during the day.

On the morning of the 4th General Crook was ordered to strike the Danville railroad between Jettersville and Burke's station, and then move up toward Jettersville. The 5th corps moved rapidly to that point, also, as I had learned from my scouts that the enemy was at Amelia Court House, and everything indicated that they were collecting at that point. On arriving at Jettersville about 5 o'clock p. m., I learned without doubt that Lee and his whole army were at Amelia Court House.

The 5th corps was at once ordered to intrench, with a view of holding Jettersville until the main army could come up.

It seems to me that this was the only chance the army of northern Virginia had to save itself, which might have been done had General Lee promptly attacked and driven back the comparatively small force opposed to him, and pursued his march to Burkesville Junction. A despatch from General Lee's chief commissary to the commissaries at Danville and Lynchburg requiring 200,000 rations to be sent to meet the army at Burkesville was here intercepted.

So soon as I found that the entire army of the enemy was concentrated at Amelia Court House I forwarded promptly all the information I had obtained to General Meade and the Lieutenant General.

On the morning of April 5 General Crook was directed to send General Davies's brigade to make a reconnoissance to Paine's crossroads on our left and front, and ascertain if the enemy was making any movement towards that flank to escape. General Davies struck a train of 180 wagons escorted by a considerable force of the enemy's cavalry, which he defeated, capturing five pieces of artillery. He destroyed the wagons and brought in a large number of prisoners.

Gregg's and Smith's brigades of the second division were sent out to support Davies, and some heavy fighting ensued, the enemy having sent a strong force of infantry to attack and cut off Davies's brigade, which attempt was unsuccessful.

During the afternoon, and after the arrival of the 2d corps at Jettersville, which General Meade requested me to put in position, he being ill, the enemy demonstrated strongly in front of Jettersville, against Smith's and Gregg's brigades of Crook's cavalry, but no serious attack was made.

Early on the morning of April 6 General Crook was ordered to move to the left to Deaconsville, followed by Custer's and Devin's divisions of General Merritt's command. The 5th corps had been returned to the command of General Meade at his request. I afterwards regretted giving up this corps.

When near Deaconsville the enemy's trains were discovered moving in the direction of Burkesville or Farmville, escorted by heavy masses of infantry and cavalry, and it soon became evident that the whole of Lee's army was attempting to make its escape.

Crook was at once ordered to attack the trains, and was notified that if the enemy was too strong, one of the divisions would pass him while he held fast and pressed the enemy, and attack a point further on, and this division was ordered to do the same, and so on, alternating, as this system of attack would enable us finally to strike some weak point. This result was obtained just south of Sailor's creek, and on the high ground over that stream. Custer took the road, and Crook and Devin coming up to his support, sixteen pieces of artillery were captured, about 400 wagons destroyed, many prisoners taken, and three divisions of the enemy's infantry cut off from the line of retreat.

Meantime Colonel Stagg, commanding the Michigan brigade of the first division, was held at a point about two and a half miles south of Deatonsville; with this force, and a section of Miller's battery, which shelled the trains with excellent effect while Colonel Stagg demonstrated to attack them, a large force of the enemy was kept from moving against the rest of the cavalry, and held until the arrival of the 6th corps, which was marching to report to me. I felt so strongly the necessity of holding this large force of the enemy, that I gave permission to General Merritt to order Colonel Stagg's brigade to make a mounted charge against their lines, which was most gallantly done, the men leaving many of their horses dead almost up to the enemy's works.

On the arrival of the head of the 6th corps, the enemy commenced withdrawing. Major General Wright was ordered to put Seymour's division into position at once, and advance and carry the road, which was done at a point about two miles or two miles and a half from Deatonsville. As soon as the road was in our possession, Wright was directed to push General Seymour on, the enemy falling back, skirmishing briskly. Their resistance growing stubborn, a halt was called to get up Wheaton's division of the 6th corps, which went into position on the left of the road, Seymour being on the right. Wheaton was ordered to guide right, with his right connecting with Seymour's left and resting on the road.

I still felt the great importance of pushing the enemy, and was unwilling to wait for the first division of the 6th corps to get up; I therefore ordered an advance, sending word to General Humphreys, who was on the road to our right, requesting him to push on, as I felt confident we could break up the enemy. It was apparent, from the absence of artillery fire and the manner in which it gave way when pressed, that the force of the enemy opposed to us was a heavy rear-guard. The enemy was driven until our lines reached Sailor's creek, and from the north bank I could see our cavalry on the high ground above the creek and south of it, and the long line of smoke from the burning wagons.

A cavalry man, who in a charge cleared the enemy's work's and was captured, but who immediately afterwards escaped, reported to me what was in my front. I regret that I have forgotten the name of this gallant young soldier. \*

As soon as General Wright could get his artillery into position, I ordered the attack to be made on the left, and sent Colonel Stagg's brigade of cavalry to strike, and flank the extreme right of the enemy's line. The attack by the infantry was not executed exactly as I had directed, and a portion of our line in the open ground was broken by the terrible fire of the enemy, who were in position on commanding ground, south of the creek.

The attack by Wheaton's and Seymour's divisions was splendid, but no more than I had reason to expect from the gallant 6th corps.

The cavalry in rear of the enemy attacked simultaneously, and the enemy, after a gallant resistance, were completely surrounded, and nearly all threw down their arms and surrendered.

General Ewell, commanding the enemy's forces, a number of other general officers, and about 10,000 other prisoners, were taken by us. Most of them fell into the hands of the cavalry, but they are no more entitled to claim them than the 6th corps, to which command equal credit is due for the good result of this engagement.

Both the cavalry and the 6th corps encamped south of Sailor's creek that night, having followed up the small remnant of the enemy's forces for several miles.

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\* Since ascertained to have been private Wm. R. Richardson, company A, second Ohio veteran cavalry.

In reference to the participation of the 6th corps in this action, I desire to add that the Lieutenant General had notified me that this corps would report to me; that Major McClellan and Lieutenant Colonel Franklin, of General Wright's staff, had been successfully sent forward to report the progress of the corps in coming up; and that on the arrival of Major General Wright he reported his corps to me, and from that time until after the battle received my orders and obeyed them; still, after the engagement was over, and General Meade had communicated with General Wright, the latter declined to make his report to me until ordered to do so by the Lieutenant General.

On the 7th instant, the pursuit was continued early in the morning by the cavalry—General Crook in the advance. It was discovered that the enemy had not been cut off by the Army of the James, and, under the belief that he would attempt to escape on the Danville road, through Prince Edward Court House, General Merritt was ordered to move his two divisions to that point, passing around the left of the army of the James. General Crook continued the direct pursuit, encountering the main body of the enemy at Farmville, and again on the north side of the Appomattox, where the enemy's trains were attacked by General Gregg, and a sharp fight with the enemy's infantry ensued, in which General Gregg was unfortunately captured.

On arriving at Prince Edward Court House I found General McKenzie, with his division of cavalry from the army of the James, and ordered him to cross the bridge on the Buffalo river, and make a reconnoissance to Prospect Station, on the Lynchburg railroad, and ascertain if the enemy were moving past that point.

Meantime I heard from General Crook that the enemy had crossed to the north side of the Appomattox, and General Merritt was then moved on and encamped at Buffalo Creek, and General Crook was ordered to recross the Appomattox and encamp at Prospect Station.

On the morning of the 8th, Merritt and McKenzie continued the march to Prospect Station, and Merritt's and Crook's commands thence moved toward Appomattox depot, a point on the Lynchburg railroad, five miles south of Appomattox Court House.

Shortly after the march commenced, Sergeant White, one of my scouts, notified me that there were four trains of cars at Appomattox depot, loaded with supplies for General Lee's army. Generals Merritt and Crook were at once notified to this effect, and the command was pushed on briskly for twenty-eight miles.

General Custer had the advance, and on nearing the depot skilfully threw a force in rear of the trains and captured them. Without halting a moment he pushed on, driving the enemy (who had reached the depot about the same time as our cavalry) in the direction of Appomattox Court House, capturing many prisoners and twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital train, and a large park of wagons. General Devin coming up, went in on the right of Custer.

The fighting continued till after dark, and the enemy being driven to Appomattox Court House, I at once notified the Lieutenant General, and sent word to Generals Ord and Gibbon, of the army of the James, and General Griffin, commanding the 5th corps, who were in the rear, that, if they pressed on, there was no means of escape for the enemy, who had reached "the last ditch."

During the night, although we knew that the remnant of Lee's army was in our front, we held fast with the cavalry to what we had gained, and ran the captured trains down the railroad to a point where they would be protected by our infantry that was coming up.

The 24th and 5th corps, and one division of the 25th corps, arrived about daylight on the 9th at Appomattox depot.

After consulting with General Ord, who was in command of these corps, I rode to the front, near Appomattox Court House, just as the enemy in heavy

force was attacking the cavalry with the intention of breaking through our lines. I directed the cavalry, which was dismounted, to fall back gradually, resisting the enemy, so as to give time for the infantry to form its lines and march to the attack, after which to move off to the right flank and mount. This was done, and the enemy discontinued his attack as soon as he caught sight of our infantry. I moved my cavalry around the left of the enemy's line of battle, which was falling back rapidly, (heavily pressed by the advance of the infantry,) and was about to charge the trains and the confused masses of the enemy, when a white flag was presented to General Custer, who had the advance, and who sent me the information at once that the enemy desired to surrender.

Riding over to the left to Appomattox Court House, I met Major General Gordon, of the rebel service, and Major General Wilcox. General Gordon requested a suspension of hostilities, pending negotiations for a surrender then being held between Lieutenant General Grant and General Lee. I notified him that I desired to prevent the unnecessary effusion of blood, but as there was nothing definitely settled in the correspondence, and as an attack had been made on my lines with the view to escape, under the impression our force was only cavalry, I must have some assurance of an intended surrender. This General Gordon gave by saying that there was no doubt of the surrender of General Lee's army. I then separated from him, with the agreement to meet again, in half an hour, at Appomattox Court House.

At the specified time, in company with General Ord, who commanded the infantry, I again met this officer, and also Lieutenant General Longstreet, and received from them the same assurance, and hostilities ceased, awaiting the arrival of Lieutenant General Grant.

On the arrival of General Grant at, I think, between one and two o'clock p. m., an interview took place between him and General Lee, at the house of Mr. McLean. General Lee having been notified that General Grant was approaching, had come over into our lines.

After a very brief interview, the surrender of the army of northern Virginia was announced.

On the morning of the 10th I collected the cavalry, near Appomattox Court House, and at about 11 o'clock commenced my return march to Petersburg, the country in the vicinity of Appomattox Court House not being sufficiently abundant in supplies to furnish my command.

On the night of the 10th I encamped at Prospect Station; on the night of the 11th near Burkesville; on the night of the 13th at Nottoway Court House; and on the 18th reached Petersburg. While at Nottoway Court House (on the 15th) I received instructions from the Lieutenant General to prepare the cavalry for the movement to the assistance of General Sherman, who was then in North Carolina.

On the 22d of April I was notified by General Halleck, chief of staff, to move my command on Greensboro', North Carolina, and at the same time General Meade was ordered to turn over to me one of the army corps of his command.

On the same day General Wright, who, with his corps, (the 6th,) was at Burkesville, reported to me that his corps had been selected, and that he would immediately march out.

I at once gave him directions to proceed to Danville and there await my arrival.

On the morning of the 24th, the cavalry command having been fully equipped, marched out from Petersburg, on the Boydton plank road, via Dinwiddie Court House, Boydton, and Abbeville, and arrived at South Boston on April 28, the marches per day averaging twenty-five miles.

At South Boston the line of march intercepted the telegraph line, and I put myself in communication with General Halleck at Washington, and General Wright at Danville, and was informed that Johnston had surrendered, and that I could return to Petersburg.



From South Boston, had the march been continued, I would have crossed the cavalry over the Dan river at South Boston, and marched from there to a point on the Jonesboro' and Danville railroad, where the 6th corps would have been directed to form a junction with the cavalry, and a combined movement thence would have been made upon Johnston's army. This movement, however, not being necessary, I, on the 29th, relinquished command of the 6th corps, and moved the cavalry back to Petersburg.

During the march from Petersburg to South Boston, I found forage and supplies in abundance on the line of march; in fact, such was the case at every point south of the James river except at Appomattox Court House.

I am unable to give an account of my own or the enemy's casualties in this active campaign of ten days. My own were very heavy, as we engaged the enemy every day from March 31 to April 9, and with severe loss on both sides. The number of prisoners captured up to the evening of April 8 was over twenty thousand, and the number of the enemy who dispersed during the same period, throwing away their arms and leaving for their homes, must have been from ten to fifteen thousand. I think not less than ten thousand were captured at Sailors' creek, and not less than six thousand at Five Forks. The balance were captured at the eight or nine other engagements which took place.

No rest was given to the enemy, day or night, until the commander of the army of northern Virginia presented his flag at Appomattox Court House, and asked to be allowed to surrender.

It was my belief, when at Winchester, that a successful campaign on this line would insure the capture of General Lee's army, and when the movement was made, the gallant officers and men of the 5th and 6th corps, the first, second, and third divisions of cavalry, and the brigade of cavalry of the army of the James, who were under my command alternately, performed their duty well, as will be seen from the record.

The first and second cavalry divisions, which belonged to the army of the Shenandoah, had marched in mid-winter over three hundred miles in constant rains, over almost impassable roads and swollen streams, to participate in the campaign, and were rewarded by the honor of having the flag of the army of northern Virginia presented to them on the morning of the surrender.

To the officers of my staff, who on all occasions so essentially aided me, and to Lieutenant Colonel H. H. Young, my chief of scouts, I thus publicly return my sincere thanks.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. H. SHERIDAN,

*Major General United States Army.*

Brevet Major General JOHN A. RAWLINS,

*Chief of Staff.*

## APPENDIX.

### No. 1.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,

*Gravelly Run, March 30, 1865.*

GENERAL: If your situation in the morning is such as to justify the belief that you can turn the enemy's right, with the assistance of a corps of infantry entirely detached from the balance of the army, I will so detach the 5th corps, and place the whole under your command for the operation. Let me know as early in the morning as you can your judgment in this matter, and I will make the necessary orders.

Orders have been given Ord, Wright and Parke, to be ready to assault at daylight to-morrow morning. They will not make the assault, however, without further directions. The giving of this order will depend upon receiving confirmation of the withdrawal of a part of the enemy's forces in their front. If this attempt is made, it will not be advisable to be detaching troops at such a distance from the field of operations. If the assault is not ordered in the morning, then it can be directed at such time as to come in co-operation with you on the left.

Pickett's entire division cannot be in front of your cavalry. Deserters from Stewart's brigade of that division came into Humphrey's front this afternoon.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Lieutenant General.*

Major General P. H. SHERIDAN.

No. 2.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY,  
*March 31, 1865.*

GENERAL: My scouts report the enemy busy all last night in constructing breastworks at Five Forks, and as far as one mile west of that point. There was great activity on the railroad; trains all going west.

If the ground would permit, I believe I could, with the 6th corps turn the enemy's left or break through his lines; but I would not like the 5th corps to make such an attempt.

The ground is very soft west of the Boydton plank road. Scouts report no re-enforcements from Johnston.

P. H. SHERIDAN,  
*Major General U. S. A.*

Lieut. General U. S. GRANT,  
*Commanding the Armies of the United States.*

No. 3.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,  
*Gravelly Run, March 31, 1865.*

GENERAL: It will be impossible to give you the 6th corps for the operation by our left. It is in the centre of our line, between Hatcher's run and the Appomattox; besides, Wright thinks he can go through the line where he is, and it is advisable to have troops and a commander there who feels so, to co-operate with you when you get around. I could relieve the 2d with the 5th corps and give you that. If that is done, it will be necessary to give the orders soon, to have the troops ready for to-morrow morning.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Lieutenant General.*

Major General P. H. SHERIDAN.

No. 4.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY,  
*Dinwiddie Court House, March 31, 1865.*

GENERAL: The enemy attacked me about 10 o'clock to-day, on the road coming in from the west of Dinwiddie Court House. This attack was very

handsomely repulsed by General Smith's brigade of Crook's division, and the enemy was driven across Chamberlain's creek.

