

THE ASSASSINATION OF AMERICAN DIPLOMATS IN BEIRUT, LEBANON

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

—————
JULY 27, 1976
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Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1976

77-055

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H 461-47

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THE ASSASSINATION OF AMERICAN DIPLOMATS IN BEIRUT, LEBANON

TUESDAY, JULY 27, 1976

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2:42 p.m. in room H-236, the Capitol, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. HAMILTON. The subcommittee will come to order.

Today the Subcommittee on Investigations is conducting an inquiry into the tragic assassinations in Beirut, Lebanon, on June 16, 1976, of the U.S. Ambassador Francis E. Meloy, U.S. economic counselor Robert O. Waring, and the Ambassador's chauffeur.

A little more than 3 years ago the former Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia of this committee held a similar inquiry following the assassinations in Khartoum, Sudan, of Ambassador Cleo Noel and DCM Curt Moore. In these two very different situations, four dedicated and able public servants of this country became victims of senseless terrorism.

MINIMIZING THE RISKS

As one expert on terrorism has written, "terrorism is theater" for terrorists and their supporters. Terrorism will doubtlessly continue to pose risks for American Foreign Service officers serving overseas. The question is how to minimize the risks.

The rapidly deteriorating situation in Lebanon was a quite different scene from all other arenas where terrorist acts have been committed against our diplomats. Months of civil war, near anarchy, scores of political assassinations, and the frustration of a situation that is not improving militarily or politically for any of the major combatants make fertile ground for terrorism against everyone.

In such a situation there must always be a careful judgment made whether the risks involved in having a presence are outweighed by the gains achieved by having diplomats available to carry out political work.

While the United States should never be one to cut off a dialog and leave a negotiating table, many of us have doubts about the utility of maintaining any presence in Lebanon given the chaotic nature of the situation and the risks that remain and will remain until significant political developments occur.

Our purpose today is to try to find out what happened June 16, why it happened, and what we have done since to assess both the security

situation in Beirut and developments in overall policy to combat terrorism.

We are happy to have as our witnesses Arthur R. Day, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in the State Department; Victor H. Dikeos, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security; and Sidney T. Telford, Jr., regional security officer, Beirut, Lebanon, Department of State.

Members are advised that as soon as a quorum of the subcommittee is present we will take a vote so that the subcommittee may go into executive session at the end of the hearing to discuss highly sensitive matters. It is the intention of the Chair to remain in public session as long as possible.

We need four members of the subcommittee present. There are only three members of the subcommittee present. As soon as one other arrives we will take the vote.

Mr. Lagomarsino, we are glad to have present but he is not a member of the subcommittee.

Mr. Day, you have a prepared statement and you may proceed.

**STATEMENT OF ARTHUR R. DAY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT
OF STATE**

Mr. DAY. Thank you.

The prepared statement has been distributed and unless you prefer I don't think I will take the time of the committee to read through it but simply to summarize some of its main points.

To begin with, Mr. Chairman, we appreciate being given the opportunity to come here before your subcommittee and to discuss the assassinations of these three men. Obviously this is a subject that touches us in the Foreign Service very closely and we are more than happy to contribute to the attempt to clarify what has happened and to consider what one does about situations like this in the future.

A UNIQUE SITUATION

These assassinations, as you have pointed out in your statement, were a result of a unique situation in Beirut. They are very much a part of the total Lebanese situation and I would like to commence my remarks this afternoon with a brief review of the circumstances in the city in the period leading up to the assassination. I will then describe the particular conditions under which the Embassy operated and the precautions that are taken to assure, insofar as possible, the safety of Embassy personnel. Finally we will talk briefly about the assassinations themselves and Mr. Telford, who was the security officer in Beirut at the time, will show the committee members on the map in a geographic sense what happened that morning.

I do hope it will be possible to go into executive session. This is a subject in which we very quickly reach sensitive material in some lines of examination and we can be much more helpful to you if we are able to talk confidentially.

Mr. HAMILTON. As I mentioned in my statement, Mr. Day, we want to remain in public session as long as we can for as much information as we can put on the public record.

Mr. DAY. I understand.

Mr. HAMILTON. We understand that some of the matters must be dealt with in executive session and it is our intent to go into executive session when those matters are under discussion. We can defer those matters until the end if you would, please.

A SHARPLY DIVIDED CITY

Mr. DAY. During the months of fighting in Lebanon, much of which had taken place in Beirut itself, the city had become more and more sharply divided geographically into an area controlled exclusively by the Christians and an area controlled by Palestinians and Lebanese Moslems. It has for some time been necessary to cross the line between the two parts of the city; a line which became firmer and firmer as the fighting proceeded.

Crossing from West Beirut which is the Lebanese Moslem and Palestinian part of the city to East Beirut which is the Christian part of the city presents certain risks—considerably greater risks than simply moving around the city as such. There is a stretch of a mile or so between the West Beirut checkpoint when you have left the area of control of the Palestinians and the Lebanese Moslems and before you enter the Christian area which is a kind of a no-man's land which is controlled by a shifting mixture of groups that tend to be among the most radical and violent.

The political/military situation was obviously of great importance, especially relative to the attempt to cross. Beirut had experienced a resurgence of heavy fighting in late May and early June. Movement about the city became almost impossible. Fighting subsided in the second week in June and it became more feasible to move throughout the city. At the same time, because of the political events which were taking place, it became more important to understand what was happening and what the principal leadership of the country intended.

CONTACT WITH CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP

Ambassador Meloy had gone to Lebanon on May 12. During his first few weeks in Beirut he did not personally call on Lebanese leaders, primarily, because of the precarious security situation prevailing at that time. He wished, however, particularly to meet with the Christian leadership, including Elias Sarkis who had only a short time before been designated as the President-elect. Before he could do so, however, the period of fighting of which I spoke broke out and it became almost impossible for him to move. He did send Robert Waring some six times in the period beginning May 19, on days when the security situation permitted, to the Christian side. Waring as a subordinate officer in the Embassy could travel with a good deal less conspicuousness and with less risk than the Ambassador himself. When the fighting subsided in the second week of June, Ambassador Meloy began to consider making his own contact with the Christian leadership.

SECURITY PROCEDURES

Now, in Beirut, turning for a moment to the security provisions for our personnel, we had made every effort to give the greatest possible degree of personal security to the chief of our mission and the members of his staff during the period that the security situation deteriorated in the city. Constant attention had been given not only to feasible protective measures for movement around town but to the security of the chancery and the personal residences as well.

The methods that we found appropriate at any given moment depended upon the nature of the threat that we saw at the time. Certain procedures had been developed that we used with some modification for going to and from the airport, moving about the city, and so forth, but it was a system that was adapted to the threat of the moment. In the specific case of Ambassador Meloy and his companions, security coverage on the movements around West Beirut was constantly subject to change, consistent with the daily or hourly threat.

JUNE 16TH ARRANGEMENTS

Wednesday the 16th of June, which was the day on which the assassinations occurred, was considered in Beirut and by Beirut terms to be an uncommonly calm day. Checks throughout the morning of the conditions along the route that the Ambassador would have to take failed to show any unusual or apparently threatening situations, it being understood that Beirut at all times was risky.

Arrangements for the call which the Ambassador wanted to make on Sarkis were made by Counselor Waring by telephone, probably the night before. At approximately 10:40 on the morning of June 16, Ambassador Meloy and party left the Embassy. Immediately prior to the departure of the party the Ambassador's chauffeur and bodyguard, Zohair Moghrabi, was informed of the party's plan of crossing to the Christian sector. This was consistent with the standard practice at the time to keep this kind of information until the very last minute.

As was the usual practice, Zohair then briefed the three security personnel who would be in the follow car on the procedures that they would follow during the passage from the Embassy to the crossover point. At approximately 10:55, 15 minutes later, the Embassy received a radio transmission from Moghrabi that appeared to indicate that the vehicle had crossed into the Christian east sector of Beirut.

This transmission gave the proper call number and then stated, "We are here and we are OK." and said that he would call back in 10 minutes. The Embassy therefore was satisfied that the Ambassador and the others had reached their destination in safety.

MIDDAY EVENTS

Shortly before 1 p.m., or about 2 hours later, the Embassy was informed that Mrs. Moghrabi, the wife of the chauffeur, had received a telephone message from an unidentified caller informing her that her husband and two others had been kidnapped but were unharmed. At that point the Embassy initiated widespread contacts with the entou-

rage of President-elect Sarkis and others and was able to establish not only that the Embassy vehicle had not reached Sarkis' residence but that it had not crossed the Christian line into East Beirut.

Having established that the Ambassador and the others were missing, the Embassy immediately notified the Department of State and then commenced contacts with a wide range of Lebanese personalities and factions, including those who in turn had connections with the PLO, and they maintained them through the afternoon. The Department of State at this end, meanwhile, made urgent contacts with a number of other governments to ask their assistance.

In the late afternoon two Swiss representatives of the International Commission of the Red Cross informed the Embassy that they were reasonably certain that the bodies which had been picked up from the sidewalk in West Beirut included those of the Ambassador and Mr. Waring and the chauffeur, and in fact, Embassy personnel subsequently identified these bodies as being those of our people.

APPREHENDING THE ASSASSINS

The 8 a.m. news broadcast of the leftist radio in Beirut on the following day on behalf of the Palestine Resistance and the National Movement stated that unidentified persons suspected of participation in the murders had been apprehended. News releases on the subject stated that PLO/Fatah were prepared to surrender the suspects to the Arab League force which at the time was still in the process of formation. On July 1, the PLO spokesman reiterated the intention of the organization to publicize the results of its investigation which it said it was conducting. There was a report 4 days later that PLO executive committee Chairman Arafat had agreed to turn over the suspects and transcripts of their interrogation to the Arab League delegation in Lebanon.

With these rather short remarks about the incident, I will leave it for questioning. I want only to add that the U.S. Government stated at the time and still strongly believes that the assassins should be brought to justice and that the justice should be severe and drastic; and that meanwhile, since we also have the care of the living to be concerned about, we must leave no stone unturned to insure the safety of the people we still have in Beirut.

Thank you, sir.

[Mr. Day's prepared statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF ARTHUR R. DAY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

I am glad to have the opportunity to come before this Subcommittee and discuss the circumstances surrounding the deaths of Ambassador Meloy, Mr. Waring and Zohair Moghrabi, their Lebanese driver. The Lebanese situation which resulted in these deaths is a tragic and unique problem, a problem compounded for the diplomats operating in Beirut, as for all others in the city, by the constant threat of terrorism. Since the assassinations we are here to examine are so integrally a part of the Lebanese situation generally, I would like to commence today by a brief review of the circumstances in the city in the period leading up to them. I will then describe the particular conditions under which the Embassy operated and the precautions that are taken to assure, insofar as possible, the safety of its personnel. Finally, I will describe the assassinations themselves. As I am

sure the Subcommittee members appreciate, there is some information, particularly that relating to the security precautions we take in Beirut, but also some of a more general political character, that cannot be discussed in public without serious disadvantage, including risk to the safety of our personnel who remain in the city. I hope it will therefore be possible, Mr. Chairman, for us to go into Executive Session at some point, where I can be more helpful.

During the months of fighting in Lebanon, much of which has taken place in Beirut itself, the city has become more and more sharply divided geographically into an area controlled exclusively by the Christians and an area controlled by Palestinians and Lebanese Moslems. There have always been in Beirut sections that were predominantly composed of one group or another, but there were always those who lived as a minority in the area dominated by another group. During the past year of fighting, these minorities have gradually moved to their own areas and the line across Beirut, known as the Green Line, has become firmer and firmer.

The American Embassy, together with most other embassies and the international part of town generally, is located in the area controlled principally by Palestinians. For representatives of the American Embassy or of the other embassies to meet with the principal Christian leaders, it has for some time been necessary to cross the Green Line into East Beirut and then, to meet some of the leadership, to go beyond the limits of Beirut to the small city of Jounie, on the coast north of the city.

Traveling through West Beirut presents certain security problems in itself. Areas of the city have come under the control of one or another of the armed and frequently undisciplined groups or gangs that set up roadblocks in their areas to check vehicles passing through. There were also roving roadblocks that added a particularly unpredictable peril. Control over stretches of roadway at times shifts from group to group almost on a daily basis.

Crossing to the eastern part of the city presents heightened danger, in part because there is a stretch of a mile or so between the West Beirut checkpoint and the East Beirut checkpoint—a form of no-man's land—that is controlled by a shifting mixture of groups that tend to be among the more radical and violent. Sniping is heavy on this stretch and roadblocks are unpredictable but frequently dangerous.