Shortly afterwards the enemy's infantry attacked on the same creek in heavy force, and drove in General Davies's brigade, and, advancing rapidly, gained the forks of the road at J. Boisseau's. This forced Devin—who was in advance—and Davies to cross the Boydton road, and General Gibbs's brigade, which was towards Dinwiddie, here attacked the enemy in the rear very handsomely.

This stopped his march towards the left of our infantry, and finally caused him to turn towards Dinwiddie and attack us in heavy force. He then again attacked at Chamberlain's creek, and forced Smith's position. At this time Capehart's and Pennington's brigades of Custer's division came up, and a very handsome fight ensued.

The enemy have gained some ground, but we still hold in front of Dinwiddie, and Davies and Devin are coming down the Boydton plank road to join us.

The opposing force was Pickett's division, Wise's independent brigade of infantry, and Fitz. Lee's, Rosser's, and W. H. F. Lee's cavalry commands.

Our men have behaved splendidly; our loss, in killed and wounded, will probably number 450 men. Very few men were lost as prisoners. We have of the enemy a number of prisoners.

This force is too strong for us. I will hold on to Dinwiddie Court House until I am compelled to leave. Our fighting to-day was all dismounted.

P. H. SHERIDAN,  
*Major General, U. S. A.*

Lieut. General U. S. GRANT,  
*Commanding the Armies of the United States.*

No. 5.

DABNEY MILLS,  
*March 31, 1865—10.05 p. m.*

Major General SHERIDAN :

The 5th corps has been ordered to your support. Two divisions will go by J. Boisseau's, and one down the Boydton road. In addition to this I have sent McKenzie's cavalry, which will reach you by the Vaughan road. All these forces, except the cavalry, should reach you by 12 to-night.

You will assume command of the whole force sent to operate with you, and use it to the best of your ability to destroy the force which your command has fought so gallantly to-day.

U. S. GRANT.  
*Lieutenant General.*

No. 6.

HEADQUARTERS OF CAVALRY,  
*Five Forks, White Oak Road, April 2, 1865.*

GENERAL : I have the honor to make the following report of our operations of yesterday :

At daylight yesterday morning I moved out, with all the cavalry, against the enemy's infantry in front of Dinwiddie Court House. On our advance, they fell back rapidly in line of battle. This sudden withdrawal was, in part, due to the advance of Ayres's division of the 5th army corps from the Boydton plank road. General Ayres was unable to get in the enemy's rear in time to attack as expected, owing to the darkness and bad roads, but his movement was sufficient to turn the enemy from the Five Forks road, and force him to cross Chamberlain's Bed.

Custer's and Devin's divisions of cavalry, under General Merritt, followed up the enemy with a gallantry that I have never seen exceeded, charging his infantry, and driving them from two lines of works, capturing prisoners from Pickett's and Johnson's divisions of infantry, as well as from the enemy's cavalry.

The enemy made a last stand at the Five Forks, behind a strong line of earth-works along the White Oak road.

After forcing him to this position, I directed General Merritt to push his dismounted cavalry well up to the enemy's works, drive in his skirmishers, and make him believe that our main attack would be made on his right flank.

In the meanwhile I had ordered up the 5th corps to within a mile of Five Forks, on the Dinwiddie Court House road, for the purpose of attacking the enemy's left flank and rear.

Between four and five o'clock, in accordance with these dispositions, the 5th corps moved out across the White Oak road, swinging round to the left as they advanced, and struck the enemy in flank and rear.

Simultaneously with this attack, the cavalry assaulted the enemy's works in front, in compliance with my orders to General Merritt, and the result of this combined movement was the complete rout of the enemy, with the loss of five pieces of artillery and caissons, a number of wagons and ambulances, and I think at least 5,000 prisoners, and several battle flags. Gregg's brigade of General Crook's division operated upon our left and rear, skirmishing with the enemy's cavalry. The two other brigades of this division remained in the vicinity of Dinwiddie Court House, guarding the trains and the crossings of Stony creek.

I ordered General McKenzie's division of cavalry, which reported to me in the morning, to the White Oak road, by the way of J. Bosseau's house, with instructions to advance in the direction of Five Forks.

When the 5th corps reached the White Oak road, General McKenzie joined its right, and in the attack swept around over the Ford Church road, cutting off this avenue of retreat to the enemy.

After the enemy broke, our cavalry pursued them for six miles down the White Oak road.

P. H. SHERIDAN,  
*Major General U. S. A.*

Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT,  
*Commanding the Armies of the United States.*

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No. 7.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*April 2, 1865—10 a. m.*

GENERAL: The enemy has abandoned his line in front of Humphreys, and is falling back to his own left, and said to be forming a little beyond Hatcher's run.

Humphreys is coming out on the Boydton plank, and Miles on the Claiborn road. General Humphreys has assumed command of Miles; the 5th corps is left to you. General Wright is moving down (south) the Boydton road, with General Ord covering his left. We presume you to be on the Cox and River road. If General Humphreys hears you engaged he will move towards you. If you hear him engaged you are requested to move towards him.

GEO. G. MEADE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General SHERIDAN.

Official copies:

P. H. SHERIDAN,  
*Major General U. S. Army*

REPORT OF OPERATIONS AND GENERAL INFORMATION OF THE CONDITION OF AFFAIRS IN THE MILITARY DIVISION OF THE SOUTHWEST AND GULF, AND DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF, FROM MAY 29, 1865, TO NOVEMBER 4, 1866.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,

*New Orleans, La., November 4, 1866.*

GENERAL: In compliance with your letter of instructions, dated October 4, 1866, I have the honor to make the following report of operations within the limits of my command since the 29th of May, 1865:

On the 17th of May, 1865, I was relieved from command of the middle military division, and assigned to the command of all the territory west of the Mississippi, and south of the Arkansas rivers, with directions to report to Lieutenant General Grant for instructions.

This territory embraced at that time within its limits the only organized rebel army left in the confederacy, which was under the command of the rebel General E. Kirby Smith, with headquarters at Shreveport, or vicinity, in the State of Louisiana.

My instructions from the Lieutenant General were: to operate against this command; to break it up or destroy it. For this purpose I was authorized to draw from Major General J. J. Reynolds, commanding the department of Arkansas, 12,000 men, and from Major General E. R. S. Canby, commanding military division of west Mississippi, 25,000 men; together with the 4th and 25th army corps, and a column of from 8,000 to 9,000 cavalry to be collected from Louisiana, West Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama. The aggregate strength of this force was about 80,000 men.

On the 29th of May I assumed control of this new command, designating it the military division of the southwest, with headquarters at New Orleans, Louisiana; and, at about the same time, received intelligence of the surrender of E. Kirby Smith, through commissioners sent from him to Major General Canby. This surrender was made, but bore upon its face double-dealing on the part of the rebel commander, or his agents, as the Texas troops declined to surrender, and had disbanded to their homes, destroying their magazines, and carrying with them arms and ammunition from the different arsenals; General Smith proceeded to Galveston, and from thence escaped to Mexico, in violation of the agreement he had bound himself to observe. This conduct on his part may have arisen from the fact that his real object in offering to surrender was, to get security for the Arkansas, Louisiana, and Missouri troops to return to their homes; knowing full well that the Texas troops did not intend to surrender, and that most of them had already gone to their homes, and that while they were destroying their arsenals and carrying home with them their arms, it was their constant boast that they were not conquered and that they would renew the fight at some future day.

Previous to the surrender, and in anticipation of the successful escape of Jefferson Davis, and his probable arrival in the trans-Mississippi department, it had been contemplated to organize a column of about 15,000 confederates at Marshall, Texas, for the invasion of Mexico. This scheme failed, perhaps from the capture of Mr. Davis; but while the main scheme of sending the 15,000 men to Mexico failed, numerous bands, squads, and parties, numbering perhaps 3,000 or 4,000 men, crossed the Rio Grande into Mexico.

In view of this and the troubles of our sister republic, and taking into consideration the fact that all our military projects during the war against Texas had been failures, and that on this account the Union people there had come to look upon the government as weak, it was determined to throw a large force into that State and along the Rio Grande border. The accomplishment of this purpose was accompanied with great labor from various causes, but it was successfully achieved.

Among the first difficulties were the inadequacy of the depot at this place for the requirements of the service to be accomplished, the absence of all mercantile marine, and the worthless character of most of the transportation held by the quartermaster's department here, for the purpose of crossing the Gulf, or entering the ports of Texas, the destruction of all the wharves at the ports in Texas, with the exception of Galveston, by the confederates, and the long line of communications to the points occupied in the interior, over which supplies had to be sent; and last but not least, the great reluctance of the troops—officers and men—to continue for a longer period in the service; they claiming that they had fulfilled their contract with the government, and that it was but just they should be mustered out.

The movement of the 13th corps had been ordered before I reached New Orleans. One division of it, under Major General F. J. Herron, proceeded to occupy the line of the Red river in Louisiana, and Marshall and Jefferson in northeastern Texas; one division, under Major General F. Steele, was under orders for the Rio Grande line; the third division, under Major General J. A. Mower, was ordered to Galveston, from thence to occupy the line of railroad from Galveston to Brenham, while Major General Gordon Granger, who was in command of the corps, was assigned to general command in Texas.

While these movements of the 13th corps were in progress, I was rapidly collecting at Alexandria, Louisiana, a column of cavalry about 4,500 strong, to be commanded by Major General G. A. Custer, and another column at Shreveport, Louisiana, about 5,000 strong, to be commanded by Major General Wesley Merritt. These cavalry columns were collected from different points in the States before mentioned, and were transported up Red river by steamboats, under great difficulties from the low stage of the water, and were organized into divisions, equipped, supplied, and prepared to march for their respective points of destination; Merritt's division to march, via Marshall, to San Antonio, and Custer's division, via Hempstead, to Austin, Texas; the columns marching nearly parallel to each other and something like a hundred miles apart.

These columns took with them a small pontoon train to cross streams on the line of march, and for the additional object of being able to cross the Rio Grande, should the government elect to send troops in that direction.

While the movements of the 13th corps and cavalry were going on, the 25th corps was embarked at City Point, Virginia, for the coast of Texas, to occupy the points of Indianola, Corpus Christi, Brazos Santiago, and the line of the Rio Grande, most of the corps, however, being sent to the Rio Grande line. Great trouble was experienced in the landing of the troops of this corps, in consequence of the bad harbors in Texas, the great draught of the vessels employed as transports, and the absence of suitable lighters to convey the troops across the bars.

While the foregoing operations were in progress, the 4th army corps, numbering about 10,000 men, with all its field transportation, arrived in New Orleans, having been ordered to report to me for service in Texas, and was transported as rapidly as possible to Indianola, and from thence to Victoria, and ordered to occupy the line from that point to San Antonio.

The troops on the line from Galveston to Austin were supplied with comparative ease, as the bar at Galveston offered no very difficult obstacle; the wharves, although in bad condition, still sufficed; the railroad to Hempstead and Brenham was in condition to transfer our necessary supplies, and from Brenham to Austin there was a passable wagon road.

The landing of the troops at Indianola was difficult on account of the dangerous bar, which had to be lightered over from the transports, and in consequence of the destruction of the wharves, the lightering had to be, in most cases, to the shore in small boats. Then when the troops were landed, there was no water for a distance of eighteen miles, and they had to be hurried over

this distance as soon as landed, and from thence to Victoria, where timber and water could be obtained in abundance. Victoria is distant from Indianola about thirty-five or forty miles.

After these difficulties had been overcome, it was found that the country between Indianola and Victoria was not passable for wagons in winter, and the railroad from Lavaca to Victoria had to be repaired at much labor and some expense, else the troops would have had to come back to their supplies at Lavaca and Indianola, where there was no water. I therefore ordered the railroad repaired, and after it was in running order sold it to the company, covering the cost of repairs. The wharf at Indianola had also to be built entire, and when completed, sold to cover the expenses incurred.

But on account of these obstacles, and especially the difficulty of crossing the outer bar, which is about twenty miles from the landing, some of the transports had to return to New Orleans or the mouth of the Mississippi river, for water for the troops and coal for the transports.

At Brazos Santiago the wharf had been destroyed, and many of the same difficulties occurred here, and some of the transports had also to return to the mouth of the Mississippi river and New Orleans for supplies of coal and water. The troops on this line were extended up the Rio Grande as far as Laredo, and along this frontier much the larger number of troops were placed. A wharf had to be built at Brazos, and at first the troops up the Rio Grande were supplied by small steamers, which we had sent to that river, but the difficulties of entrance at the mouth of the Rio Grande made this line very dangerous and precarious for the supply of the troops, as sometimes a transport could not cross the bar at the mouth of the river for nine or ten days. I therefore ordered the building of a railroad from Brazos to White Rancho, on the Rio Grande river—a distance of eleven miles—and this gave security to the supply of the troops. This railroad was afterward sold, at about forty thousand dollars (\$40,000) over the actual expense of construction.

All these difficulties in the movement of troops were overcome, and in a short period of time.

The effect of this large movement of troops on the destiny of imperialism in Mexico has not been fully appreciated by our people. It is, however, well known that while we were struggling for a republican existence against organized rebellion, and when nearly all the heads of the government in Europe (except Russia) wished, and did believe, that republicanism was not a success, the Emperor of the French undertook this bold expedition to subvert the republic of Mexico. There was no territorial question to be settled, and history will not excuse the attempted annihilation of a nation on the plea of non-payment of a million or two of debts due. There was no good excuse for the attempted violation of rights, and the history of imperialism in Mexico is only the history of the buccaneer Morgan on a more extended scale, who at one time captured and held Panama, on the isthmus, until he could hold it no longer. When this movement of our troops to Texas and the Rio Grande took place, we found the line of that river and all northern Mexico in the hands of imperialism—a government which collected no taxes, had no civil organization, and supported its partisans, soldiers, and civilians by levying contributions on the poor inhabitants. But the appearance of our troops, and the knowledge that friends were on the border, went like electricity to the homes and hearts of the Mexican people. The rebels who had escaped from our country received no sympathy, and in less than a year this hardy people, without money, without arms and munitions of war, and without supplies, have recaptured Matamoros, Camargo, Presidio de Rio Grande, Lampissas, Monterey, Saltillo, Monclova, Durango, Chihuahua, and in fact hold nearly all the country, putting the invaders on the defensive, and confining them to the valley of Mexico, with a fair prospect of their speedy extermination.

I have felt much interest in this event, because I have always believed that the occupation of Mexico was a part of the rebellion; and knowing that the contest in our own country was for the vindication of republicanism, I did not think that that vindication would be complete until Maximilian was compelled to leave.

The course taken by nearly every newspaper in the lately rebellious States was sympathy for Maximilian, and the sentiment of a large portion of the population was likewise; and so determined was this on the part of thousands of adventurers, that the Cordova emigration scheme was gotten up, which had for its object the formation of a Maximilian-American party, composed of confederates entertaining antipathy towards our government. Many of these, having no means, would have drifted into the army of Maximilian. I had to take strong ground against this emigration, and finally broke it up, refusing to permit emigrants to embark from the seaports within the limits of my command.

The effect of the presence of our troops in Texas and on the Rio Grande, as alluded to heretofore, on the destiny of imperialism, was great. It had not a friend among the officers or men from the highest to the lowest grade, and the effect was depressing in the extreme. So much so, that I am inclined to believe that had a demand been made for the withdrawal of the imperial troops, on the ground that the invasion of Mexico was a part of the rebellion, it would have been granted, and the miseries of that country for the last year avoided.

While the imperial troops held the line of the Rio Grande the strictest neutrality was preserved. Since they were driven away the same honorable neutrality has been preserved toward the liberal government.

The number of troops sent to Texas was about 52,000. Shortly after they had arrived and become somewhat settled, orders came for the muster-out of about 47,000 of this force, and the muster-out was carried on gradually and in accordance with our ability to bring them back, so that the movement may be considered as equal to a continuous movement of over 90,000 men over the most difficult line of operations which we have in the country. I make these remarks because I was under the impression at one time that the Quartermaster General did not fully understand the magnitude of the movement, or the natural obstacles in the way of its accomplishment, and we had to struggle for six months without funds, on the plea that the Brazos railroad was constructed without authority; in consequence, the public service was made to suffer by the denial of funds. I believe the Quartermaster General was influenced in this act by the representations of incompetent inspectors sent out to make reports.

The condition of civil affairs in Texas was anomalous, singular, and unsatisfactory. I found the provisional governor, backed by a small portion of the population, had for his standard of loyalty, "Abhorrence for the rebellion and glory in its defeat;" while his successor, as actual governor, had for his standard of loyalty, "Pride in rebellion; that it was a righteous but lost cause, being overpowered by the federal forces." Both of these representatives of the civil law, entertaining opposite standards for the loyalty of their subjects, I was required to support, and did it to the best of my ability, but it has been embarrassing in the extreme.

Governor Hamilton, the provisional governor, was clamorous for more troops, and, in several communications to me, asserted that the civil law could not be carried out; that freedmen would be killed and Union men driven from the State without military support, which I gave whenever it was possible. Governor Throckmorton, the present governor, wants all the troops moved from the settled portions of the State, asserting that the civil law was all right; that justice would be done to freedmen, Union men, and to our soldiers, in the courts. But justice is not done. To give you an instance of this: two soldiers were shot at Brenham, Texas, about two months ago; they were unarmed, and offered no provocation. The grand jury could find no bill against their would-be assassins,



but found a bill against Brevet Major Smith, 17th infantry, for burglary, because he broke into the house of some citizen in his attempt to arrest those men.

My own opinion is that the trial of a white man for the murder of a freedman in Texas would be a farce, and in making this statement I make it because truth compels me, and for no other reason.

During the last six months Indian depredations have taken place on the remote frontier. Their extent is not defined, as yet, but they are not very alarming, and I think the governor has, to some extent, been influenced by exaggerated reports, gotten up in some instances by frontier people to get a market for their produce, and in other instances by army contractors to make money.

I have ordered two regiments of cavalry to the frontier and placed a regiment of infantry at Austin, to be moved if necessary.

It is strange that over a white man killed by Indians on an extensive frontier the greatest excitement will take place, but over the killing of many freedmen in the settlements nothing is done. I cannot help but see this, and I cannot help but tell it to my superiors, no matter how unpleasant it may be to the authorities of Texas.

I will establish the frontier posts in Texas in the early spring. It was not done heretofore on account of having no available regular troops, and to have attempted it with volunteer troops, desirous of returning to their homes, would have involved an expense which I did not like to put upon the government.

In Louisiana there was about as much, if not more anomaly in civil affairs than in Texas:

Our depot was in New Orleans, which, from its geographical position, became the main depot of the Gulf States, and, in fact, the whole of the southwest. This place had necessarily been the headquarters of superior commanders, and, as many of them appeared to have more ability in civil than in military affairs, they left the results of that ability to be settled by myself and the subordinate officers of my command: questions of claims, semi-military and semi-civil, of every possible phase, and so numerous and complicated that, after a fair examination, I think that it will require one officer and ten clerks for over twelve months to brief and systematize what is yet left.

The settlement of such of those claims as have already come up has been a dead weight upon the legitimate military duties of my command. Then there was the accumulation at this place of material of war of every possible character, from ocean steamships down to pickaxes and spades, the disposition of which gave great labor, but, by keeping steadily at work, and by the good judgment of subordinate commanders and staff officers of the different bureaus, this depot is now reduced to the present wants of the service.

At the time of my arrival at New Orleans, as before alluded to, the civil affairs were much mixed up. Governor J. Madison Wells was legitimately holding the position of governor, but a new election was to occur in the summer or fall; and although, from the antecedents of the governor, who supported the federal authority, I had reason to expect good judgment, still, either on account of the approaching election, in which he was a candidate for re-election, or because he thought it best, he was filling a number of vacancies in offices throughout the State by returned confederates. I did not know this, as it was none of my business, until I learned it by the constant appeals made to me by men who were turned out to give place to new-comers, whom they did not think deserving, and I only speak of it now because it led, afterwards, to bitterness and the shedding of blood, in which the military were, to some extent, involved.

The governor was re-elected and the legislature met, but it was found that the governor had one will and the legislature had another; each hated the other, and trouble was sure to come.

Not only was the legislature in antagonism with the governor, but all, or

nearly all, the subordinate civil authorities in the State were against him. Many of these he had himself appointed. Then the governor commenced making appeals to the military authorities to support him; and when it was proper and legitimate, to serve the ends of justice, such support was given; but when it was to satisfy partisan or political purposes, it was refused, and the military assumed the position that politics was outside of the profession, and that it could not be called upon legitimately to serve the interests of either side. This bitter political feeling finally culminated in the massacre of the 30th July, 1866. I have thought, had I been in the city, this slaughter might have been avoided; but I did not expect it to occur, and was led to this belief by a conversation, about the first of June, held with Judge Durell, who was the president of the Louisiana convention of 1864, and who told me that he would decline to call it together. He asked if it could have military support. I said it could not; that I would not allow the military to be used for party purposes; but that if the parties in the State came into collision it would be my duty to maintain the peace of the country, inasmuch as I had believed for some time past that the safety of life and property did not rest with the civil authorities when there was any great disturbing cause.

In Florida there were no political issues involving the military authorities, although much annoyance occasionally came from arrests of officers and soldiers for acts alleged to have been committed during the rebellion. The people of Florida appeared to realize the fact that it would not make much difference to them what party was in power, and that their best interest was to take off their coats and go to work to repair the disaster of the rebellion.

On the 27th of June, 1865, the temporary military division of the southwest was abolished by the creation of the military division of the Gulf, which included the departments of Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Florida. These departments were, respectively, commanded by Major Generals Wright, Canby, Slocum, and Foster.

On October 7, 1865, the department of Mississippi was transferred to the military division of the Tennessee.

On May 22, 1866, Major General Canby, having been ordered to Washington, was succeeded by Brevet Major General A. Baird in the command of the department of Louisiana.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. H. SHERIDAN,

*Major General United States Army.*

Brevet Major General J. A. RAWLINS,

*Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.*



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REPORT

OF

BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES B. RICKETTS,

TO THE

HON. COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

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REPORT  
OF  
BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES B. RICKETTS,  
TO THE  
HON. COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

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242 G STREET, WASHINGTON, *July 18, 1866.*

SIR : It has recently come to my knowledge that, in the report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War relating to the "wounded from Front Royal, Va.," William A. Hammond, then Surgeon General, and Dr. David S. Hayes, then surgeon of the 110th regiment of Pennsylvania volunteers, both made unwarrantable statements with regard to my conduct; in proof of which I respectfully enclose a copy of my report called for by indorsement on the Surgeon General's letter of June 16, 1862, supported by seven letters and a copy of a letter from the War Department, exonerating me from censure.

Trusting you will take some steps to correct this record, which reflects on one who has had no other opportunity to explain, and has suffered too much from wounds and privations in the zealous performance of duty to be unmindful, at any time, of his comrades in the same great cause,

I remain, very respectfully, yours,

JAMES B. RICKETTS,  
*Brevet Brigadier General U. S. A.*

Hon. B. F. WADE,  
*United States Senator.*

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MANASSAS, VIRGINIA, *June 22, 1862.*

GENERAL : I have just received the letter of the Surgeon General, dated June 16, 1862, with your enclosures, on which I am required to make a "prompt and full report," to wit : The Surgeon General's letter supported by a copy of telegram from Dr. Hayes, which I answer by a letter from Dr. A. L. Cox, brigade surgeon, dated June 21, 1862, marked A ; two notes dated Front Royal, June 13, 1862, from my assistant adjutant general to Dr. Cox, brigade surgeon, explained by himself under date of June 21, 1862, marked B.

The other enclosure is a special medical order No. 50, headquarters Shields's division, dated Luray, June 11, 1862, not signed, and addressed to Surgeon Hayes, chief surgeon Brick hospital. This in no way concerns me.

REPORT.

On the 13th June, 1862, at my headquarters, one mile and a half from Front Royal, a surgeon (presumed to be Dr. Hayes) reported to me his arrival with a number of sick and wounded of General Shields's division, which he desired to turn over to me

Having no hospital, I told him it would be impossible; the sick had been ordered by General McDowell to Washington, and my division was under orders to move on the shortest notice, (see papers marked C, D, and E;) therefore his sick must be forwarded in accordance with his own instructions, marked F, and he must accompany them. I referred him to the provost marshal in Front Royal, who, from his report, (marked G,) did all in his power, and called to his assistance the proper medical officers.

In explanation of the notes to Dr. Cox: He was not senior medical officer, even if the brigade to which he is attached had been on duty in Front Royal, instead of a mile and a half from it. Dr. N. R. Mosely, brigade surgeon to Hartsuff's brigade, was the senior, and Hartsuff's brigade occupied the town. Therefore, when Dr. Cox delayed joining his brigade after breaking up his hospital, and assumed to be the senior medical officer, I feared he might also relieve Dr. Hayes, whose presence I considered necessary; and then caused the note to be written reminding him of his position.

All of which is respectfully submitted, and the Surgeon General's letter, with enclosures, herewith returned.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES B. RICKETTS,

*Brig. Gen. Vol., Commanding Division.*

General L. THOMAS,

*Adjutant General U. S. A., Washington, D. C.*

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A.

MANASSAS, VIRGINIA, *June 20, 1862.*

GENERAL: On the 13th instant, in immediate expectation of marching, I had closed the brigade hospital at Front Royal, by express order of Doctor Magruder, medical director of this department of the army.

At this moment I received from Doctor Bryan, medical director of General Shields's division, a communication requesting me as head of a hospital at Front Royal, to take charge of two hundred and eighty wounded men of that division.

All the medicines, surgical instruments, and other appliances were packed and nailed up in boxes for transportation. It was, therefore, absolutely impossible for me to afford the desired aid to the men, and I so represented it to Dr. Hayes, the surgeon who had them in his charge.

You had not verbally or by writing refused to allow me to attend the wounded of Shields's division.

Originally the hospital had but thirty-six beds.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ABM. L. COX, *Brigade Surgeon.*

Brigadier General RICKETTS.

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B.

HEADQ'RS SECOND DIVISION, DEP'T OF RAPPAHANNOCK,

*Near Manassas, Virginia, June 21, 1862.*

GENERAL: In relation to two letters of the date June 13, 1862, written in my official capacity to Dr. A. L. Cox, brigade surgeon first brigade of this division, while stationed near Front Royal, Virginia, I have the honor to state that my understanding of your instructions upon that occasion was that the correspondence related altogether to a point of discipline—the absence of the brigade surgeon from his duties without your permission. I have the honor further

to state that the town of Front Royal was in charge of Brigadier General Hartsuff, and Dr. N. R. Mosely, the senior medical officer on duty.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN W. WILLIAMS,

*Assistant Adjutant General.*

Brigadier General JAMES B. RICKETTS,  
*Commanding Second Division.*

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C.

FRONT ROYAL, June 8, 1862.

GENERAL: Special orders directing Hartsuff's and Duryee's brigades to march to Warrenton are hereby countermanded, and yours and Hartsuff's brigades are to go instead. The artillery, except the section now with Colonel Christian, and the cavalry, except a squadron, will accompany the two brigades. You will please to notify General Duryee of this change, and give him the necessary orders for his government. The ammunition here for your division should accompany it in wagons, which you can get on application to the depot quartermaster.

Very respectfully, general, your obedient servant,

ED. SCHRIVER,

*Colonel, Chief of Staff.*

Brigadier General RICKETTS,  
*Commanding Ord's Division.*

P. S.—General McDowell having directed the removal of all the sick and prisoners to Washington, you will please give orders to General Duryee to furnish the requisite guard for the latter.

E. S.

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D.

FRONT ROYAL, June 11, 1862.

GENERAL: In a telegram received yesterday from General McDowell, it is directed that as soon as General Banks's cavalry and artillery arrive at Front Royal, General Ricketts is to send his cavalry and artillery, by the nearest road, to Catlett's.

Nothing is said about the movement of infantry, and therefore the existing orders are to govern. My understanding is that the two other brigades (Duryee's having gone,) are to leave for Catlett's in the cars, as soon as the troops from Banks's command shall arrive here to relieve them, the presence of two brigades in Front Royal being considered necessary by the Secretary of War.

I go to Manassas at 11 o'clock to-day, and now renew my request that you keep a guard at Mr. Cook's house for his protection; also, that the officer who will be in charge after you leave be made acquainted with this wish, which I know is General McDowell's.

The general also directs that all persons at Front Royal belonging to Shields's command (stragglers and foot-weary men) be brought by rail to Manassas, thence to Catlett's. These men will be forwarded by the provost marshal, and he ought to have instructions about the general's directions, which I will ask you to communicate.

I enclose a communication just received from General Crawford, and a copy of my reply, which concerns your movements.

Very respectfully, general, your obedient servant,

ED. SCHRIVER,

*Colonel, Chief of Staff.*

Brigadier General RICKETTS,  
*Commanding Division.*



## E.

[By telegraph from Manassas, 4 p. m. June 12, 1862.]

*To General Ricketts :*

Major General McDowell wishes you to hold your division constantly ready to move at the shortest notice to Luray.

ED. SCHRIVER,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

## F.

HEADQUARTERS SHIELDS'S DIVISION,  
*Luray, Virginia, June 11, 1862.*

DOCTOR: I have been ordered by General Shields to forward all the sick and wounded of this division to Front Royal. If you cannot take care of them you will please see that they are sent on to Washington, or the nearest point where they can be properly cared for.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY BRYAN,  
*Medical Director.*

Senior MEDICAL OFFICER,  
*Front Royal, Virginia.*

MANASSAS, VIRGINIA, *June 20, 1862.*

The above was received by me at Front Royal, on the 13th instant, and is now placed by me in General Ricketts's hands.

ABM. L. COX,  
*Brigade Surgeon.*

## G.

CAMP NEAR MANASSAS, *June 21, 1862.*

SIR: In reply to your question as to the facts concerning the reception of the wounded of General Shields's division at Front Royal, I would respectfully report the following :

General Hartsuff was military commander of the town, and I was appointed provost marshal by him to relieve Major Shedd. Early on the morning of the 13th instant a note was put into my hands requesting me to prepare accommodations for 260 wounded men of General Shields's division. I immediately ordered two hotels and a church cleared for the reception, and sent to Doctor Mosely, of General Hartsuff's brigade, acquainting him with the facts. Soon the wounded arrived, and were placed in the quarters provided by me. Dr. Hayes called upon me, and I told him I would give him all the aid in my power to make them comfortable. I offered to draw rations for them, furnished them with clean straw, all the beds in the hotels being in requisition, and also provided the surgeon with brandy, which I had just seized, as a stimulant. During the day Dr. Mosely, accompanied by Surgeons and Assistant Surgeons Hayward, Nordquist, Whitney, Chaffin, Kendall, and Colby visited them, and assisted in dressing their wounds. The next day they were sent to Alexandria.

I believe they were as kindly cared for in Front Royal as they could have been. Every effort was made that I could possibly make to supply them with necessaries for their comfort, and I have never heard that they suffered from neglect at Front Royal. I should state that we were under marching orders at the time, and expected momentarily to be relieved.

The reason for my sending to Dr. Mosely was the fact that I knew him to be a humane man and a skilful surgeon, and I did not know the post surgeon, as I had been in Front Royal but a short time. In fact I supposed Dr. Mosely to be in command of that department.

All of which is respectfully submitted:

JAMES L. BATES,  
*Captain Co. H, 12th Reg't Mass. Vols.,*  
*Provost Marshal, Gen. Hartsuff's Brigade.*

JOHN W. WILLIAMS,  
*A. A. G., Gen. Ricketts's Brigade.*

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WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
*Washington, July 23, 1862.*

SIR: Your report dated the 22d ultimo, concerning the wounded men of General Shields's division, transmitted to this Department, has been submitted to the Secretary of War, who is of the opinion that neither yourself nor Dr. Cox are amenable to censure under the circumstances.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. THOMAS,  
*Adjutant General.*

Brigadier General JAMES B. RICKETTS,  
*U. S. Vols., Comd'g, &c., Front Royal, Va.*



COMMUNICATION  
OF  
NORMAN WIARD,

ADDRESSED TO THE

*Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, upon the subject of great guns.*

FEBRUARY, 27, 1865.—Referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs and ordered to be printed.