This then is the geographical setting. To turn briefly to the political setting, Beirut had experienced a resurgence of heavy fighting in late May and early June when the Syrians moved large numbers of troops into Lebanon and were thought by many to have the intention of taking over Beirut and the other main cities. During this fighting, which was characterized as usual by very heavy shelling with large caliber weapons, movement about the city became virtually impossible. The fighting subsided in the second week of June. The Arab League met and agreed to form an Arab League Force with contingents from a number of Arab countries and the Syrians agreed to cooperate. Political activity to some extent replaced military activity in the city, movement became more feasible again, and at the same time it became more important to understand what was taking place and what the principal leadership intended.

Ambassador Meloy had gone to Lebanon on May 12, leaving his previous post in Guatemala on short notice in order to take up this important mission. Ambassador Brown had left Beirut shortly before, but Ambassador Meloy, in replacing him as the principal American representative in Lebanon, also became our formally designated Ambassador to Lebanon, which Ambassador Brown had not been. During the first three weeks in Beirut, Ambassador Meloy did not personally call on Lebanese leaders primarily because of the precarious security situation prevailing at the time. He was able to obtain their viewpoints and explain the views of the United States Government through members of the Embassy staff but came increasingly to feel the need for personal contact with leading Lebanese political figures. He wished to meet with the Christian leadership, including Elias Sarkis, the President-elect of the country. Before he could do so, however, the period of fighting of which I have spoken broke out in the city, and he was forced to curtail his travel. He did send Robert Waring some six times in the period beginning May 19 when the security situation permitted to talk with leaders on the Christian side, and he saw those in West Beirut as well. Waring, as Economic Counselor, would travel considerably less conspicuously and with less risk than the Ambassador. Waring had excellent con-

tacts in the city, developed through years of dealing with them on all manner of economic subjects, and he had done a brilliant job of keeping in touch under difficult circumstances when it became important to see these contacts for political discussions as well.

When the fighting subsided in the second week of June, it became possible again to consider Ambassador Meloy's making his own direct contact with the Christian leadership, which included, of course, many of the principal national leaders of the country, and with the Muslim leaders.

Before describing his effort to do so on June 16, let me turn for a moment to the security arrangements for the Embassy, insofar as I can discuss them publicly.

The provision of the greatest possible degree of personal security to the Chief of Mission in Beirut and the members of his staff has been a constant pre-occupation of the Embassy and the Department as the general security situation there deteriorated over the months. A highly skilled and experienced security officer—a post held by Mr. Sidney Telford during the period in question—is assigned to the Embassy, and he is assisted by other security specialists, both American and Lebanese. Constant attention has been given not only to feasible protective measures for movement around town but to the security of the Chancery and personal residences as well. And, the security objective was pursued in an environment where Governmental institutions had ceased for all practical purposes to exist. It is extremely difficult to detail these measures and procedures here as the methods considered appropriate at any given moment depended upon the nature of the threat perceived at that time and, therefore, generalization is impossible. Certain procedures had of course been developed that were used, with necessary modification, for going to and from the airport, moving about the city, and so forth. I am certain you will understand that I am not able to be specific on this subject in open session out of consideration for the continuing security of Foreign Service personnel still serving in Beirut and other posts throughout the world.

In the specific case of Ambassador Meloy and his companions, security coverage on their movements around West Beirut was constantly subject to change consistent with the daily—or even hourly—threat evaluation. In the area and at the time of his travel on June 16, kidnapping was not considered to be a major threat. Frequent sniping, bombings and long-range artillery attacks were our primary concern.

Wednesday, June 16, was in fact an uncommonly calm day in West Beirut. Checks throughout the morning of conditions along Ambassador Meloy's and Mr. Waring's proposed route of travel failed to turn up unusual or apparently menacing situations that would have justified cancellation or postponement of their call upon President-elect Sarkis in the eastern suburb of Hazmiyeh. Against the backdrop of a security situation in which movement by Embassy personnel for many months had been attended by some degree of risk, it was decided that conditions that day were sufficiently quiet to permit a crossing.

Arrangements for the call on Sarkis were made by Counselor Waring by telephone, and the exact time of the appointment was set early the same morning. At approximately 10:40, Ambassador Meloy and Waring departed the Embassy, hoping not only to see Sarkis but also to arrange calls on one or more additional Christian leaders once they were on the eastern side of the demarcation line bisecting Beirut.

Immediately prior to the departure of the party, the Ambassador's chauffeur/bodyguard, Zohair Moghrabi, was informed of the party's plans to cross into the Christian sector. As was the usual practice, Zohair then subsequently briefed the three security personnel in the follow car on procedures to be followed during the passage from the Embassy to the cross-over point near the National Museum. Moghrabi (who was subsequently murdered along with the two Americans) was the senior member of the accompanying Embassy security team and gave last-minute instructions to the follow-car personnel who were not actually intended to cross into Eastern Beirut. Moghrabi was also provided with an agreed radio signal by which he was to inform the Embassy of his safe arrival in Christian-held territory.

At approximately 10:55, the Embassy received a radio transmission from Moghrabi that appeared to indicate the vehicle had crossed safely into Christian East Beirut. This transmission, which was a focus of some attention in the

public media at the time, gave the proper call number, stated that "we are here and we are okay" and said he would call back in ten minutes. Simultaneously, the personnel from the trailing surveillance car returned to the Embassy to report that they had observed the Ambassador's vehicle proceeding safely along the Corniche Mazraa before they turned back to the Embassy at a pre-arranged point. The Embassy, therefore, was satisfied that the Ambassador and his companions had reached their destination, particularly as the President-Elect's office did not telephone to report the failure of Ambassador Meloy to arrive for the scheduled 11:00 o'clock appointment. An American employee of the Embassy did talk by phone about noon with an associate of Sarkis who asked why the Ambassador had not arrived at the Sarkis villa. The American employee, who was not briefed on the Ambassador's schedule, asked his caller to recheck the Ambassador's whereabouts and call back.

Shortly before 1:00 P.M., the Embassy was informed that Mrs. Moghrabi, the wife of the Ambassador's chauffeur, had received a phone message from an unidentified caller informing her that her husband and "two others" had been kidnapped but were unharmed. The Embassy immediately initiated contacts with the entourage of President-elect Sarkis and other Lebanese parties and was able to establish not only that the Embassy vehicle had not reached Hazmiyeh, but that it had not crossed the Christian lines at any of the checkpoints near the Museum. It was also established that neither the Ambassador nor Mr. Waring had contacted any of the other Maronite Christian leaders pursuant to an appointment with them.

Having established that the Ambassador and his companions were missing, the Embassy immediately notified the Department of State by cable of that fact and of steps taken and under way to locate and effect the release of Ambassador Meloy, Counselor Waring, their chauffeur and vehicle. Contacts with a wide range of Lebanese personalities and factions (including those with connections with the PLO/Fatah) were stepped up and maintained over the afternoon but all reports received were consistently negative. The Department of State, meanwhile, made urgent contact with a number of other Governments to ask their assistance in locating the missing men.

In the later afternoon, two Swiss representatives of the International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC) Delegations to Lebanon called at the Embassy. They informed Embassy officers that they were reasonably certain that three bodies which they had picked up from a sidewalk in the Ramlet al Baida area included those of the Ambassador and Mr. Waring, whom the two officials had previously met on at least one occasion. Two Lebanese employees of the Embassy accompanied the ICRC officials to the ICRC tent hospital at Ouzai, just south of Beirut, where the bodies had been quietly taken, and arrangements made for their unobtrusive transfer to the American University Hospital (AUH). The Department, which had been kept informed by cable of developments over the afternoon, was notified of the identification of the remains and steps were taken to assure that no information regarding the recovery of the bodies of the deceased was released locally prior to the notification of next of kin.

The assassination of Ambassador Meloy, Waring and Moghrabi drew condemnation from leftist and Palestinian circles in Lebanon, as well as from governments around the world. The 8:00 A.M. news broadcast of the leftist radio in Beirut on June 17 announced on behalf of the "Palestinian Resistance and the National Movement" that unidentified persons suspected of participation in the murders had been apprehended by the PLO/Fatah. During the day, several non-authoritative radio newscasts gave the number of those arrested as five and this point was confirmed by Wafa, the Palestine News Agency, later on June 17 when it was announced that the detainees were affiliated with the so-called "Arab Socialist Revolutionary Movement." News releases on the subject stated that the PLO/Fatah were prepared to surrender the suspects to the Arab League force which, at that time, was still in the process of formation. On July 1, a PLO spokesman reiterated the intention of the organization to publicize the results of its investigation. The Arabic language daily, al Muharrir, which has close connections with the PLO, reported four days later (July 5) that PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat had agreed to turn over the suspects and transcripts of their interrogation to the Arab League delegation in Lebanon.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make two points. First, we continue to believe strongly that the assassins of Meloy, Waring and Moghrabi must be brought to justice. The President stated this immediately after the killings, and we have made it clear—and continue to make it clear—to governments in the area, whom we have asked for help in seeing that this is done. We will not allow this case to rest, though we fully appreciate the difficulty of pursuing it in the circumstances that exist in Lebanon today. Secondly, we have the living to see to and protect. We must leave no stone unturned to assure the security of our personnel who remain on duty in Beirut. They are there because of the stake we have in Lebanon and in the peace of the Middle East, because we care about Lebanon, and because there are private American citizens still in the country. They deserve and are getting the best protection we can give them.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Day.

We have a vote now. The subcommittee will recess while we go cast a vote and will return for the questions by the members.

[Whereupon, a short recess was taken.]

Mr. HAMILTON. The subcommittee will come to order.

I might say for the benefit of the members that we are still one short. We gained one and lost one so we will wait for another member of the subcommittee before a motion is made to go into executive session. In the meantime we will go ahead with general questions.

Mr. DAY. Mr. Chairman, before you do I wonder would it be of interest to the subcommittee to have Mr. Telford briefly show on the map where all this transpired? ¹

Mr. HAMILTON. I think it would be of interest.

Mr. Telford, you may proceed.

Mr. DAY. Mr. Telford, as you know, was the security officer in Beirut at the time of the assassinations.

STATEMENT OF SIDNEY T. TELFORD, JR., REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICER, BEIRUT, LEBANON, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. TELFORD. Mr. Chairman, to geographically put the setting in proper order, everything to the left of the black line was considered the West Beirut Moslem sector and to the right the Christian sector. The American Embassy is located in this general vicinity.

DEPARTING FROM THE EMBASSY

At approximately 10:40 on the morning of June 16, Ambassador Meloy, Mr. Waring, and driver Moghrabi departed from the American Embassy with the follow car or surveillance car for the crossover point and eventually to the residence of President-elect Sarkis. They traveled on the Corniche Mazraa from the Embassy around the coast, south. This road is considered the Corniche and the Mazraa itself juts off and goes toward the east.

The driver of the Ambassador's vehicle, Moghrabi, was told to instruct the follow-car driver and the bodyguards to observe the Ambassador's vehicle past the Moslem roadblocks into the relatively safe area, passing the last roadblock crossing through a no-man's land to the Christian side.

¹ See map at beginning of hearing.

For still an unexplained reason the surveillance vehicle dropped off at approximately this point [indicating]. The driver watched through the rear vision mirror as the Ambassador's vehicle proceeded down to about this point [indicating] and then lost sight of the vehicle. The surveillance car proceeded slowly back to the chancery. If it had been last summer, it would have been almost impossible to view an automobile through the rear vision mirror for more than a block due to traffic on the Corniche. However, during this particular time, as it has been for a number of months, with the fuel situation and so forth, there were relatively few cars on the Corniche.

Prior to departing the chancery, driver Moghrabi was given the call sign, as Mr. Day indicated earlier, and that is what we received at approximately 10:55—between 10:55 and 11—which was the approximate time which it would have taken us time-wise for calculating the safe arrival in Christian land at the residence of Mr. Sarkis.

Mr. HAMILTON. Would you point out for us where the bodies were found?

Mr. TELFORD. The bodies were found in this general location, sir, near the construction site of the new American Embassy chancery.

Mr. BONKER. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.

CONFLICTING REPORTS

Mr. BONKER. Where do you estimate the encounter took place?

Mr. TELFORD. At approximately this location.

Mr. BONKER. Well, in the statement it notes that at approximately 10:55 the Embassy received a radio transmission from the driver that appeared to indicate the vehicle had crossed safely into the Christian sector and it said that: "We are across and we are OK." Then you go on to say later on that the vehicle had not crossed. How do you explain that inconsistent report?