*To the Honorable Committee on the Conduct of the War,  
United States Senate:*

1. Since the battle of Solferino, when rifled cannon were first actively put in use, all the nations liable to a state of war have been straining every nerve to improve their ordnance, and hence their improvements in the means of defence, and the experiments conducted to produce large rifled guns were cotemporary with the experiments in iron-clad ships. Modern warfare, therefore, with large rifled guns and iron-clad ships, is in its infancy, although large smooth bores and wooden ships have an earlier date; their general use in service began with the present rebellion, and, at this date, the large gun of either class, not liable either to the accident of enlargement of the bore or bursting has not yet been made; while of rifles we have none over 30-pounders that have not proved utterly unsafe, except a few 60-pounder Parrott's, untried in battle, and some experimental 50-pounders which have been made, but never put in service.

2. As field rifle guns were successfully used before the rebellion, it appears that no improvements have been made in large guns during the war, whilst every other branch of inventive genius has been successfully keeping pace with the march of the revolution in science and mechanics.

3. We can, and we should have guns to answer the purpose of their creation equally with agricultural instruments.

4. What farmer would continue to use a plough, if it were liable to burst and blow him and his team to atoms? Private enterprise overcomes these difficulties, why does not the government likewise?

5. At Fort Sumter, in the beginning of the rebellion, the only casualty was by the bursting of a gun. In the attack on Fort Fisher all the casualties in the fleet resulted from the same cause. At the bursting of every gun more or less life is lost, beside the sacrifice of property, and owing to the reticence of the departments but a small percentage of the numbers that burst, and the losses sustained by the government, are published. Those we hear of in the newspapers generally come from some literary, but unscientific reporter.

6. Eighteen large rifles were disabled on Admiral Porter's fleet at Fort Fisher, yet the Secretary reported to Congress but five; and recently a board

convened by the Ordnance bureau of the navy to investigate the subject reported twenty-one burst altogether out of 703 in service, while their own tables show thirty-four, and the last report of the chief of the bureau exhibits 1,005 at that time available. The board likewise suppresses the truth in not reporting that of the 703, 483 were twenty and thirty pounders, which were not of the classes under contemplation or liable to burst.

7. I have had twenty-five years' experience in manipulating iron, and all the talent or inventive faculty I have resulting from that large experience has been for three years entirely devoted to this subject. The chief of the Ordnance bureau has said that I have great experience, much inventive talent, and am a great mechanic; yet I was not allowed to give any information to that board. Mr. Horatio Ames was here, and has the reputation of being one of the most extensive iron manufacturers with experience of this subject in the country, and who had made a 50-pounder wrought iron gun, that they could not burst, yet he was not allowed to testify, nor Mr. Hotchkiss, another very efficient ordnance mechanic. Only Mr. Parrott, the maker, was heard. Hence your honorable committee can see why no improvements are made in guns. The departments persist in shutting out the light. The reason they do so is likewise apparent.

8. In the navy, some years since, a young lieutenant, of considerable talent, much ambition, with a remarkably fine address, exhibited great aptitude for ordnance. The country being at peace, he worked without rivalry, except in an officer sustaining about the same relation to the army. They were each more or less successful, owing to the general ignorance on this subject, and at the birth of this rebellion each was the autocrat of ordnance in their respective branches of the service, and their different systems were covered by patents: the one the Dahlgren navy gun, cast solid in a mass double the weight of the gun, chipped off, and bored out in the lathe; the other, the Rodman army gun, cast hollow, and cooled from the centre with water. It is doubtful if at this period Europe had so far advanced as we. But they have kept on while we have stood still, utterly, disgracefully still, so far as the departments are concerned. The mechanical talent of the country has had no encouragement, although private foundries have been employed to make these guns, but not to make other or better ones. This being the result of the influence of these two patentees, whose systems became so deeply rooted in the minds and interests of those connected with ordnance and the bureau.

9. An opinion of Robert Mallet in the preface to his great work on ordnance is apropos to this subject; he says: "There are those who affirm that all that relates to the fabrication or improvement of artillery belongs properly to the officer of artillery or of engineers, and that he alone is qualified to treat of or to direct such, and to these some apology may seem fitting for meddling with matters deemed so purely professional. To superior knowledge, wherever found, I willingly defer, and recognize the great ability and brilliant attainments of very many within the scientific corps of our army, among whom I reckon some honored friends, but I cannot admit the preceding doctrine, nor do I believe it possible that, under the existing conditions of military education and life, or perhaps under any others consistent with its primary necessities, commissioned officers can attain that varied, comprehensive, and accurate scientific and practical knowledge, and that educated physical tact which long experience in technical matters alone confers, to the extent that civil life permits, and which the education and occupation of the civil and mechanical engineer create and empower. '*Non omnia possumus omnes.*' Experience proves it to have been of necessity so always and in all countries."

10. Who have been the great improvers, if not the creators of the science of gunnery itself? A long list of illustrious men, in civil life—Tartaglia, Galileo,


Cassini, Marriotte, Hawksbee, Robins, and Hutton, while many of the most important practical details applied to the military art have also come from men such as Forsythe, a country clergyman, the inventor of the percussion lock, to which we may add the following names of Americans: Sharpe, Colt, Treadwell, Dickinson, Hotchkiss, Doremus, Professor Barnard, James, &c.

11. The first efforts at heavy guns were in wrought iron, and they have, from a very early period, been tried in every conceivable shape, but always burst. James II, of Scotland, was killed by one of a pair made by an artist of his day, and the other of the pair burst at a later time. A large wrought-iron gun burst on board the Princeton, killing Mr. Upshur, a member of the cabinet; in fact, they have in every instance failed.

12. After them came a series of bronze guns; then cast-iron was tried for a while, after which wrought-iron built up guns, fabricated with more skill than had previously been bestowed upon them; yet they failed, for 1,476 Armstrong guns, or parts, were returned for repairs up to July, 1862. Then cast-iron again cast solid, the same as the Dahlgren system, which was in turn abandoned for cast-iron banded guns, (Parrott's system.) The English government burst or rejected 356 of this kind, and they were abandoned as old iron in 1862, following after or coeval with which came guns cast hollow as by Colonel Rodman. Not one of these systems has stood the test of battle, and most of them not that of proof.


13. The Dahlgren gun has exhibited better endurance in proof than any other large gun, yet Dahlgren only allowed limited charges of powder fired from them, and that behind spherical shells; they could not stand a charge commensurate with the size of the gun, with a solid shot, especially under rapid firing. Although the gun is so made as to secure a quality of porosity to the interior metal, which can be heated inside without being expanded to sufficient extent to break the dense surrounding metal, under slow firing, as used in proving and ordinary practice: as, for example, the finger may be inserted into a sponge without rupturing the outside, while a needle cannot be inserted into a cake of ice without causing radiating cracks; and the effect on this gun under heavy firing would be similar to the effect of powder in rock blasting. "The rock is somewhat compressible and of brittle texture; the pressure of powder

enlarges the diameter of the hole by compressing the material immediately surrounding it; then first, suppose the bore two inches in diameter to be so enlarged as to start two cracks on opposite sides to a depth of two inches, the gases of powder enter these cracks, acting then upon a surface six inches wide. If the pressure in the bore, two inches in diameter, was before sufficient to induce cracks two inches wide each side, when the pressure acts upon six inches the cracks will be increased six inches in addition on each side, making eighteen inches width of surface upon




which the pressure acts to continue the fracture further."

"If we make equidistant circular marks on the end of an India-rubber cylinder, and stretch it, we can see plainly how much more the inside is strained than the outside or even the intermediate parts. The spaces between the marks will become thinner, each space becoming less thin than that outside of it, and the inner space much thinner than the others, showing that when the inside is strained almost to breaking, the intermediate parts are doing much less work, and those far removed almost none.



India-rubber cylinder, with equidistant concentric marks.

15. LAW OF STRENGTH OF CYLINDERS.—“In the first volume of the ‘Transactions’ of the Institute of Civil Engineers, p. 133, there is a paper by Professor Peter Barlow, F. R. S., on the Strength of Cylinders. The law he deduces is, that ‘in cylinders of metal the power exerted by different parts varies inversely as the squares of the distance of the parts from the axis. Thus, in a 10-inch gun, when the inside, which is 5 inches from the axis, is fully strained, the metal 2 inches from the inside, or 7 inches from the axis, can only exert a force 25-49, or little more than half as much; 3 inches further, 10 inches from the axis, the force exerted diminishes to 25-100, or but a quarter of that exerted by the inside; and if the gun be 12 inches thick, the outside, which is 17 inches from the axis, can exert but 25-289, or about 1-12 as much power as the inside. Of course, casting the gun still thicker would add but very little to its strength; we cannot, therefore, be astonished that it has been found in practice that cylinders for hydraulic presses, with a thickness equal to about  $\frac{1}{2}$  the diameter of the piston, are very nearly as strong as if ten times as thick.



The same cylinder, stretched by internal pressure; the concentric marks show the inferior stretch of the exterior.

16. “In 1855, Dr. Hart, of Trinity college, Dublin, investigated the problem. His calculations (see note W., p. 259 of Mr. R. Mallet’s work on the Construction of Artillery) give the greater strength to the inner parts, but still less to the outer, than those of Professor Barlow. Both these gentlemen, as well as General Morin, and Dr. Robinson, the astronomer, who have also studied the question, agree that no possible thickness can enable a cylinder to bear a pressure from within greater on each square inch than the tensile strength of a square inch bar of the material; that is to say, if the tensile strength of cast iron be six tons per inch, a cylinder of that metal, however thick, cannot bear a pressure from within of six tons per inch.”

17. Hence the necessity of shrinking bands one upon another each with a certain pressure upon what it encloses to get a gun into the state of so-called “initial tension” necessary to its sustaining the greatest pressure from within possible to a given thickness of wall, which as applied to a hydraulic press cylinder is correct, but for a gun it is a fallacy, the effect of the expansion of the interior by the heat of the powder not being taken into the account.

18. These solid or hollow-cast guns are thus useless against armored ships, which is now the means of defence to which our means of offence must be adapted.

19. The Navy Bureau design adopting the Rodman system of casting hollow and cooling from the centre, thereby admitting their want of confidence in the Dahlgren plan. Yet this will increase their weakness against the expansive force of heat engendered in battle firing. For it has been seen that the Dahlgren 11-inch gun is not capable of enduring heavier charges than 15 pounds of powder and a hollow shot, and that only safe under slow firing, principally because of its porosity inside, whereas if it is cast hollow as in the Rodman plan, and cooled from the centre, although it will stand occasional heavy charges better than the other, and have more enduring surface to the bore, it must burst when fired rapidly, even with small charges, thereby rendering it entirely inefficient for actual service. For the inevitable effect of the system is to produce an initial tension to the verge of rupturing, rendering them certain to explode by the force of the metal expanding, when quickly heated from the interior; in fact one of the Rodman guns burst itself on cooling in the foundry at Pittsburgh, before it was taken out of the pit.

20. There are the only three systems of casting guns recognized by the departments, and it has been clearly proven that they are all worthless. Of the

classes of guns that have, up to this date, been fabricated, those of cast iron are of three kinds: the Dahlgren gun, cast solid, the Rodman gun, cast hollow, and cast iron guns banded round the breech with wrought iron.

21. Of wrought iron and steel guns there are three kinds: those made from solid forged masses, as by Wiard in 1861, by Krupp of soft steel, and by Ames of wrought iron. Those that are barrel-banded, as by Armstrong, Blakeley, Whitworth and Treadwell, and staves with bands, as proposed by Mallet, and practiced from the most ancient times. Bronze guns are only used for small calibres. Each kind of material fabricated can be used with success, in making small guns, but for large guns, although made in the same manner, they invariably fail when subjected to the actual conditions of service, and at this time no absolutely safe large gun is to be found in any service in the world.

22. That this failure is due to other causes than inability to withstand the pressure of the gases of the powder, may be found in the fact that a steel gun, with a tensile strength of 120,000 pounds to the inch of section, exhibits less endurance under rapid firing than a cast-iron gun of the same calibre, form, and size, with a tensile strength of 18,000 pounds. Or 8-inch cast-iron guns made from metal having a strength of 38,000 pounds to the inch of section, have less endurance than a gun of like calibre and form of which the iron has a tensile strength of only 27,000 pounds.

23. The following extract from Rodman's work on ordnance, pages 137 and 138, (erasing the repetitions of the words *solid-cast* whenever they occur,) fully illustrate this principle." It is not deemed out of place here, in order to show the necessity of further investigation into the properties of cast-iron, in its application to the manufacture of cannon, to notice some facts in the history of gun foundering in this country since 1849.

24. The very low endurance of the first pair (8-inch) of experimental guns which were cast in that year, was attributed to the inferior quality of the iron of which they were made. Two years were spent in searching after a better quality of iron, which was undoubtedly found; and in 1851 another pair of 8-inch guns was cast.

25. The iron in this pair of guns has a tenacity of near 38,000 pounds, while that of the iron in the first pair was only between 27,000 and 28,000 pounds. The gun of the first pair burst at the 85th fire, and that of the second pair at the 73d fire; the superior iron giving the inferior gun.

These results did not, however, destroy confidence in strong iron for guns, and the first pair of 10-inch guns was made from the same lot of iron; and with a tenacity of iron of 37,000 pounds the gun burst at the 20th fire. This result weakened confidence in very strong iron, and the tenacity was reduced. In 1857, after guns of good tenacity had failed at Fort Pitt, South Boston, and West Point foundries, four out of seven guns offered for inspection at the last named foundry have burst in the proof.

26. Mr. Parrott, proprietor of the West Point foundry, one of our most experienced gun founders, cast his trial contract guns of iron having a tenacity of 30,000 to 32,000 pounds. One of these guns has endured 1,000 service charges of 14 pounds powder, (800 rounds with shell, and 200 with shot.) The iron selected at that foundry, and from which the last five experimental guns have been made, was of the same quality, and in the same proportion as in the guns last above referred to.

27. In 1858, after the failure at the 169th fire of the West Point experimental gun made from this iron, Mr. Parrott condemned it as being too high for heavy guns.

28. And again, "these facts to my mind are conclusive as to the fact that we are at present far from possessing a practical knowledge of the properties of cast-iron in its application to gun foundering; and it is too much to expect of private enterprise to take up and prosecute so intricate and expensive an inquiry." Thus



we see how recently the author of the system of casting hollow acknowledges his ignorance of casting iron, and I venture to say that neither bureau knows more to-day. Colonel Rodman's plan of hollow casting provides well for the pressure of the powder in a gun, but the gun that is in the best state to resist the pressure, viz. by initial tension, is in the worst state to resist the unequal expansion from the heat of firing; the same holds good in a wrought-iron gun.

29. Built up guns of all kinds are better able to withstand *pressure* than solid forgings or castings, as has been heretofore and will be hereinafter more fully explained; but such guns must be made of soft ductile iron that will stretch, so thus be disabled and need repairing or they will be burst by unequal heating.


30. The tensile strength of gun metals is usually only tested by simple extension of length, or of one of the dimensions undergoing which extension other dimensions are reduced. It is not known how the tensile strength of a sample would be affected if force was applied to extend all its dimensions at the same time. As for instance, take a hollow cylinder of which the area of cross section is known and subject it to a pressure of liquid on the interior, having *only* the tendency to enlarge its dimensions *radially*, while the measured force of the instrument by which its tensile strength was being measured, was applied to extend its length only. Or have the forces acting to enlarge the diameter *pulling* from the outside instead of *pushing* from the inside, it would undoubtedly be found that while subjected to such additional forces the extension or rupture would be accomplished with less force. For the attraction of cohesion acts with greater energy as the faces of crystals or atoms are near or distant, in the same ratio as the shadow of a screen upon a wall from a point of light increases or diminishes in superficial area as the screen is moved toward or from the light.

31. Hence the more dense the sample, of cast-iron from remelting, or greater time in fusion, the greater the tensile strength, when the initial tensions within the mass of the sample, from unequal cooling or heating, do not affect the result; the extension of length would require more force, because the faces of crystals are not all perpendicular to any axis. The strength of metals in large masses is much less than in small ones, owing to initial tensions.

32. If we produce a homogenous ball of wrought or cast-iron, and subject it to repeated heating and cooling, it becomes larger in dimensions, and may, by continuing the process, be made distinctly hollow. Upon heating it the outside receives the heat first, enlarging the interior—the dimensions of masses of metals may be enlarged or separated by the application of sufficient force, indefinitely; while the dimensions of a mass cannot be materially reduced no matter what force is applied—at a later time when the interior is heated, the outside is enlarged, or receives what has been termed a "*permanent set*." Again, in cooling the outside loses its heat first, being unable to compress the inner metal, (for the resistance to first increment of compression is about six times as great as the resistance to first increment of distension to give a permanent set;) it is distended by the inside cooling first, and receives permanent enlargement, and by repeating the process another enlargement occurs, and so on.

33. "One of the illustrations given by Lieutenant Colonel Clerk represents a 12-inch wrought iron cylinder,  $\frac{1}{2}$ -inch thick and 9-inch deep, after being heated to redness, and cooled by immersing its lower half in cold water—these operations having been repeated 20 times. The upper edge of the cylinder (in the air) did not alter; the lower edge (in the water) contracted 3-inch in the circumference, and at about one inch above the water-line the circumference was reduced 5.5 inch.

34. "The general effects noticed in the paper are a maximum contraction of the metal about 1 inch above the water-line; and this is the same whether the metal be immersed one-half or two-thirds its depth, or whether it be 9, 6, or 3 inch deep. With wrought-iron the heatings and coolings could be repeated from 15 to 20 times before the metal showed any signs of separation; but with cast-iron, after the fifth testing, the metal was cracked, and the hollow cylinder separated all round just below the water-line after the second heating. Cast-steel stood 20 heatings, but was very much cracked all over its




Wrought-iron cylinder, after 20 heatings and coolings surface.

35. "As respects the change of form of cast-iron and steel, the result was similar to that in wrought-iron, but not nearly so large in amount. Tin showed no change of form, there being, apparently, no intermediate state between the melting point and absolute solidity. Brass, gun-metal, and zinc showed the effect slightly; but instead of a contraction just above the water-line there was an expansion or bulging."

36. The following extract also from Holley's late work on ordnance and armor, page 352 and 353, illustrates this:


37. "The initial strains of large cylindrical forgings are, to some extent, deranged by a cause that operates so unfavorably in solid cast-iron guns—the cooling of the exterior first, and the consequent stretching of the interior. Mr. Clay acknowledged this difficulty before the defence commissioners, and stated that his new process, hollow forging, overcame it. Such a result actually occurred in the case of the Horsfall gun; a breach-plug or false bottom was placed in the chamber to cover a crack arising from this cause.

38. The masses were forged from puddled slabs of manageable size, "by slabbing up two or more large flat pieces, laying these upon each other, and welding them together into a rude sort of square prison, which was afterwards partially rounded down, at the corners, under the hammer.




39. Mr. Mallet, in the paper before referred to, gives the following facts and illustrations as to the cause of fissure: Two masses, about 2½ feet in diameter and 8 feet long, were forged for two 36-inch mortars, which Mr. Mallet was constructing for the British government. They were slightly tapered, and at one end there was a collar projecting 6 inches all round, and about 12 inches wide in the line of the axis, presenting laterally the general form shown.


40. These pieces were welded together, apparently, perfectly sound; but after they had become cold they were invariably found, upon borings being made into the centre, to have large rents internally, with jagged crystalline, irregular surfaces \* \* \*. At first it seemed probable that the rents due to cooling, now to be described, were found in the direction of the broad planes of the slabs; but more careful and exact examination proved that in more than one case, at least, these rents had undoubtedly been found across, or at right angles to those planes. The opposite faces of those rents were counterparts, and presented distinct evidence of having been torn asunder by contraction, from the centre towards the circumference, as the mass cooled."



41. Two of these rents are shown in the figures. "The limits of the fractures, as seen perpendicularly to their plane, were found to be generally as shown by the next figure. The ascertainable extent was from two to three feet along the axis, and usually rather more than half the extreme diameter of the mass in breadth, measured across the large end. The cracks were from a half to seventh-eighths of an inch open at the widest part in the centre, and passed off, at each extremity, to an indefinitely thin wedge."



42. In no case was there a trace of bad welding or of defective workmanship. They were clean fissures, presenting opposite surfaces of solid, sound metal, though rough by being torn asunder. In this conclusion Mr. Clay coincided. On consideration, it appeared that the phenomenon was simply due to contraction on cooling."



43. These silent and insidious effects of heat have to do with all our practical pursuits; and nothing in the science of natural philosophy is so little understood, or so necessary to be known, if we would work metals; we cannot ignore them if we would succeed; for they are the principal agents, not only during the fabrication of guns, but the effects must also be considered when we use them. We are not likely to avoid the difficulties in our way occurring through their agency in the fabrication of so large a mass of metal by chance; and of course less likely to avoid them, also in utilizing the gun after it is made, as a blind man may blunder into a labyrinth, but he could not be expected to blunder in and out again."

44. In the face of these well attested principles, so thoroughly known to practical founders, the Ordnance bureau act on the erroneous idea that guns burst from the explosive force of the gases only, and give their attention in the fabrication to counteracting this supposed difficulty; hence the further they proceed in this direction, the wider they are from the mark.

45. They do not seem to know that the heat engendered from the burning gases of gunpowder has any effect upon the gun.

46. No little amount of surprise is expressed by inexpert persons that the acknowledged difficulty of making large guns is not overcome by using strong materials, as, for instance, wrought-iron or steel in the place of cast-iron. Ordnance officers excuse this discrepancy on the plea of the impossibility of perfectly welding large masses, and no other reason is given, and often speak of the "mysterious force" of gunpowder. Professor Treadwell, of Cambridge, Massachusetts, shows distinctly how large guns may be made of these strong materials, and triumphantly points out, by calculations which cannot be disproved, that the *pressure* of gunpowder can be resisted by guns made upon his plan, even upon the supposition that the pressure is enormous; and that there are no fissures or tendency to them, but the reverse state of initial tension; but his imitators, in carrying out his theory, have failed as others have often done before; an evidence that the guns fail from some cause not understood, and other than the direct pressure of the powder. And hundreds of the heavy rifles of Admiral Dahlgren having been abandoned because of the liability to bursting; the large number of Parrott guns that have failed in service, and during proof; the spontaneous bursting of Rodman guns; the enlargement and fissures in solid forged guns; the mysterious and uncertain endurance of all built-up guns, by whoever made, either by bursting, distortion of the bands, or by enlargement of the inner tube, and stretching the bands if ductile, and breaking them if strong and hard; points to the absolute necessity that some new skill and class of ideas should be engaged upon the subject.

47. It is not a little gratification to American mechanics to believe that the state of the art in foreign countries has not kept pace with our own, notwithstanding the greater expenditure upon foreign ordnance, and that we have so clear a field, which we may enter, and distance all competitions, if we utilize the energy, genius, and skill of our artizans, not heretofore brought into requisition.

48. Cast-iron has heretofore exhibited greater endurance of surface to the bore in guns than any other material used. A 30-pounder Parrott fired on Morris Island endured 4,606 rounds before it burst, with a minimum abrasion of surface of bore and enlargement of vent. Its small size, thinness of wall, heated through more uniformly than a gun of thicker walls; and being fired slowly with intervals of fifteen minutes between the rounds, it was not exposed to the rupturing principle hereinbefore having been, and hereafter to be, more particularly described. The only enlargement of bore occurring in a cast-iron gun being within the limits of its elasticity, it recovers its original size and form after the force acting upon it has been expended. If the forces acting upon it is great enough to extend it beyond the limits of its elasticity, it is ruptured, having but little ductility. It will be shown that these qualities are most desirable in guns, and that cast-iron can be so used as to be absolutely safe from bursting, whether by heavy charges or by rapid firing, when of course its endurance of surface and cheapness is so much in its favor that it must be the material from which heavy guns are to be made hereafter.

49. When the steamship Great Eastern was launched, Braham or hydraulic presses were used of ten-inch calibre, and with ten inches thickness of walls of cast-iron, consequently these presses had the usual proportion of thickness of walls in a ten-inch gun. Ten-inch guns have been fired with double-shotted charges without bursting. These press cylinders burst as often as five thousand pounds pressure to the inch was applied on the occasion alluded to.

50 Major Wade and Major Hagner conducted experiments at Springfield armory, in which water pressure was applied at different points in the length of musket barrels. Twenty-five hundred pounds to the inch would permanently enlarge a musket barrel in the "thinnest part, near the muzzle, and five thousand pounds to the inch would permanently enlarge it in the strongest part," a result, says the report, never attained by the proof charges of powder and bullet. In these examples, five thousand pounds to the inch had a greater effect upon the barrels or cylinders, both of large and small sizes, and of wrought and cast iron, than the pressure of powder.

51. The parallelism of the bore of a wrought-iron gun is continually changing, affecting its range and accuracy—both disabling the gun and preparing it for an explosive bursting, by communicating to it initial tension, by enlarging the interior; in which state, if it is afterwards fired rapidly, it will burst like any other gun.

52. A gun is heated nearly the same with small charges of powder as with heavy, because, with a heavy charge the shot is ejected somewhat quicker, and, although the temperature of the gases is higher, the time of action is less.

53. Mr. Ames made eight guns before he produced one sound one, and he informed us that he expended \$90,000 to produce his first five 50-pounders. This is about the experience of every one making the effort, the cause of which is explained by the failure to comprehend that fissures occur at the time of fabrication from a cause that cannot be averted. I found them in all blocks of twelve inches in diameter and upwards, during my early efforts to produce reliable guns. Upon building up a large mass of forging, the last welds are the largest planes of weakness, (welds of all areas of surface being weaknesses.) If all the welds are longitudinal, the fissures will be lengthwise of the block. If transverse, as in the Ames gun, the fissures are most likely to occur around the bore. If the block is forged hollow, and partially cooled from the interior, the fissures will be in the centre of the mass, equidistant from the cooling surfaces, (proportional to the rate in rapidity of cooling.) This statement will be appreciated best by practical founders, who well know that the surface of castings may be sound while the centre is porous. The Dahlgren gun, cast hollow, has its porosity in the centre of the block. The Rodman gun, cast hollow, has an annular region of porosity, between the inner and outer surface, always located where the heat leaves the mass last, both in cast and wrought iron. The policy that only attempts to procure guns from those who do not know how to make them, will always result in ruin to the contractor, and disappointment to the government. No contractor can long continue to produce guns when receiving less than \$25,000 for a lot of five guns that cost \$90,000, as shown by an affidavit of Mr. Ames, and which is according to my experience.

54. Steamboat shafts, that are only examined on the outside, where they are always dense and perfect, may long continue to be produced and used, made in a faulty and uncertain manner, as all heavy forgings are of necessity made; but to make a gun that is to be bored out, exposing more surface to critical examination, and to the searching test of powder, is of questionable propriety, to say the least. The effect of powder upon the best and most minute welds of even the best quality of wrought iron is shown in a marked manner by the evidence of Mr. Anderson, superintendent of the royal gun factory, for Armstrong guns, before the select ordnance committee of the English House of Commons, as follows:

55. Question 1676, by Sir Frederick Smith: Will you be kind enough to state to the committee how the failures take place when your guns are under proof?

56. From what I have already said, you will see the tendency is for us to wish for a hard metal, in order to avoid indentation; *but the harder we get it, the greater is the liability for non-welding.* The chances are, when the iron is

hard, that some portion is unwelded, and then the powder acts upon that part of it, and very soon makes it appear worse, and renders it necessary to withdraw the interior of the gun, and put in another lining.

57. 1677. Will you explain to the committee how the unwelding can take place?

58. If you were to see the process performed, and to see it even in the turning lathe, you would think it was perfect; *but the powder soon shakes it up,* and shows the smallest defect.

59. 1680. In what part of the bore is the defect first seen?

Most in the vicinity of the bullet; the *pressure* of the gas indents the iron, (*see paragraphs 33, 34, 35, of this paper.*) We always leave the bore a little smaller, so as to enable us to enlarge it to the proper size by boring out afterwards.

60. 1690. Do you consider that it is possible to find any iron capable of resisting a heavier charge than that which has been lately used in the 300-pound guns?

61. No; we could not get a better iron for gun material; *we could get it harder, (i. e. with greater tensile strength,)* but still not better as a whole, at the present time, than what I have already stated.

62. It will be discovered by a careful study of the subject that this failure to comprehend the effect of heat upon the gun, when it is being fabricated, as well as when it is used, is the foundation of all the errors and misapprehensions connected with this intricate subject. If it were not for the unequal heating or cooling, the strongest and most rigid metal would make the strongest gun.


63. In England, as in this country, the fabrication of guns is intrusted to a class of men educated in college in the higher sciences, so far above the ordinary practical pursuits of life, that they have overlooked the real difficulty of the subject. They arrogate to themselves all knowledge on the subject they have in charge, and all the emoluments growing out of success. Hence practical men, who might have advanced the science of ordnance, have been deterred from giving attention to it. For myself, I find hearty corroboration of my views from the superintendents, foremen, and workmen in foundries, and have no doubt that I could get certificates from every skilful worker of metal on an extensive scale in the United States as to the correctness of my theories, and from each the relation of a familiar example that would show that they understood the effects of heat upon metal as I have been so long endeavoring to illustrate them.

64. The pressure of powder is undoubtedly uniform, and it is a folly to attribute greater pressure to it at one time than another, unless such accidents occur as not ramming the shot home, when the straining effect on the gun is said by some to be greater, or by using heavier projectiles, to overcome the *vis inertia* of which requires more nearly the entire effort of the powder.

65. It is undoubtedly true that the pressure upon a square inch of surface of a chamber filled with powder of one size will be the same as upon a like size or area of surface of a larger chamber also filled, and cast-iron chambers have endured charges of powder from which there was no escape of the gases, as well as where the gases escaped slowly, as through a small vent, which is positive evidence that the full pressure of the gases of powder can be restrained by cast-iron walls, whether the chamber be filled or partly full.

66. When gunpowder is fired from a gun two prominent phenomena are to be observed, the expansive force which ejects the shot, and the heat which results from the combustion of the powder.

Fig 1.



67. The effect of heat on metals is exhibited by a familiar experiment. Pour boiling water into a glass tumbler; the heat communicating more quickly to the thin sides than to the thick bottom, breaks the glass by the unequal expansion. If we wish the tumbler to withstand the sudden communication of heat, we must make it everywhere thin alike, so that the heat may pass through it, conducted uniformly and quickly. Hot water may then be poured into it with impunity. But if we wish it to

Fig 2.






Fig 3.




withstand a pressure of cold fluid, it will be necessary to make the walls in all parts equally thick; it will then withstand a considerable pressure on its interior surface, even if communicated suddenly. But if, after having prepared it to withs and the pressure, we wish to communicate a pressure accompanied by heat, as of a considerable height of column of melted metal, although the thickness of the walls would be sufficient to withstand the pressure, the heat communicated to the inner surface of the wall would expand it within the outer metal before the heat reaches the outside, and it would be broken by this unequal communication of the heat. Now, this unequal communication of heat has a similar effect upon large guns. This may also be illustrated by a glass model of a gun, which, although

strong enough to withstand a pressure on the inner surface of 400 pounds to the inch, would be broken by the insertion of a heated rod of iron of smaller diameter than the bore, even though so inserted as not to come in contact with its sides, and not accompanied by any pressure against the surface.


Fig 4



68. The fractures of large guns upon improved models, with a light chase and heavy re-enforce, that have burst with the service charges, are curiously alike in their direction, running through the centre of the breech and re-enforce to a point usually forward of the trunnions, and branching off at either side, generally breaking the gun into three great pieces. This direction of fracture holds whether the




gun has the outlines of the army columbiad, of the Dahlgren gun, or of the Parrot gun with its strong wrought-iron re-enforce, and whether the gun be made of steel or of cast-iron. It would scarcely be expected, when the



Dahlgren guns burst with the great thickness through the cascabel that the fracture would occur through that part where the metal has more than twice the thickness exhibited in the army columbiad, but this principal direction is usually the result.