Mr. TELFORD. To be absolutely honest, we cannot explain it. We still do not know. The timing was such from the radio report itself that it appears as if the vehicle and the passengers were safe on the Christian side. The transmission was the call sign 57 or the call numbers which I had given to the driver immediately prior to the departure. Moghrabi has been a driver for American Ambassadors in Beirut a number of years, he is well versed with radio procedure and so forth. The young Marine guard that took the message said there was nothing abnormal about his voice, he came through loud and clear.

Mr. BONKER. And he said they were across but you determined subsequently that they did not go across?

Mr. TELFORD. We believe they were not across the line. There was nothing to support they went across the line.

Mr. DAY. They were found on the west side of the line and the people who man the Christian roadblock said they had not seen them cross so we made the assumption that they didn't cross. This transmission obviously is one of the major remaining mysteries that may never be settled, exactly why the transmission was made at that time and what it indicated.

POSSIBLE THEORIES

Mr. BONKER. Do you have any theories?

Mr. DAY. Well, one theory obviously is that by that time they had been picked up by whomever had picked them up and they had been more or less induced to make the call.

Mr. BONKER. I see.

Mr. DAY. In other words, we could make the same speculations that you could make. We don't have any more facts to go on than you do.

THE SURVEILLANCE CAR

Mr. BONKER. Mr. Chairman, may I proceed with one more question?

Mr. HAMILTON. Surely.

Mr. BONKER. You say there was a surveillance car.

Mr. TELFORD. It was a follow car which would have turned into a surveillance car to observe the group across the roadblocks. Visual surveillance.

Mr. BONKER. Visual, but you say for some unexplained reason it didn't follow the Ambassador's car all the way.

Mr. TELFORD. It did not continue and remained to observe the vehicles past the roadblock. The bodyguards and the armed bodyguard driver later stated separately and together that they had been instructed by Moghrabi to drive to a certain location and turn at the area of the Coca-Cola plant; although I had given Moghrabi different instructions.

Mr. BONKER. They were instructed by whom?

Mr. TELFORD. By driver Moghrabi.

Mr. BONKER. On the radio?

Mr. TELFORD. No, no, in person at the chancery immediately prior to their departure.

Mr. BONKER. But you had instructed them to follow him to the line?

Mr. TELFORD. Not to the line but to the point of the first roadblocks and to watch them through the roadblocks.

Mr. BONKER. So that is not an unnatural procedure?

Mr. TELFORD. No; in a procedure like this it was unnatural that they did not remain there to observe. That was unnatural. But the natural aspect of it was that they could not go through the roadblocks or remain at the roadblocks in the follow vehicle or surveillance vehicle because we had Moslem bodyguards and a Moslem driver and they could not go through the lines into the Christian side.

MOGHRABI'S INSTRUCTIONS

Mr. HAMILTON. Did I understand that the chauffeur gave the follow-car driver different instructions from your instructions?

Mr. TELFORD. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is that explained, as to why he would do that? Was that a misunderstanding or don't you know?

Mr. TELFORD. I don't believe it was a misunderstanding at all, sir. It is entirely possible. One of the conclusions is that Moghrabi had been

a driver for a number of years and he felt that he could act on his own and knew the situation on the ground better than some others, and it is highly conceivable that that particular day he knew what he was doing. He had been the driver for Mr. Waring on each trip that Mr. Waring had taken to the other side.

APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT-ELECT SARKIS

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Telford.

We will just begin general questions now.

I would like to know if the appointment for Ambassador Meloy to see President-elect Sarkis was made on the direct instruction of the Secretary of State.

Mr. DAY. No, sir, it was not. Ambassador Meloy some weeks before had indicated that he planned to see a number of principal figures in the city, including Sarkis. The fighting that I spoke of erupted and he was unable to do so. When the fighting died down a few days before June 16, the State Department communicated to Meloy and said:

It looks to us as though given the situation now in the city you can go ahead with the plan that you had informed us about earlier, taking due regard for your personal safety and—

Mr. HAMILTON. When you say the State Department, is that a cable, that goes out in the name of the Secretary?

Mr. DAY. That is right. This was not an instruction to see Sarkis at any particular time, it was simply a concurrence in effect to go ahead with the plan that he had already, himself, informed us about.

PLO CONTACT

Mr. HAMILTON. The Department acknowledged today that we did deal directly with the PLO on security matters in the Embassy area and have been doing that. Is that correct?

Mr. DAY. In a limited and particular way as of now. This was not true at the time of Meloy's assassination.

Mr. HAMILTON. What do you mean by "limited in a particular way"?

Mr. DAY. The issue has arisen in two respects. One is in connection with the evacuation on two occasions. With respect to the second evacuation we have been in touch with everyone who had any control over security in the area through which we would be passing and that would include the Palestinians, the PLO. We have also, where necessary, talked with Palestinians concerning the security problems existing in the city; basically the same type of talks but in a slightly different context.

This incidentally is one of the areas I really can go into a little further in executive session but I wanted to make first the point that we did not make these contacts at the time of Meloy's assassination so they do not bear on his situation; and that there were not widespread and across-the-board contacts with the PLO but only those that resulted from the PLO's obvious physical control of the security of the city.

SECURITY-PROOF CAR

Mr. HAMILTON. Why was the Ambassador not in a security car, bulletproof car?

Mr. TELFORD. He was, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. He was?

Mr. TELFORD. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Glass bulletproof armor plated?

Mr. TELFORD. Yes, sir.

PREVIOUS SECURITY PRECAUTIONS

Mr. HAMILTON. Now the economic counselor, Mr. Waring, had traveled into this area, I think your statement said, on six separate occasions when the security conditions in the city were judged to be more adverse than they were on this particular day. What kind of security precautions were taken for Mr. Waring when he made those trips?

Mr. TELFORD. Sir, when we say more adverse than this particular day, I must say, Mr. Chairman, that the security situation in Beirut would change from light sniping activities to bombing activities in various parts of the city, to artillery rounds landing on various parts of the city but no sniping, so there was a constant change in the dangers every day.

I can't think of any particular time when he traveled to East Beirut when there was not firing in another part of West Beirut other than the Corniche Mazraa. There was one occasion when he returned from East Beirut to West Beirut; he could not travel on the exact Corniche Mazraa and had to take a small road, a very narrow road right next to the Corniche Mazraa where he could not be sniped at.

Mr. HAMILTON. Did Mr. Waring proceed in a bulletproof car?

Mr. TELFORD. Partially armored.

Mr. HAMILTON. What does that mean?

Mr. TELFORD. That means it does not have exactly the same armor, the size, and it has Lex-sand in the windows.

Mr. HAMILTON. Was there a followup car for him?

Mr. TELFORD. No, there was not, sir.

APPOINTMENT WITH SARKIS

Mr. HAMILTON. Who in the Embassy knew about the appointment between President-elect Sarkis and the Ambassador on this day?

Mr. TELFORD. Very limited number of people, sir. I did not know myself absolutely that day until that morning. I heard the night before that it might be the next day, the day after that, or the next couple days. I believe that the only ones that knew were the Ambassador, Bob Waring, and possibly one of the political officers.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you have any knowledge that anybody could have listened to the phone conversation?

Mr. TELFORD. Absolutely, sir; we have no absolute concrete information but I know of many days when I, myself, would stand on the

balcony in front of the Embassy looking down at the telephone box down on the street and see a little fellow with a khafia on his head and an AK-47 on his back with earphones on, sitting crosslegged listening on the wire. This would happen in broad daylight every other day. Other than that, in the various parts of the city, the telephones were compromised.

Mr. DAY. Of course, the other end that one was talking to was subject to the same problem, so I think one has to assume that it was certainly highly possible that the conversation was being overheard.

MAINTAINING SECURITY MEASURES

Mr. HAMILTON. When you learned, Mr. Telford, that the Ambassador was going to try to make that appointment, what security measures did you take at that point?

Mr. TELFORD. When I found out, sir, I was limited by time in what I could do. In West Beirut, to insure what was happening on the Corniche Mazraa and in the area of the crossover points, we had numerous sources of information that ranged from tax drivers to some employees who had come across to members of the Beirut Express Co. to those with the Lebanese Arab Army. We had numerous sources to inform us what was happening on the Corniche Mazraa.

The day of the particular trip itself, these are the sources of information we used. We gaged the amount of traffic that was going down the Corniche Mazraa. And it is amazing—in Beirut within 5 minutes of a kidnapping of local indigenous personnel, it spreads like wildfire. You know that local indigenous personnel are being kidnapped on a particular road at a particular place, so you can gage.

TRAVELING CONDITIONS

Mr. HAMILTON. Did the Ambassador himself make the determination to proceed to seek an appointment with President-elect Sarkis on this particular day?

Mr. TELFORD. I don't know if he did or not but Mr. Waring is the one that told me he was going.

Mr. HAMILTON. Wouldn't the Ambassador, or someone, check with you to determine if conditions were favorable?

Mr. TELFORD. Mr. Waring asked me, sir, through the Ambassador, if I knew of anything adverse to prevent his trip over that day.

Mr. HAMILTON. And you responded negatively?

Mr. TELFORD. I responded that I did not like the idea that he was traveling over that day because I didn't like it even when Bob Waring traveled to the other side. They knew the risks that were involved, but I did not have anything concrete which would have aborted the mission.

Mr. HAMILTON. Insofar as you know, in our Embassy, the number of people who knew that the Ambassador was going over on that day were very, very few.

Mr. TELFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Waring, the Ambassador, yourself, the chauffeur.

Mr. TELFORD. Yes, sir, at the very last minute the chauffeur.

Mr. HAMILTON. And no one else knew? The secretary—

Mr. DAY. It is my understanding that not even some of the senior officers in the Embassy knew.

USE OF A HELICOPTER

Mr. HAMILTON. As I understand it, Mr. Brown, when he was there, often used a Lebanese helicopter, to go from one part of the city to the other.

Mr. DAY. Yes

Mr. HAMILTON. Did the Ambassador not choose to do that? Why did he not choose to take the helicopter?

Mr. TELFORD. He would not have been able to do that. The helicopters left and landed at the airport. The airport was closed. Second, the helicopters were controlled by President Franjeh. Third, in view of picking up the Ambassador at the airport, if the airport had been open or had not and we had been able to bring a helicopter to West Beirut, the Christian side was quite concerned that the helicopter would have been seized by the Moslems.

Mr. HAMILTON. Where is the airport on that map, please?

Mr. TELFORD. This location here, sir [indicating].¹

LEFTISTS LIKE LIMOUSINES

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, why did the Ambassador use the car you have indicated rather than his limousine on this trip?

Mr. TELFORD. Sir, I did not use the big black limousine starting with the departure of Ambassador Godley because I had too many people telling me that too many of the leftist groups, the various groups, wanted that car badly. We lost a number of Embassy vehicles. I must say that the chief of American security in Beirut was standing at his window in the Embassy and watched one of our stolen cars driving by the Embassy and there was nothing that he could do about it. The situation is and was pretty bad. We would have lost our vehicle. The last time we actively used this vehicle was when I took Ambassador Godley to the airport for his departure.

THE AMBASSADOR'S BODYGUARDS

Mr. HAMILTON. Did the chauffeur double as a bodyguard?

Mr. TELFORD. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Was he armed?

Mr. TELFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. What with?

Mr. TELFORD. A 9-millimeter pistol, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. How many men were in the followup car?

Mr. TELFORD. Three, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. Were they armed?

Mr. TELFORD. Yes, sir.

¹ See map on p. IV.

Mr. HAMILTON. Were they Lebanese, Palestinians, Americans?

Mr. TELFORD. They were all three Lebanese, sir; Lebanese Moslems.

Mr. HAMILTON. When Mr. Waring went into that area previously had he been accompanied by bodyguards?

Mr. TELFORD. He was accompanied, sir, by the same driver, Moghrabi, who was the driver-bodyguard.

Mr. HAMILTON. Now these men who were assigned to guard the Ambassador on that day, when did they find out that they were going to be doing that?

Mr. TELFORD. They found out shortly before their departure by Moghrabi.

Mr. HAMILTON. Did they know where the Ambassador was headed?

Mr. TELFORD. No.

STATEMENT OF VICTOR H. DIKEOS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SECURITY

Mr. DIKEOS. May I add that Moghrabi did not know the actual destination. He was told he was going to be taking the party to East Beirut but that he would get the actual destination once they had crossed the line.