69. Guns sometimes exhibit additional fractures to those represented above, and this occurs when the thickness of metal is continued further forward towards the muzzle, having the same effect as if a tire or strong band were placed upon the




gun at the place where the fracture usually branches off to either side, thus delaying the longitudinal fracture until the expansion lengthwise of the inner metal is great enough to cause the cross fracture. It may be said

then, in brief, that the fractures at right angles to the plane of the bore are caused by the lengthening of the inner metal about the bore by heat, while the outer metal remains the same length, or with less expansion of length, until ruptured, and that longitudinal fractures are due *principally* to the enlargement of the inner metal *by heat* in the direction of the diameter, or *radially*. If the gun be parallel all the way to the muzzle or banded, as by Parrott, the cross fractures will occur more frequently along the re-enforce, because in that part it is exposed to the highest temperature, and, consequently, the greatest expansion of length, while the band restrains radial expansion to some extent.


70. It is a corroboration of this theory that the guns of the Dahlgren model, with more than double the thickness of metal behind the chamber, though made of the strongest steel, should break in the same direction, forward of the trunnions, but sometimes exhibit only cross fractures (when made of cast-iron) to the rear of the trunnions. It is evident that the model is best in which the direction of the fracture is least uniform, but a properly constructed gun should not burst at all.

71. The gun without bands, however, is usually broken through the breech—the




strongest part of the gun—and beyond the range of the pressure, which is, of course, limited to the bottom of the bore or chamber. The diagram in Captain Rodman's book, page 43, exhibiting the various kinds of strain to which a gun is subjected at each discharge, considers the gun as if made up of staves, and really exhibits only the strain from the expansive force, or direct pressure of the powder, bending the staves outward; and page 47 of the same book, by diagram, the direction of fracture due to such strain, not through the breech, but running at an angle to the plane of the bore.

to which a gun is subjected at each discharge, considers the gun as if made up of staves, and really exhibits only the strain from the expansive force, or direct




72. To show that it is improbable that the direct pressure of the powder should be the cause of fracture, as exhibited by the gun actually broken by firing, prepare three plates of metal, say 4 inches thick, 12 inches wide, and 60



inches long, with plane surfaces; the middle one, on being heated to 1,600°, will be found expanded one-sixtieth part of its length, or will be 61 inches long. On placing it between the other two, a part of its heat is immediately communicated to their contiguous surfaces only. The expansion of one


surface of the outside plates, while the other surfaces remain cold, warps the latter to the form of a segment of a circle. Now, supposing them placed upon



the diagram of a burst gun, the metal of which has been heated by the combustion of powder, it is evident that the fracture in the particular direction exhibited must have resulted from the unequal expansion of the gun by heat. A narrow band



adjusted upon the middle of the length of the re-enforce thus curved by heat would not much hinder the fracture; if the band were wider, it would only cause the cross-fracture more frequently, as in the Parrott gun. A diagram exhibiting



these curves, the result of this expansion, will be exactly the opposite of the curves on the diagram by Rodman, and will account for the breaking of the gun through the

breech, beyond the range of the pressure made by the powder.


73. That the fracture almost always intersects the vent has been heretofore referred to the weakness resulting from drilling away part of the metal; but on page 355, Major Wade's Reports on Metals for Guns, we find that after a gun had been put to extreme proof, and exhibited signs of fracture, a hole was drilled one inch forward of the base ring, and four from the line of the vent, to a depth of four inches, and of the diameter of one and a quarter inch. The gun was then fired with double charges of powder, and with a bore full of balls and wads, eleven times, to bursting. Although the piece burst into more than twelve fragments, one of the fractures intersecting the vent, it did not split through the large hole, showing that the gun had strength to resist the pressure of the powder, but burst, notwithstanding the drilling away of so large a part of the metal, from the communication of heat. The true cause, probably, of the intersection of the vent by the fracture was the communication of heat to the surface of the vent, thereby expanding a column of metal about it; for it should be recollected that the passage of a large quantity of gases through the vent would communicate more heat to its surface than would be communicated if there was no current, but the capacity of the vent only filled. In that case not much heat would be supplied to the surface, because the quantity contained within the vent would be small.

74. But in this example, as in all others, as is well known to ordnance inspectors, the fracture began to exhibit itself on the interior surface of the bore. This would seem to prove that guns burst by pressure rather than by expansion of the inner metal—as if the inner metal were expanded by the communication of heat before the outer metal gave way; a strain of compression resisted by the strength of the outer metal would rest upon the inner metal of the gun, that would prevent inside cracks; and, undoubtedly, if it ever occurred to an ordnance officer to inquire whether the communication of heat to the inner metal of guns was the cause of their failure, the beginning of fracture on the inside would appear to him an argument against the theory. This I consider a critical point, but one directly favoring the theory. It requires a most familiar knowledge of the effects of heat, and careful recollection of time and place of all the phenomena, to comprehend and explain this part of the subject. If the gun were heated continuously from the surface of the bore, the greatest expansion would be immediately there. But we are to recollect that in the most rapid firing the surface of the bore is exposed to this high temperature only about one hundredth part of the time, while during the other ninety-nine hundredths the heat of the surface of the bore is radiating away. If the gun was of six inches diameter of bore, and eight inches thickness of metal about the bore, the range to which the heat would penetrate the metal at the first discharge would be about four inches; for heat enters metal with a velocity depending on the difference in temperature of the source from which it flows and the metal into which it is flowing. The heat is communicated to the *small* surface of the bore, while it is radiated from the *large* outside surface of the gun; from this cause, if from no other, the temperature would be much higher within the mass than on the outside.

75. The penetration from the first discharge being four inches, it might be supposed that the range of the heat from the next discharge would be greater; but heat having been communicated by the first discharge, the range of the

second is less, from the reduced difference of temperature. Although of course the heat flows onward, its motion is very slow. If, then, the first penetration be four inches at the distance of four inches from the surface of the bore, the temperature will be comparatively low—but little higher than that of the metal at four and a half inches from the surface of the bore. The heat, therefore, is conducted from the point of four to that of four and a half inches slowly; more slowly from that of four and a half inches to five, and with a continually reduced and very slow rate of motion to the outside. As the heat is communicated from one inner stratum to the strata surrounding it, for each inch of the increasing distance it travels, the mass of which the temperature has to be raised is greater in circumference also; this is another cause of the retardation to its motion outward.

Fig. 13.



Although for ninety-nine hundredths of the whole time the heat is radiating from the surface of the bore, the velocity with which it leaves is much less than the velocity with which it is received, because the difference in the temperature of the gun and the atmosphere occupying the bore is much less than the difference in temperature between the metal of the gun and the gases ejecting the shot by their pressure. The atmosphere occupying the bore receives the heat by radiation in the intervals between firing quickly from the immediate surface, and less quickly a little distance beyond; and so again the heat flows from the metal of the gun with reduced velocity as the distance increases from the bore, leaving the point of highest temperature in the mass of metal, but not far from the surface of the bore. (See Fig. 13.)

Its effect toward causing rupture may be illustrated by taking a cylinder of pine wood a few inches in length, and a cross-section like the diagram, and providing a wedge similar in form to a bayonet, but truly tapered to a point from a cross-section at the head, the same as the lines representing the place and quantity of heat on the diagram, showing its effects by *intermittent communication* of heat. (Fig. 13.) If the point of this wedge be set upon the end of the wooden cylinder at the point supposed to be the point of great heat, according to the theory above, and by a blow driven into the end-wood, it will penetrate so as to make an impression like the inner line of the diagram. A second blow, driving it further into the wood, penetrating as if to the second line of the diagram, and expanding the wood, will cause a fracture inward toward the surface of the bore first; a third or fourth blow will split it to the outside. And thus guns burst, the first fracture occurring on the inside, and afterward opening to the outer surface.



76. In Rodman, Plate II, Fig. 2, is shown the interior line of fracture of a 10-inch columbiad. Here a thin bit of metal, indicated by the line marked , is shown, which seems nearly to envelop the bore. Nearly one-half the re-enforce was broken off this gun in the same manner as chips break off a stone door-cap when the building is burning; but in this example the outside of the stone is first heated, while the inside remains colder. The outward pressure of the powder at the time of this fracture would surely have carried away so thin a piece of metal; but it remains standing to show that the pressure had been reduced before the gun broke—

Fig. 15





a remarkable evidence of the true cause of the bursting of the gun. The diagram exhibiting the place and quantity of heat shows but little heat at any surfaces of the gun. From this, also, we may have been hitherto deceived as to the importance of the study of its effects, and we can only appreciate it by some experiments like the following: a clean rifled musket, the barrel of which weighed about five and a quarter pounds, was fired twelve times with the ordinary charge, at intervals of five minutes between each discharge. The time during which the surface of the musket was radiating away the heat from beginning to end was, therefore, about one hour. At the end of this time its temperature was  $200^{\circ}$ . The radiation was somewhat hindered by the wood of the stock, which was a non-conductor, partially enveloping the barrel, and the burnished surface of the barrel, which was a non-radiator. The whole amount of powder was less than one ounce, and it communicated this great amount of heat to five and a half pounds of metal. There would be a material difference in the amount of heat communicated in this experiment if the barrel were not clean inside, as the residuum of powder would be a non-conductor, and would prevent its communication to the metal of the barrel. The temperature of the gases in a large gun, say a 100-pounder rifled cannon, would be much greater than in a musket; and its effect towards heating the gun would be greater from the longer term of exposure to the high temperature. The work of the powder in a gun is to overcome the inertia of the shot, and to do this it presses against a certain number of inches of area. If the shot be short the pressure is still exerted against the same area. The projectile in a 100-pounder rifle gun is twelve inches in length, while the projectile from a common rifled musket is less than one inch in length. The resistance from the inertia would be thus about twelve times as great in the large gun as in the small one, and the expansive force or pressure, and consequently the temperature, high in proportion.

77. From the fact that solid-cast guns, of the largest size now in service, have a certain strain upon them within themselves when cast, from the heat leaving the inner metal last, which is relieved by the expansion of the inner metal by the first few discharges, I hold that solid-cast Dahlgren guns, or any columbiads of large sizes, cast solid, may pass the inspection of ten service charges, and be stronger at the tenth discharge than they were at the first—that number of rounds perhaps being necessary to relieve them of the before-mentioned strain, by communicating the proper proportion of heat to place them in the same state in which we find the hollow-cast gun at the first round.


78. The guns in our service having great thickness of metal about the bore should not be relied upon in rapid firing, even when exposed to the hottest rays of the sun on their very large exterior surface—the most favorable circumstances under which a gun can be fired—and should never be fired at all, if a hollow-cast gun, with uniform density throughout the mass, in rain or in cold weather. It may sometimes happen that a hollow-cast gun, after the Rodman plan, would exhibit greater endurance than a solid-cast gun, made from the same metal and at the same time. At the time of the bursting of two large steel 50-pounder navy-guns of my fabrication, each at the ninth round, fired rapidly on a cold day at Staten Island, I suggested to the inspector either that the guns should be fired at longer intervals between the discharges, or that I should be permitted to give elasticity by drilling a series of small holes about the bore having a quincunx position relative to each other, and a

Fig 19




proper direction to permit the expansion of the inner metal without any undue strain upon the reinforce, as shown in the two sections above. Captain Rodman's book, page 297, exhibits the impossibility of casting a solid projectile, cavities

Fig 20



being formed in the centre of the mass, due to the shrinkage of the inner metal after the outer shell had frozen, so as to prevent any supply of metal to the centre thereafter; and this is related as the cause which led to the hollow mode of casting. These cavities do not occur of necessity in the centre of a casting, but of necessity in the centre mass at equal distances from the cooling surfaces if subjected to an equal rate of cooling; and they are to be found near the centre of the mass in the Rodman gun as well as in any other. Their presence

Fig 21




cannot be detected at any of the surfaces of the casting. *If they were generally distributed between the inner metal of the gun and the reinforce, a sufficient elasticity between these parts of the gun might be had, and*

*a similar result arrived at to that obtained by the drilling of the holes, proposed by me, as shown by diagram. Fig. 19.*


79. The 15-inch guns can be shown to be inefficient, for they only give a velocity of 750 feet per second; or they are unreliable (perhaps both) for they will burst as often as the accidental porosity above spoken of is not evenly distributed between the inner metal and the reinforce. And who can say when these condition are all fulfilled, except by a practice inaugurated by the man "who had the goose that laid the golden eggs," viz., BY CUTTING OPEN. By that practice, THE GUN THAT WE KNOW TO HAVE BEEN A GOOD GUN IS NO LONGER A GUN.

80. It is perhaps pertinent to this subject to consider that the gasses of gun-powder always have the same weight as the powder from which they have been evolved. A musket barrel is burst at the muzzle if the shot is carelessly inserted and not put down against the powder, by the momentum, it is supposed, or *vis viva* of the gasses, that, having weight and velocity, are projected against the bullet.



When a long rifled cannon is fired at a high elevation, the gun recoils backward on a plane, representing the deck of a ship, different from the plan of the bore. All bodies in motion resist a change of direction, in the proportion of 1-90th of their whole

momentum, for a change of direction of  $1^\circ$ . If one ivory ball of a pair, suspended to the ceiling by threads is projected against the other at rest, striking it at right angles  $90^\circ$ , the one in motion comes to a state of rest, communicating its whole momentum to the one before at rest. If the one at rest should be struck at angle of  $45^\circ$ , the ball in motion would have its direction changed  $45^\circ$  and it would give one-half its momentum to the other. Each would be projected the same distance. So, also, if the angle with which they came in contact was one degree, 1-90th of the momentum would be given to the ball at rest. The whole sum of the momentum of a shot projected from a rifled cannon, is very great. At the muzzle of the gun, the resistance to a change of direction is sufficient to overcome the preponderance of the gun. If the bore was crooked, the shot would not be much diverted, but the gun would be moved to conform to the direction of the shot, and many have noticed, when firing guns




on the ship-carriages, at high elevations, that the breech of the gun was raised, and came down again with a considerable blow on the quoin or elevating screw. If the chase of the gun is light, the muzzle will sometimes be broken

off, instead of overcoming the inertia of the gun, or lifting the breech suddenly, against the resistance of the preponderance.

82. This result would occur with more certainty if the whole interior metal of the gun were heated and expanded laterally and longitudinally, straining the gun to the extreme verge of its strength to resist. This example is inserted as one of the peculiarities of living force, as exhibited in gunnery, viz: resistance to changes of direction by bodies in motion, and to account for the failure of many of the Dahlgren and Parrott guns, from the breaking off of their muzzles, as has frequently happened since the war began.

83. In 1855 I made a heavy pile-hammer in Chicago, for a contractor on the Illinois and Michigan canal, which was removed from the mould in the foundry too early, and placed on a paving of brick on the deck of a canal boat for transportation to Joliette. It was so hot when put on board that it set fire to the deck about two hours after, while *en route*. In dashing water under it upon the deck, some was thrown upon the hot iron, cooling parts in advance; at a later time when the heat left the interior, it burst in two parts, and each piece was thrown to the bow or stern, and passing down through the bottom, sunk the canal boat. The report was heard two miles.


84. One of Blakely's first guns, as exhibited in the following diagram, failed by the longitudinal extension of the inner tube, and the bands between the trunnion ring and the cascabel. The gun was strengthened longitudinally by four bolts, reaching from the trunnion ring to a cascabel piece against the breech of the gun.



85. Captain Blakely says of this accident: "At this round the four bolts gave way—the four united being equal to a solid bar the size of the bore. *The rest of the gun was uninjured.* \* \* I had this gun re-made with four bolts of the best charcoal iron, but they, too, broke without injury to the tubular part."—*Paper read by Captain Blakely before the United Service Institution, England; vol. III, Journal.*


86. There is no way to account for this except by the extension of the length of that part of the gun sustained by the bolts, by heat; if the pressure of the powder had broken the bolts, the whole breech would have been shot away. It is satisfactory to us in this manner to learn that in England they do not know the cause of the failure of guns; we may thus now far excel them, if we utilize the knowledge we have.

87. The inner tube of the Whitworth gun shown in General Gilmore's report increased in length one inch, (shown marked *a b* on the cut,) by the heat communicated to it, and closed the vent. If the bands had been fastened by screw threads, as recommended by Prof. Treadwell, and by General Gilmore, the bands would have parted transversely as *d*' the bolts of the Blakely gun.