TRANSPORTATION PROCEDURES

Mr. TELFORD. We had a common practice. When Bob Waring went to the eastern side I would arrange for the car and the driver. Once Bob Waring got in the car—of course we had already checked on the route and so forth. Once Bob Waring entered the car, that is when Bob would tell Moghrabi where he was going.

Mr. HAMILTON. Your assessment is that the follow car left the Ambassador's convoy prematurely because of the instruction from the chauffeur?

Mr. TELFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. And that the chauffeur gave that instruction not for any devious purpose but because he thought he knew the situation better than you?

Mr. TELFORD. That is what we believe, sir, that he was second guessing me and second guessing the situation itself.

Mr. DAY. He was a very self-confident man. He had long experience and was known to be self-confident and it is quite consistent with his personality that he would have decided himself how best to handle things.

Mr. HAMILTON. We have another vote, gentlemen. We will recess and begin the questions with Mr. Winn.

[Whereupon, a short recess was taken.]

BODYGUARDS USED IN BEIRUT

Mr. HAMILTON. The subcommittee will reconvene.

I think Mr. Winn is on the way.

Let me ask one other question. It is not your custom to use American bodyguards in Beirut?

Mr. TELFORD. Sir, I, myself, acted as a bodyguard on numerous occasions. Numerous occasions.

Mr. HAMILTON. But you don't use Marines, the Marine guard?

Mr. TELFORD. No.

Mr. HAMILTON. Why don't you use American bodyguards?

Mr. TELFORD. Per se civilians or Marines?

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, either.

Mr. TELFORD. The American bodyguards, of course—our positions had been cut down. We had limited our staff and I was the only security officer left in Beirut, so I made numerous trips as an American bodyguard. The young Marine guards, however, were not trained for the roadblocks and the various problems, the problems changing as rapidly as they were, it is not the same type of situation as in Buenos Aires and other places where you have a government and you have law enforcement to call upon in the case of an incident or problem and so forth. There was difficulty.

A LOW PROFILE

Mr. HAMILTON. Why didn't you accompany the Ambassador on this day?

Mr. TELFORD. For several reasons, sir. I almost did, I came very close to accompanying him on that day. However, all the trips made by Mr. Waring were very low profile. Personally, I wanted to keep this as low profile as possible. Second, I had gone through a number of incidents. I was very well known by the leftists in Beirut and I was afraid that I might have triggered problems at the roadblocks. Third, since I was the only security officer, I had 45 other Americans plus the mission to consider. There were times when the Corniche Mazraa would close in the afternoon when people could not get across and I was afraid, at the last minute if something like that happened, I would be caught on the other side, although with the Ambassador. While I would be safe on the other side, I still had the mission and 45 other Americans to consider so it was one of those last minute very quick decisions to make.

THE AMBASSADOR'S APPOINTMENT

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Lagomarsino.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Was the appointment made by telephone as far as you know?

Mr. DAY. It really had to be. That was the only means of communication from east to west and even that was very unreliable.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. When was it made? Was it the day before?

Mr. DAY. I don't think it is entirely clear that anyone really knows. I think the assumption is that Waring probably called over the night before and made it known that the Ambassador wanted to come but since he was the one who did it and he didn't tell people about it at the time, we can only assume that.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Waring himself did it?

Mr. DAY. He would be the one to do it.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Of course we have no idea whether the information could have been disseminated from the Sarkis end of the line.

Mr. DAY. That is right.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. The chauffeur was also a Lebanese, a Moslem?

Mr. DAY. Yes.

MOGHRABI'S POSITION

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Even with hindsight is there any reason to suspect that the chauffeur might have been part of the plot?

Mr. DAY. It is very hard to see either the likelihood of it or the motivation on his part for he had been a loyal and prized employee of the Embassy for many, many, many years and valued and took great pride in this role of his. That obviously comes to mind but I think that no one takes this possibility seriously.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Do you think, if anything, he might have been too competent in his own way?

Mr. DAY. Yes, in taking Waring across a number of times he very likely had developed a pattern of dealing with these roadblocks and managed to get himself through. Each one was different, each one took a certain kind of psychology to manage. As I say, he was a very self-confident man and probably felt that he had the situation pretty well worked out.

ALTERNATE BODYGUARDS

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. And there was no other bodyguard that you could have in that car, is that it?

Mr. TELFORD. At that particular time there was no one else, sir. We had one who could have been, who was a Druze, but he had gone into the mountains approximately 3 weeks prior to that to see a newborn baby. He had been living in the Embassy for several months. He was the one used with Ambassador Brown. On that particular day I may have made the same decision of a low profile since Zohair Moghrabi was a driver bodyguard as well as having gone through special training, special driving techniques, and so forth. I frankly felt that the primary weapon for defense was the automobile itself with the driver behind the wheel and secondarily the driver himself.

Mr. DAY. Zohair and the Druze were the only local people we had who were accepted on both sides of the line. The others were all not only Moslem, they had no acceptance. I don't know why Zohair had acceptance on the other side but he had.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. So there was a reason for his continuing?

Mr. DAY. Yes.

THE FOLLOW CAR

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. What makes you believe, if you can tell us, that the follow car, the surveillance car, was instructed by the chauffeur in the first car to turn back?

Mr. TELFORD. What makes us believe that?

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Yes, what makes you believe that story?

Mr. TELFORD. Sir, as soon as we found out that the Ambassador had not arrived at his destination without letting the three of them know, I pulled them out separately and received basically——

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. You knew they had come back?

Mr. TELFORD. Yes.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Before you heard about the problems?

Mr. TELFORD. They arrived back, sir. I was waiting in the lobby of the chancery next to the Marine security guard desk when the call 57 came over the radio. It was at that time when the bodyguards and the driver walked into the lobby.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Right then?

NO CAUSE FOR ALARM

Mr. TELFORD. Yes, sir, right then, and they asked if everything was OK. The call 57 came over the line, the marine picked up the receiver. Now this type of a radio remote was the type where we had the base station at the top of the Embassy and at the Marine security guard desk they had a small receiver box. When the receiver was on the hook, the sound came through the small amplifier of the set. We picked the receiver up off the hook and it came through just the earphone special telephone. I heard the 57, the Marine took the rest of the message.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. You heard the rest of the message when it came through the amplifier?

Mr. TELFORD. Yes, and the Marine heard it. I said something to the effect, was everything OK and he nodded the same. That is when the driver and the bodyguards came up and asked the same question and I asked if everything had been OK and they said yes. The approximate timing was such that it gave us no cause for alarm at that time.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. What you heard was in the chauffeur's voice?

Mr. TELFORD. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. And the Marine guard who took the message—he had been there longer than most of the Marine guards, a very competent young man—he said afterward in his statement that there was nothing abnormal about the voice. Of course Zohair had used radio jargon, as I mentioned before, quite often, daily.

MOSLEM CHECKPOINTS

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Now the checkpoints to which you referred and which you showed us on the map were Moslem checkpoints I take it.

Mr. TELFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Well, why couldn't the second car go through the Moslem checkpoints?

Mr. TELFORD. Well, if they had gone through the Moslem checkpoints themselves, sir, we have had a number of instances where even follow cars—the principal car would be allowed to go through and the follow car has been detained. We had that instance with Ambassador Godley's follow car at one time in the hotel district. Our two bodyguards who were in the car at that time were members of the former Sureté and they were known in that part of the city as well. They were concerned about the safety of going through and having to turn around again within the roadblock area next to no-man's

land. That is why I felt at that time the best thing for us to do was to surveil the car across.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Even though they were Moslems you were fearful not only what would happen on the Christian side but on the Moslem side as well?

Mr. TELFORD. They were Moslem, but they were not members of the group of other leftist Communist groups or members of the rejection front who manned the roadblocks in that particular area.

POINT OF INCIDENT

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Well, I guess we really don't know where the actual hijacking and kidnaping took place, do we?

Mr. DAY. We can delimit it by virtue of a couple of assumptions. They didn't get into Christian territory and it could not have been past a certain point, and it was clearly past where the surveillance car had left them.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Which would be about where the two is on the map; in other words, somewhere between two and the black line.

Mr. TELFORD. Where the three is, sir.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. The three?

Mr. TELFORD. Yes.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. They claim they saw the car?

Mr. TELFORD. They watched the car through the rear vision mirror. They watched it down to approximately this point [indicating] where they lost sight of it.

RECOVERING THE CAR

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Was the car ever recovered?

Mr. TELFORD. No, sir.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Has there ever been any information about the car?

Mr. DAY. We understand that the Fatah has it but that is all I can say. We don't have it.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. How do you understand it?

Mr. DAY. That is one of the things I have heard.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. What do we know about the surveillance?

Mr. DAY. I can say here we do not have a great deal of information. The information which I mentioned in my statement came mostly from press announcements on the part of the PLO and is about all that there is in terms of how many people were arrested and what they were thought to have done. A little later if we have an executive session I can give you a little further detail.

Mr. WOLFF. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Yes; I yield.

SALAH KHALAF

Mr. WOLFF. You have not mentioned the name of Salah Khalaf at all and yet, as I understand, he was the designer of this mission, murder, or whatever you want to call it. That name has not even come up here.

Mr. DAY. I am not familiar with that report, sir. The only mention I have heard of him in this connection was a report in a Cairo newspaper about a week ago which alleged that American officials had said that Salah Khalaf was responsible, which we had not done. Frankly, I am not familiar with the statement attributed to him.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I have no further questions.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Winn.

THE SURVEILLANCE CAR

Mr. WINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I understand it the followup car turned around, or did it just go off on a side street?

Mr. TELFORD. It turned around.

Mr. WINN. It turned around.

Mr. TELFORD. Yes.

Mr. WINN. In the period of time of turning around then they could zero in on the Ambassador's car in the rear view mirror. That is the only way they could get completely stopped.

Mr. TELFORD. Yes.

Mr. WINN. How do you know that they picked them up in the rear vision mirror?

Mr. TELFORD. This is what they said, sir, and the driver himself. It was the driver looking through the rear vision mirror, the other two said they turned around and watched.

Mr. WINN. They said they could see them for about another block?

Mr. TELFORD. They said more than a block, sir. From the point of the Coca-Cola plant to about No. 3 where there is a mosque. As I mentioned before, traffic was very sparse. We had had a terrific fuel shortage in Beirut and there were very few automobiles on the streets. They saw them from point 2 to about point 3.

BODY GUARD ASSIGNMENTS

Mr. WINN. Who in the Embassy has the assignment and responsibility for setting the policy as to the use of and the agreements concerning the bodyguards?

Mr. TELFORD. The agreements concerning bodyguards?

Mr. WINN. The use of them and their assignments and all that.

Mr. TELFORD. I had control over that, yes, sir. One of my senior—

Mr. WINN. Who picks them?

Mr. TELFORD. I pick the bodyguards but my senior local investigator was the one that made up a monthly bodyguard worksheet for assignments. Our big problem was that from approximately December until the point of the assassination we never really knew what bodyguards we were going to have and when.

Mr. WINN. Why?

Mr. TELFORD. Because of the street conditions, the road conditions, and the crossover points. We had two bodyguards that lived in the Embassy daily, they could not get to their homes. We had one Christian bodyguard who in January went home to see his family and could not get back across the line. The Druze bodyguard that I mentioned we could possibly have used that day, but, I am not

convinced that we could have. He was stuck for a number of weeks on the Christian side—as a matter of fact, he didn't return to Beirut until about 2 days before my departure.

Mr. WINN. You do have some Christian bodyguards?

Mr. TELFORD. Yes, we do, sir.

SECURITY PRECAUTIONS

Mr. WINN. Who would pick up the car as far as security is concerned at the green line?

Mr. TELFORD. At the green line?

Mr. WINN. Yes.

Mr. TELFORD. There was no one directly that I was in contact with that would have picked up security on the other side of the line.

Mr. WINN. So there was just our Ambassador and the chauffeur and the others?

Mr. TELFORD. Yes.

Mr. WINN. Just the three of them?

Mr. TELFORD. Yes.

Mr. WINN. They would not be protected in any way?

Mr. TELFORD. They would have Bob Waring whenever he went onto the other side and various people, Christians, of the groups and the families and people that he was planning on meeting that would meet them several blocks or a block and a half or a mile or at a particular point. Bob was absolutely never concerned about the Christian side—never concerned.

CHRISTIAN SECURITY

Mr. WINN. But you had no such agreement with Christian security?

Mr. TELFORD. No, sir. I didn't because at that time there was not anything really called Christian security. Christian security was in Jounieh with President Franjeh. The Christian security, so to speak, that was with President-elect Sarkis shifted back and forth. When he was first elected the security that was provided for him was made up of Syrians.