There are two views of this gun in General Gilmore's book, a slight mark on the reinforce would lead us to suppose the reinforce had been cracked transversely. It is strange that the other view should be one of the opposite side of the gun, and that nothing should be said of the crack.

88. A three hundred pounder Armstrong gun, in which the breech piece was inserted by screw threads within the principal reinforce band abutting against the inner tube of steel, was burst by the lengthwise expansion of the inner tube, pushing out the whole breech, breaking the reinforce band transversely, (cut on left side.) Compare this example with the Whitworth gun shown in General Gilmore's report and with those Parrott's that have failed at the breech, (see cut to right,) and see the analogy.




300 pounder Armstrong gun, breech pushed out by extension of inner tube. Par. 88.



Parrott gun breech forced out by same cause.

89. When a Parrott gun is strained radially as well as longitudinally forward and under the band by the heating inside, the reaction of the forces having a tendency to push out the breech also tend to push outward and forward the slab of the cast-iron reinforce that leaves the gun forward of the band or wrought-iron hoop, and in this effort the pressure of the powder assists; hence the forward reinforce fractures, and when the band also breaks, the cause is obvious.



90. An Armstrong gun, a banded tube, failed by the breaking of the outside band. If the pressure of the powder had broken it the parts would have been thrown off with projectile force.



81. Here we have five guns, exhibiting the effect of the expansion of the inner metal of guns by heat of the powder to the extent of rupturing them, and the most astute of our ordnance officers will find it difficult to account for the result in any other manner.

92. In the conclusion of this part of the subject, I repeat here what I have before said in the *Intelligencer*, to exhibit the danger of relying on the faulty guns we have now in service.

94. The Dahlgren gun is a shell gun, and is the most beautiful gun in any service in the world, but it is believed that more effective guns are now required for attack on iron-clad ships. The first Monitor was armed with guns of this class; and great reliance was placed on them in case that certain wrought iron solid projectiles, prepared for them, were to be used in any encounter with the *Merrimac*; but it is understood that the inventor forbade the use of the latter, even with the fifteen pound charge of powder. Lest his directions should not be obeyed, it is said that he caused them to be taken off the Monitor, while she was at anchor in Hampton Roads, and certain other hollow shots, covered with bronze, substituted. Shells broke against the sides of the *Merrimac*, inflicting no injury. Hence the *Merrimac* continued to be the terror to our army and navy for a long critical time. But for this we might have captured Richmond sooner than we did Yorktown; and who can conceive or estimate the cost of life or money that has resulted?

95. Other eleven-inch shells have been projected against iron sides without effect. We must have better guns than these to meet the requirements of modern naval warfare.

96. Next we have the Rodman fifteen-inch gun, cast hollow, and cooled from the interior, the object attained by which is to freeze the metal from its liquid state immediately surrounding the bore first. As the heat is nearly all withdrawn from the cast block through the surface of the bore, successive strata of the iron freeze and contract upon the stratum within it, having the effect to contract or squeeze it into smaller dimensions, both longitudinally and radially. In this manner the state of "initial tension" is attained in the gun, which makes it capable of resisting a greater pressure from within, having a tendency to rupture the wall or enlarge the bore of the gun; the necessity for which tension has been beautifully described and illustrated by Professor Treadwell, of Harvard, and by Captain Blakely, R. A., England. Although the longitudinal tension might be considered advantageous in assisting to resist the lengthwise pressure of the powder against the bottom of the bore or chamber of the gun, there is another rupturing force to be provided for, viz: the unequal heating when it is fired; for then this force has the tendency that cannot be resisted by any amount of strength in the gun to increase both the longitudinal and radial



extension, for the part even slightly heated becomes both longer and larger in diameter.

97. The Rodman gun, as cast at the great Fort Pitt foundry, is strained in this manner to the extreme limit of the elasticity of the outside metal, and to the extreme limit of compressibility of the inside metal, which is proved by the fact that one of them was ruptured at the above-named foundry, from end to end, before it was removed from the mould in which it was cast; and the fissure, occurring through a wall of iron sixteen inches thickness and about sixteen feet in length, remained in the close contract along the bore, while it was gaping along the outside wide enough for the insertion of the fingers. Like St. Rupert's drops, these guns are liable to fly into pieces on slight occasions. How wonderful it is that any of them endure firing at all.

98. If a tightly-fitting tompion happens to be placed in each of the large number of them mounted in the forts of New York harbor, when for some time the weather has been warm, and then changes suddenly to extreme cold, it is quite possible a number of them may be found bursted. The tompion would protect the surface of the bore from the change of temperature, which would dangerously contract the outside upon the inner metal. We have never noticed whether these guns are furnished with tompion or not. If they are, we would advise that they be not used.

99. Guns with "initial tension" can withstand more *pressure* than without. Consequently, a single very heavy charge can be fired from these guns without bursting them, while rapid firing, such as practiced in battle, will burst them even with small charges. When these guns are proved, as well as in target practice, they are fired slowly. If we ever have to resist the entrance to our harbors of a fleet of iron-clads each gun will have to be fired rapidly. What if they burst at that critical time? No fort or works on which these guns are mounted has ever been attacked. They have never been subjected to the test of actual battle, yet hundreds of them are being mounted on the works at the entrances to our most important sea-port, and we rest in fancied security because they look formidable.

100. Of those mounted in our turret-ships, we believe eight were in the encounter with Fort Fisher, and two of the eight burst under the most rapid firing they have yet been subjected to. The navy-charge for these guns is thirty-five pounds of powder, with a shell of three hundred and fifty pounds, or a shot of four hundred and fifty pounds, which is a very small charge, and usually they are fired once in fifteen minutes. The velocity of the shot is so low that the effect is not what was promised or expected of them. Of the only two shots we know to have hit the sides of an iron-clad, one struck the pilot-house of the Atlanta, and one struck the Tennessee, but neither accomplished much.

101. Twenty-three large Parrott guns burst on Morris Island in 1863, under General Gilmore, yet this alarming failure has not hindered the continuance of their supply. Before that time six had burst in the navy, beside a great number that were disabled, and in 1864 about thirty-three have burst in the navy, of which eighteen failed in Admiral Porter's fleet; perhaps there were more, for the admiral reported that all the rifled guns in the fleet had burst. At the time of the encounter with the iron-clad Albermarle, it was reported that one hundred-pound Parrotts were useless against plating with ten pounds of powder. Now it is proposed to reduce the charge to eight pounds, which must vastly diminish their value.

102. The Parrott gun embodies "initial tension" also under the band. When fired rapidly the inner metal is expanded lengthwise and radially; when so strained a slight shock will break it. The rapid firing off Fort Fisher was too much for them.

103. On Morris Island, the guns were fired mostly at high elevations; under such circumstances the pressure and temperature of the gasses is higher, and

the time of the action of the force and heat is longer for each discharge; consequently less rapid firing bursts the gun.

104. The 30-pounder that endured four thousand six hundred rounds was a small gun, and was heated more nearly uniform throughout because of the thinness of the walls, and because of the long intervals between the rounds, which was fifteen minutes.

105. Built-up guns, like the Armstrong or Whitworth guns, although capable of enduring heavy charges, fail with rapid firing.

106. Guns forged solid, like the two guns on the United States steamer Princeton, and the Ericsson thirteen-inch gun burst because it is impossible to attain uniformity of fabrication, and because of the unequal expansion. The Ames gun, although somewhat more uniform, cannot be absolutely so, and will either burst or enlarge in the bore.

107. No absolutely safe gun has ever yet been made; yet, undoubtedly, we can have such guns, if we first learn the cause of failures. The Naval Board, appointed by the Ordnance bureau, report that they are unable to decide why they burst. This conclusion was to be expected, as they were neither practical mechanics nor inventors. The business of designing guns has usually been confined to such persons, and the facts upon which to found correct theories, upon which to base invention, have also always been kept a profound secret. It has been light literally hid under a bushel.

108. The subject deserves and should receive the immediate attention of Congress, for our dignity, unity, and power as a nation depend upon it.

109. I have shown that no large gun ever made could be pronounced a good one until it was burst or cut open. Yet I believe that it is possible to so construct a gun that not a single trial shot need be fired for the purpose of demonstrating its good qualities.

110. When I proposed to show that the heat evolved from the burning powder in a gun was the principal agent in bursting, I found ordnance officers opposed the theory, on the ground that but little heat was communicated to guns. This was said to me by Major Wade, by Captain Rodman, and indirectly by several others occupying high positions. Major Wade, however, afterward told me he recollected having seen copper melted by the heat of powder, at a time when a few kegs of powder exploded in a powder mill. Captain Rodman, in a part of his book before quoted, speaks of higher temperature exhibited when larger masses of powder are burned in a 11-inch gun than in a 7-inch, as accounting for three times more force in the larger gun than in the smaller; and Captain Dahlgren, in his report to the Secretary of the Navy for 1862, says a gun was so heated by firing that it was afterward eighteen hours in cooling.

111. In the report of Brigadier General E. W. Crofton, Royal Artillery, from headquarters Tein Tsin, China, 9th September, 1860, we are informed that on the 21st August preceding, at the capture of the Peiho forts, "the vent pieces, after about twenty-five rounds, became so hot that they had to be changed, and at the end of the firing (85 rounds) both vent pieces were so hot as to be inconvenient in handling." "No clogging or other hindrances in loading took place, except from the excessive heating of the vent piece. And Major Hay reports to the same office, 6th September, 1860, referring to another battery: "The vent pieces become so hot that it is difficult for a man to hold them; some non-conductor of heat round the neck appears to be necessary."

112. Now I have never claimed that heating a gun would burst it, or that cooling it would burst it; but that heating or cooling one part of the gun to a certain extent, while the rest of the gun was at the opposite state of temperature, would burst it, and the extent of this unequal expansion necessary to burst the gun must be greater than the elasticity and ductility of the metal of the gun provides for

113. Professor F. A. P. Barnard, attached to the coast surveys, in a letter, says, "Speaking of my theory and the pressure of powder, I do not think that your theory needs the support of that consideration pushed to the extent to which it is apparently carried in your pamphlet, while there is no strength whatever which can be possibly given to a cast-iron gun which the immense force arising from unequal expansion by heat may not be sufficient to overcome."

114. Of wrought-iron guns that at present are most conspicuous is that of Mr. Ames. He claims three qualities for his guns. First, that it is made of a superior, strong, and tough, or ductile iron, the Salisbury; secondly, that it is homogeneous; and thirdly, that it has fibre transverse around it, in the direction best disposed to resist the pressure of the powder. It is made by welding disks or cross sections together by end blows of the steam hammer. Guns were made in this manner as long ago as the year 1716, by M. Villons, of Porte de Marle, France, but they failed, and the process was abandoned. With regard to the iron it is not as good as the iron used by Armstrong for his large guns; the quality of toughness or ductility is the one sought for by English gun-makers, and undoubtedly obtained. But the Armstrong 110-pounder will endure but about forty rounds before it has to be repaired if fired rapidly, from the distension caused by unequal heating, although the same gun will stand very heavy charges without injury, if fired at long intervals so that the heat becomes uniformly distributed.

115. The Salisbury iron used by Ames cannot compare with Krupp's steel for ductility, a cylinder of which four inches in length and two in diameter was pressed down cold in a hydraulic press to a lozenge of half of its original length, without cracking in the slightest degree. Its tensile strength is much greater than the Salisbury iron, yet guns made of this fine Krupp's steel burst when fired rapidly, but do not explode from excessive charges of powder.

116. In large masses of wrought-iron, as in cast-iron, the strongest metal does not make the strongest gun, as seen from the quotation already made from Rodman's work, pages 137 and 138. The reason being from want of uniformity in cooling; one part of the mass is straining either to compress or rupture another part. And the more dense the metal the more severe the strain.

117. In support of this theory, I will give another extract from "Holley's Ordnance and Armor," where he quotes Mallet, page 355. "If it were possible that a cylindrical mass of heated forged iron could be examined while cooling, so as to bring it into evidence, there can be no doubt that the following would be the phenomena resulting from the conjoint reactions of its originally soft condition and uniformly high temperature, its external cooling, contraction, and assumption of rigidity, and the final cooling contraction, and rigidity of the internal portions; the external surface would rupture in several places, parallel to the axis, and directed to the centre in the first instance. These fissures would afterwards all close, and the opposite and abutting surfaces would press against each other, like the voussoirs of a circular arch. The internal diameter fissure or fissures would then be rent, the external form of the mass would change from a circle to an oval, the minor axis being in the plane of the internal rent, and the whole mass would at length assume stable equilibrium with respects to molecular forces. The change to the oval would probably be accompanied with a reopening of some of the external fissures, situated towards the end of the major axis of the oval sections."

118. Fibre in wrought-iron is only possible, or is only attainable by extending a block or bloom to from *ten to sixty times* its *original length, under pressure as between rolls*. If a bloom four inches by four inches, and twelve inches long were heated to a welding heat, and by the rolling process drawn out into a half-inch square bar, it would be near sixty feet in length, and would exhibit well defined fibre. If sufficient quantity of such bars were provided, cut into

lengths of five feet each, and, after being polished on the surface to remove all oxide, made into a pile eighteen inches square, being five feet long, for which it would require 1,296 bars, held together with a strong band shrunk on each end; upon raising the temperature of the pile to a welding heat, in a most careful manner, it would be found firmly united throughout, without a defective weld, without either hammering or pressure, but upon breaking the block so made in two, it will be found to have no fibre, but a central star shaped-fissure.


119. A new crystalization having taken place, under a law not well understood, regulated by the size of the mass and the outside form, fibre could be re-established in this metal only by rolling it out again to fifty or sixty times its original length. Fibre could not be established under the hammer without extending its length at least twice as much as with rolls.

120. As this is an experiment I have conducted many times, I speak of the facts with confidence. I have now twelve wrought-iron guns made in this manner, from bars a half-inch square, each block having been extended under the hammer, continuing the square form (*i. e.* without rounding the block,) the central fissures are usually attributed erroneously to rounding the block,) to twice its length in the large pile, yet there is no fibre; in fact, the crystalization closely resembles the crystalization in other masses of the same material, made up in the ordinary manner by welding the original blooms, from which the small bars were made and massed together.

121. The only advantage got by this laborious process is in being assured of more perfect homogeneity, there being no extensive planes of weakness. I have also noticed very little difference in the transverse or longitudinal tensile strength, except at the centre, subjected to the cooling strains that promote fissures, which can be partially avoided by extremely slow cooling, but by leaving the whole mass porous.


122. Having thus shown the fallacy of adhering to the present received systems, and the difficulties attending the fabrication of large wrought-iron guns, I will now show how I have endeavored, as a first effort, upon an entire new system, to make a gun not liable to failure from any of the foregoing causes, and will give the description as found in Holley's Work on Ordnance, page 327.

123. *Mr. Wiard's Plan.*—Mr. Norman Wiard, whose ingenious and important speculations on the bursting of guns by the heat of firing have been referred to in the foregoing chapter, has received a large order for heavy cannon, based upon the endurance of either one of two test guns. The engravings illustrate the general features of his plan, but not the exact proportions; these are the subject of extended experiments and calculations not yet perfected.



The gun is said to have the same diameter and length of bore as the navy 15-inch gun, and about nine inches greater external diameter, and is to weigh 43,000 pounds. The interior parts may be cooled uniformly by water passing through the cores between the ribs, and in the bore, upon Captain Rodman's plan. The exterior part or reinforce being thicker than the other parts, *will cool last after casting*, and is by this means intended to compress the barrel with such force as to bring all parts of the metal into equal strain at the instant of firing, according to Professor Barlow's formula. The ribs are curved in both directions, from front to rear, and from the inner barrel to the outer hoop or reinforce, so that they can spring enough to allow the inner barrel to expand both longitudinally, and the intention is, radially, by the heat of firing, *without straining the structure*. The ribs also yield, during the process of casting, under unequal contraction, due either to unequal cooling, or to chemical difference in the metal. They are proposed to be *stiff enough to resist the pressure of the powder*, and sufficiently flexible to bend under the *greater force of expansion*, a force limited

only by the ultimate strength of the metal. The elasticity of the whole structure would be greater than that of guns without ribs.