THE RETURN TRIP

Mr. WINN. In the usual procedure do the bodyguards in the follow-up car usually wait for the Ambassador to return from the Christian side?

Mr. TELFORD. No, sir; we had another followup call sign to be used.

Mr. WINN. But when they were coming back across that green line, then they could get in touch with a followup car or bodyguards?

Mr. TELFORD. Immediately prior to their departure from Sarkis', sir, they were to give another call sign to me personally on the radio or the Marine guard and the call sign would indicate that they were coming back. There was an alternate call sign which the words were to the effect that there has been a delay which was to indicate that they were going to go to another appointment on that same day and then return at another time. We had the times. If they had completed the first appointment with President-elect Sarkis, it would have been

approximately a 1:30 return. If they had gone to another appointment—they had one at approximately 3:30—we were gaging on that. Bob Waring was always pretty darn good about keeping within, say, a 30-minute time frame, a 40-minute time frame of returning when he absolutely said he was going to be returning.

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS

Mr. WINN. If these telephones are all bugged on both sides, security-wise, they would know about when our Ambassador was coming back from these visits.

Mr. TELFORD. We would not do that on the telephone, sir.

Mr. WINN. You have other methods of communications?

Mr. TELFORD. That would be radio, sir.

Mr. WINN. Radio.

Mr. TELFORD. Yes, sir, that is why we had the codes that we used, sir, and our radios had been compromised so our individual call signs for key locations, call sign numbers for individuals, personnel, vehicles, we changed these numbers and call signs very frequently.

EMBASSY BODYGUARDS

Mr. WINN. Are Americans ever used as bodyguards or Marine escorts instead of the Moslems and Christians?

Mr. TELFORD. In Beirut I was the only one that was used as a bodyguard. I used myself on a number of occasions and then previously when I had another man with me.

Mr. WINN. Why do we use Moslems?

Mr. TELFORD. Why do we use Moslems?

Mr. WINN. Yes.

BEIRUT ROADBLOCKS

Mr. TELFORD. In West Beirut we have to use Moslems or Druze sir. To put it so that everyone understands, the fluid situation in Beirut regarding the roadblock is something we can't define in the sense of what a roadblock would be here in the United States.

Mr. WINN. That is why I don't understand it.

Mr. TELFORD. It is a terrific experience to come upon a roadblock with a 9- or 10-year-old young boy carrying an RPG rocket launcher over his shoulder and other weapons standing around. It is quite an experience and this is the typical roadblock. One roadblock may be composed of youngsters who are looking at the identification on vehicles and vehicle registration. If they find a car that has been stolen, they will more than likely just ask the driver to walk and they will burn the car right on the spot. This is one kind of a roadblock.

You might have another roadblock where they just have tires out in the street and they let people angle around in an S form. Some roadblocks just wave people by. There were times, just down the street from the Embassy in March, when 50, 60, 70, 100 people, Christians, were kidnaped and held for negotiation for Moslems that had been kidnaped on the other side. So the roadblocks in themselves would take a number of pages to explain.

ZOHAIK MOGHRABI

Mr. WINN. Do you have any reason to not believe Mr. Moghrabi's loyalty to the United States, to the Embassy or to the State Department? I suppose we are the one paying his salary.

Mr. TELFORD. I have absolutely no reason to believe anything to the contrary.

Mr. WINN. Nothing questionable ever before?

Mr. TELFORD. No, sir.

Mr. DAY. He was anxious to come to this country, wasn't he?

Mr. TELFORD. I believe he had been granted visas for his family prior to the assassination and he had a number of friends in the United States. His English was impeccable.

Mr. WINN. You don't think that might have been part of a strategy to be sure that his family would get visas to come over here for protection in case he did or didn't get through some kind of a—

Mr. TELFORD. Sir, he had been working on his visas for quite some time—quite some time.

Mr. WINN. Prior to the more recent development?

Mr. TELFORD. Oh, yes, sir.

ACCEPTANCE ON ALL SIDES

Mr. DIKEOS. May I say I happen to know the person quite well, having served in Beirut and I can say that he has been an employee since 1951. I believe, and he has driven a succession of American Ambassadors going back prior to the 1958 Lebanese crisis. His whole life was driving the U.S. Ambassador and he was known as the American Ambassador's chauffeur. I am convinced that is the only reason he had the laissez-passer to allow him to cross the black line when nobody else could.

Mr. WINN. Because he was recognized as such?

Mr. DIKEOS. Because he was doing this so long and was so well known and had an unusual form of trust—that is not quite the right word. Acceptance had developed on all sides where this man was concerned.

Mr. WINN. Mr. Chairman, there are some more questions I would like to ask along that line if we get into executive session.

Mr. HAMILTON. It does not look encouraging. We are losing instead of gaining.

Mr. Wolff.

A LOW PROFILE

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TELFORD. I take it the vehicle that had been used that day had been used before.

Mr. TELFORD. That particular vehicle had only been used once before with Mr. Waring. We switched the vehicles quite often.

Mr. WOLFF. In other words, did you switch the armor plate in the vehicle for that particular car?

Mr. TELFORD. No, sir, we switched the vehicles where we had partial armor and Lex-sand in the windows. We switched the vehicles themselves for the trips to the other side.

Mr. WOLFF. The chauffeur was well known.

Mr. TELFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. WOLFF. The chauffeur was well known and we were trying for a low profile visit. Is that correct? You had a follow-on car that obviously had some people who were known. The reason for their turning back was the fact that they were known at the checkpoint, is that right?

Mr. TELFORD. They may have been known at the checkpoint, sir, and also within West Beirut we did use the follow car all the time whenever the Ambassador was traveling. We would always have the two cars together. This would have raised the profile. Yes, Moghrabi was known but it is amazing how many roadblocks you never have to stop at. You just see a car coming and they wave you goodby. There are other times you would be stopped.

Mr. Day. At this time you didn't have the two cars together; one was in back so it was not identified with the front car.

THE CAR AS SECURITY

Mr. WOLFF. That car had just arrived in the area and it had not been used before?

Mr. TELFORD. The car we used that day?

Mr. WOLFF. Yes.

Mr. TELFORD. No, sir, we borrowed that car from Amman, Jordan, months before from their Embassy because we had been receiving so much sniping we needed additional vehicles to enable us to leave the Embassy to get to our homes safely at night.

Mr. WOLFF. The car itself, then was the security because you had virtually no other security except for the chauffeur in that area. The car itself was the security?

Mr. TELFORD. The car itself, the driver, and the driver's training.

Mr. WOLFF. The what?

Mr. TELFORD. The driver's training. The driver was trained in defensive driving techniques and how to escape possible roadblocks and things such as that. This is another question that we still don't understand.

A PRECARIOUS SITUATION

Mr. WOLFF. Was Mr. Waring armed?

Mr. TELFORD. No, he was not armed, sir.

Mr. WOLFF. Is there any reason why you take two men even for a local trip, two men of the rank of these two that you have indicated, where there had been kidnapings, where there had been even the idea of hijacking a vehicle as a status symbol for the people who take the vehicle? Is there any reason at that point that the security of a low profile would be better serving than the idea of increased power within the vehicle to fend off an attack?

Mr. TELFORD. Well, increased power within the vehicle, sir, I am convinced to this day would have meant that we would have had one more dead man.

Mr. WOLFF. You had a 9-millimeter pistol?

Mr. TELFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. WOLFF. That is the only type of armament that could be afforded there?

Mr. TELFORD. No, sir, we quite often use submachine guns and we did have those but you have to remember also that just about every roadblock usually had a Land Rover next to it with a dushka which is the Russian equivalent of a .50 caliber on the back of the Land Rover. I, myself, have been stopped at many roadblocks and I have been very well armed and I knew what would happen as soon as I pulled out my .35 caliber and I had all those kids around me. It is a precarious situation.

THE USE OF HANDGUNS

Mr. WOLFF. What was your reason for arming the chauffeur in the first place?

Mr. TELFORD. Arming the chauffeur in the first place was really a double reason. One was for his self-confidence. It was amazing what Zohair without weapons, as well as the other drivers, would not do. I don't know if you recall, sir, but during the heavy hotel fighting in the St. George, Zohair drove down to the St. George Hotel to evacuate the Americans there. I was quite worried that if the Christians at the hotel saw him with a handgun and some of them knew he was a Moslem that he might have problems. He said absolutely not, he would not go to the hotel unless he had a handgun, but he could not take anything larger than a handgun.

A REVERSAL OF ORDERS

Mr. WOLFF. Did you get any further confirmation other than the people in the follow-on vehicle telling you that Zohair had reversed your order to move back?

Mr. TELFORD. The only way I found out, sir, my chief local investigator was in the room when Zohair gave the instructions on where they were to turn around. He did not comprehend them until afterward so we didn't know until after this all happened—and we discussed it with him afterward, individually and collectively—that my orders had been countermanded.

Mr. WOLFF. Was he considered chief of security for the mission?

Mr. TELFORD. This local employee?

Mr. WOLFF. No; Zohair.

Mr. TELFORD. No, sir, he was considered by the drivers and many of the local employees as being the oldest and No. 1 local employee.

Mr. WOLFF. What I am referring to is, is it not unusual for a driver to be able to countermand the orders that are given by the chief of security for that mission?

Mr. TELFORD. Absolutely. It was not normal, sir, but there were times I indicated how cocky and independent Zohair was.

Mr. WOLFF. Forgetting Zohair, how about the other people?

Mr. TELFORD. The other people, no.

Mr. WOLFF. Why did they take orders from him?

Mr. TELFORD. They didn't know that he had countermanded my orders.

Mr. DAY. They would have assumed that these instructions would have been the right ones.

Mr. WOLFF. You did not give any direct orders?

Mr. TELFORD. No, sir, only to Zohair.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you.

SCENE OF THE KIDNAPING

Mr. HAMILTON. The area beyond point 3 on the map is black. Is that a wooded area?

Mr. TELFORD. This is the racetrack.

Mr. HAMILTON. It looks like a racetrack there.

Mr. TELFORD. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. So assassins or kidnapers could have had concealment and jumped out of the car at that point?

Mr. TELFORD. Not really. There is a wall and a fence here, sir. This is more or less a no-man's land where sniping activity takes place.

Mr. HAMILTON. It is probably along that street that the kidnaping occurred, though, according to your best judgment.

Mr. TELFORD. I would say closer prior to that, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. I see.

Mr. TELFORD. Basically in this area [indicating].

CHANGES IN SECURITY

Mr. HAMILTON. Have you made any changes in your security procedures as a result of this incident?

Mr. TELFORD. Security procedures with Ambassador Seelye who went into Beirut, sir, the procedures were significantly changed with the two American security officers that accompanied the Ambassador in Beirut.

Mr. DIKEOS. There was a significant deterioration of the situation which called for different levels of security between June 16, I believe, when the assassination occurred and approximately 2 weeks later.

Mr. HAMILTON. Can you indicate to us what changes were made?

Mr. DIKEOS. What changes were made? Well, we replaced Mr. Telford as an officer who has responsibility for the Embassy itself, the residences and the persons of all of the staff except the Ambassador. We put in another security officer. We have had responsibility for the security of the Ambassador and all of his movements and have given him assistants. I might add that all of that prevailed until yesterday when we removed the Ambassador, Ambassador Seelye, and two expert security officers.

Mr. HAMILTON. So you had three security officers there in the period after June 16.

Mr. DIKEOS. Yes.

REDUCTION IN SECURITY

Mr. HAMILTON. You only had one before. It strikes me as very curious that Mr. Telford would be the only security officer in Beirut in this period prior to June 16. You know, this would be the No. 1 danger

spot in the world for American diplomats without any doubt at all and we only have one American security officer there. That just does not seem to me to be reasonable. How do you explain that?

Mr. DIKEOS. Until January—February—we had two American security officers fully occupied with security. A sentry was taken at the post at Beirut by the then Ambassador to reduce the staff in a number of ways.

Mr. HAMILTON. By which Ambassador?

Mr. DIKEOS. By Ambassador Godley at that time and I believe this was in concert with the general reduction of the staff to reduce the security presence by one American security officer. So between that time and—

Mr. HAMILTON. Is that a decision that is made by the Ambassador himself or is that made in Washington?

Mr. DAY. The Ambassador would recommend and Washington would make the final judgment but it is customary—unless there are really strong reasons—to follow his recommendations. Even though we had only one American security officer at that post, we nevertheless had an unusually heavy security complement all told.

Mr. HAMILTON. How many?

Mr. DAY. With the Marines and the local—

Mr. HAMILTON. How many?

Mr. DAY. How many? Fourteen Marines, I believe.

Mr. HAMILTON. But they are not engaged in the business of protecting the Ambassador when he travels away from the Embassy.

Mr. DAY. No.

Mr. TELFORD. Until the point of the attempted coup in March we had an element of law and order. I say an element very loosely; we did, in fact. We were able to utilize many of our bodyguards who had come in and out and so forth. Although it was extremely difficult with one American security officer until March, it was more effective than it was after March, after the coup, when we really lost our security around the Embassy itself.

POINT OF SUSPICION

Mr. HAMILTON. When did you first become suspicious that something had gone wrong? You mentioned this radio callback 57 and the return of the men who were in the follow-on car and I presume at that point you felt all was well.

Mr. TELFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. At what point, then, did you become suspicious that something had gone wrong?

Mr. TELFORD. Well, it really was not until the telephone call from Mrs. Moghrabi through first her son who worked in the Embassy and then to one of the senior local employees, Mr. Gaby Arcau.

Mr. HAMILTON. That was at about 1 o'clock.

Mr. TELFORD. I believe that was about the time, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. And there was no identification of the call?

Mr. TELFORD. No, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. They simply said, "We have your husband and two other persons," is that right?

Mr. TELFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. And was that all they said?

Mr. TELFORD. Something to the effect that "Your husband is all right." I don't recall the exact words.

Mr. DAY. My recollection is that they reportedly said, "We want the others, your husband is all right."

EMBASSY COMMAND

Mr. HAMILTON. You got that signal. Then what happened?

Mr. TELFORD. I was the one to receive the information on that, sir. I went immediately to see Nathaniel Howell who was the political officer.

Mr. HAMILTON. Who was in charge at that point after the Ambassador had gone? Who was in command of the Embassy?

Mr. TELFORD. The man in command was George Lambrakis.

Mr. HAMILTON. Was he there?

Mr. TELFORD. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. What happened from that point on? Tell me what you did.

Mr. TELFORD. Prior to going in to see George Lambrakis because the telephone lines came on, commercial power had just come on in the building, I contacted Howell. We contacted the defense attaché, the public affairs officer, and I believe that was all at the time to make immediate phone calls and then Nathaniel Howell advised George Lambrakis.

MAKING CONTACTS

Mr. HAMILTON. Then what happened?

Mr. TELFORD. A number of contacts were made, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. With whom?

Mr. TELFORD. With the Christian side as well as the Moslem side.

Mr. DAY. I think the first one was to check whether he had arrived.

Mr. TELFORD. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. What did you learn?

Mr. TELFORD. That he had not arrived.

Mr. HAMILTON. Who did you talk to?

Mr. TELFORD. I believe it was to his aide, sir, a Colonel Zar.

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, the Ambassador was due at Sarkis' at what time?

Mr. TELFORD. He was due there at 11 o'clock.

Mr. HAMILTON. And it is now well after 1 o'clock.

Mr. TELFORD. Yes.

CALL AT NOON

Mr. HAMILTON. And Sarkis' staff had not yet called the Embassy to say that the Ambassador arrived?

Mr. TELFORD. No, sir, there was a call at approximately 12 noon, I believe, or probably it was before 12 to the acting public affairs officer from his counterpart at Sarkis' residence and our public affairs officer did not know about the appointment. The public affairs officer of Sarkis said he understood that the Ambassador was due at Sarkis'

for an appointment but he had not arrived yet. Our public affairs officer did not know about this. He came to see me shortly after that and told me and said that he had asked the man to call back and check to see if I found this. Our public affairs officer was in another part of the building and Mr. Ross said he didn't believe that he could see the car. The telephones continued working for most of the afternoon. No other telephone call was received. We were not concerned and then of course events like that happened.

NO CAUSE FOR CONCERN

Mr. HAMILTON. When that call came, when you were notified of the call from Sarkis' office, that did not alarm you?

Mr. TELFORD. That did not alarm me to any significant degree because, of course, Ross did not know about the appointment and the other man was on location where you could see.

Mr. HAMILTON. But you knew the Ambassador was to be there at 11 o'clock.

Mr. TELFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. And here it is 12 and you get an indication that he is not there.

Mr. TELFORD. Got a possible indication that he was not there by someone on Sarkis' side that had just found out about the appointment. We had received the all-clear code signal from Zohair so it didn't alarm me, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. Did he call back?

Mr. TELFORD. No, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. Never called back?

Mr. TELFORD. No, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. Did that alarm you?

Mr. TELFORD. That he did not call back?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.

Mr. TELFORD. No, sir.

Mr. DAY. My understanding is that his phone call to our public affairs officer was about something else.

Mr. TELFORD. Yes; he had not seen our Ambassador.

EMBASSY CONTACTS

Mr. HAMILTON. All right. You made a lot of contacts. Who did you contact? You said you contacted some Christians and some Moslems.

Mr. TELFORD. I believe you have them listed here.

Mr. DAY. I don't know whether you want me to run down the names and positions of all these people.

Mr. HAMILTON. We will take them as part of the record.

[The following was submitted for the record:]

EMBASSY CONTACTS CONCERNING KIDNAP VICTIMS

In accordance with the committee's request, the following are the contacts made by the Embassy in an attempt to locate Ambassador Meloy, Counselor Waring and Chauffeur Moghrabi:

1. Karim Pakradouni of the Phalange Politburo.
2. Colonel Nassif, Military Aide to President-elect Sarkis.

3. Colonel M. Sardouk, Former Lebanese Army Air Defense Commander.
4. Raymond Edde, Christian leader with access to the Palestinians.
5. Ambassador Argod, French Ambassador.

Mr. DAY. Basically we checked at Sarkis' end to see if he had arrived and then we checked with the security people and the Christian people to see if he had crossed at any of the crossings.

TO CALL AGAIN

Mr. HAMILTON. Let me go back to page 8 of your statement. At the bottom of the page you report that the Embassy received this radio transmission from the chauffeur and he said, "We are here and we are OK," and he also said, "We will call back in 10 minutes." Now this is shortly before 11 o'clock. He did not call back in 10 minutes, I presume. Now, does that cause you any alarm?

Mr. TELFORD. Sir, I did not know about the 10-minute portion of it until the following day when he called on the radio.

Mr. HAMILTON. Who did know that, the Marine?

Mr. TELFORD. The other Marine guard, yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. Did it not disturb him that there was no callback in 10 minutes?

Mr. TELFORD. It didn't significantly disturb him, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. He did not report that to you?

Mr. TELFORD. No, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. There was no callback at that point.

Mr. TELFORD. No, sir, he changed. He was relieved shortly thereafter when another Marine came on.

MAKING CONTACTS

Mr. HAMILTON. When you did become suspicious and then you made contacts, did you begin to go out in the car in the city to look for the Ambassador?

Mr. TELFORD. There was no way for me to go down the Corniche Mazraa itself to look for the Ambassador himself.

Mr. HAMILTON. Why was there no way for you to do that?

Mr. TELFORD. The only way I could have gone is with the Lebanese Arab Army, and the tension we had in the group and the Lebanese Arab Army—although an element of control existed by the Palestinians, the rejection front, every time they see them they open fire upon them.

Mr. DAY. You had a situation here 2 hours after they disappeared and what you needed to do was get in touch with people who had contacts throughout the city rather than trying to make contact yourself—they clearly would not be any longer on the main street.

Mr. HAMILTON. So the only thing you could do is make telephone calls?

Mr. TELFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. You didn't learn anything from those telephone calls?

Mr. TELFORD. Not really, sir.

Mr. DAY. I might say, sir, at the same time the Embassy had informed the State Department and we had gone by the most rapid communications we could muster to other governments who had contacts also with the city, so that we were working from both directions within an hour, I would say.

MOSLEM BODYGUARDS

Mr. HAMILTON. The three Moslem bodyguards that were in the followup car were questioned by you immediately when you became suspicious of the problems.

Mr. TELFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. Are these three bodyguards still working for the American Embassy?

Mr. TELFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. And you have no reason to suspect their involvement in this matter?

Mr. TELFORD. No reason, sir.

Mr. DAY. These were people, I might say, who were not simply hired off the street. They were people with whom our people had had contacts in their previous capacities as security officers and they were well known to be responsible.

RADIO CALL 57

Mr. HAMILTON. In your procedures with Mr. Waring and with the Ambassador, would you not have provided that once they reached Sarkis that they were to call you? Was that the radio call you got, 57?

Mr. TELFORD. Yes, sir, call 57.

Mr. HAMILTON. And you understood that to mean that he was at Sarkis' residence?

Mr. TELFORD. Yes, sir.

THE ASSASSINS

Mr. HAMILTON. Now what do we know about the assassins, if anything?

Mr. DAY. We don't "know" anything. I would say we have no reliable information about them at all. The next day the Palestinian news agency announced that the PLO had picked up three people whom they considered to be responsible. Then on subsequent days up through the 5th of July there were various other public announcements about people having been picked up. The number of 5 people was mentioned on one occasion but there was never any real attempt to define and describe who they were.

Mr. HAMILTON. Are they Lebanese or Palestinians?

Mr. DAY. Well, the initial impression we had—it was only an impression—was that they were Lebanese. Lebanese leftists.

A SIMILAR PICTURE

Mr. HAMILTON. Were they identified with any particular group?

Mr. DAY. There was some talk—and I put this in a very vague way because there was nothing explicit or clear—they were described as

having come from an organization that had the title "Socialist Revolutionary Organization." It sounded to us at the time that it was very similar in fact to the picture and pattern that we got after the two kidnappings that we had last year. The same name or a name very similar was mentioned in each case.

Mr. HAMILTON. Which kidnapping?

Mr. DAY. Morgan and Gallagher.

There was also mentioned the possibility that these people, the Lebanese, might have been connected with one of the rejectionist Palestinians. Again there was a similar pattern to the kidnapping experience but I would not in any way characterize it as—

Mr. HAMILTON. You said your initial impression was that they were Lebanese. Is that still your impression?

Mr. DAY. We don't have any other information.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you have any reason to think they were acting alone or acting in concert with someone else?

Mr. DAY. It is all conjecture, sir. If we go back and take the pattern, which apparently did occur during the Morgan kidnapping, you had an organization which picked up someone on the street and then traded him off to a larger organization that had an interest in him, but it apparently did not do so under the instructions of the larger organization. That is the kind of thing that happens there.

ARRESTS MADE

Mr. HAMILTON. How many men were arrested?

Mr. DAY. The first indication we had was that there were three and then a later indication that there were five—they are all public announcements.

Mr. HAMILTON. Arrested by whom?

Mr. DAY. By the PLO.

Mr. HAMILTON. These were public announcements by the PLO?

Mr. DAY. By the PLO. They at one point announced they would be prepared to turn them over to the Arab League force which at that time was beginning to be formed, but since July 5 there has been nothing made public at all.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you have any knowledge of where these assassins or kidnappers may be today?

Mr. DAY. I do not. I might say, simply, as explanation for the fact that this has dropped out of the picture, that shortly after this occurred the Christian attack on the Palestinian camp of Telzatar took place and you have a situation of intense bitter conflict in the city since then.

ACHIEVING JUSTICE

Mr. HAMILTON. What are we doing today with regard to trying to identify and bring to justice the kidnappers?

Mr. DAY. Well, all I can say, sir, in an open session, is that immediately after learning that these men had been killed we went to governments with whom we had good relations and who we knew had influence in Beirut and the circles we considered knowledgeable, if not responsible, and asked for their help in bringing these people to justice.

Mr. HAMILTON. Have you had any cooperation?

Mr. DAY. We have had full cooperation from the governments to the best of our knowledge but we have had no results.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you have any reason to believe these men are incarcerated today or under the control of another group?

Mr. DAY. We have heard nothing about them one way or the other since early July, and that is almost 3 weeks, when we had the public statements that I mentioned to you.

CONTACTS WITH THE PLO

Mr. HAMILTON. Now we have taken the position that we will not deal with the PLO and not talk with the PLO on Middle East questions generally. I take it we made an exception in this instance to that general policy and that we have been in touch with the PLO representatives about security matters on the evacuation of Americans and with regard to this assassination.

Mr. DAY. No; not with regard to the assassination.

Mr. HAMILTON. Only with regard to the two evacuations that have occurred?

Mr. DAY. Only with the second evacuation. On the first evacuation the only contact that we had with the Palestinians was casual and ad hoc contact at the time of the embarkation in connection with the evacuation. We had that.