125. This gun will undoubtedly cool without serious initial rupturing strains. The whole practice in founding, especially in founding car-wheels, (which a cross-section of the gun resembles,) warrants this conclusion. - A plain-disk wheel, not annealed, can only be stretched or compressed, and so broken or greatly strained in cooling, and therefore goes to pieces under service. A gun, when so corrugated as to bend in cooling at some thin part intended to be bent, instead of breaking or being severely strained at some part that cannot be bent, endures more hard service than would be ordinarily expected of cast iron.

126. For the foregoing reasons, the strongest iron may be employed. It has already been shown that a pure, high iron, of great tenacity, shrinks too much to make a safe casting by other plans. But car-wheels are cast as sound from the highest and strongest iron as from a weaker iron, because ample provision is made for it to change its figure more or less, as required, without strain.

127. Upon the proper tension and strength of the reinforce as modified by its large diameter, the heat of firing, and the elasticity of the parts within it, depends, after all, the chief strength of the gun.

128. Comparing the reinforce with an equal thickness of metal on the exterior of Captain Rodman's gun, the former is cooled on all sides to prevent, as far as possible, unequal shrinkage, and is carried in two directions to prevent unequal and injurious strain due to what unequal shrinkage there may be. The latter is cooled (in practice) only from the inside, so that its exterior surface is strained and weakened. It appears, then, that the former would be in a better condition to stand the tension, in which case too the tension can be the better regulated.

129. The official report already quoted (376) is evidence that the outer part of the Rodman gun is drawn into compression by the subsequent shrinkage of the intermediate metal. It cannot be put into the desired tension except by cooling the gun exclusively from within; and this can only be done by keeping the mould at a temperature 2700°—a process so difficult that it has not been realized in practice. But there is nothing to draw the corresponding part of the Wiard gun—the reinforce—into compression. All the parts enclosed by it have already cooled and set.

130. In other words, the part that cools last regulates the strain of the rest. The interior and the exterior parts of the walls of the Rodman gun cool independently, and without any great strain; then the intermediate metal cools and puts strains into them which are just opposite to those required. But the reinforce of the Wiard gun cools last, and if it shrinks most, must compress the inner tube, and be itself drawn into tension—the required condition.

131. As to the strain due to expansion by the heat of firing, suppose the reinforce and the barrel to be put under such respective initial tension and compression that the force of the powder would strain them equally and as much as they would safely be in service; if the ribs yield under the pressure of the powder, the barrel may be stretched to the breaking point before the reinforce is stretched to the same point. If the ribs do not yield under the pressure of the powder, then they will not yield under an equal pressure from the expansion of the barrel by heat, up to a pressure equal to the pressure of the powder, will act directly to stretch the reinforce, which had already been stretched as much as it will bear. Up to this point the case is similar to that of a solid gun; beyond a pressure equal to that of the powder, *the ribs may yield to the pressure by heat* without straining the reinforce as much as it would be strained in a solid gun.

132. But the barrel will not be heated as much as the corresponding part of a solid gun, because it is *exposed to the air on both sides*, and presents a large radiating surface. Besides, the longitudinal expansion of the barrel is the source of the greatest strain, and this, in the Wiard gun, is *provided for by the longitudinal corrugation of the ribs*.

133. The largest diameter of the reinforce is not a source of comparative weakness.

134. On the whole, it is probable that the barrel and ribs of Mr. Wiard's gun can be cast without serious strains; that the reinforce can be shrunk upon them with some degree of tension; *that the strongest iron can be used*; and that the guns will not be seriously strained by heat. *The failure of the first guns, if they should fail, ought to be attributed to the improper carrying out of the principles; for the present knowledge on the subject of cast iron, however imperfect it may be, define these principles with much clearness.*

135. The contract given me for the large guns was made by the honorable the Secretary of the Navy against the wishes of the then chief of ordnance, Admiral Dahlgren, and during his absence from the bureau.

136. The verbal arrangement upon which the contract was founded provided for *three* trials; for I represented to the department that, although I had confidence in the proportions of my gun, as at that time exhibited by models and drawings, it could scarcely be expected I could succeed in making a gun, on such an entirely new system, correctly at the first effort, and that I might also fail at the second when I would succeed at the third. The written contract, however, provided but for *two* trials against which I remonstrated; but as the contract (a lengthy one) was already signed by the Secretary when I noticed it, and as I was assured the department intended dealing liberally with me, I accepted the terms.

137. The contract provided that I was to be paid one half the price of the trial gun before it was fired. This condition was not fulfilled by the Navy Department. The first gun failed; when shortly after the Navy Ordnance bureau *annulled the contract, although I had a second gun nearly ready for trial, which now lies at my works at Trenton, and has never been fired.*

138. The experience I have attained in the efforts to produce these large guns gives me confidence now to state that I can make cast-iron guns that will not enlarge in the bore except as they are worn out by long continued use, and that cannot be burst either by heavy charges or rapid firing. And I can make or re-make such guns from old guns or from the fragments of old ones, thus reducing the cost materially, while the efficiency is much increased.

139. The Dahlgren gun of eight tons weight requires sixteen tons, or more, of iron to produce it, because more than one-half of the iron is wasted by being cut away into chips of little value.

140. It is proved by the preceding argument that Rodman or Dahlgren cast-

iron guns cannot be made of the strongest iron, consequently such guns cannot be made from fragments of bursted or rejected guns, (for iron is improved by re-melting.) Upon my system the strongest iron will make the strongest and best gun.

141. Upon my system the walls may be made equally strong with any other by thickness; I can have the proper initial tension upon it to restrain the pressure of the powder, and no other detrimental strain, which is not possible in any other gun ever proposed; while I provide the necessary elasticity both longitudinally and radially to prevent the unequal expansion from the heat of firing. In fact, I am confident I have discovered the true and only system upon which guns can be made to endure the strains of actual service, and I charge the Ordnance department with having practiced a studied system of oppression to prevent me succeeding in getting my guns introduced, resulting in incalculable loss of money, life and prestige to the government under which they occupy sinecure positions.

142. I append hereto a letter from Ed. N. Dickenson, esq., of New York, and take the liberty to state that I can procure such or stronger letters corroborative of the theories and statements affecting the endurance of guns and the effect of heat upon metals from seven-eighths of the eminent practical mechanics of the country.

143. I believe your views to be entirely correct on the subject of bursting of guns.

144. I was much struck by the coincidence of the result at Fort Fisher with your prophecy to me that the 15-inch guns would burst whenever fired rapidly. Of course I knew the Parrott guns would, and I always have given them a wide berth when fired in my presence. They are liable to burst at short notice.

145. In ordinary machinery we have illustrations of your theory on guns, by the spontaneous bursting of wheels and other castings.

146. I believe your large skeleton gun will be successful in preventing these accidents.

NORMAN WIARD.

Sworn to before the Committee on the Conduct of the War.

B. F. WADE,

*Chairman of Committee on Conduct of the War.*

WASHINGTON, February 27, 1865.



# MEMORIAL.

*To the Hon. the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:*

The memorial of Norman Wiard respectfully represents: That he has been long engaged as an ordnance founder, and is and has been a practical worker of metals for twenty-five years last past; that he has observed, with the alarm naturally excited in the minds of all earnestly loyal citizens of the United States, that, notwithstanding the large amount of money of the government, and the time and effort of ordnance officers of the United States, expended in the attempt to produce safe and effective guns of large sizes, either rifled or smooth-bore, the failure to attain even comparative success has been most disastrous and unquestionable. The officers of the government having in charge the designing as well as the fabrication of ordnance being rather theorists than practical men, and being surrounded with and incited by pride of position and prestige, (for it is an honor to be charged exclusively with so particular a branch of science as ordnance and artillery for a government so renowned as is ours for military achievements,) has resulted in their becoming banded together into a "*close corporation*," so jealous of outside interference or innovation that no suggestion or improvement can be entertained from outside parties; principally because it is not in accordance with the time-honored practice of past ages, or because it would so dangerously interfere with patented plans of officers or parties in intimate relations with the heads of departments, or actually occupying the highest positions therein themselves.

This may seem to be the unfounded statement of an ill-natured or disappointed individual, anxious to either rule or ruin; your memorialist therefore cites the following facts to substantiate the statement:

1. It is well known that all the heavy guns for the United States service are made upon one of three patented plans, viz: Dahlgren guns, made upon plans patented by Rear-Admiral Dahlgren; Rodman guns, under the patented plans of Colonel Rodman, upon which all the heavy smooth-bore guns of the War Department and some of the navy are made; and Parrott guns, made upon the patented plans of Captain R. P. Parrott, now and long the proprietor of the old regular army and navy ordnance foundry, and whose projectiles for rifled guns of large sizes are almost exclusively used, although notoriously inefficient and useless.

The Dahlgren gun, although a good shell-gun, well adapted for an old order of things when *wooden walls* were in vogue, is now rendered inefficient by the introduction of iron-clads; and it should be recollected that the army of the Potomac was once prevented from passing up the James river by the presence of the *terrible* Merrimac, which iron-clad was encountered by another iron-clad, the *little* Monitor, armed with Dahlgren 11-inch shell-guns, the projectiles from which crumbled against her sides, and she returned uninjured to her picket duty, and long continued to hold possession of Norfolk harbor and the mouth of the James river, or so long as until our army had passed too far to return toward a disastrous campaign, to get to her rear at Harrison's Landing. If we had been provided with more effective guns on the Monitor at that critical time, or if the Congress and Cumberland had borne broadsides of effective guns, capable of being fired rapidly with heavy charges, giving high velocity to solid projectiles, their great preponderance in numbers and weight of guns would have destroyed the Merrimac; and Richmond, (then unprotected,) approached suddenly by the easy route of the James, would have fallen before the hundreds of thousands of lives and millions of treasure since expended had been sacrificed a holocaust to "*exclusive privileges*," "*pretentious ignorance*," and "*imbecility of invention*." It must not be forgotten that Admiral Dahlgren himself forbid, in the most positive terms, the use of solid wrought-iron projectiles, prepared especially for this great occasion, in his shell-guns in the Monitor turret, although it was afterward discovered, as the admiral complacently

informs us in his last report as Chief of Ordnance, that nearly a double charge of powder and a solid shot might have been used. We have never heard, however, that these guns have penetrated plating in actual battle, or otherwise than at the experimental battery where slow firing is the practice. What the result would have been if every shot that struck the casements of the Merrimac had *smashed* through is obvious.

One of Colonel Rodman's 15-inch guns burst in the pit in which it was cast;\* unlike the "frog in the fable, that swelled and burst itself," it *shrunk* and burst itself, from unequal cooling. The process in making it was the same as in all others made upon Colonel Rodman's patented plan, in which the inner metal is cooled first, and the outside shrinks upon it, like the tire upon a wagon wheel. Most of these guns do not so break or burst before they are finished, but all of them are strained nearly to the point of breaking. No gun is fired without having some heat communicated to the interior, enlarging the dimensions and distorting and straining it severely, both longitudinally and transversely, thus dangerously increasing the forces within the gun to assist the pressure of the powder to burst it. This disastrous result is avoided, usually, by firing the guns slowly and with small charges of powder. In the excitement of battle, however, gunners are liable to forget their caution, and by firing rapidly and continuously the gun fails at the very emergency it was produced to provide for. No fort or works on which these guns are mounted has yet been attacked; consequently they have never been tested, although hundreds are being made and mounted. When they are so tried, the fate of the nation may be the issue; how terrible will be the disaster if we only learn then that they are not reliable. The Rodman guns in the Monitor turrets do not afford a test; even although they have been in battle, they are so mounted that they cannot be fired rapidly. Yet two of them failed off Fort Fisher under the quickest firing they have yet been subjected to. Metals expand, when heated, with force that cannot be resisted. Thus it will be seen, that it would not add to the endurance of these guns to further strengthen them with bands.

The Parrott guns have been purchased in large numbers by both branches of the service. Twenty-three of them burst on Morris island during one campaign under General Gilmore; and undoubtedly the failure of the United States forces to capture or destroy Charleston is to be attributed principally to the disastrous failure of these guns. Again, when the most formidable fleet of modern times make their attack on Fort Fisher, the whole country is astonished and confounded by the reports that follow each other of the failure of Parrott guns, and finally the Admiral concludes with the statement, "All the rifled guns in the fleet have failed." Immediately a board of naval officers was convened, who made a specious report, in which it was stated that they were unable to decide what was the cause of their failure; and to distract attention from the particular failures they have been considering, they make public the other surprising fact, that Parrott shells have heretofore proved utterly unreliable, thirty-three out of one hundred and twelve having been reported as failing in target practice. In addition, the board find that nearly all classes of guns, whether made embodying "initial tension" or without, whether made of steel, wrought iron, or cast iron, whether "homogeneous" or "built up," have shown unreliable endurance. What else does this show so clearly, as that ignorance on the subject of ordnance does now and has heretofore pervaded the whole service?

Your memorialist has been long of the opinion that the failure to produce more effective heavy ordnance and projectiles is due, principally, to the fact that the invention and fabrication of ordnance has been heretofore confined to one class of persons, all educated in the same school or manner, jealous of the interference of all other persons; and that your honorable bodies may, by

\* Since the above was written, another of the 15-inch guns has burst spontaneously at the foundry.

taking some action to open the business to public competition, give the incentive that will accomplish the most valuable results, in providing a class of guns that will not longer disgrace us as a people proud of our mechanical genius and skill, and in this hope he has been incited to present to you this memorial. In case your honorable bodies perform such acts as will make it possible, your memorialist, who believes he has much valuable information to communicate, and many important suggestions to make, will, with many he believes to be similarly inclined, who also have valuable and practical knowledge on the subject, with a strong desire to communicate it in such a manner as to be useful to the government, at once take energetic measures to lay it before you, in such a manner as you may indicate, in the full confidence that it will result in providing a new, complete, practicable, and effective system of ordnance; uniform for the army and navy, commensurate with the wants of a great nation, and necessary to her dignity among other nations.

The board of naval officers lately convened acknowledge themselves unable to decide the questions presented to them, and also seem unable to decide upon any new test to throw light on the difficult subject. Yet the board was composed of officers, some of whom have spent nearly a lifetime performing precisely the same experiments they now again recommend to give them information upon which to base an opinion. This is the very essence of the practice in the circumlocution office.

If it is believed that the premature bursting of shells in the bore is the cause of failure, why not try to burst one of the size found to be most liable to failure, viz., the 300-pounder, by bursting shells in the bore? A shell lying at rest in the bore will act more severely upon the wall of the gun than if it is moving along the bore with great velocity. To thus explode a number equal to the greatest number ever known to have exploded in a gun that failed, will establish whether the failure is due to that cause, and at a much less cost than by firing 3,000 shells from three guns, which experiment, recommended by the board, will cost about \$55,500. The experiment with the shells will not cost more than \$500.

Then, if it is believed that the *vis viva* of the gases of powder acting against the shot when "not home" explodes the gun, try the experiment, repeating it as often as it has been known to have occurred in a gun that burst, with the shot placed at different points along the bore, but with long intervals between the trials, that the gun may not be affected by the unequal expansion by the heat of the powder.

If it is believed that the direct pressure of the powder is the cause of the bursting of the gun, fire a large gun one charge, the gun to be laid horizontally, so mounted that it will recoil on a horizontal plane, with a cylindrical shot of double weight, and a double service-charge of powder. If that does not burst, a similar gun can never be burst with a service-charge, unless some other element beside the pressure of the powder should come into the calculation. If it is believed that the unequal heating of the gun does or does not cause the bursting, this, too, can be proved by inserting heated shot in the bore.

This series of experiments would not cost ten per cent. of as much as would the series recommended by the board. It would give positive information on all the points; while the experiments recommended by the board may be conducted to the end without giving one new idea to those who witness them. Your memorialist takes the liberty to say that he believes, from a long experience as a suitor at the Ordnance department, that nothing less than the strong will of Congress can correct the evils of our present system of procuring ordnance, or attain the practical results herein indicated as important and necessary.

And he therefore prays that your honorable bodies will take some action in the matter.

Most respectfully,

NORMAN WIARD

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MEMORIAL  
OF  
NORMAN WIARD,

ADDRESSED TO THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR,  
UPON THE SUBJECT OF GREAT GUNS.

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FEBRUARY 27, 1865.—Referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs and ordered to be printed.

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