THIRD PARTY CONTACTS

Mr. HAMILTON. Among the contacts that were made after you became suspicious that the Ambassador had encountered difficulty, did you contact the PLO?

Mr. DAY. No, sir, but of course we had close friends and contacts who had instant access to the PLO.

Mr. HAMILTON. So, indirectly, a contact was made with the PLO through third parties?

Mr. DAY. It was direct contact that we are talking about, however.

Mr. HAMILTON. I understand.

Mr. DAY. We have every reason to believe that the people we talked to talked to the PLO.

Mr. HAMILTON. The PLO spokesman after the murder is quoted as saying, "I don't know if we could have saved him if we had known earlier, but it is possible." Are you familiar with that quotation and how do you react to it?

Mr. DAY. We attempted to calculate, because it became a matter of interest in the press as well as to ourselves, about when the PLO were likely to have learned about what we were doing. The first point, of course, is that we, ourselves, didn't know during the period in which anyone could probably have done something. I think—and, Sid, tell me if I am wrong on this because I know you have been closer to it—we would estimate that the PLO probably would have known through the contacts we were making within an hour or an hour and a half after we first talked to our first contact after learning that some-

thing had happened. Anything is possible. It is conceivable that they could have been in touch. There is simply no way to judge. It is pure conjecture.

Mr. TELFORD. I think after our initial contact it could have been less.

Mr. DAY. Maybe less.

MINIMAL PLO CONTACTS

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Day, why don't we talk with the PLO about this assassination?

Mr. DAY. Our principal reason is the same as the reason that we have not talked with the PLO in general.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, we violated that or we made an exception to that rule with regard to the evacuation of Americans. Why don't we make an exception to this rule with finding out about the assassination?

Mr. DAY. Well, one overall point, we want to keep our contacts with the Palestinians to an absolute minimum. That is just the general rule. I think you understand the reasons that we have that rule.

A COMPELLING SITUATION

Mr. HAMILTON. This is a pretty compelling situation.

Mr. DAY. If we are dealing with the security and the safety of people in a dangerous situation, I think you can make a case that that is more compelling than attempting to followup the murder of people who have been killed, for a number of reasons. For one thing, the urgency is great because you are in a moving situation.

Mr. HAMILTON. I don't have any problem with that. I agree with you on that, but I think also that this is a compelling situation.

Mr. DAY. Well, I agree it is a compelling situation.

Mr. HAMILTON. Who is objecting to it?

Mr. DAY. Pardon?

Mr. HAMILTON. Who is objecting to contacting the PLO with regard to the assassination?

Mr. DAY. Well, no one to my knowledge.

Mr. HAMILTON. Why don't we go ahead and do it?

Mr. DAY. No one has objected to our doing it specifically for that purpose; however, the subject of contact with the Palestinians at all, with the PLO at all, obviously does have objections.

Mr. HAMILTON. I recognize that but, you know, I just don't see any reason why in this instance you cannot do it. There are possible benefits to be gained.

EFFORTS PROCEEDING

Mr. DAY. However, sir, since it is not a matter of urgency in point of time we have felt that by going to the PLO through friends of ours, who have a lot more clout in the PLO than we do, time not being such a factor, we could achieve the results we were seeking.

Mr. HAMILTON. So those efforts are proceeding?

Mr. DAY. Yes, those efforts are proceeding.

Mr. HAMILTON. If they fail, will we contact the PLO directly?

Mr. DAY. I don't know, sir.

AMBASSADOR SEELYE

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, Ambassador Seelye was evacuated, was he not?

Mr. DAY. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. And he is to return to Washington for consultations?

Mr. DAY. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. And he is going to return to Beirut?

Mr. DAY. I don't think it has been fully decided what will be done.

U.S. EMBASSY

Mr. HAMILTON. How many Americans now remain at the Embassy in Beirut?

Mr. DAY. Fifteen.

Mr. HAMILTON. How many of those are Foreign Service officers? Do you know?

Mr. DAY. I don't know. I can look at our list.

Mr. HAMILTON. Let me ask, Mr. Day, to take care of this question and others, too, that you supply for the committee record a list of the number of Americans in the U.S. Embassy in Beirut this year and the time and the number of reductions made.

Mr. DAY. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. Let's take it back a full year. Can you do it for us in that time period? I presume you would include a list of the Americans who are now present at the Embassy and what their titles are.¹
[Classified material retained in committee files.]

Mr. DAY. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. You are under the impression that no determination has been made whether or not Ambassador Seelye will return?

Mr. DAY. I think it is unlikely if you consider that he just came out. I don't want to make that as a categorical statement.

Mr. HAMILTON. I do have some further questions of a more general nature relating to our general policy in dealing with terrorists that I would like to submit to you for written response. I don't think I will go into them with you orally.

Mr. DAY. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. I would appreciate a response to those questions at an early date.

Mr. DAY. Fine.

Mr. HAMILTON. We appreciate your testimony today.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned.]

¹ See appendix p. 39.

APPENDIX 1

BIOGRAPHIES OF WITNESSES

ARTHUR R. DAY

Mr. Arthur R. Day was born in New Jersey, on July 13, 1923.

He served during World War II as a pilot in the Naval Air Corps, and subsequent to the War received an MA from the University of Chicago.

He joined the State Department in August, 1949, and entered the Foreign Service in November, 1950. His early posts included assignment as Political Officer in Bremen, Germany, and as Economic Officer in Santiago, Chile, as well as an assignment in the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. Subsequently he served on the Berlin Task Force, and in the U.S. Mission, Berlin, as Chief of the Political Section and as Deputy to the Minister.

He attended the National War College in 1966-67. Thereafter he served in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs and in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency before going to Jerusalem as Consul General in 1972.

He returned to the Department in June, 1975, to serve as Country Director for Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, and on December 1, 1975, was appointed to the post of Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

VICTOR H. DIKEOS

Mr. Victor H. Dikeos, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security, was born in North Dakota in 1923 and holds a Bachelor's degree from Montana State University. He served as an officer in the U.S. Navy during the Second World War and with the CSC before joining the Department of State in 1954. Mr. Dikeos has served in Hong Kong, Manila, Warsaw, Beirut, Mexico City and the Department in a variety of security and executive positions.

Mr. Dikeos and his wife, the former JoAnn Gilmore, have two sons Mark and Gary.

SIDNEY T. TELFORD

Mr. Telford was born in Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1938 and received his education at public schools in Vermont and New York and at Norwich University in Vermont. His work experience prior to joining the State Department in 1963 included four years in the USMC.

Mr. Telford's overseas assignments with the Department have included tours in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, where he served as the Regional Security Officer for several West African embassies; Phnom Penh, Cambodia, where Mr. Telford supervised the evacuation of the Embassy in April 1975 and Beirut. Mr. Telford spent 1969 and 1970 on leave from the Department with the Marine Corps in Vietnam.

Mr. Telford is married to Mary Harriss Symmes.

APPENDIX 2

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN HAMILTON AND SUBSEQUENT REPLIES SUBMITTED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT

JULY 28, 1976.

Mr. ARTHUR R. DAY,
*Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
Department of State, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. DAY: We appreciate very much your testimony before the Subcommittee yesterday.

I enclose a series of questions which we would like answered for the record of the hearing.

With best regards,
Sincerely yours,

LEE H. HAMILTON,
Chairman, Special Subcommittee on Investigations.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., October 4, 1976.

HON. LEE H. HAMILTON,
Chairman, Special Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am enclosing answers to the questions you posed in your letter of July 28 to Deputy Assistant Secretary Arthur R. Day.

During Mr. Day's testimony before the Subcommittee on July 27, you asked him to provide staffing levels for American employees in our Embassy in Beirut over the last year. You will find this information, presented in tabular form, in the body of the response to the second question of the enclosure.

Mr. Day was also requested during the hearing to name the people our Embassy in Beirut contacted immediately following the abduction of Ambassador Meloy and his companions on June 16. This information is available and the Department will be happy to brief you orally on it, or provide it on a classified basis. As I am sure you will understand, many of the people through whom we work in such a matter would prefer not to be named publicly. You may be sure that contracts were made immediately with a wide range of influential Lebanese who, experience has demonstrated, might have been in a position to be of assistance had the murders not been carried out so quickly.

I hope you will find this information useful in completing the Subcommittee's record.

Sincerely,

KEMPTON B. JENKINS,
*Acting Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations.*

Enclosure.

ANSWERS TO SUBCOMMITTEE'S QUESTIONS

Question 1. In a situation like the one in Beirut, we seem to have to weigh constantly the need for and benefit to the United States in keeping its representatives there to carry on essential diplomatic business against the security risks involved. Is it your impression that prior to the assassinations, those risks could have been minimized, but that now the scale is tipped the other way and the risks have escalated significantly?

Answer. The security situation in Beirut is, in many ways, a most uncommon one. It has been the object over the months of constant review both in the Embassy and in the Department. Prior to the assassinations, Ambassador Meloy was actively engaged in an examination of measures for dealing with that evolving situation, which might have included, *inter alia*, another sharp staff reduction, an augmentation of American Security personnel, the hiring of addi-

tional Lebanese personnel for special security needs, improved communications systems, additional armored cars as well as upgraded armoring for some existing vehicles. Against this backdrop, security procedures were under constant scrutiny, as they are today, to adjust to the changing situation on the ground, including realignments and shifts of forces in the city, relocation of personnel residing outside the Chancery, and perceptions of likely threats (e.g., shelling versus kidnapping). We had thoroughly briefed Ambassador Meloy on resources that might be made available to him and to the Embassy prior to his departure for Beirut in May, 1976.

We do not wish to understate the continuing personal security risks to our residual staff in Beirut today; they remain significant. This judgment is subject to daily re-evaluation and we would certainly be prepared to respond immediately to any increase of those risks to an unacceptable level. At present, we regard the risks as being manageable. Our staff in Beirut is very lean and both their working and living arrangements have been adjusted to reduce further their exposure. They engage in only the most essential travel and then only if the margin of risk is considered acceptable. The Committee will have noted, for example, that rather than have Embassy staff members make the hazardous trip to the Christian-held areas for direct contacts, the Department sent officers from Washington by commercial sea transport from Cyprus to maintain contact with the Christian leadership.

Since the beginning of 1976 the Palestine Liberation Organization has exercised much of what passes for security control in West Beirut. This control became even more evident after March, when Lebanese army and police forces in the West Beirut area virtually disintegrated overnight, with some members forming a so-called Lebanese Arab Army led by a Lt. Khatib. This latter organization took charge of the area in the immediate vicinity of our Embassy, but cooperated closely with Fatah and the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command elements which are part of the PLO. Some other foreign Embassies meanwhile explored informally with the PLO prospects of having security protection by the PLO for their properties and personnel. The British Embassy, for example, entered into direct contacts with the PLO authorities in order to secure protection and escort services for the evacuation by road to Damascus which they planned for June, in which our Embassy had planned to participate.

Our broader policy of not recognizing the PLO and not having direct contacts with that organization led us to work through intermediaries, including certain Arab Embassies, in order to assure PLO cooperation for the sea evacuation which we conducted on June 20. We were successful in obtaining PLO cooperation in this way.

The combination of the assassination of Ambassador Meloy and Robert Waring and this sea evacuation led us, however, to reexamine the question of seeking protection and escort services directly from the PLO. We decided that we should not leave our people in Beirut exposed to the increased dangers without being able to contact the PLO directly. At the end of June, therefore, we authorized the security officer in our Embassy to seek cooperative arrangements directly from the PLO for assuring the safety of our personnel on travels in particularly dangerous parts of West Beirut. The PLO responded affirmatively to our proposal and, since then, has provided escort and protection services for personnel moving about the city on official calls, in preserving the security of our July evacuation by sea, and in protecting our personnel that are required to travel overland into and out of Lebanon.

Question 2. How do you answer the charge that we kept too many people in the Beirut Embassy too long, and that, when we scaled down our presence earlier this year, we did not go far enough?

Answer. Questions of this kind are always subject to differing judgments, but the tabular presentation below demonstrates the manner in which the staff of our Embassy in Beirut has been reduced in response to the security situation in that city and the functions which our mission there was charged with providing:

USG PERSONNEL IN LEBANON

July 1975: 475¹, official personnel and dependents; reduced to 175, official personnel.

November 1975: 91, official personnel.

April 1976: 54, official personnel.

May 1976: 43, official personnel.

June 1976: 27, official personnel.

September 1976: 17, official personnel.

¹ Not confirmed.

At each stage in this phased reduction, conscious decisions were made as to the number of persons who should be transferred and the number who should remain to perform the remaining functions of the mission. Embassy Beirut had been a large post, performing many regional functions and seeing to the needs of a large American private community. Even after we began to move out the regional staffs, the political and consular roles continued for some time to require a considerable number of people.

Judgments on staffing at each stage were affected not only by assessments of the state and likely duration of the crisis, but by the size of the residual American community even after repeated Embassy warnings that those with non-essential business in Lebanon should leave the country. A number of consular officers were retained on the staff until the evacuation of July 27 when, following a public announcement, the consular section was closed. These officers were necessary to provide services to the still sizeable American community, including documentation and other functions when the final evacuation was ordered. A decision to maintain a given number of substantive officers affects the number of supporting staff, such as communications personnel, security personnel and administrative personnel, that should likewise be retained. In the prevailing circumstances an unusual number of security personnel was necessary, particularly so long as an Ambassador was in residence. Out of the current staff of 17 in our Embassy, there are only 5 substantive officers.

Question 3. What steps are being taken now to improve security measures for American diplomats in Beirut?

Of the Americans now remaining in the Embassy, how many work and live in the Embassy itself?

Has the security section of the Embassy been beefed up?

How many security officers are stationed there now?

How many Marines are stationed in Beirut now?

Answer. Immediately following the assassinations in June, the Embassy and the Department's Office of Security conducted a further thorough review of the Embassy's security procedures and environment. This review, which is updated continuously on the basis of Embassy and other intelligence reports, resulted in:

- (a) Increased physical security equipment being supplied to the Embassy;
- (b) Improved communications capabilities and provided an additional backup system;
- (c) Reviewed the entire Embassy internal defense plan with an eye toward further improvement and adjustment to the needs of the reduced staff;
- (d) Increased personal protection for the Chief of Mission and other Embassy officers travelling in Beirut, particularly through our direct security contact with the PLO; and
- (e) Limited travel outside the Embassy.

The entire American staff of the Embassy now live and work in the Chancery and will continue to do so until the local security situation improves appreciably and remains stable over a reasonable period of time.

Until the reduction of staff ordered by the Department in January 1976, the security complement of the Embassy consisted of two career security officers, two technical support personnel, a Regional Security Supervisor and a Regional Marine Officer. The Marine Security Guard (MSG) complement included thirteen Marines. At present, the Embassy has one professional security officer and an MSG unit of five. This staffing is considered adequate for present conditions in view of the fact that we have no Ambassador at the post, and because of a corresponding reduction in the post's general profile and the curtailment of all but absolutely essential travel in the city.

Question 4. Will there be a "Special Task Force" appointed to investigate the Beirut murders, such as the one formed to investigate the Khartoum assassinations of Ambassador Cleo Noel and Chargé d'Affaires Curt Moore?

Answer. The circumstances surrounding the murders of Ambassador Meloy and Mr. Waring are being investigated by the Department of State's Office of Security in cooperation with the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. No "special task force" has been established, nor do we believe one to be necessary.

Question 5. Are the eight Palestinians charged with killing Noel and Moore still under "house arrest" in Egypt?

Answer. The eight Palestinian terrorists who murdered Ambassador Noel and Mr. Moore remain under detention at a police facility in Cairo. They are not under simple "house arrest."

Question 6. Following the incident at the Munich Olympic Games in September 1972, President Nixon formed a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism.

Does this Committee still exist?

What have its major activities and accomplishments been?

How often has it met in the last year?

How often has its Working Group met this year?

Has the Group met since the Meloy/Waring assassinations?

Answer. The Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism is still in existence; its major accomplishment to date has been to provide the impetus and framework for coordinating the U.S. Government's program to bring terrorism under control both at home and abroad. While the Cabinet Committee itself did not meet during the past year, its working body—the so-called Working Group—met regularly to discuss such matters as the strategy to be followed at the United Nations to stimulate new international initiatives to fight terrorism, improving international agreements and legislation to cope with international terrorism, ways to bolster security at airports both in the United States and overseas, etc.

The Working Group consists of representatives of more than 20 government agencies, including State, CIA, DOT, FBI and Justice; it meets on a bi-weekly basis at the Department of State to develop, implement and subsequently evaluate U.S. efforts in the anti-terrorism field. It has met more than six times since the Meloy-Waring murders; these meetings, however, have not been held specifically to discuss the murders in Lebanon, but rather to carry out the broader responsibilities given to the Working Group as noted above.

Question 7. Has a re-evaluation been made, following the Meloy-Waring assassinations, of the State Department's stated policy of "no negotiations" with or "no concessions" to terrorists?

Answer. No. We continue to believe that our policy is the correct one and do not intend to change it. Further, it should be noted that the murders of Ambassador Meloy and Mr. Waring made no demands for negotiations or for concessions of any kind before or after the murders.

Question 8. What is the policy of the United States towards those countries that refuse to prosecute terrorists and harbor them?

Why doesn't the United States use diplomatic recognition, economic aid, and military assistance as leverage against countries which engage in such activities?

Can you name any instance where such leverage was used?

Why are we not as inflexible in our policy towards them as we are towards the terrorists?

Answer. The United States is firmly opposed to the granting of asylum to persons who resort to the use of terrorist tactics no matter how laudable their stated goals may be. We do not feel that any ends can justify the utilization of such horrible means. We have, therefore, stressed the principle that terrorists should either be prosecuted for their crimes in accordance with local law or extradited to a place where they will be duly prosecuted. This principle was contained in the draft convention on terrorism which we introduced at the UNGA in 1972, but which failed to gain the support of a significant number of members. We intend to support a West German initiative at the UNGA this month which aims to draft a convention for the protection of hostages and which also calls on countries either to "prosecute or extradite" terrorists. We are hopeful that, in the aftermath of the OPEC, Entebbe and Egyptian incidents during the last year, the atmosphere at the UN will be more conducive to the acceptance of an initiative in this important area.

The United States has used its diplomatic and economic leverage against countries which support terrorist activities. One obvious instance in which we applied such leverage was after the Khartoum murders; when the terrorists were released by the Sudanese Government to Egyptian authorities, the American Ambassador in Khartoum was recalled to Washington and all U.S. assistance programs were suspended. Many months passed before the Ambassador returned to his post and it was only recently, after the GOS had helped to effect the safe release of several American citizens being held hostage by Eritrean independence groups, that a decision was made to resume normal relations with the Sudan.

Our policy, which strongly condemns nations which harbor terrorists, has been publicly stated on numerous occasions. It must be noted, however, that most nations which are willing to harbor terrorists do not receive assistance from the U.S. and, in some instances, do not even have diplomatic relations with us. In such situations, our ability to exercise direct leverage over such governments is thus minimal.

Question 9. Brian Jenkins, of the RAND Corporation, in a report to the State Department, has seriously questioned the efficacy of the no-negotiation position of the State Department, and has concluded that what really deters terrorism is not stated policy, but hard-line, determined action after the particular incident to see that the culprits are captured and punished.

What is your view of this contention?

Have this and other recommendations of this report had an effect on U.S. policy towards dealing with terrorists?

Why is the report he submitted to the State Department still classified?

Answer. The Jenkins study has yet to be published by the RAND Corporation, but we have had an opportunity to read a draft of the report and to discuss it on several occasions with Mr. Jenkins. We do not agree with Mr. Jenkins on the question of adopting a more flexible attitude towards making concessions to terrorists; we are convinced that to abandon our no-concession policy would constitute an invitation to increased terrorist action against American targets. We are unwilling to take that risk, especially when lives are involved. Moreover, while it is clearly difficult to cite specific instances in which this policy has deterred terrorists attacks on Americans, we do know that the major terrorist groups are fully aware of our no-concessions policy. We, of course, agree wholeheartedly with Mr. Jenkins that determined action to bring terrorists to justice after they have perpetrated an incident is also a major deterrent to the commission of future acts.

As to the RAND report itself, the question of declassifying it will not be addressed until it has been completed and formally submitted to the Department of State. In the meantime, a number of recommendations included in the report have already been incorporated into our anti-terrorism policies as a result of discussions with Mr. Jenkins.

Question 10. Have we advised other countries that have been the target of terrorist activities to adopt similar hard-line attitudes?

Have steps been taken to adopt a multilateral policy towards dealing with such terrorist activities against diplomats?

Why did the United States back away from the proposal to submit a resolution to the UN Security Council following the Meloy-Waring Assassinations?

Answer. The United States Government has made other governments fully aware of our no-concessions policy and the rationale behind it. We have also urged the merits of this policy on other governments. With regard to terrorist acts directed at diplomats, the U.S. has been in the forefront of the drive to achieve wide international adherence to the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents. We have submitted legislation to the Congress to implement the Convention and thus pave the way for its ratification. As for the Meloy-Waring assassination, no consideration that we are aware of was given to submitting a resolution to the UN Security Council in the aftermath of that incident.

Question 11. According to the Washington Post of July 18, the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) has suggested some reforms of security procedures for American diplomats abroad. They include an increase in protection of low-level and middle-level officers; reductions of staffs in high-risk areas to a minimum; and greater use of American military personnel (instead of local police) to provide protection.

What do you think of these proposals?

Are they being taken into consideration in the formulation of security procedures for State Department personnel in dangerous areas?

Answer. AFSA has indeed suggested reforms in the Department's security programs for the protection of American diplomats abroad as reported by the Washington Post of July 18th. The Department shares AFSA's concern for the safety of all American diplomats overseas and has continuously attempted to balance the risk to its personnel against the requirements for diplomatic representation

in high-risk areas. The expenditure of some \$100 million from supplemental Congressional appropriations for security improvements overseas since FY-74 has emphasized establishing an umbrella of protection for all personnel at our Missions abroad with increased protection for "high profile" targets, i.e., Chiefs of Mission, their dependents, Military Attachés, and other officials of high visibility in foreign communities. This additional increment of protection for senior officials, however, has not decreased the level or quality of protection for employees of lesser rank. The Department believes that its security resources have been applied equitably and prudently and that all employees have benefitted from the security improvements implemented. The Department uses American military personnel, specifically U.S. Marines, to the maximum extent possible consistent with international law, to provide protection to Missions and American diplomatic personnel overseas. There are very real limitations, however, to the scope of security responsibilities that can be assigned to American military personnel due to traditional diplomatic practices and the Department's support of the provisions of the Vienna Convention, which hold the host country responsible for the protection of diplomats.

The reduction of staffs in high-risk areas is always a consideration in making an evaluation of security requirements for threatened posts. The Department consults with AFSA regularly on a broad range of questions of interest to employees and will continue to consult with its leadership concerning security protection for U.S. employees serving abroad.

Question 12. What is State Department policy as to who is responsible for the protection of U.S. diplomats abroad?

Is it the United States, or the host government?

Answer. It is a fundamental principle of international law that the host government bears the responsibility for the protection of diplomats as well as other foreign citizens within its borders. Under this principle, we look primarily to the host government for measures aimed at guaranteeing the safety of our diplomats and citizens and for achieving their safe release in the event of a hostage situation. At the same time, the USG takes every step feasible in a foreign jurisdiction to protect its diplomats and citizens. Our efforts to enhance security at U.S. Missions abroad are an example of such steps.

Question 13. Ambassador Armin Meyer, in testimony in 1973, testified that State was considering increasing its civilian security personnel abroad, following the events in Khartoum.

To what extent has this been done?

Were supplementary security officers added to the Beirut Embassy Staff when the civil war worsened in early 1975?

Answer. Since the Khartoum incident in March 1973, the Department has intensified its security efforts, making a broad range of improvements throughout the world. As a result of the FY-74 supplemental appropriation to combat terrorism, the Department has increased overseas strength by fifty-five civilian security officer positions. In addition, the Department has analyzed the requirements of each of its overseas posts for improvements in the physical posture of both the offices and residences of its employees. The Department believes that its substantial efforts in this area have been effective. However, projections of increased targetting of American officials and installations overseas by terrorists in the future have led the Department to request additional positions and funding for still further improvements in our overseas security posture.

In the case of Beirut, it should be recalled that, at the outset of the civil strife in Lebanon and until January 1976, the Embassy included a larger than normal security complement because of its regional responsibilities. As noted elsewhere, a proportional reduction in security-related personnel, particularly those with regional responsibilities, has accompanied the phased reduction of the overall Embassy staff. Under the present staffing pattern at the Embassy, one-third of the remaining personnel have full-time security functions and that percentage has been the average ratio since January. We believe that this proportion is as high as one could reasonably establish in a functioning diplomatic post and is adequate under current circumstances. Substantial additions of security personnel would greatly increase the profile of the mission without significantly enhancing its security.